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ABSTRACT 
This study is motivated by the numerous reforms to strengthen the efficacy of corporate 
boards and their oversight committees, in the wake of high profile corporate failures. The 
empirical question, however, is whether recent proposals would enhance board and their 
committee effectiveness and in this way, reduce the likelihood of firm‘s failure. This study 
examines whether the composition, structure and functions of corporate boards and their 
interactions are related to the probability of corporate failure. Prior studies employ agency 
and resource dependency theories in isolation as theoretical lenses. This study, however, 
employs these aforementioned theories as theoretical lenses and argues that the board control 
and resource function affects the relationship between corporate board attributes and 
corporate failure.   
 
This study examines a sample of 358 UK listed firms, consisting of 95 failed firms and 263 
non-failed firms during the period 1999-2011. This study also uses a unique hand-collected 
data set that measures the corporate governance attributes and functions of these 358 firms 
over a period of five years preceding failure or otherwise, resulting in 1748 firm-years 
observations.  
 
This study reveals that the probability of failure is lower in firms with large board size, 
former government officials, independent remuneration committee chairman and greater 
proportion of outside directors as well as effective audit and remuneration committees. This 
study also finds that the prospect of corporate failure is higher in firms with less than three 
independent NEDs on both the audit and nomination committees, without audit committee 
and where audit committee has no one with financial expertise. The results, however, suggest 
that the possibility of corporate failure is higher in firms whose boards have a female director 
and where the nomination committee meets often or where its membership is exclusively 
preserved for independent NEDs.  
 
On the interaction effects, the results show that frequency of board meetings as well as its 
interactions with presence of female directors, audit and remuneration committees 
14 
 
 
effectiveness are positively related to the probability of corporate failure. The results also 
indicate that a number of interactions between corporate board attributes and functions are 
unrelated to the likelihood of corporate failure. These include the interactions between 
board composition measures (i.e. proportion of outside directors, presence of female directors 
and board size) and the board resource proxy (i.e. former government official). These 
associations, especially remuneration committee effectiveness, remuneration committee 
chairman independence, firm size and profitability, are not only statistically and 
economically significant but also robust to different specifications. Further, the Receiver 
Operating Curves indicate that the impact of corporate governance measures after controlling 
for firm size, liquidity, profitability, age, industry effects, and leverage is more profound in 
two years preceding failure. The implication of this is that corporate governance mechanisms 
alone are insufficient to rescue the firm on the verge of collapse.  
 
The findings are consistent with the idea that failing firms decline in size, managerial 
performance, corporate board attributes as well as their board‘s ability to discharge it‘s 
monitoring and resource roles. This study adds to the debate on the impact of corporate 
governance on corporate failure by developing, analysing and testing a robust UK corporate 
failure prediction model which is underpinned by a multi-theoretical framework: agency and 
resource dependency theories. This study also offers several recommendations for policy 
makers and firm-level corporate governance strategies in the mix of the numerous corporate 
governance reforms worldwide, this in particular makes this study unique.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH CONTEXT 
 
1.0 OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER 
 This chapter provides an overview of the study. In particular, the drivers, objectives, overall 
approach and significance of the research are addressed accordingly in the relevant sections. 
Among others, the present chapter sets the scene for the review of the relevant prior literature 
in the subsequent chapter. The chapter concludes with the structure of the thesis in section 
1.5.   
 
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
Investors and debt holders, due to the presumed loss of their investment in assets, incur 
significant costs when a firm fails. Evidence suggests that direct costs of corporate failure, 
for these stakeholders, ranges between 3.1% and 5.3% of firm‘s value (Warner, 1977; Weiss, 
1990). Altman‘s (1984) findings suggest that indirect costs are more profound (17.5%).  
 
Similarly, the Andersen-Enron debacle suggests that auditors face potential law suit, which 
may result in its failure, if their opinion is inappropriate on client‘s going concern (see 
Charitou, Neophytou and Charalambous, 2004). In sum, the recent high profile financial 
scandals and failures did not only produce significant losses to stakeholders but also partly 
accounted for the recent financial crisis. In this regard, there is a near consensus in the 
literature suggesting that a robust corporate failure prediction model is inevitable, if 
stakeholders seek to moderate the substantial losses associated with the corporate failure 
syndrome. It is argued, however, that the role of corporate governance in these unprecedented 
failures has kept corporate governance and corporate failure in the public eye. Platt and Platt 
(2012) observe that maintaining a firm‘s survival is the most critical responsibility of boards. 
They also contend that the importance of this board mandate is clear in the post 2007-08 
financial crisis and in high profile failures worldwide.  
 
Consequently, the press, investors‘ community and politicians worldwide are calling for 
corporate governance reforms (Clarke, Ferris, Jayaraman and Lee, 2006; Zaman, Hudaib and 
Haniffa, 2011) to strengthen the effectiveness of boards and its committees, and in this 
16 
 
 
manner, reduce the likelihood of firm‘s failure. For this reason, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act 
(2002) outlines fundamental corporate governance obligations to enhance firm‘s survival by 
mitigating the principal-agent conflicts (Zhang, 2007). Cadbury (1992) proposes guidance to 
address financial aspects of the UK‘s corporate governance, in response to the collapse of 
Maxwell Communications. Greenbury (1995) focuses on allocation of responsibility for 
determining executives‘ compensation, suggesting that proper accountability is inevitable to 
prevent the clamour over executives‘ remuneration that characterised ‗The British Gas Case‘. 
In response to the collapse of Barings Bank, Hampel (1998) approves Cadbury and 
Greenbury, emphasizing that ‗Box ticking‘ is not the answer to prevent misapplication of 
shareholder fund and/or enhance firm‘s survival.  
 
Further, the Enron-Andersen fiasco triggers reforms aiming at strengthening the role of non-
executive directors (NEDs), and, in this mode, enhanced board monitoring role to prevent the 
occurrence of the exceptional failures worldwide (Clarke, Ferris, Jayaraman and Lee, 2006). 
In the UK, for example, reformers advocate board diversity (Tyson, 2003), greater proportion 
of NEDs on boards (Higgs, 2003) and audit committees (Smith 2003) as mechanisms 
necessary to enhance board effectiveness and, in turn, promotes legitimacy to access critical 
resources for firm‘s survival (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The nomination, audit, and 
remuneration committees also reduce the likelihood of firm‘s failure by improving the board 
composition (Ruigrok, Peck, Tacheva, Greve and Hu, 2006), accountability (e.g. Turley and 
Zaman, 2007; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009), and the executive remuneration process 
(Ezzamel and Watson, 1998; Cotter and Silvester, 2003), respectively. 
 
Prior literature on corporate failure prediction, however, focuses on financial information 
(e.g. Beaver 1966; Altman 1968; Jones and Hensher, 2004; and Pompe, and Bilderbeek, 
2005) but not corporate governance proxies. As Argenti (1976) observes, the corporate 
failure syndrome becomes financial at the penultimate stage, implying that prior models 
neglect the question of how the firm got into financial distress in the first place (see Zavgren 
1985; Argenti, 1985; Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006).  
 
Another noteworthy feature of the existing literature is the absence of economic theoretical 
underpinning of financial information (Agarwal and Taffler, 2007). Put differently, prior 
17 
 
 
prediction models focus on statistical significance of variables rather than economic 
significance (Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006). This means that existing models‘ predictive 
variables are sample specific (Becchetti and Sierra, 2003) and fundamentally unstable 
(Zavgren, 1985). This in part, explains the counter-intuitive signs of prior models‘ co-
efficient (see Keasey, McGuinness and Short, 1990). In turn, these drawbacks limit existing 
models‘ robustness (Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006; Agarwal and Taffler, 2007), implying that the 
critical question of why firms fail is beyond the scope of the numerous existing statistical and 
financial-based models (Argenti, 1985). 
 
Further, little is known about the effects of the composition and structure of corporate boards 
on the probability of corporate failure, despite the renewed enthusiasm in issues of corporate 
governance and corporate failure (Fich and Slezak, 2008; Platt and Platt, 2012). Notable 
exceptional studies, for example, employ the matched paired technique, resource dependency 
lens and document significant contribution of large board size (e.g. Chaganti, Mahajan and 
Sharma 1985; Gales and Kesner, 1994; Platt and Platt, 2012) and director interlocks (e.g. 
Sheppard, 1994; Platt and Platt, 2012) in enhancing firms‘ survival. Darrat, Gray and Wu‘s 
(2010) study shows that larger boards and greater proportion of inside directors, respectively, 
reduce complex and technically sophisticated firms‘ failure. Fich and Slezak‘s (2008) study 
also underlines that larger and less independent boards with a lower proportion of outside 
directors and larger ownership stakes of non-management shareholders are more likely to 
fail.   
 
Another stream of research employs both agency and resource dependency analytical lenses 
and show the relevance of board leadership structures, after controlling for firm‘s financial 
and size indicators, in reducing the probability of firm‘s failure (Daily and Dalton 1994a). 
Platt and Platt‘s (2012) study extends this line of research and find that failed firms are 
characterised by lower attributes of board composition and characterises (e.g. Firm CEO age, 
average age of directors, number of boards held by CEO). On board committees, they find 
that failed firms exhibit higher gray directors‘ membership in their audit and remuneration 
committees. Platt and Platt‘s (2012) findings suggest that non-failed firms exhibit greater size 
in the audit and remuneration committees. Platt and Platt‘s findings, however, are based on 
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comparison of means of a sample of 90 failed and 213 non-failed US quoted firms between 
the periods, 1998-07.   
 
Overall, prior studies focus on selected features of corporate governance on corporate failure. 
Further, evidence on the effects of corporate governance on corporate failure in the UK is 
distinctively lacking. Specifically, there is no study that mirrors Cadbury (1992) and its 
subsequent amendments in the corporate failure context. In this respect, the findings of prior 
US studies may not be applicable in the UK, due in part to fundamental difference in Chapter 
11 and Insolvency Act (1986), respectively (see Senbet and Wang, 2012).  Prior studies (e.g. 
Daily and Dalton 1994b; 1995; Fich and Slezak 2008) also consider the direct associations 
between board attributes and corporate failure. The significant implication is that previous 
studies neglect a comprehensive analysis of the causal relationships between board‘s 
composition, structure, functions and their interactions on corporate failure. Simply put, a 
multi-theoretical approach that considers the interplay between board attribute and functions 
in the corporate failure context is non-existent. This, in part, contributes to the mixed 
findings, and, in this way, limits our understanding on the effects of corporate governance on 
corporate failure. I turn next to the study‘s motivation.  
 
1.2 MOTIVATION OF THE STUDY 
This study is motivated by schemes to strengthen the effectiveness of corporate boards and 
their committees, in the wake of extraordinary profile corporate failures. For instance, new 
proposals require board audit (e.g. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002; Smith, 2003) and remuneration 
(Greenbury, 1995) committees to be entirely independent of top management. These 
proposals are intended to enhance boards‘ ability to monitor the CEO, reduce the 
predominant CEO-shareholder conflict, thereby reducing the likelihood of failure. 
 
In the UK, the Higgs report (2003) requires that at least half of the board, save the chairman, 
should be independent non-executive directors (NEDs). The assumption of this is that 
outsider-dominated boards, due to their presumed board capital and independence (Hillman 
and Dalziel, 2003), are more likely to be effective board monitors (Johnson, Daily, and 
Ellstrand, 1996) and enhance firm‘s access to crucial resource (Pfeffer, 1972; Pearce and 
Zahra, 1991; Fich, 2005), thereby reducing environmental uncertainties (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
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1978) and the possibility of a firm‘s failure (Baysinger and Hoskisson 1990). Prior evidence 
in the US context, however, predates Higgs Report‘ (2003) recommendations (e.g. Chaganti, 
Mahajan and Sharma, 1985; Daily and Dalton 1994a; Gales and Kesner, 1994), or is not 
persuasive enough (see Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008; 
Darrat, Gray and Wu, 2010; Chancharat, Krishnamurti, Tian, 2012; Platt and Platt, 2012). In 
short, studies on the impact of proportion of outside directors on corporate failure in the UK 
context, to the best of our knowledge are non-existent, despite series of reforms advocating 
for greater proportion of board seats for outside directors. 
 
Recent board reforms in Europe call for female representation in decision making roles 
(Singh and Vinnicombe 2003), implying that board composition is taking a legalistic 
perspective. The UK government, for example, requires FTSE companies to have at least 25 
per cent of female directors by 2015 (see Davies, 2011; Sealy and Vinnicombe, 2012). 
Embedded in board gender diversity reform is that women offer different perspectives to 
enrich the boardroom dynamics, and in this fashion, enhance firm‘s value (e.g. Shrader, 
Blackburn, IIes 1997; Carter, Simkins and Simpson 2003; Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader 
2003). This, in turn, reduces the likelihood of firm‘s failure. Prior studies, however, examine 
the effects of board gender diversity on firm performance but not survival or otherwise (e.g 
Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008; Carter, D'souza, Simkins, and Simpson, 2010). Put 
differently, studies on the impact of board gender diversity on corporate failure, to the best of 
our knowledge are distinctively lacking.  
 
The Code (2003) requires board to be of sufficient and manageable size. Inherent in this 
proposal is that increasing board size is linked to greater diversity, which enhances the 
board‘s ability to secure critical resources and enhance firm‘s survival (Platt and Platt, 2012; 
Darrat, Gray and Wu, 2010; Gales and Kesner, 1994; Chaganti, Mahajan and Sharma, 1985).  
On the contrary, increased board size may inhibit board‘s ability to discharge their 
monitoring and strategic roles (Goodstein, Gautam and Boeker, 1994), due in part to due to 
increased coordination and free-rider issues (Yermack, 1996; Chancharat, Krishnamurti and 
Tian 2012). The important implication of this is that smaller boards are more likely to be 
effective decision makers and CEO monitors (Platt and Platt, 2012), and, in this light, 
enhance the prospects of firm‘s survival. Research, however, predates the Code (2003) 
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recommendations (e.g. Chaganti, Mahajan and Sharma, 1985; Gales and Kesner, 1994), or 
examined US firms (see Darrat, Gray and Wu, 2010; Platt and Platt, 2012). Simply put, 
evidence on the impact of board size on corporate failure in the UK context, to the best of our 
knowledge is non-existent. 
 
Likewise, Cadbury (1992) requires listed firms to establish a proper, rigourous and clear 
system for new board candidates. Cadbury (1992) recommends that majority of membership 
on the nomination committee should be non-executive directors. Higgs (2003) approves 
Cadbury‘s (1992) recommendation of the nomination committee, emphasising on its main 
role and responsibilities. Integral in the nomination committee reforms is that an effective 
nomination committee is linked to greater board independence, which enhances the board‘s 
ability to be effective monitors of the CEO, thereby reducing the agency problem and firm‘s 
failure (Platt and Platt, 2012). Little, however, is known about the effects of nomination 
committee on corporate failure, despite series of nomination committee‘s guidance in the 
Anglo-Saxon literature (see Vafeas, 1999b; Ruigrok, Peck, Tacheva, Greve and Hu, 2006). 
 
Cadbury (1992) also requires listed firms to establish a formal and transparent arrangement 
for considering risk and financial reporting. Smith (2003) validates Cadbury‘s 
recommendations on the board risk and audit committee, emphasising on a more prescriptive 
guidance on its purpose, membership, meetings, remuneration, skills and resources. Implicit 
in this is that the effectiveness of the board is strengthened by the quality and value of the 
audit committee. This means that firms can enhance their survival by strengthening the board 
audit committee (Platt and Platt, 2012). Little, however, is known about the effects of audit 
committee on corporate failure, despite series of audit committee‘s guidance in the Anglo-
Saxon literature (see Zaman, Hudaib and Haniffa, 2011; Pucheta-Martinez and de Fuentes, 
2007). 
 
Similarly, Cadbury (1992) obliges listed firms to establish a formal and transparent 
arrangement for fixing executive remuneration. Greenbury (1995) and Higgs (2003) 
corroborate Cadbury‘s recommendation on the board remuneration committee, emphasising 
on guidance on its status, membership, meetings and resources. Implicit in the remuneration 
committee reforms is that an effective remuneration committee can reduce the predominant 
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agency conflict through quality board monitoring and evaluation of the CEO‘s performance. 
This in turn may enhance the prospects of the firm‘s survival (Platt and Platt, 2012). Little, 
however, is known about the impact of remuneration committee on corporate failure, despite 
the vast amount of remuneration committee‘s guidance in the Anglo-Saxon environment (see 
Conyon, 1997; Conyon and Peck, 1998). 
 
This study attempts to fill the gaps identified above by developing, analysing and testing a 
robust UK corporate failure prediction model which is underpinned by a multi-theoretical 
framework: agency and resource dependency theories. Thus, this study invokes Zahra and 
Pearce‘s (1989) notion that the corporate failure context is one of the opportunities for linking 
the existing corporate governance system theories. However, to date, empirical evidence 
using these theoretical lenses in the corporate performance or failure context are limited (see 
Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Therefore, Scholars (e.g. Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004) are 
calling for more research on the interaction of board attributes and roles on corporate failure. 
This study answers this call by proposing an integrated framework that encapsulates board 
attributes and functions as well as their interaction effects on corporate failure.    
 
On the interaction effects, the study examines whether the interactions between board 
attribute measures and monitoring role (as measured by frequency of board meetings or 
CEO‘s performance evaluation) are associated with corporate failure. In this regard, this 
study contributes to the extant literature on the effects of CEO‘s performance evaluation (e.g. 
Young, Stedham, and Beekon, 2000) and frequency of board meetings (e.g. Vafeas, 1999a) 
on performance, by extending these measures in the corporate failure context. This study also 
examines whether corporate failure is related to the interactions between board composition 
measures and resource role (as measured by board interlock or NEDs interlock or former 
government official). In this respect, this study includes CEO‘s corporate affiliation and 
government experience in the definitions of board interlock and former government official 
measures; this has been ignored in the interlocking literature (Vance, 1983; Rivas 2012).  
 
On the direct effects, this study examines whether the composition and structure of corporate 
boards are related to corporate failure in the UK context, while controlling for financial and 
firm demographic features. Thus, this study invokes Taffler‘s (1984) notion that the UK is a 
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major global economic market, and in this manner, suitable for a successful development of 
prediction of failure model. Specifically, this study tests the research question using six 
measures of corporate board attributes: the proportion of outside directors, presence of female 
directors, board size, nomination committee effectiveness, audit committee effectiveness, and 
remuneration committee effectiveness. This study uses insolvency petition under the UK 
Insolvency 1986 as a proxy for corporate failure, because it provides an objective criterion 
for dating and distinction between our failed and non-failed samples. As well, prior studies 
(e.g. Platt and Platt, 2012) use nomination, audit and remuneration committee effectiveness‘ 
variables in isolation, but in this study constructs nomination, audit and remuneration 
committee effectiveness indexes that mirror Cadbury (1992), Smith (2003) and Greenbury‘s 
(1995) guidance, respectively. I turn next to the research problem of the study.  
 
1.3 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM  
An analysis of corporate failure prediction studies (from 1966-2012), shows that, previous 
studies rarely make reference to specific theory that explain why entities fail, but rather 
emphasise on the statistical method or financial ratio used (see also Charitou, Neophytou and 
Charalambous, 2004). Simply put, the lack of any real theory that guides the use of predictive 
variables remains a serious gap in the corporate finance literature (Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006; 
Agarwal and Taffler, 2007).  
 
Few researchers use theoretical frameworks to select predictive variables. These theoretical 
frameworks, however, have been observed by Aziz and Dar‘s (2006) review as basic 
(Wilcox, 1971, 1973, 1976; Laitinen and Laitinen, 1998), complex (Santomero and Vinso, 
1977; Vinso 1979), or insufficiently concrete (Scapens, Ryan and Fletcher, 1981; Booth, 
1983; Blum 1974; Gentry, Newbold and Whitford 1985; Aziz, Emanuel and Lawson, 1988; 
Huyghebaert, Gaeremynck, Roodhooft, and Van De Gucht, 2000) to answer the practical 
questions of why businesses fail.  
 
Similarly, the bulk of corporate failure prediction studies neglect the role of corporate 
goveranance but rather attempt to predict failure using financial data (see Balcaen and Ooghe, 
2006). Thus, despite the renewed enthusiasm in issues of corporate governance and corporate 
failure in the wake of the recent unprecedented corporate failures, empirical studies remain 
23 
 
 
scant (see Parker, Peters and Turetsky, 2002; Darrat, Gray and Wu, 2010; Platt and Platt, 
2012).   
 
Another limitation of the extant literature is its near universal focus on a direct association 
between corporate governance mechanisms on firm‘s financial performance or failure (Daily, 
Dalton and Cannella, 2003). For example, researchers (Chaganti, Mahajan and Sharma, 1985; 
Hambrick and D'Aveni, 1992; Daily and Dalton 1994a; 1994b; Gales and Kesner, 1994; 
Sheppard, 1994; 1995; Thornhill and Amit, 2003) consider some aspects of corporate 
governance and corporate failure neglecting a comprehensive analysis of the effects of 
corporate board attributes and functions as well as their interactions on corporate failure. This 
has invariably led to the limitation of the depth of our understanding of the link between 
corporate governance and the corporate failure prediction. 
 
This study attempts to address some of the issues identified in the previous studies using 
recent data from the UK between 1999-2011 financial years to answer the following research 
questions:  
Main Problem: 
In the context of the UK, are corporate governance measures related to corporate failure? 
Sub-problem 1: 
To what extent are the composition and structure of corporate board related to corporate 
failure?  
Sub-problem 2: 
To what extent is corporate failure related to the interactions between board attributes and 
functions? 
 
The study examines these questions through a multi-theoretical lens (i.e. agency and resource 
dependency theories). This paves the way for a brief overview of the overall approach 
adopted for this study in the next section.  
 
24 
 
 
1.4 OVERALL APPROACH  
This study tests six main hypotheses regarding the impact of the following on the probability 
of corporate bankruptcy: proportion of outside directors (H1a), presence of female directors 
(H2a), board size (H3a), nomination committee effectiveness (H4a), audit committee 
effectiveness (H5a) and remuneration committee effectiveness (H6a). This study also 
examines the interaction effects of corporate board attributes and functions on corporate 
failure by testing nine additional hypotheses. This study, finally, tests 15 auxiliary hypotheses 
in line with the individual variables in the three composite measures namely: nomination 
committee effectiveness, audit committee effectiveness and remuneration committee 
effectiveness.  
 
This study adopts the positivism approach due in part to the difficulties of obtaining data 
through interviews from boards of failed firms. Specifically, I extract corporate governance 
proxies from the annual reports for incorporation in the proposed models. Thus, this study 
considers both financial and non-financial proxies unlike prior UK studies that consider only 
the latter (see Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006). 
 
This study opts for the random sample approach rather than the paired-sample approach. The 
justification is that matching criteria are habitually ad hoc and may lead to a ―selection bias‖ 
(Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006: 29), resulting in sample specific failure prediction model (Zavgren, 1983). 
As well, this study seeks to investigate the effects of industry, firm age and size on corporate 
failure, in addition to the corporate governance proxies. This mirrors Peel Peel and Pope‘s 
(1986) notion that ―a superior methodology would appear to be to use variables as predictors, 
rather than to use them for matching purposes‖ (p.7.).The final sample is 358 firms, 
consisting of 95 failed and 263 non-failed firms. Following previous studies (Hambrick and 
D'Aveni 1992; Sheppard, 1994; Lara, Osma and Neophytou, 2009), I stratify the dataset into 
five cross-sectional samples:  353, 351, 350, 346, and 346 for t – 1 to t – 5 (where t is the year 
of a firm‘s insolvency). This implies that the data reflects firms‘ governance and financial 
conditions in the relevant years prior to insolvency or lead time. Thus, this study accounts for 
temporal distance (Zavgren, 1985), which is a significant factor in the corporate failure 
context. Further, I randomly split each year‘s sample into two sub-samples: estimation and 
holdout test. The aim is to test the robustness of the models. 
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This study employs logit analysis because of the binary nature of the dependent variable: 
failed or non-failed firms. The empirical tests are based on three different model 
specifications (i.e. pooled cross-sectional, cross-sectional and multi-period data analysis) and 
sub-samples (i.e. estimation, holdout, and combined samples)
1
. The aim is to test the 
reliability of the predictions (see Altman, Haldeman and Narayanan 1977). For this reason, I 
use robust estimation and cluster by firm for all estimations of the pooled cross-sectional and 
multi-period LOGIT models and thus, moderate the effects of heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation. The Jackknife procedure, however, is used for the holdout test of the cross-
sectional models. 
 
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The rest of the thesis is outlined below and in Figure 1. Chapter 2 discusses the institutional 
background issues on corporate governance and corporate failure in the UK. The chapter is 
logically structured under five broad thematic areas namely: (1) leadership, (2) effectiveness, 
(3) accountability, (4) remuneration and (5) relationship with shareholders. It concludes with 
an overview of the insolvency rules in the UK. 
 
Chapter 3 provides a systematic review of 89 articles reporting 160 prediction failure models 
published from 1966 to 2012 in scholarly reviewed journals in four main disciplines, namely: 
accounting, finance, banking, and economics. The discussion and critique of literature, in turn 
provides a solid foundation for the research. Consequently, the chapter concludes with a 
discussion of gaps in the literature where further research is inevitable. Therein lays the 
justification of the present study.  
 
Chapter 4 reviews scholarly papers that map a route through the domains of corporate 
governance and corporate failure. The goal is to discuss important insights of the corporate 
failure syndrome from two main theoretical approaches, namely: agency and resource 
dependency. It is important to note that within the corporate failure literature the corporate 
                                                          
1
 For more detailed descriptions of the different model specifications and sub-samples see chapter 6 (section 
5.4) and 7 (sections 7.5.3, 7.5.2 and 7.5.3), respectively.  
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governance perspective is neglected. Accordingly, this chapter seeks to contribute by 
exploring the role of corporate governance within the corporate failure process. 
 
Chapter 5 develops six main hypotheses of the study. Thus, I pull together work covered in 
chapters 2, 3 and 4. Chapter 6 describes the research data and methodology. It provides the 
empirical setting of the study. In particular, the philosophy approach, data collection, sample 
design, variables and statistical technique are addressed in the relevant sub-sections.  
 
Chapter 7 presents the empirical results. This chapter reports the descriptive statistics, 
multicollinearity tests, univariate analysis as well as the results of the multivariate logit 
analysis in the relevant sections.                  
    
Chapter 8 discusses the findings and concludes the thesis. It emphasises on bridging the gap 
between theory and practice. Specifically, the chapter presents pragmatic policy 
recommendations based on the findings of the study. The aim is to facilitate prediction of the 
health of corporate UK through corporate governance proxies and financial indicators. This 
in turn, may trigger policy reforms to strengthen board effectiveness, and in this mode, 
reduce the likelihood of firm‘s failure. The main findings, promising contribution, limitations 
of the study as well as the recommendations for future research are discussed in the relevant 
sections. 
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Figure 1: The Structure of the Thesis 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND INSOLVENCY FRAMEWORKS IN THE UK 
 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
The recent business scandals and financial crisis (Coffee, 2005) have renewed interest in 
corporate governance among stakeholders (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). This suggests that, 
weak corporate governance may deteriorate financial performance, and in this manner, 
increases the likelihood of firm‘s failure. This, in turn, triggers macroeconomic crises. 
Accordingly, Walker (2009) contends that gaknesses in risk management and board quality 
should be addressed to reduce the risk of a recurrence of the global downturn (see also 
Coffee, 2005).  
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.1 describes the concept ‗corporate governance‘. 
The evolution and principles of the framework of corporate governance in the UK are 
addressed in sections 2.2 and 2.3, respectively. Section 2.4 explains the term ‗corporate 
failure‘. Section 2.5 summarises the UK Corporate Insolvency process. Section 2.6 
concludes.  
 
2.1 DEFINITION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The term ‗governance‘ originates from the Latin word ‗gubernare‘, which means ‗to steer‘ 
(Solomon, 2010), implying that corporate governance includes the function of direction 
rather than control. Thus, the governance role includes: (1) running of the business, (2) 
overseeing the executive actions and (3) satisfying legitimate expectations of accountability 
(Tricker, 1984).   
 
Nonetheless, there are two paradigms in the quest to define the concept ‗corporate 
governance‘, namely: Stock Market and Welfare State Capitalism (Dore, 2000). The former 
focuses on accountability to stockholders (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 
2000). Thus, corporate governance is structures, processes, cultures and systems (Keasey, 
Thompson and Wright, 1997) to reduce principal and agents‘ conflict (Mayer, 1997), and in 
this way, ensures the firm is run for the benefit of the stockholder.  
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Critics, however, argue that shareholder long term interest would be best served by 
considering the wider interests of other stakeholders (e.g. employees). For this reason, 
Welfare State Capitalism takes a broader perspective of accountability to all stakeholders 
(Tricker, 1984; Noteboom, 1999). Solomon (2010), for example, defines corporate 
governance as both internal and external mechanisms which ensure that firms discharge their 
accountability to all their stakeholders. As well, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define corporate 
governance mechanisms as financial and legal institutions that can be altered through the 
political process. In this regard, the impact of regulation on corporate governance occurs 
through its effect on ‗the way in which companies are owned (stock exchange rules), the form 
in which they are controlled (legal forms) and the process by which changes in ownership 
and control take place (takeover codes)‘ (Jenkinson and Mayer, 2012, page 1).  
 
This study adopts the classical definition of corporate governance in the UK due in part to its 
empirical setting, where corporate governance is seen as a system by which a firm is directed 
and controlled (Cadbury, 1992, paragraph 2.5).  Further, given the nature of this research‘s 
theme i.e. bankruptcy, the study emphasises the fact that governance mechanisms aim at 
aligning managerial interests not only with those of shareholders but also with those other 
stakeholders (Cadbury 1992, 2.7; Coombes and Wong, 2004). This paves the way for a 
discussion of historical development of corporate governance in the UK. 
 
2.2 EVOLUTION OF THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE    
Corporate governance dominates the public eye over the past two decades, due to the high-
profile financial scandals involving entrenched CEOs and ineffective boards (Cadbury, 1992; 
Ezzamel and Watson, 2005). In response, the Cadbury Committee addresses the financial 
aspects of corporate governance in the UK. The Cadbury committee‘s (hereafter Cadbury 
1992) guidance emphasises on three main principles namely: openness, integrity and 
accountability. These principles, in turn, allow investors to examine firms more 
comprehensively, and in this mode, promote efficient allocation of resources. For this reason, 
Cadbury (1992) triggers governance reforms worldwide, due in part to the use of its key 
proposals as benchmark of good governance (Brennan and Solomon, 2008; Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009).  
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Later, Greenbury (1995) sets out guidance for the executive remuneration committee under 
five thematic areas namely: accountability, responsibility, full disclosure, alignment of 
director and shareholder interests and improved company performance.  Greenbury (1995, 
Section 1.14) contends that ‗the key to strengthening accountability lies in proper allocation 
of responsibility for determining Directors‘ remuneration, proper reporting to shareholders 
and transparency‘. Further, Greenbury (1995) endorses Cadbury‘s (1992) proposal for the 
establishment of a remuneration committee, comprising entirely of non-executive directors 
(paragraph A1-A4). Greenbury (1995, Section B10), however, recommends a maximum 
notice period of 12 months term for service contracts rather than  the three years suggested by 
Cadbury.  
 
Hampel (1998) sanctions majority of the proposals of Cadbury (1992) and Greenbury 
(1995), and hence combined these reports with their work to produce the Code (1998). 
Hampel‘s (1998) findings suggest that the Code is treated as sets of prescriptive rules, 
implying a ‗yes‘ receives a tick. From this point, Hampel (1998) emphasises that ‗Box 
ticking‘ is not efficient in preventing abuse (paragraph 1.12-1, 14). For this reason, Cadbury 
commends that UK listed companies should incorporate a ‗comply or explain‘ statement into 
their annual reports.    
 
Turnbull (1999) examines the risk management and internal control issues unresolved by the 
Cadbury (1992), which in part aided the collapse of Barings. The Turnbull‘s guidance 
requires boards to review and report the system of internal control and risk management. It 
also encourages boards to express an opinion on the effectiveness of the system. More 
importantly, Turnbull outlines a frame of reference, against which boards could model their 
firms‘ systems of internal control. 
 
In 2001, the Enron-Andersen debacle raises questions globally about the effectiveness of the 
role of non-executive directors. This prompts the UK Government to set up the Higgs, Tyson 
and Smith Committees, the analysis of which I turn to.  Higgs (2003) applauds more 
influential role for non-executive directors (NEDs), and in turn, greater accountability of 
boards in the UK. Explicitly, Higgs (2003) advocates a greater proportion of NEDs on boards 
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(at least half) and more apt remuneration for NEDs. Higgs also encourages one NED to 
champion shareholder interest. 
  
Tyson (2003) argues that diversity in backgrounds, skills and experiences of NEDs are 
factors required to enhance wider range of perspectives to bear on issues of company 
performance, strategy and risk. Tyson claims that board diversity may send a positive and 
motivating signal to stakeholders to enhance legitimacy to access critical resources necessary 
for firm‘s survival. Smith (2003) also identifies requirements on the purpose, membership, 
procedures, resources and remuneration of audit committee in UK listed entities. Unlike a 
more prescriptive approach in the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), the Smith‘s (2003) 
guidance follows the UK tradition of principles-based approach on the issues in question.    
 
 The Code (2003) includes: (1) main and supporting principles of the Code (1998), (2) 
compliance guidance on internal controls (Turnbull, 1999) and audit committees (Smith, 
2003), (3) suggestions from Higgs (2003), and performance evaluation of board and its 
committees. Further, the Code (2003) provides criteria to evaluate the independence of 
NEDs. The Code also amends the principle of at least one-third NEDs on boards to at least 
half excluding chairman (on boards of FTSE 350) and at least two (other listed companies). 
From this point, Figure 2 depicts a sharp reduction of UK Corporate Insolvency from 2003 to 
2010 compared to the astronomical figures recorded in 1994-2002. This sharp reduction is 
due in part to the enactment of the Enterprise Act (2002), which repeals administrative 
receivership by providing a stay on creditors‘ claims for loans made after September 15, 
2003
2
. The Insolvency Act (2000) also introduces 28 day moratorium, while an eligible 
company puts together company voluntary arrangements (CVAs), with effect from 2 April 
2001 and 1 January 2003. Further, the directors can seek creditors consent to extend the 
moratorium for additional two months. These modifications are encouraged by efficiency and 
fairness concerns, implying that the UK‘s Insolvency Law is moving towards the so-called 
―rescue culture‖ (Frisby, 2004; Armour, Hsu and Walters, 2008). In sum, the Enterprise Act 
                                                          
2
 Armour, Hsu and Walters (2008) document the impact of the Enterprise Act 2002. 
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(2002) and the Insolvency Act (2000) seek to preserve viable firms capable of making a 
valuable input to the UK economy
3
.  
 
Figure 2: Corporate Insolvency in the UK (1995-10) 
 
Figures extracted from European Union Insolvency Report 
          
Finally, the Code (2003) excludes disclosure of directors‘ remuneration, due to the enactment 
of ―The Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations 2002‖, but demands further disclosures 
(e.g. number of meetings). The Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations (2002) 
supercede the earlier Code provisions and, in turn, require the boards to prepare a transparent 
and understandable remuneration report to shareholders (see Deliotte & Touche LLP 2004). 
As well, the Association of British Insurers (ABI) outlines principles on executive 
remuneration with emphasis on constructive and timely dialogue between remuneration 
committees and major institutional shareholders.  
 
In July 2004, the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and RSM Robson Rhodes LLP propose a 
practical guidance on corporate governance issues (hereafter Guide). The aims of this Guide 
are two-fold. First, the Guide takes account of the principles and provisions of the Code 
(2003). Second, it strives to provide practical insights into best practice on boardroom 
                                                          
3
 See Report of the Review Committee, Insolvency Law and Practice, Cmnd 8558 (June 1982) (―Cork Report‖), 
paragraph 198 and chapters 7-9. 
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effectiveness. This, in turn, helps boards achieve their strategic objectives and build enduring 
value in their businesses.   
 
Myners (2005) endorses automated process as crucial alternative to ensure a more efficient 
voting system, after a thorough review of the impediments of UK voting shares. Turnbull 
(2005) makes minor changes but strongly sanctions the retention of the flexible, principles-
based approach of Turnbull (1999). The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 
provides International Financial Reporting Standard on Share-based Payment (IFRS 2), 
suggesting that boards should account for Share-based Payment‘s impact (expense) on 
consolidation accounts beginning on or after 1 January 2005. It is also retrospectively 
applicable to grants of shares and/or share options from November 2002 that has not vested 
the directors or other staff prior to 2005. The National Association of Pension Funds (2005) 
provides a draft code of governance for pension scheme trust boards and management 
committees, in response to the ―governance vacuum‖ and the tremendous growth in contract-
based, defined contribution and workplace schemes. 
 
In 2006, the FRC proposes three minor changes and thus, published the Code (2006). The 
changes are as follows: (1) board chair to sit on remuneration committee, (2) supplementary 
provisions on ‗vote withheld‘, and (3) publishing the results of resolution on a show of hand.  
The FRC reassures the Code‘s content after a periodic review in 2007, 2008 and 2009. The 
Code (2009), however, incorporates recommendations from Walker Review (2009). The FRC 
reviews the Code (2009), and in turn, demands that much more attention needs to be paid to: 
first, the spirit of the Code as well as its letter, and second, interaction between the boards of 
listed companies and their shareholders.  
 
To this end, the FRC has assumed responsibility for a stewardship code, which encourages 
institutional shareholders to engage more actively with boards, hence the first UK 
Stewardship Code (2010). It is argued that progressively, the UK corporate governance is 
taking on the characteristics of the German and Japan system, insider rather than outsider 
system. Nonetheless, the 25 unique codes since 1992 have not altered the ‗‗comply or 
explain‘‘ approach, the trademark of corporate governance in the UK (Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2009). Compliance to the Code, however, is a necessary condition of listing in the 
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LSE, hence regarded as quasi-mandatory (Conyon and Mallin, 1997). Fernandez-Rodriguez, 
Gomez-Anson, Cuervo-Garcia‘s (2004) findings suggest that market reacts positively to 
announcements of compliance with the code. Appendix 1 (see page 285), sets out the main 
principles which underpin the corporate governance systems in the UK, the analysis of which 
I turn to. 
 
2.3 THE PRINCIPLES OF UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE   
Coombes and Wong (2004) stipulate that codes touch fundamental governance issues. These 
include but not limited to: (1) fairness, (2) accountability, (3) transparency, (4) board 
attributes, (5) the responsibility for stakeholders‘ interest, and (6) complying with the law.  
Zattoni and Cuomo (2010) concur, emphasising that these governance practices are necessary 
in order to avoid governance issues, and in turn, increase board effectiveness and firm 
performance.   
 
For that reason, the FRC focuses on changing the ‗‗tone‘‘ of the Code by making limited but 
significant changes to signal the significance of general principles that guide board 
behaviours. In this respect, the Code (2010) describes five fundamental governance issues 
namely: leadership, effectiveness, accountability, remuneration, and relationship with 
shareholders, I will discuss each in turn. 
 
2.3.1 Board Leadership in the UK 
Following the agency theory (Berle and Means, 1932; Fama and Jensen, 1983) governance 
reforms preserve the unitary board structure in the UK. The UK Code on Corporate 
Governance (the Code) requires an effective board to head listed firms, suggesting that the 
board is jointly accountable for the firm‘s survival (Code 2010, section A). Cadbury (1992, 
paragraph 1.4), for example, recommends a dual role of the board namely: leadership of the 
board and executive obligation for running of the firm. Thus, no person should have 
unfettered influences on board decisions (section A. 2). In short, the division of 
responsibilities between the chairman and the chief executive should be clearly established 
and should not be exercised by the one person (paragraph A2.1).    
 
  
35 
 
Higgs (2003) suggests that the NEDs should constructively challenge formulation of firm‘s 
strategy.  Again, Cadbury (1992) commends that the board should appoint one of the 
independent NEDs as senior member where there is CEO duality (1.2). However, the Code 
(1998) proposes the appointment of Senior Independent NED to cover contingencies (Section 
3.18), whereas Higgs (2003) envisages an expanded role. In this regard, Higgs requires the 
senior independent NED to serve as an intermediary between other directors and shareholders 
(Code 2010, Section 3.18). Critics, howerver, suggest this creation of the ‗trinity‘ at the top of 
the firm has attracted criticism. Nonetheless, the Code (2010) states that the chairman is 
responsible for the following: (1) leadership of the board and ensuring its effectiveness, (2) 
for achieving the requisite culture of constructive challenge by the independent NEDs, and 
(3) for training, evaluation and board composition (paragraphs A.3, B.4, B.4.1, B.4.2).  
 
In consonance with the principle of integrity in Cadbury (1992), the chairman should meet 
the independence criteria set out in paragraph B.1.1 of the Code on his or her appointment. 
For example, there should not be any relationships (e.g. close family ties with key 
stakeholders) or circumstances (e.g. significant shareholdings) that may impair the 
chairman‘s independence in character and judgment.   
 
Additionally, the boards‘ role is to set the company‘s strategic aims and standards and ensure 
that the necessary resources are in place for the firm to meet its objectives and review 
management performance. Indeed, the directors must act in the best interest of the firm 
consistent with their fiduciary and statutory duties. In fact as Cadbury (1992) notes, board‘s 
actions are subject to regulations and the shareholders in the annual general meeting, is 
germane here. Subsequently, the board must be effective, the analysis of which I turn to.       
             
2.3.2 Board Effectiveness in the UK 
The Code (2010) presents seven main principles to strengthen board effectiveness in the UK. 
These are as follows: (1) composition of the board, (2) appointments to the board, (3) time 
commitment consideration of directors, (4) professional development, (5) information and 
support, (6) evaluation, and (7) re-election of directors. I discuss each in turn.   
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Board Composition 
The Code (2010) stipulates that the board and its committees should have balance of 
executives and non-executive directors with appropriate diversity and independence of the 
firm to enable them to discharge their roles effectively (paragraph B.1). This implies that no 
group of individuals can dominate the board process (paragraph B.1.3).         
     
Cadbury (1992) requires boards to have at least three NEDs (with majority being independent 
in character and judgment). Shortly, the Hampel (1998) argues that for effective board 
contribution the NEDs should be a third of the board. Higgs (2003) recommends at half of the 
board save the chairman, should be independent NEDs. This implies that reforms continue to 
shift the overall power of the board in favour of NEDs. 
 
Board Appointments  
The Cadbury (1992, section 4.30) and subsequent amendments require a formal, rigorous and 
transparent mechanism for the appointment of new directors to the board. The board 
appointments should be made on merit and with due regard to board diversity (Code 2010, 
paragraph B.2.2). In addition, the board should satisfy itself that plans are in place for orderly 
succession planning (paragraph B.2.3). 
 
Hence, a nomination committee, made up of majority independent NEDs (Cadbury 1992, 
section 4.30), and chaired by independent NED (Higgs 2003), or chairman save dealing with 
appointment of his successor (Code 2003, section A.4.1), is charged with three main duties. 
First, it proposes new board members (Cadbury 1992, section 4.30). Second, it evaluates the 
board diversity and independence. Finally, in the light of this evaluation, it prepares 
description of the role capabilities required for new appointment (Code 2003, Section 4.2).   
 
Time Commitment Consideration of Directors 
The Code (2010) requires directors to assign satisfactory time to the company to discharge 
their duties effectively (section B.3). The following supporting principles are relevant. First, 
appointment letters of NEDs should spell out the estimated time obligation and job 
specifications (Code 2003, section A.4.3-4). Second, the board should resist executive 
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directors offers to take on chairmanship or more than one non-executive directorship in FTSE 
100 company (Code 2003, section A.4.5).  
 
Professional Development  
The chairman is required to facilitate professional development of directors, due to the 
presumed board diversity (Cadbury, 1992), as follows. First, new appointees receive tailored 
induction (Code 2003, section 5.1). Second, directors update their skills and knowledge with 
the company to facilitate effective discharge of their roles (A.5 paragraph 3).  
 
Information and Support 
Cadbury (1992) requires the board chair to supply the board with relevant and reliable 
information required for effective board process (section 4.8). In this respect, the board chair 
should ensure that board committees have sufficient resources and advice from the 
company‘s secretary and/or independent professional (Cadbury, section 4.25; 1.5).  
 
Evaluation 
The Code (2003) states that boards should undertake a rigorous assessment of its members, 
performance and committees (Section A.6). Specifically, the directors‘ evaluation should 
assess each director contribution and commitment to their roles (A.6 paragraph 2). In turn, 
the chairman is required to act on the evaluation‘s results by addressing the weaknesses of the 
board (A.6 paragraph 2). In like terms, senior independent NED, taking into account the 
views of executive directors, is expected to evaluate the chairman‘s performance.                  
 
Recently, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) via the Code (2010) is demanding FTSE 
350 companies to undertake external evaluation on at least every three years (B.6.2). More 
so, a statement should be made available of whether an external facilitator has other 
connection with the company. 
 
Re-election of Directors 
Directors of UK listed companies are required by the listing rules to submit themselves for 
election at the first AGM after appointment (see Code 1998, section 3.21). More so, the  
Code (1998) endorses NAPF and the ABI‘s provision suggesting that directors submit 
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themselves for re-election at intervals of no more than three years (3.21), subject to continued 
acceptable performance (Code 2003, section A.7). In this regard, directors of FTSE 350 
companies are subjected to annual election by shareholders.   
 
2.3.3 Board Accountability and Audit in the UK 
The board should provide a true and fair assessment of the company‘s performance (Code 
2003, C.1). Also, the board should safeguard shareholders‘ funds by maintaining a robust 
internal control system (Code 2003, C.2). In the same view, the board should enhance the 
financial reporting process and audit quality by establishing an audit committee (Cadbury 
1992, 4.35; Code 2003, C.3).  
 
Consistent with Cadbury, Smith (2003) endorses the minimum three NEDs membership but 
introduces modification in three main areas; namely (1) membership and appointment, (2) 
meetings, and (3) resources and skills, I will discuss each in turn. 
 
Membership and Appointment   of Audit Committee Members 
Smith (2003) contends that audit committee should consist of minimum three independent 
NEDs (Section 3.1 and Code 2003; C.3.1). This contradicts Cadbury‘s (1992) view, 
suggesting majority of the audit committee members should be independent but not all 
(4.35b). 
 
Further, Smith (2003) prohibits the board chair to be an audit committee member (Section 
3.2). More importantly, Smith (2003) suggests that audit committee appointments should be 
made jointly by the board, nomination committee and the audit committee chairman (Section 
3.3).  
 
Meetings of Audit Committee 
The audit partner and finance director may attend audit committee meeting at the request of 
the committee‘s chairman (Smith, 2003; Section 3.6). Further, Smith (2003) recommends at 
least three audit committee meetings in a financial year (Smith, 2003; Section 3.5), a view 
that differs from Cadbury‘s (1992) recommendation (see 4.35a). Finally, the audit committee 
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is encouraged to discuss issues raised in the management letter with both external and 
internal auditors, in the absence of management (Smith, 2003; Section 3.8). 
 
Resources and Skills of the Audit Committee 
The Cadbury (1992) requires boards to provide sufficient resources required by the audit 
committee to discharge their supervisory role (4.35d). Thus, the audit committee may take 
professional advice at the company‘s expense (see section 3.14). Concerning skills of 
members, Smith (2003) prescribes that a member should have relevant financial experience 
(e.g. an auditor, finance director, professional accountancy qualification holder). 
 
2.3.4 Board Remuneration in the UK 
Directors‘ remuneration is one of the areas of failure of corporate governance and the 
Cadbury (1992), in particular. For this reason, directors‘ remuneration reforms (e.g. 
Greenbury 1995 and Directors‘ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002) provide proposals 
on openness (Cadbury 1992, Section 4.40). Following Greenbury (1995), I discuss three main 
aspects of board remuneration: remuneration committees, disclosure and remuneration 
policy. 
 
Remuneration Committee   
Cadbury (1992) and Greenbury (1995) encourage boards to establish remuneration committee 
with a minimum of three NEDs to supervise the executive remuneration process. Thus, the 
remuneration committee determines firm‘s remuneration policy (Greenbury 1995, 4.4.1). For 
that reason, the remuneration committee members should seek the interest of shareholders. 
This in turn, suggests that its membership should be entirely independent NEDs (Cadbury, 
1992: 4.42).   
 
Disclosure 
Greenbury (1995:5.2) suggests that full disclosure of Directors‘ remuneration enhances 
accountability and restores investor community‘s confidence. Greenbury (1995:5.3), 
however, cautions that full disclosure should not result in the loss of crucial facts. In this 
vein, Cadbury (1992) requires boards to report directors‘ salary and performance related pay 
as well as future benefits (e.g. stock options). Further disclosures encouraged by Cadbury are 
the total and chairman‘s remuneration as well as those of the highest paid director.  
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Remuneration Policy 
The Code (2010) requires boards to provide reasonably high remuneration to motivate 
directors to maximise shareholders‘ value (Section D.1). Further, boards enhance firms‘ long-
term performance through the performance-related pay of top executives‘ remuneration 
(Section D.1 paragraph 2).  
                      
NEDs‘ remuneration, however, should not include share options and/or performance-related 
pay (Code 2010, D.1.3). Individual NED‘s remuneration should mirror his/her time 
commitment and role (e.g. annual fees and additional fees for chairmanship of committees). 
Nevertheless, advance shareholders‘ approval is inevitable in unique circumstances where 
share options are awarded to NEDs. In this regard, these shares should be held for a minimum 
of one year after the NED departs from the board.      
 
2.3.5 Board Relationship with Shareholders 
Boards are required by the Code (2003) to engage in satisfactory dialogue with shareholders 
based on mutual objectives. The chairman, especially, should ensure that directors are aware 
of shareholders‘ issues (Code, 2010). Cadbury (1992) requires institutional investors to 
exchange views and information on board strategy and performance (section 6.11, Para 1). 
Hampel (1998) affirms that 60% of shares in listed UK companies are held by UK 
institutions, is appropriate here. Enron trial, however, suggests that employees‘ interest may 
prevail over short-term shareholder value (Powell, 2006). Here, the national governance 
mechanisms protect the investors‘ rights and trade credit (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, 
Shleifer, And Vishny, 2000). From this point, disciplinary mechanisms (i.e. both internal and 
external) for poorly performing executives seem to be at work in the Anglo-Saxon 
environment (Pochet, 2002).  Sutton and Callahan (1987), Gilson (1990), and Gilson and 
Vetssuypens (1993) and Hambrick and D‘Aveni‘s (1992) findings confirm this notion. Jensen 
(1993) concurs, emphasising that bankruptcy law is designed as a monitoring mechanism for 
healthy firms and more importantly, governance device for financially distressed firms.  
 
Overall, the purpose of corporate governance is to facilitate effective management, thereby 
reducing the likelihood of a firm‘s failure (Code, 2010). The Companies Act (2006) lends 
support to this notion, emphasising that the board must promote the long term success of the 
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firm by discharging their fiduciary duties of protecting the interest of shareholders (section 
172:1). 
 
Directors, however, can wind up the firm voluntarily by making a statutory declaration within 
5 weeks preceding the date of directors‘ resolution to the effect that the firm is solvent and 
thus, can redeem its total liabilities, within 12 months from the start of the winding up 
(Insolvency Act, 1986). Here, the directors must submit both the statutory declaration and the 
recent statement of financial position to the registrar of companies within 15 days after the 
date of the resolution. Here too, the Insolvency Act (1986) provides for punitive measures 
such as fines and imprisonment for the firm and every director who contravenes the above 
provisions.   
 
Similarly, the Insolvency Act (2000) introduces a revised moratorium procedure for small 
companies in financial distressed. The Directors‘ role in obtaining a moratorium includes 
filing with the court: (a) an outline of voluntary arrangement; (b) the financial position of the 
company, (c) the company‘s eligibility for a moratorium; and (d) the nominee‘s consent.  
 
Insolvency law, however, forces communal governance mechanisms on an insolvent firm and 
its creditors (Armour et al,  2008) by providing an orderly winding up or reorganisation of the 
insovent company‘s affairs (Frisby, 2004). In this respect, critics argue that firms should 
rather be free to contract upfront over how controlling rights will be allocated in insolvency 
(Armour et al, 2008). The next section presents the definition of the term corporate failure in 
the UK.  
 
2.4 DEFINITION OF CORPORATE FAILURE IN THE UK 
The term failure has multiple meanings (Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2010); hence, there is no 
agreement as to what is meant by the term ‗corporate failure‘ (Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006). For 
the purpose of this thesis, corporate failure is companies in insolvency. A firm is deem as 
insolvent, if it fails to pay due debts (Insolvency Act 1986). Accordingly, our empirical 
setting limits our definition to companies in formal insolvency procedures namely: 
compulsory or voluntary liquidation, administration, administrative receivership, and/or 
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dissolved. Appendix 2 (see page 282) presents the main features of five but one of the 
procedures, the analysis of which I turn to.  
 
Explanation of the Five Main Stages in the Definition  
A firm is said to be in liquidation when the court appoints a liquidator to run and ‗wind up‘ 
an entities‘ affairs properly. In the UK, however, there is no provision of an automatic stay, 
suggesting that secured creditors may sell entities‘ assets without heeding to other claimants‘ 
interest. This action may not be challenged save fraudulent or negligent (Davydenko and 
Franks, 2008). Nonetheless, the liquidator may dispose the company or its assets (i.e. 
piecemeal) to redeem debts, strictly as follows: (1) secured debts, (2) liquidation costs, (3) 
preferential, (4) floating charge holders, (5) unsecured debts, (6) interest on debts, and finally, 
(7) residual claimants. In this regard, the liquidator may face legal action or dismissal if 
he/she delays the entity‘s sale by using secured creditors‘ funds to run the company. At the 
end of the process, the liquidator will apply to have the company‘s name deleted from the 
register at Companies House.   
 
Liquidation may be either compulsory or voluntary (either Members or Creditors). First, a 
company enters compulsory liquidation when the court, petitioned by creditors or board, 
makes an order for its ‗wind up‘. In this respect, all the directors are required by law to 
present the winding-up petition jointly. Thus, a single director cannot present a winding-up 
petition save when he/she is the only director of the firm.  
 
Second, a company enters members‘ voluntary liquidation, where the shareholders opt for 
liquidation. This is permitted by the law provided there are sufficient funds to settle entities‘ 
total debts. Creditors' voluntary liquidation, however, is where the shareholders, normally at 
the boards‘ request, opt for liquidation. This is also permitted by the law provided the entity 
is deem insolvent, thus, it lacks sufficient funds to settle entities‘ total debts.  
 
The Insolvency Act provides reorganization as an alternative to liquidation. The primary aim 
of reorganization is to secure the company as a going concern. Therefore, the priority rule in 
the liquidation process is not applicable in reorganizations. The Insolvency Act offers four 
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reorganization procedures namely: administration receivership, administrative, company 
voluntary arrangements and moratorium. 
 
Administrative receivership is the appointment of an administrative receiver by floating 
charge holder(s) over the entities‘ assets. Specifically, the Administrative Receiver seeks the 
best outcome for his appointer, implying that he/she has no duty of care to other creditors. 
This, in turn, may result in ineffective liquidation of many financial distressed firms (Kaiser, 
1996).    
 
Further, existing claims receive primacy over new financing. This may hinder the firm‘s 
reorganization plan, if it needs injection of funds to secure its going concern. Franks and 
Sussman‘s (2000) findings also suggest that that recovery rates for junior creditors in 
distressed UK SMEs are negligible.  
 
Second, there is no automatic stay provision in the UK‘s receivership code.  Franks, Nyborg 
and Torous (1996) argue that an important constraint on the receiver‘s discretion is liens held 
by other creditors on specific assets. For this reason, the Insolvency Act (1986) offers two 
rescue procedures: administration and Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA). Pochet 
(2002) and Davydenko and Frank (2008), however, suggest floating charge holders‘ veto 
right in favor of an administrative receivership limits the use of these two procedures.  
 
Subsequently, Enterprise Act (2002) repeals administrative receivership for loans made after 
September 15, 2003, and substituted it with administration. The floating charge holder may 
appoint the administrator, whose duty of care extends to every debt holder.  Consequently, 
the administrator has legal backings to stay creditors‘ claims, and in this mode, avoid 
repossession attempts from owners of leased asset. Further, the administrator, due to the 
presence of court-administered procedure to secure new financing, has more flexibility in 
dealing with debt.    
 
Finally, dissolution is not an insolvency procedure, but relate to Section 1000 of the 
Companies Code (2006) allowing the striking off company not carrying on business or in 
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operation from the registrar of companies in the Companies House. This sets the scene for the 
justification of the corporate failure definition adopted for the study in the next subsection.  
 
Motivation for Adoption of the Definition  
The rationale for adoption of the legal definition is multiple fold. First, the five stages 
confirm the argument that corporate failure is a state of insolvency or bankruptcy (in US 
parlance) where control of assets is exercised for creditors‘ benefit, rather than its owner(s) 
(Booth, 1983: D‘Aveni, 1990). Thus, this echoes Gillespie and Dietz (2009:128) argument 
that ―failure is a single major incident, or cumulative series of incidents, resulting from the 
action (or inaction) of organisational agents that threatens the legitimacy of the organisation 
and has the potential to harm the well-being of one or more of the organisation‘s 
stakeholders‖.  
                  
Second, the definition verifies organisational ecologist view of failure, in particular, 
dissolution. Freeman, Carroll and Hannan (1983) explain dissolution as the state at which an 
organisation ‗ceases to carry out the routine actions that sustain its structures, maintain flows 
of resources, and retain allegiance to its members‘.  
 
Finally, the definition is objective due to its legalistic nature. Indeed, there is a general 
agreement in the literature that, the above five stages constitute failure (see, Morris, 1997). 
Figure 3 presents an overview of the insolvency process in the UK, the analysis of which I 
turn to. 
 
2.5 AN OVERVIEW OF THE INSOLVENCY PROCESS IN THE UK 
The relevant insolvency legislations in UK include but not limited to Companies Act (2006), 
Enterprise Act (2002) and Insolvency Act (1986). Notwithstanding these numerous 
documentation, the UK Insolvency Laws are fundamentally unfamiliar to the US‘s rescue 
culture and most importantly, remain under the government. In this vein, Pochet (2002) 
notes, UK creditors prevent adverse effects of proposed insolvency rules by devoting 
adequate resources to defensive activism. From this point, critics (e.g. Kaiser, 1996) contend 
that the UK Act encourages creditors to hastily liquidate a financial distressed firm. In a sharp 
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contrast, the US‘s chapter 11 allows the debtor to retain control of the firm at least for a 
limited period, to propose a plan of reorganization (Franks et al, 1996).  
                         
Nonetheless, in the UK, an out-of-court workout between a firm and its creditors is possible. 
On one hand, company voluntary arrangement allows the company‘s directors to compromise 
its liabilities to creditors and, in turn, avoids a more costly administration or liquidation 
procedure (see Insolvency Act 1986, section 1-7 and Enterprise Act 2002, section 1A). At the 
other, the use of this procedure is hindered by the lack of automatic stay of secured creditors. 
For this reason, small companies may opt for the moratorium option, which allows 28 days 
automatic stay to enable the directors to rescue the company, under the supervision of the 
insolvency practitioners (Insolvency Act 2000). In other words, an insolvency practitioner is 
appointed by the bankruptcy court or the creditor (in the case of receivership), to liquidate or 
reorganize the firm, and the board immediately steps down save the moratorium option.  As 
Flynn (2000) puts it, the Insolvency Act (2000) is a milestone towards a more debtor-oriented 
system.  
 
Appendix 2 depicts debtors‘ breach of a debt covenant is the main criterion for creditors to 
initiate the insolvency process save members voluntary liquidation. These covenants may 
include but not limited to instalment schedules, minimum liquidity and/ or maximum 
leverage ratios. On the contrary, Franks et al (1996) contend that creditors may not wish to 
precipitate a firm into insolvency despite breach of its loan covenants. Further, the directors 
may not initiate members‘ voluntary liquidation, when the company is solvent. On one hand, 
this mirrors creditors‘ unwillingness to take managerial control of the firm and management 
preference for power, at the other. As a result, the Insolvency Act has adequate penalties for 
directors who trade while the firm is insolvent.  Figure 3 (adopted from Expert Group 2011) 
sums up the insolvency process from the time the company starts experiencing considerable 
financial problems until the company is eventually dissolved.     
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Figure 3: An overview of insolvency process in the UK 
 
Source: Report of Expert Group (2011) 
 
2.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter builts on the foundation laid in chapter one of the thesis. In particular, it outlines 
the definitions of corporate governance and corporate failure within the empirical setting. 
Further the evolution of corporate governance in the UK and the Code‘s provisions are 
discussed in the relevant sections and sub-sections. The chapter concludes with allocation of 
control rights to various stakeholders regarding the future of the failing firm in the UK in 
section 2.4, 2.5 and in particular, Appendix 2 (see page 282).  In conclusion, the issues 
discussed in this chapter provide a starting point for the conceptual framework and 
hypotheses testing during later stages of the research. For this reason, the scene is set for a 
critical review of predicting corporate failure extant literature, in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
―One might ask a basic and possibly embarrassing question: why forecast bankruptcy? 
This is a difficult question, and no answer or justification is given here. It could, perhaps, 
be argued that I are dealing with a problem of “obvious” practical interest 
(Ohlson, 1980, p3)” 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
At a glance, one judges interest in corporate failure by the considerable number of articles in 
journals of diverse disciplines dealing with prediction of corporate bankruptcy. Here, since 
Beaver (1966, 1968) and Altman‘s (1968) seminal work, the literature on corporate failure 
prediction has developed at a speed equal to the growth of corporate failure itself, due in part 
to the impact of corporate failure on stakeholders (Wilson and Sharda, 1994). On one hand, 
one significant feature of this vast literature is the general agreement that accounting proxies 
are capable of predicting corporate failure. On the other hand, these models, due in part to the 
ad hoc selection of variables approach in modelling, lack full professional acceptance (Scott, 
1981; Agarwal and Taffler, 2007). 
 
Similarly, prior reviews are limited in scope and/or out of date (example: Kumar and Ravi, 
2007; Aziz and Dar, 2006; Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006; Dimitras, Slowinski, Susmaga, 
Zopounidis, 1999; O‘Leary, 1998; Keasay and Watson, 1991; Morris, 1997; Jones, 1987; 
Altman, 1984; Altman and Narayanan, 1996; Taffler, 1984; Scot, 1981). More importantly, to 
date, there is no systematic literature review that contributes towards a better understanding 
of research issues that integrates corporate failure prediction models from the three strands 
namely: classical statistical techniques, artificially intelligent expert systems and theoretical 
approaches. This chapter attempts to fill this gap. 
 
Following the approach of Biolchini, Mian, Natali and Travassos (2005) the aim of this 
chapter is accomplished through a systematic literature review (SLR). Thus, the chapter 
presents the state-of-the-art in corporate failure prediction, to uncover several gaps both 
theoretical and empirical. The presentation of the SLR in this chapter is particularly 
motivated by the structures of Nicolas and Toval (2009). 
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The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.1 summarises the main aspects of the design of 
the SLR. The results, discussions, research gap and limitations of the SLR are presented in 
sections 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5, respectively. Finally, section 3.6 concludes the SLR with 
recommendations for further research. 
 
3.1 PLANNING THE SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW 
We follow Biolchini et al (2005) and Nicolas et al‘s (2009) review protocol in this SLR. 
Accordingly, section 3.1.1 presents the scope. Section 3.1.2 outlines the research questions 
that guide the SLR. Section 3.1.3 states the planning of the search process. Section 3.1.4 
reports the inclusion and exclusion criteria. Section 3.1.5 describes the data collected from 
the selected studies, and finally, the data analysis is the focus of section 3.1.6. 
 
3.1.1 Scope of the SLR 
The aim of the SLR is stated in section 3.0. Nonetheless, the SLR is limited to reviewing 
scholarly studies on corporate failure prediction from three broad research paradigms namely: 
statistical techniques, intelligence techniques and theoretical foundation. Table I contains an 
overview of related methods of the three research paradigms discussed in section 3.3. 
 
Table 1 is structured into four main columns. First, column one outlines the various related 
methods under each paradigm. As well, column one reports the respective author(s) who 
initiated the method in the corporate failure context. A brief description, strengths and 
limitations of each method are outlined in columns 2, 3, and 4, respectively.  
 
3.1.2 Research Question of the SLR 
The SLR seeks to answer the four main research questions: 
RQ1. What value can be drawn from the literature in respect to corporate failure prediction 
from models? 
RQ2. What techniques have been employed in this field? 
RQ3. What are the methodological issues in the literature? 
RQ4. What is the main research gap in the literature? 
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Table 1: Three perspectives of Corporate Failure Prediction 
DIMENSION STATISTICAL TECHNIQUE(1-5), AIES (6-16) AND THEORETICAL (17-19) 
Models(M)/ 
Landmark study 
description Major strength Major limitation/Critics 
1.0 Univariate/ 
Beaver (1966) 
1.1 If a firm records a higher 
ratio compared to a certain 
cut-off point, this signals 
strong financial health and 
vice versa.  
1.2 Simple to understand and easy to 
apply. 
1.3 Neglects multi-dimensional nature of 
corporate failure ( Keasey and Watson, 1991) 
2.0 MDA 
Altman (1968) 
2.1 Linear combination of  
certain discriminatory 
predictors in the form of Z-
Score 
2.2 Constructs a discriminant function (Z-
Score) by maximizing the ratio of 
between-groups and within-groups 
variances (Fisher, 1936).  
2.3 Demanding  Assumptions:  
(1)Linear separability, (2) Multivariate 
normality& (3) equal and within group 
covariance and others  (Eisenbeis and Avery,  
1972) 
3.0 LPM 
Meyer and 
Pifer(1970) 
 
3.1 Expresses the likelihood of 
firm’s failure as a 
dummydependent variable 
3.2 Estimates the odds of firm’s  
      failure with  probability 
3.3. Results in model considered complex forthe 
average user to interpret 
3.0 Logit / 
       Martin (1977) 
3.1 Replaces the LPM 
distribution with a logistic 
cumulative distribution. 
3.2 Same as LPM. 3.3 Results in models considered complex for the 
average person to interpret 
4.0 Probit/ 
     Zmijewski (1984) 
4.1 Estimate the parameters of 
the linear model by the 
maximum likelihood 
estimation procedures. 
 5.2 Replaces the logistic function with 
 normal distribution function. 
5.3 Several assumptions: Dependent variable 
categorical, error term has a cumulative 
normal distribution, and others 
(Aldrich and Nelson, 1984). 
5.0 CUSUM 
Kahya& Theodossiou 
(1999) 
5.1 The time series behaviour of 
the attributes variables for 
each of the failed and non-
failed firms is estimated by a 
finite order VAR model 
5.2 CUSUM model has a very ‘long 
memory’ in the case of bad 
performance of the firm 
5.3 CUSUM model has a very ‘short memory’ in 
the case of past good performance. 
6.0 Partial   adjustment 
processes/ 
Laitinen 
& Laitinen(1998) 
6.1 View failure as firm’s 
inability to pay financial 
obligations as they fall due. 
6.2 Compared to non-failed, failing firms 
exhibit smaller absolute elasticity of 
cash balances. 
7.3 Too narrow 
7.0 MDS 
Neophytou and 
Molinero (2004) 
7.1 Produces graphical 
representations of the main 
characteristics of the data  
7.2 Allows the inclusion of qualitative 
information and assesses the reasons of 
the probability of specific firm’s failure. 
8.3. Practitioners interested in the health of 
 companies not included in the original sample 
 must add these. 
8.0 Neural networks 
Bell, Ribar& Verchio  
8.1 Perform classification tasks 
in a way intended to emulate 
8.2 Ability to induce algorithms  
              for recognising patterns  
8.3 NN models are characterized as ‘black boxes’ 
which decision makers may be reluctant to rely 
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(1990) 
 
brain processes.             (Zhang, Hu, Eddy Patuwo and Indro, 
1999). 
upon due to a lack of transparency. 
10.0 CBR/     
      Kolodner (1993) 
10.1 Solves a neclassification 
problem with the help of 
similar prior solved cases. 
10.2 Fits conveniently in the bankruptcy 
context due to it four-stage procedure. 
10.3 Is purely based on the assumption       
that similar cases are useful for predicting the 
outcome of the new case. 
11.0 K-Nearest Neighbour 
(kNN) 
Tam & Kiang (1992) 
11.1 Distribution-free technique 
applicable under less 
restrictive conditions 
regarding population 
distribution and data 
measurement scales 
11.2 A nonparametric method for classifying 
observations that relaxes the normality 
assumption as well as eliminates the 
functional form required in statistical 
techniques (e.g. MDA and logit) 
11.3 Same as NN 
12.0 Genetic algorithm 
(GANN)/ 
Kingdom & Feldman  
(1995)  
12.1GA works as a stochastic 
 search technique to find an 
optimal solution to a given 
problem from a large  
number of solutions 
12.2 Optimized linear functions without 
restrictive statistical hypotheses such as 
normality of explanatory variables or 
the equality of the variances/co-
variances matrix. 
12.3  same as NN 
13.0 Rough set/ 
Slowinski & Zopounidis 
(1995) 
 
13.1 classify objectsusing 
imprecise information 
13.2 Result in a set of easily understandable 
decision rules which are supported by a 
set of real example. 
13.3 same as NN 
14.0 Survival Analysis/ 
Lane, Looney and 
Wansley (1986) 
14.1 Appropriate when 
measuring the time of event 
(Cox&Oakes, 1984).  
14.2  Provides us with a possibility to model 
dynamic aspects of the failure process. 
14.3 The date of annual closing of accounting is not 
 necessarily a natural starting point for the 
failure process. 
15.0 Data Envelopment 
analysis(DEA) 
Premachandra, 
Bhabra &Sueyoshi 
(2009) 
15.1 Designed to assess the 
efficacy of decision-making 
units (DMUs) with both 
inputs and outputs. 
15.2 Study the frontier shift over time 
horizon, suggesting that it explores the 
dynamic change of corporate failure on 
a time horizon. 
15.3 Same as NN 
16.0 Iterative 
dichotomizer 3 (ID3) 
      Quinlan (1979) 
16.1 ID3 creates a decision tree 
that classifies the training 
sample. 
16.2 Like RPA, ID3 employs a non-
backtracking splitting procedure. This 
in turn, maximises the entropy of the 
split subsets. 
16.3 It assumes that the entire space of possible 
events begins as a single category (Braun and 
Chandler, 1987). 
17.0 Balance sheet 
decomposition 
measure 
 Lev (1973) 
17.1 Examine changes in the 
structure of the balance 
sheet 
17.2 Significant changes in the composition 
 of assets and liabilities, indicates a firm 
is incapable of maintaining the 
equilibrium state. 
17.3 Assumes that firms try to 
        maintain equilibrium in their    
        financial structure 
18.0 Gambler’s ruin  
theory/ Scot (1981) 
18.1 Views the firm as a gambler.  18.2 The gambler, playing repeatedly with 
some probability of loss, continues to 
play until its net worth goes to zero (i.e 
failure) 
18.3 Assumes a net positive   probability 
         that firm’s cash flows will be  
         consistently negative over a run of  
         periods. 
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19.0 Cash Management 
Theory/  
Aziz, Emanuel & 
Lawsonl (1988) 
19.1 An imbalance in cash flows 
depicts failure of firm’s cash 
management function, 
persistent of which may 
cause financial distress and 
ultimate failure  
19.2  Short-term management of firm cash 
flow is a major concern for a firm’s 
going concern. 
19.3. Too simple 
A similar approach has been used by Aziz and Dar (2006)
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3.1.3 Search Process of the SLR 
I select five main sources to perform the SLR. These are: (1) Google Scholar 
(http://scholar.google.co.uk), (2) Wiley Interscience (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com), (3) 
ScienceDirect (www.sciencedirect.com),(4) Web of Knowledge (via Thomson Reuters), and 
(5) Business Source Complete (http://web.ebscohost.com). Specifically, I search scholarly 
reviewed articles of corporate failure prediction from these sources.    
 
At this point, I identify that some articles used bankruptcy, insolvency, liquidation, financial 
distress and dissolution as synonyms for corporate failure. Hence, I extend the search string 
in the various search engines for other articles using a search framework that encapsulates all 
the terms identified. In this respect, all the string defined is the following: ("Prediction‖ OR 
"Predicting" OR "Forecasting") AND ("Liquidation" OR "Bankruptcy" OR "Insolvency" OR 
"Dissolution" OR "Failure‖) AND ("Corporate" OR "Firms" OR "Company"). 
 
3.1.4 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
 First, the search string depicts that it is satisfactory to read the title of the article to consider 
its inclusion or otherwise in the SLR. Second, in cases where the title is inadequate to 
determine inclusion, the abstract is read and, if need be the introduction, and to the extreme 
the conclusions or the whole article. For this reason, the full texts of the article must be 
present in an electronic format. Finally, the paper must be written in English. 
 
In contrast, to ensure the SLR is within reach, I devise exclusion criteria as follows. First, I 
exclude articles with synonym titles such as organisation mortality and death as well as 
organisational exit, decline, retrenchment, downsizing, setbacks and financial distress. Thus, 
the SLR invokes Greenhalgh, Lawrence and Sutton‘s (1988) notion, suggesting that these 
should not be considered as failure. Secondly, books, PhD Thesis, working papers, technical 
reports as well as articles in conference proceedings, due in part to the SLR quality bias, are 
excluded. Accordingly, each article is scrutinised further to ensure that it is published in a 
peer-reviewed journal. 
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3.1.5 Quality Assessment of the SLR 
The quality of the selected studies in section 3.1.4 is addressed as follows:   
a) Publication place: I select articles published in at least gradetwo ranking journal as 
per Association Business School Academic (ABS) Journal Quality GuideVersion 4 
2010 Edition (hereafter the Guide) due in part to quality preference.   
b) Estimation and Validation procedures: In addition to (a) above, I select studies with 
reasonable estimation sample or ex-ante validation or ex-post data validation or 
Lachenbruch test (see Collopy, Adya and Armstrong, 1994). 
c) Finally, each paper and its resultant model(s) passes through an in-depth scrutiny on 
four critical dimensions namely: robustness, predictive accuracy, adaptability and 
explanatory capability. 
 
3.1.6 Data Collection of the SLR 
An integrated template designed after taking a cue from prior reviewers, particularly Kumar 
and Ravi (2007), Aziz and Dar (2006), and Balcaen and Ooghe (2006) is filled for each 
selected work. The form consists of the research attributes. These include results (RQ1), 
technique used (RQ2), and methodological issues (RQ3 and RQ4). The methodological 
issues comprise purpose, sample, variables, matching, origin, and operational definition 
among others. 
 
3.1.7 Data Analysis of the SLR 
 The data collected are formulated to display: 
a) The identifier allocated (i.e. its authors, bibliographic reference, origin and year of 
publication) to the study in the SLR. 
b) The organization of the study following the taxonomy suggested (presented in 3.2.2). 
c) The rational for the study and it results are discussed in relation to RQ1. In addition, a 
discussion of the corporate failure prediction studies is the focus of section 3.3.  
d)  The research technique and method used to develop and validate model (concerning 
RQ3). Consistent with Aziz and Dar (2006) and Dimitras et al‘ s(1999) reviews, 
studies that used two or more methods are counted as more than one empirical 
investigation. This sets the scene for a discussion of the results in section 3.2 and 
particularly the search results in section 3.2.1. 
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3.2 RESULTS OF THE SLR 
3.2.1 Search Results and Deviations from Protocol 
The search string is used in the search engines of the five main sources. Table 2 reports a summary of 
the number of papers identified per source, candidates and selected studies
4
. Thus, the inclusion and 
exclusion criteria are used to identify the candidate and selected studies, respectively.. 
 
Table 2: Search Results 
Source Studies found Candidate Studies Selected Studies 
Google Scholar 142 57 13 
Wiley Interscience 32 13 13 
 Science Direct 11357 32 32 
 Web of Knowledge 54 17 16 
Business Source Complete. 128 13 13 
Other-deviation from protocol   10 
Total 11,713 132 97 
Note: Identical studies in different sources have not yet been eliminated. 
 
The search process also results in 11 scholarly reviewed articles and one book (see section 
3.0 above). These are read with a critical eye for the following reasons: (1) to generate a 
representation of the state of the art about the SLR subject. For this reason, I read these prior 
reviews with Darwin‘s Evolution Theory at the back of our mind, suggesting that all 
organisms are derived from a common ancestral gene pool. The goal is twofold: First, to 
acquaint ourselves with prior authors, and second, deepen our knowledge on the field under 
study. The bibliographies of the prior reviewed articles also reveal related papers relevant to 
the SLR‘s research questions. In view of that, the SLR includes 10 papers that satisfy the 
quality criteria but two: Altman (1973) and Wilcox (1973). On one hand, this is a deviation of 
protocol that concerns repetition of the SLR. On the other hand, the interest of working with 
more widespread set of papers must prevail.  
 
Consequently, the present SLR covers 97 articles reporting 160 prediction failure models (see 
table 3), published in scholarly reviewed journals in nine main disciplines. These are as 
follows: finance (57), information management (32), operations (32), accountancy (22), 
                                                          
4
 To conserve space, I present only the selected studies in Table 2 
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economics (5), management (4), marketing (3), entrepreneurship (3), international business 
(1) and finally, tourism (1). The important implication of this is that, the prediction of 
corporate failure is a multi-disciplinary field. In particular, 17, 16, 14, 13, 10, and 9 studies 
are published in the following Journals: (1) Intelligence System Accounting Finance and 
Management, (2) Expert System Application, (3) Business Finance Accounting, (4) Decision 
Support Systems, (5) Banking and Finance, and (6) Accounting Research, respectively. 
Furthermore, selected studies originate from 12 countries. Table 3 shows that 53%, 14%and 
10% of the studies used dataset from the US, Korea and UK, respectively. In addition, 
Australia, Belgium and Canada account for 4% each, whereas the rest of the world accounts 
for the remaining (i.e. Finland 3%, France 3%, Greece 2%, Italy 2%, Brazil 1% and Spain 
1%). These disclosures pave the way for an in-depth discussion of the methodological issues 
in the extant literature, in the next sub-section. 
 
3.2.2 Synthesis of the Proposals 
This section provides a synthesis vision of the field of knowledge addressed by the SLR 
questions, to facilitate future research in this area. In particular, this section answers RQ3, 
what are the methodological issues in the literature? In this respect, the selected papers‘ 
attributes are tabulated in table 3. From this point, taxonomy is proposed for the papers 
selected in this SLR based on the five steps used by prior researchers to achieve their 
respective contribution. These steps are as follows: (1) research objective, (2) application 
focus, (3) data collection, (4) development of model and (5) empirical results. I discuss each 
in turn.  
 
 Step 1-Research Objective 
The present SLR identifies four common objectives from prior studies. First, most 
researchers test the predictive ability of variables and/or statistical technique (e.g. Beaver 
1966; Altman, 1968, 1973; Casey and Bartczak, 1984; Tam and Kiang, 1992). Second, others 
(e.g. Tam and Kiang 1992) test the predictive accuracies of various statistical methods, due in 
part to Joy and Tollefson‘s (1975) criticisms. Third, Deakin (1972), Moyer (1977), Booth 
(1983), Fanning and Cogger (1994) and others also examine the predictive abilities of prior 
models, Altman‘s (1968) model, in particular, Finally, minority (e.g. Altman, Halderman and 
Narayanan, 1977; Dambolena and Khoury, 1980; Mensah, 1983; Back, Laitinen and Sere, 
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1996) focuses on methodological issues (example: variables selection, dataset or statistical 
technique). 
 
Nonetheless, to avoid overlaps, the SLR follows Dietrich (1984) and, in this way, categorises 
the aims of prior papers into two namely: testing the association between distressed measures 
(R1), and developing models to predict corporate failure (R2). In this respect, the former and 
the latter account for 86% and 14%, respectively (see table 3, column 5).  
 
Step 2-Issues Associated to the Application Focus of Models 
Most of the models reported in table 3, are application driven. Thus, researchers apply 
numerous statistical techniques and firms‘ accounting data to predict corporate failure 
(Cybinski, 2001; Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006). Thus, models are the outcome of a statistical 
search through a number of accounting variables (Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006). In this regard, 
Cybinski (2001) contends that prior prediction models are the outcome of ‗putting the cart 
before the horse‘. The implications are twofold namely: (a) neglect of non-financial 
information and (b) ad hoc selection of variables. I discuss each in turn.    
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Table 3: Summary of Attributes of Papers Reviewed 
NO. AUTHOR(S) YEA AIM VAR TERM MATC YPTF F-SAMP FIRMS ORIG MODEL OPA ET1 ET11 VT1 VTII V MET 
S001 Beaver 1966 R1 FR D5D6 23 5 79:79 Mix USA UA 90 22 5 34 8 h-out 
S002 Altman 1968 R1 FR D5 23 5 58:99 M USA LDA 96 6 3 4 21 h-out 
S003 Deakin 1972 R2 FR D5 123 5 43;55 M USA LDA 97 3 3 18 23 ex-ante 
S004 Casey et al 1984 R1 FR D5 2 5 60:230 Mix USA UA 75 17 27 3 35 h-out 
S005 Casey et al 1984 R1 FR D5 2 5 60:230 Mix USA LDA 86 17 13 37 11 h-out 
S006 Casey et al 1985 R1 MIX D5 12 5 60:230 Mix USA LDA 87 13 13 13 33 h-out 
S007 Casey et al 1985 R1 MIX D5 12 5 60:230 Mix USA Logit 88 37 5 60 5 h-out 
S008 Martin 1977 R2 FR D13 6 6 23;5575 Banks GBR QDA 87 9 8 8 45 h-out 
S009 Martin 1977 R2 FR D13 6 6 23;5575 Banks USA LDA 82 17 4 50 20 h-out 
S010 Martin 1977 R2 FR D13 6 6 23;5575 Banks USA Logit 91 9 9 17 10 h-out 
S011 Collins 1980 R1 FR D1 6 1 162;162 Credit  USA LPM 94 4 2 0 0 none 
S012 Collins 1980 R1 FR D1 6 1 162;162 Credit USA LPM 93 4 3 0 0 none 
S013 Trieschmann et al  1973 R2 FR D1 23 1 26;26 Insurance USA LDA 94 8 4 0 0 none 
S014 Moyer 1977 R1 FR D5 23 3 27;27 Mix USA LDA 91 5 14 20 14 none 
S015 Taffler 1982 R2 FR D1 67 1 56;55 M GBR LDA 94 12 0 40 0 h-out 
S016 Altman 1973 R2 FR D5 8 2 21;71 Railroad USA LDA 98 2 0 0 0 h-out 
S017 Altman et al 1977 R2 MIX D5 12 5 53;58 R&M USA LDA 93 4 10 5 7 h-out 
S018 Altman et al 1977 R2 MIX D5 12 5 53;58 R&M USA QDA 93 6 9 23 8 h-out 
S019 Sharma et al 1980 R2 FR D5 23 5 36;36 R USA LDA 92 nr nr nr nr h-out 
S020 Wilcox  1971 R1 FR D5 n/a n/a n/a n/a USA Ruin n/a 0 0 0 0 h-out 
S021 Dambolena et al  1980 R1 FR D5 12 5 23:23 R&M USA LDA 91 17 0 17 13 h-out 
S022 Altman et al 1979 R2 FR D5 12 3 23:35 Mix BRA LDA 91 12 7 21 15 h-out 
S023 Altman 1977 R2 FR D5 6 5 56:107 S&L USA QDA 96 4 4 4 8 h-out 
S024 Booth 1983 R1 FR D5 12 1 25;25 Mix AUS LDA 85 18 12 25 50 h-out 
S025 Betts et al 1987 R1 FR D5 6 3 50;50 Mix GBR LDA 96 8 2 8 19 h-out 
S026 Altman et al 1976 R2 MIX D5 6 1 40:113 Brokers USA QDA 90 10 10 18 12 h-out 
S027 Koh et al 1990 R2 FR D5 23 1 48:420 Mix USA LDA 93 6 9 21 11 h-out 
S028 Baldwin et al 1992 R1 FR D5 123  6 Q 40;40 Mix USA LDA nr 0 0 0 0 Jack 
S029 Taffler 1983 R1 FR D1 237 1 46;46 M GBR LDA 96 4 0 0 4 h-out 
S030 El Hennawy et al 1983a R1 MIX D1 7 5 31;31 M,C&D GBR LDA 98 5 4 0 0 h-out 
S031 El Hennawy et al 1983a R1 MIX D1 7 5 31;31 M,C&D GBR LDA 98 5 4 11 10 h-out 
S032 El Hennawy et al 1983a R1 MIX D1 7 5 53;53 M,C&D GBR LDA 97 7 6 11 10 h-out 
S033 El Hennawy et al 1983a R1 MIX D1 7 5 53;53 M,C&D GBR LDA 98 5 4 11 10 h-out 
S034 Neophytou et al 2004 R1 FR D1 23 1 50;50 Mix GBR MDS nr nr nr 0 0 h-out 
S035 Lo 1986 R1 FR D5 123 1 38;38 Mix USA LDA nr 0 0 0 0 none 
S036 Lo 1986 R1 FR D5 123 1 38;38 Mix USA Logit nr 0 0 0 0 none 
S037 Wilcox  1973 R1 FR D5 23 5 52;52 Mix USA  Ruin 94 0 0 0 0 h-out 
S038 Santomero et al 1977 R1 FR D5 6 1 00:00 Banks USA Ruin nr 0 3 0 0 h-out 
S039 Vinso 1997 R1 FR D5 6 nr 20:20 Utilities USA Ruin nr 0 0 0 0 none 
S040 Blum 1974 R2 FR D5 123 8 115:115 Mix USA LDA 94 7 10 20 15 h-out 
S041 Gentry et al 1985 R1 FR D5 123 3 56;56 Mix USA Logit 83 21 12 26 30 h-out 
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S042 Aziz et al 1988 R1 FR D5 23 5 49;49 Mix USA LDA 89 0 0 0 0 h-out 
S043 Aziz et al 1988 R1 FR D5 23 5 49;49 Mix USA Logit 92 14 2 14 16 h-out 
S044 Begley et al 1996 R1 FR D5 23 1 130:2600 Mix USA LDA 78 22 22 19 25 h-out 
S045 Begley et al 1996 R1 FR D5 23 1 265:3300 Mix USA Logit 72 12 17 11 27 h-out 
S046 Altman et al 1994 R1 FR D5 23 3 554:554 Mix ITA LDA 88 4 7 5 10 h-out 
S047 Altman et al 1994 R1 FR D5 23 3 404:404 Mix ITA BPNN 94 5 8 14 11 h-out 
S048 Mensah 1983 R1 FR D5 23 1 41:65 M USA LDA 100 0 0 54 31 ex-ante 
S049 Mensah 1983 R1 FR D5 23 1 41:65 M USA Logit 97 0 0 0 0 ex-ante 
S050 Gentry et al 1987 R1 FR D5 123 3 33;33 Mix USA Probit 84 21 12 0 0 none 
S051 Aly et al 1992 R1 FR D5 1234 3 26;26 Mix USA LDA 90 12 8 0 23 jack 
S052 Aly et al 1992 R1 FR D5 1234 3 26;26 Mix USA Logit 100 0 0 0 0 jack 
S053 Jones et al 2004 R1 FR D5D6 6 5 423:7818 Mix AUS Mxlogit 99 0 0 0 0 ex-ante 
S054 Wilson et al 1994 R1 FR D5 23 1 65:64 Mix USA LDA 89 17 6 7 8 h-out 
S055 Wilson et al 1994 R1 FR D5 23 1 65:64 Mix USA BPNN 100 0 0 4 4 h-out 
S056 Jones et al 2004 R1 FR D5D6 6 5 423:7818 Mix AUS MNLogit nr 0 0 0 0 h-out 
S057 Kim and Gu 2006 R1 FR D5 3 1 33;33 Restaurants USA Logit 94 18 14 26 16 h-out 
S058 Luoma et al 1991 R1 FR D1 23 1 36;36 SME: R&Ind FIN SA 62 38 38 0 0 none 
S059 Luoma et al 1991 R1 FR D1 23 1 36;36 SME: R&Ind FIN LDA 80 35 24 0 0 none 
S060 Laitinen et al 1998 R1 MIX D5 123 2 41;41 SMEs FIN logit 87 12 15 34 29 h-out 
S061 Hensher et al 2007a R1 MIX D5D2D6 3 5 423:7818 Mix AUS MxLogit 81 27 3 nr nr ex-ante 
S062 Hensher et al 2007b R1 MIX D5D2D6 6 5 790:4036 Mix AUS ECMlogit 82 9 1 nr nr h-out 
S063 Jones et al 2007a R1 MIX D5D2D6 6 5 592:7818 Mix AUS Nlogit nr nr nr 0 5 ex-ante 
S064 Nam et al 2000 R2 FR D5 23 6 74;70 Mix KOR Logit 77 20 26 26 22 h-out 
S065 Kim et al 2010 R1 FR D5 6 1 729:729 M KOR NN 75 23 35 9 17 h-out 
S066 Kim et al 2010 R1 FR D5 6 1 729:729 M KOR BNN 76 18 32 23 26 h-out 
S067 Kim et al 2010 R1 FR D5 6 1 729:729 M KOR BANN 77 17 31 23 26 h-out 
S068 Yang et al 1999 R1 FR D5 6 1 33:89 OilGas USA PNN 84 37 10 nr nr h-out 
S069 Yang et al 1999 R1 FR D5 6 1 33:89 OilGas USA LDA 87 12 13 nr nr h-out 
S070 Varetto 1998 R1 FR D5 6 3 2369:2369 Mix ITA GANN 97 4 2 17 3 h-out 
S071 Salchenberger et  1992 R1 FR D5 35 1 229:229 S&L USA BPNN 97 4 2 15 1 h-out 
S072 Salchenberger et  1992 R1 FR D5 35 1 229:229 S&L USA Logit 94 10 3 28 1 h-out 
S073 Luoma et al 1991 R1 FR D1 23 1 36;36 SME: R&Ind FIN Logit 72 27 29 0 0 none 
S074 Lussier  1995 R1 NFI D5 235 1 108;108 SMEs USA Logit 69 27 27 0 0 none 
S075 Frydman et al 1985 R1 FR D5 6 1 58;142 R&M USA LDA 70 18 12 0 0 none 
S076 Pompe et al 2005 R1 FR D5 6 5 1369:3000 SMEs BEL LDA 76 29 25 29 54 h-out 
S077 Pompe et al 2005 R1 FR D5 6 5 1369:3000 SMEs BEL NN 77 nr nr 0 0 h-out 
S078 Huyghebaert et al 2000 R1 CF D5 7 1 81:742 MIX BEL Logit 56 16 73 31 28 none 
S079 Kahya et al 1999 R1 FR D6 6 1 72:389 R&M USA CusumNN 82 18 17 na 19 none 
S080 Kahya et al 1999 R1 FR D6 6 1 72:117 R&M USA LDA 76 31 17 0 0 none 
S081 Kahya et al 1999 R1 FR D6 6 1 72:117 R&M USA Logit 76 32 16 0 0 none 
S082 Mckee 2000 R2 FR D5 6 1 100:100 MIX USA Rough set 93 nr nr 14 10 h-out 
S083 Lacher et al 1995 R1 FR D5 7 4 94:188 M USA CascorNN 94 11 2 9 2 h-out 
S084 Lee et al  1996 R1 FR D5D2D11 3 1 83:83 MIX KOR LDA 68 nr nr nr nr ex-ante 
S085 Lee et al  1996 R1 FR D5D2D11 3 1 83:83 MIX KOR ID3 74 nr nr nr nr ex-ante 
S086 Lee et al  1996 R1 FR D5D2D11 3 1 83:83 MIX KOR MDA-NN 70 nr nr nr nr ex-ante 
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S087 Lee et al  1996 R1 FR D5D2D11 3 1 83:83 MIX KOR ID3-NN 73 nr nr nr nr ex-ante 
S088 Lee et al  1996 R1 FR D5D2D11 3 1 83:83 MIX KOR SOFA(MDA)NN 84 nr nr nr nr ex-ante 
S089 Lee et al  1996 R1 FR D5D2D11 3 1 83:83 MIX KOR SOFM(ID3)NN 74 nr nr nr nr ex-ante 
S090 Min et al 2005 R1 FR D5 6 1 944:944 MIX KOR SVM 88 nr nr 18 16 h-out 
S091 Jo et al 1997 R1 FR D5 2 3 271;271 MIX KOR LDA 82 nr nr 0 0 h-out 
S092 Jo et al 1997 R1 FR D5 2 3 271;271 MIX KOR NN 84 nr nr 0 0 h-out 
S093 Jo et al 1997 R1 FR D5 2 3 271;271 MIX KOR CBR 82 nr nr 0 0 h-out 
S094 Boritz et al 1995 R1 FR D5 7 1 171:6153 MIX CAN LDA 99 nr nr 0 0 h-out 
S095 Boritz et al 1995 R1 FR D5 7 1 171:6153 MIX CAN QDA 63 0 0 0 0 h-out 
S096 Boritz et al 1995 R1 FR D5 7 1 171:6153 MIX CAN NPDA 99 0 0 0 0 h-out 
S097 Boritz et al 1995 R1 FR D5 7 1 171:6153 MIX CAN Logit 99 0 0 0 0 h-out 
S098 Boritz et al 1995 R1 FR D5 7 1 171:6153 MIX CAN Probit 99 0 0 0 0 h-out 
S099 Boritz et al 1995 R1 FR D5 7 1 171:6153 MIX CAN OETNN 99 0 0 0 0 h-out 
S100 Boritz et al 1995 R1 FR D5 7 1 171:6153 MIX CAN BPNN 99 0 0 0 0 h-out 
S101 Fanning et al  1994 R1 FR D5 6 5 190:190 MIX USA Logit 96 nr nr 6 24 ex-ante 
S102 Fanning et al  1994 R1 FR D5 6 5 190:190 MIX USA GANNA 95 nr nr 6 24 ex-ante 
S103 Fanning et al  1994 R1 FR D5 6 5 190:190 MIX USA BPNN 95 nr nr 6 24 ex-ante 
S104 Zhang et al 1999 R1 FR D5 23 1 110;110 M USA CV-NN 79 18 24 0 0 none 
S105 Theodossiou 1991 R2 FR D5D13 6 1 81:420 M GRE LPM 93 11 4 0 14 ex-ante 
S106 Theodossiou 1991 R2 FR D5D13 6 1 81:420 M GRE Logit 94 7 4 4 8 ex-ante 
S107 Theodossiou 1991 R2 FR D5D13 6 1 81:420 M GRE Probit 93 7 5 4 5 ex-ante 
S108 Ohlson 1980 R1 FR D5 6 3 105:2058 Mix USA Logit 96 11 27 12 17 h-out 
S109 Tam 1991 R1 FR D5 3 2 81;81 Banks USA LDA 85 7 24 18 36 h-out 
S110 Min et al 2005 R1 FR D5 6 1 944:944 Mix KOR LDA 79 nr nr nr nr h-out 
S111 Min et al 2005 R1 FR D5 6 1 944:944 Mix KOR Logit 80 nr nr nr nr h-out 
S112 Min et al 2005 R1 FR D5 6 1 944:944 Mix KOR BPNN 85 nr nr 21 14 h-out 
S113 Tam 1991 R1 FR D5 3 2 81;81 Banks USA Logit 87 12 14 36 9 h-out 
S114 Tam 1991 R1 FR D5 3 2 81;81 Banks USA kNN 69 36 25 41 5 h-out 
S115 Tam 1991 R1 FR D5 3 2 81;81 Banks USA ID3 92 10 5 23 18 h-out 
S116 Tam 1991 R1 FR D5 3 2 81;81 Banks USA BPNN 96 0 8 18 11 h-out 
S117 Tam et al 1992 R1 FR D5 3 2 81;81 Banks USA BPNN 96 0 8 9 12 jack 
S118 Tam et al 1992 R1 FR D5 3 2 81;81 Banks USA ID3 92 10 5 21 17 jack 
S119 Tam et al 1992 R1 FR D5 3 2 81;81 Banks USA DA 89 0 22 17 11 jack 
S120 Tam et al 1992 R1 FR D5 3 2 81;81 Banks USA Logit 92 9 7 12 17 jack 
S121 Tam et al 1992 R1 FR D5 3 2 81;81 Banks USA kNN 69 36 25 19 31 jack 
S122 Charitou et al 2004 R2 MIX D1 23 3 51;51 Mix GBR BPNN 96 0 8 14 18 jack 
S123 Charitou et al 2004 R2 MIX D1 23 3 51;51 Mix GBR Logit 94 8 4 16 13 jack 
S124 Bryant  1997 R1 FR D5 7 3 85:2000 R&M USA CBR 61 73 5 73 5 ex-ante 
S125 Park et al 2002 R1 MIX D5 23 1 1072;1072 Mix KOR AHP-KNN-CBR 83 nr nr 0 0 none 
S126 Frydman et al 1985 R1 FR D5 6 1 58;142 R&M USA RPA 84 14 2 0 0 none 
S127 Mckee 1995 R2 FR D5 67 1 30;30 Electronics USA ID3 97 0 6 0 0 none 
S128 Shin et al 2002 R1 FR D5 6 1 264;264 M KOR MSD-ICPB 81 0 0 0 0 ex-ante 
S129 Nanda et al 2001 R1 FR D5 23 1 75;75 Mix USA LDA 69 5 nr 4 0 ex-ante 
S130 Nanda et al 2001 R1 FR D5 23 1 75;75 Mix USA MSD 65 6 nr 8 0 ex-ante 
S131 Nanda et al 2001 R1 FR D5 23 1 75;75 Mix USA MSD-ICPB 72 2 nr 4 0 ex-ante 
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S132 Nanda et al 2001 R1 FR D5 23 1 75;75 Mix USA GANN 74 6 nr 4 0 ex-ante 
S133 Nanda et al 2001 R1 FR D5 23 1 75;75 Mix USA GANN-ICPB 69 2 nr 2 0 ex-ante 
S134 Fletcher et al 1993 R1 FR D5 23 1 18;18 Mix USA BPNN 89 nr nr 0 0 h-out 
S135 Fletcher et al 1993 R1 FR D5 23 1 18;18 Mix USA Logit 77 nr nr 0 0 h-out 
S136 Etheridge et al 2000 R1 FR D5 6 3 137:941 Banks USA BPNN 96 13 4 44 5 h-out 
S137 Etheridge et al 2000 R1 FR D5 6 3 137:941 Banks USA CLNN 93 0 7 17 8 h-out 
S138 Etheridge et al 2000 R1 FR D5 6 3 137:941 Banks USA PNN 98 44 2 48 3 h-out 
S139 Cienlen et al 2004 R1 FR D5 7 1 90:276 Mix BEL MSD 78 29 19 26 16 jack 
S140 Cienlen et al 2004 R1 FR D5 7 1 90:276 MIX BEL DEA 85 26 11 24 10 jack 
S141 Cienlen et al 2004 R1 FR D5 7 1 90:276 MIX BEL C5.0 80 45 11 37 7 jack 
S142 Mckee 2003 R1 FR D5 123 1 146:145 Mix USA Rough set 61 nr nr 0 0 h-out 
S143 Peel, Peel&Pope 1986 R1 MIX D1 6 2 22:56 MIX GBR CLA 97 2.94 2.27 17 0 h-out 
S144 Peel &Peel 1988 R1 MIX D1 6 3 23:59 industrial GBR mnlogit 90 nr nr 0 0 ex-ante 
S145 Peel&Peel 1988 R1 MIX D1 6 3 23:59 industrial GBR Logit 92 8.6 6.8 0 0 ex-ante 
S146 Keasey et al 1990 R1 FR D1 123 5 62:62 Mix GBR mnlogit 90 nr nr 0 0 h-out 
S147 Keasey, et al 1990 R1 FR D1 123 5 62:62 Mix GBR Logit 86 14 86 36 30 jack 
S148 Zhang et al 1999 R1 FR D5 23 1 110;110 M USA Logit 79 22 20 0 0 none 
S149 Park et al 2002 R1 MIX D5 23 1 1072:1072 Mix KOR CBR 68 28 17 0 0 none 
S150 Park et al 2002 R1 MIX D5 23 1 1072:1072 Mix KOR RegKNN 76 nr nr 0 0 h-out 
S151 Park et al 2002 R1 MIX D5 23 1 1072:1072 Mix KOR LogitKNN 79 nr nr 0 0 h-out 
S152 Premachandra et al 2011 R1 FR D5 6 1 50;951 Mix USA DEA 83 28 17 0 0 h-out 
S153 Jardin et al  2011 R1 FR D5 23 3 1430;1430 Retail FRA LDA 82 18 27 30 13 h-out 
S154 Jardin et al  2011 R1 FR D5 23 3 1430;1430 Retail FRA Logit 81 18 20 29 12 h-out 
S155 Jardin et al  2011 R1 FR D5 23 3 1430;1430 Retail FRA BPNN 83 18 17 28 13 h-out 
S156 Jardin et al  2011 R1 FR D5 23 3 1430;1430 Retail FRA SA 81 20 18 13 18 h-out 
S157 Jardin et al  2011 R1 FR D5 23 3 1430;1430 Retail FRA SOM 83 16 19 18 19 h-out 
S158 Sanchez-Lasheras et al  2012 R1 FR D5 6 1 256;63467 Construction SPA SOM-MARS 85 12 11 nr nr h-out 
S159 Lau  1987 R1 MIX D5 3 3 100;700 Mix USA mnlogit 96 nr nr nr nr h-out 
S160 Platt et al 1990 R1 MIX D5 123 1 57;57 Mix USA logit 90 7 12 14 14 h-out 
        A Similar approach has been used by Aziz and Dar (2006) 
Abbreviations:  
FIRST ROW: YEA-year of publication, AIM-objective of study, VAR-independent variables, TERM-definition of corporate failure, MATC-matching 
technique, YPFT-number of years prior to failure considered, of the term , F-SAMP-full sample, ORIG-origin, OPA-overall predictive accuracy in 
%,ET1-estimation type I error in %, ETII-estimation type II error in %, TEST-validation results in %,VT1-validation type I errors in %, VTII-validation 
type II errors in %, Validation Method.  
FIFTH COLUMN: FR-financial ratios, MIX-financial and non-financial ratios, NFI-non-financial ratio  
TENTH COLUMN: M-manufacturing, R-retail, M-manufacturing, n/a-not applicable, C-construction, D-distribution, Ind-industrial, S&L-savings and 
Loans. 
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Figure 4: Independent Variables used in Prior Studies 
 
(a) Neglect of Non-financial Information 
Figure 4 shows that 84%, 1% and 15% of prior studies employed financial ratios, non-
financial ratios and both, respectively. Thus, there is a general agreement that financial ratios 
provide the best predictions of corporate failure (Aziz and Dar, 2006). Financial ratios are 
arguably objective meas 
ures based on publicly available data (Laitinen, 1992). This in part accounts for the 
dominance of its use in the corporate failure context. 
 
However, there is little agreement about the most suitable ratios to use from, accrual-based 
financial ratios (Casey and Bartczak, 1984), cash based ratios (Gentry, Newbold and 
Whitford 1987; Aziz and Lawson, 1989) or both (Gentry, Newbold and Whitford, 1985). In 
this regard, the list of ratios
5
 extracted from the papers reviewed verifies  Dimitras, Zanakis, 
and Zopounidis‘s (1996) findings, suggesting that working capital/total assets, EBIT/total 
assets, total debt/total assets, net income/total Assets, quick assets/current liabilities, and 
current assets/current liabilities are the most common ratios used in prior studies. 
 
There are disadvantages, however, in using financial ratios. First, small and medium 
enterprises in most countries are not obliged to publish financial statements. This limits prior 
studies to dataset from listed firms (95.63%). Also, but for Luoma and Laitinen‘s (1991) 
                                                          
5To conserve space the full list of ratios per each study is available upon request.   
Financial Ratios 
84% 
Mix 
15% 
Non-Financial 
1% 
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analysis in unincorporated entities, where the incidence of failure is greater (Altman, 1968), 
literature on unincorporated entities is distinctively lacking. Secondly, financial statements 
may not necessarily be true and fair, due in part to creative accounting. In this regard, 
accounting measures are subject to manipulation due to the accounting policies (see Argenti, 
1976; Chakravarthy 1986; Keasey and Watson 1987; Rosner, 2010). This indicates that the 
financial ratios calculated may be unreliable. Thirdly, models, due in part to occurrence of 
extreme ratio values and errors, may be contaminated (see Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006). 
Finally, financial prediction models assume that all relevant failure indicators are reflected in 
the accounting proxies. For this reason, Zavgren (1985) contends that any model containing 
only financial information will not predict with certainty the failure or success of a firm (see 
also Argenti 1985). In this respect, Argenti (1985) notes the crucial question of why the 
entities fail is beyond the scope of financial ratios, emphasising those financial predictors 
may give signpost on the verge of collapse. 
 
Few (15%) researchers (e.g. Argenti, 1976; Altman, Haldeman, Narayanan, 1977; Ohlson, 
1980; Peel, Peel and Pope, 1986; Peel and Peel, 1988), however, favour financial and non-
financial indicators (i.e. Mix) in the corporate failure context. Lussier‘s (1995) study employs 
exclusively non-financial indicators from 108 matched paired firms, and finds that 
professional advice, education, staffing and parents are significantly different between the 
successful and failed US SMEs. Peel et al (1986) also show the efficacy of the timeliness of 
financial reporting to predict financial distress, using data from the UK. 
 
(b) Ad-hoc Selection of Variables 
Figure 5 indicates that majority (98%) of prior models are based on ad hoc selection of 
variables through statistical (61%) and artificially intelligent expert systems (37%) 
techniques. This suggests that existing models are purely based on empirical consideration, 
due in part to the lack of theory in the identification of predictive variables. Researchers use 
arbitrarily criteria which include: (1) prior studies‘ ratios, commonly Altman (1968) (e.g. 
Deakin, 1972; Collins, 1980; Sharma and Mahajan, 1980; Salchenberger, Cinar and Lash, 
1992; Kim and Gu, 2006), (2) ratios popularity and predictive success in prior studies, (3) 
researchers speculation, and (4) data availability for computation of ratios. Beaver (1968b) 
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notes that the selection of variables based on popularity may be problematic, emphasising 
that popular ratios are more likely to be manipulated and, thus, may not be reliable. 
Figure 5: Techniques used in Prior Studies 
 
 
For this reason, empirical considerations are used to reduce the large set of potential financial 
ratios into seven key sets of decision dimensions: profitability, leverage, liquidity, cash, 
capital, inventory, and receivables (Pinches, Mingo and Caruthers 1973). 
 
There are disadvantages, however, to this empirical consideration approach. First, the choice 
of variables is sample specific, implying that the resulting model is data specific (Zavgren, 
1985). This may result in unexpected signs for some co-efficient (see Keasey, McGuinness 
and Short, 1990). This approach is heavily criticised. Blum (1974), for instance, argues that 
in the absence of a theory of symptoms, researchers cannot use statistical analysis of 
accounting ratios and anticipate a sustained correlation between explanatory variables and 
bankruptcy prediction. This SLR notes the classical papers of Blum (1974), Gentry et al 
(1985) and Aziz, Emanuel and Lawson, 1988) as the few exceptions to the present 
predicament. Thus, ―these models do not command full professional acceptance, in part 
because they lack the underpinnings of an explicit and well-developed theory (Scott, 
1980:p1). Agarwal and Taffler (2007), however, propose a sound practical reason why these 
statistical based models work in practice, emphasising that ―potential insolvency is difficult 
to hide when such ‗holistic‘ statistical methods are applied‖ (p.298). Put simply, practitioners 
AIES 
37% 
STATISTICAL 
61% 
THEORETICAL 
3% 
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may not be so concerned about theory in developing failure prediction models. Nonetheless, 
Agarwal and Taffler (2007) suggest that future researchers must consider theoretical 
arguments to select suitable financial and non-financial variables for their models.   
 
Step 3-Data Collection Stage of Prior Studies 
The data collection stage is characterised by six features worth mentioning. These are: (1) 
subjectively defining the term corporate failure, (2) subjectively matching technique, (3) 
sample selectivity issues, (4) Non-consideration of misclassification cost, (5) assessment of 
classification results and (6) data sources. I discuss each in turn.  
 
(a) Subjective Definition of the term “Corporate Failure”  
I code the definition of the term ―corporate failure‖ of each study on a scale of D1 to D13, 
using Morris‘ (1997) spectrum of indicators of business distressed. These are: liquidation 
(D1), delisting (D2), going concern qualification (D3), creditors‘ composition (D4), and 
creditors‘ protection (D5). Others are default of debt agreements (D6), reconstruction (D7), 
director resignation (D8), take-over (D9), closure or disposal of part of business (D10), and a 
reduction in dividend (D11). The rest are profits below forecast and zero capital for D12 and 
D13, respectively. 
 
From this point, table 3 records 73.75% and 12.5% for D1 and D5, respectively. These, in 
turn, suggest that there is a general agreement on the legal definition of corporate failure, 
bankruptcy (D5) or insolvency (D1), in the US or UK, respectively. This definition allows an 
objective criterion for dating the failing firms and splitting the sample into failed and non-
failed sub-samples (Charitou, Neophytou and Charalambous, 2004).  
 
In contrast, researchers develop economic bankruptcy models but not legal bankruptcy 
models (Altman, 1968; Shumway, 2001; Hillegeist, Keating, Cram and Lundstedt, 2004). 
Hence, researchers (e.g. Beaver 1966, Lau 1987; Altman, Marco and Varetto 1994; Lee, Han 
and Kwon 1996; Jones and Henser, 2004 and Jones, Henser and Greene, 2007; Du Jardin and 
Severin, 2011) broaden the legal definition to include more than one of the Morris‘ (1997) 
spectrum. Balcaen and Ooghe (2006) concur, stressing that the corporate failure‘s definition 
is artificial and applied inappropriately to corporate failure prediction. 
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The definition of failed and non-failed companies is essential to minimise possible outliers 
and errors (i.e. Type I and II), in particular. Researchers‘ bias to minimise the type II errors, 
due in part to the heterogeneous nature of non-failed firms, results in a careful selection of 
non-failed firms (see. Altman and Loris, 1976; Taffler and Tisshaw, 1977; and El Hennawy 
and Morris 1983). Researchers, also, minimize type I errors by adopting the legalistic 
definition. Thus, researchers seek to avoid classifying business closure, delisting, mergers 
and acquisition as failures. As Watson and Everett (1996) observe closure firms may have 
sound financial position, but closed for other reasons.   
 
(b) Subjective Matching Technique  
Having subjectively defined the term failure, researchers‘ next key task is to devise a 
procedure for matching the failed to the control sample. For clarity, I code the matching 
techniques of prior studies on a scale of 1 to 8, representing year, industry, size, inventory 
and depreciation method, location, random, bias, industry averages, respectively.  The SLR 
records 30%, 27%, 22%, 9%, and 9% for size (e.g. assets, capital size, employees etc.), 
industry, random, year and bias, respectively. This result indicates overlap, due in part to 
combination of one or two items in the matching scale. Nonetheless, our results support the 
notion that size and/or industry dominates the matching technique in the extant literature.  
 
There are disadvantages, however, with matching by size and industry. First, it leads to 
sample selection bias (Martin, 1977, Zmijewski 1984) and, in this way, asymptotic bias 
parameter and probability estimates (Menski and Lerman 1977). Morris (1997), for example, 
contends that sampling bias explains why the market does not appear to behave in the way 
expected if failure identification models are consistently successful. On one hand, matching 
on the basis of size leads to too many small companies in the non-failed sample. On the other, 
matching on the basis of industry leads to too many companies from recession-hit industries 
in the failed sample (Lennox, 1999). The important implication of matching by size and 
industry is that study‘s samples may not depict the firms‘ population. 
 
Second, the use of relatively small sample may lead to over-fitting. This in turn, may impact 
on the models‘ stability (Platt and Platt, 1990), implying that model‘s predictive accuracy is 
misleading. Casey and Bartczak (1985) agree, emphasizing that matching on size limits the 
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generalizability of the study‘s findings in the predictive context. Third, it is not possible to 
examine the role of industry and size on the likelihood of failure (Jones 1987).  
 
Zmijewski‘s (1984) study, however, suggests that the qualitative findings of the arbitrarily 
matching and random sampling techniques are comparable. For this reason, Ohlson (1980) 
argues that the suitable criteria for matching are not clear. Though, a sizeable proportion of 
the literature follows the standard random sampling design (e.g. Martin, 1977; Jones and 
Henser, 2004; Kim and Kang, 2010).   
 
Figure 6: Prior Studies and Number of years considered 
 
 
(c) Sample Selectivity Issues 
The sample selectivity issues are discussed logically as follows: (i) neglect of the time 
dimension of corporate failure, (ii) neglect of large size and (iii) arbitrary sample period. 
 
(i) Neglect of the Time Dimension to Corporate Failure 
The lack of data for the failed companies, especially in developing countries (see Altman and 
Narayanan, 1996), accounts for the numerous one year data models. Figure 6 indicates 80 and 
36 out of 160 models consider one and five year data, respectively. Further, the US and UK 
studies account for 71% and 16% of the five year prior models.  
80 
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There are demerits, however, of the dominance static prediction models. The demerits are 
primarily grounded in the two unrealistic assumptions. First, successive financial accounts 
are independent, repeated measurements (i.e. uniform failure-process). In an ex-ante 
predictive context, however, application of these static models to consecutive annual 
accounts of a firm may result in conflicting predictions (see Keasey, McGuiness and Short, 
1990; Luoma, and Laitinen, 1991). Second, it also considers failure as a sudden event, and 
thus, neglects time-series behaviour (Luoma and Laitinen, 1991). 
 
(ii) Neglect of Large Sample Size 
The bulk of the literature is filled with small sample size models. The few notable exceptions 
are Ohlson (1980), Min and Lee (2005), Pompe and Bilderbeek (2005), Park and Han (2002), 
Hensher and Jones (2007), Jones and Hensher (2007), Du Jardin and Severin (2011) and 
Sanchez-Lasheras, De Andres, Lorca and De Cos Juez (2012). 
 
To overcome the limitations of small sample size, prior studies collect data from mix 
industries (51%). Beaver (1966), Boritz, Kennedy, and De Miranda (1995), Charitou et al‘s 
(2004) mix industries models, despite industry sensitive (Altman and Lavallee, 1981), record 
accuracies as high as 90%(87%), 99%(99%) and 96%(86%) for estimation (validation), 
respectively.  
 
(iii) Subjective Sample Period 
The definition of corporate failure is applied to a subjective chosen time period (Balcaen and 
Ooghe, 2006). Table 3 shows that sample period ranges from eight months (see Hyghebaert, 
Gaeremynck, Roodhooft, Van De Gucht, 2000) to 23 years (see Fanning and Cogger, 1994). 
On one hand, more than one year time frame is desirable to facilitate sufficient datasets for 
failed firms. Morris (1997) contends that 2% of listed firms fail in each year is germane here. 
On the other, two main assumptions are vital for models reliability namely: data stationarity 
and stability (Altman and Eisenbeis, 1978; Zmijewski, 1984). Stationarity implies stable 
relationship, first, among the independent variables (Edmister, 1972) and second, between the 
dependent and independent variables (Mensah, 1984 and Jones, 1987). Data stability also 
requires no change in the macroeconomic environment (i.e. inflation, interest rate and phase 
of business cycle, see Moyer 1977 and Mensah 1983).  
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The synthetic definition of failure which is applied to a subjective time period leads to sample 
selection bias (see Taffler, 1982; 1983). For this reason, models are valid for sample specific 
data within the chosen time period (Joos, De Bourdeaudhuij, and Ooghe, 1995). Simply put, 
prior models are sensitive to data examined, implying that models‘ power shrinks with ex-
ante sample (Moyer, 1977). 
 
Attempts to overcome data instability include but not limited to stability measures (Altman et 
al 1977, Dambolena and Khoury, 1980; Betts and Belhoul, 1987; Pompe and Bilderbeek, 
2005) industry-relative ratios (Platt and Platt, 1990, El Hennawy and Morris 1983), deflated 
financial ratios (Mensah, 1983; Yang, Platt and Platt, 1999). These studies‘ results, however, 
are mixed. Yang et al (1999), for example, verify Platt and Platt‘s (1990) notion that deflation 
enhances the discriminant ability of prediction models. Dambolena and Khoury (1980) and 
Betts and Belhoul (1987) also suggest that inclusion of standard deviation of ratios improves 
significantly the ability of the discriminant function of large firms but not in the ex-ante‘s 
results. Pompe and Bilderbeek‘s (2005) findings, however, dispute Dambolena and Khoury 
(1980), suggesting that ratio stability measures do not enhance model‘s power, using small 
and medium industrial firms. Platt and Platt (1990) also suggest that industry-related 
variables do not significantly improve model‘s stability. 
 
(d) Non-consideration of Misclassification Cost 
Another issue worth mentioning is the non-consideration of misclassification cost. This 
indicates that prediction models depend fundamentally on the choice of the optimization 
measures and the modelling method. In this respect, there is no superior modelling method 
and optimization cut off-point, both are exclusively at the researcher‘s choice. In addition, 
researchers attempt to optimize various goodness-of-fit measures such as classifications 
accuracies, r-squared and maximum likelihood (Zavgren, 1985; Ooghe and Balcaen, 2002). 
In this respect, Balcaen and Ooghe (2006) posit that there is no point in finding a model that 
minimises a performance measure that is irrelevant to researcher‘s aims. Koh (1992) 
contends that the non-consideration of misclassification costs in prior studies does not appear 
to be a severe limitation. Ohlson (1980) shows, however, that consideration of 
misclassification costs may lead to different optimal cut-off points and thus, different results. 
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To mitigate the effects of non-consideration misclassification costs, researchers use ex-post 
and/or ex-ante sample as well as Lachenbruch jackknife test (Joy and Tollefson 1975) to 
examine both overfitting and violation of the stationarity assumption (see also Zavgren, 1983; 
Zmijewski, 1984; Mensah 1984). In particular, Jones (1987) is not in favour of the 
Lachenbruch method, since it does not test external validity. The inter-temporal test, which is 
equivalent to Lachenbruch Jackknife validation test, is a statistical technique widely accepted 
for validation of relatively small sample size. The SLR indicates 59.12%, 16.98%, 15% and 
8.81% for holdout test, ex-ante test, no validation and Lachenbruch test for the extant 
literature, respectively. This probably confirms Moyer (1977), Mensah (1984), Charitou et al 
(2004) and Balcaen and Ooghe‘s (2006) notion, suggesting that existing failure models suffer 
from non-stationarity and data instability problems. 
 
Most of the studies also register significant results using one-year financial data prior to 
failure, but results deteriorate 2-5 years prior to failure. Further, existing models‘ power is 
questionable with ex-ante data. Consequently, a sizeable number (15%) of models are not 
validated. This is perhaps one of the major limitations in the literature. Mensah (1983), El 
Hennawy and Morris (1983), Taffler (1982: 1983), Peel and Peel (1988) and Shin and Lee‘s 
(2002) studies, however, consider ex-ante sample for models‘ validation. 
 
Figure 7: Classification Results of Prior Studies in % 
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(e) Assessment of Classification Results of Prior Studies 
In general, independent variables‘ contribution may be assessed using one of the following: 
(1) forward stepwise discriminant analysis, (2) backward stepwise discriminant analysis, (3) 
scaled vector test, separation of means test (see Mosteller and Wallace, 1963; Joy and 
Tollefson, 1975; Altman et al, 1977), (4) conditional deletion test (Altman and Eisenbeis 
1978), (5) univariate f-statistic and (6) Mosteller Wallace Analysis. Obviously, this is also 
another tonic issue, since the various methods result differs. The scaled vector method, in 
particular, is over criticised in the literature (see Joy and Tollefson, 1975; Moyer, 1977).  
 
Figure 7 depicts that AIES, statistical and theoretical models record grand mean of overall 
predictive accuracy (OPA) estimation of 83.47 %, 79.72 %, and 63.14 %, respectively. 
Further, AIES slightly maintains its supremacy in the overall validation accuracy (VAL) of 
66.38%, compared to 64.42% and 44.29% for statistical and theoretical models, respectively. 
This probably supports Aziz and Dar‘s (2006) findings, but sharply contrasts Plat and Platt‘s 
(1990) notion that within the sample classification results one year prior to failure are fairly 
invariant with respect to methodology. The validation results verify Platt and Platt‘s (1990) 
findings, suggesting that these results are disappointing. In this respect, Wood and Piesse 
(1987) suggest that theses disappointing results occur because the values of certain 
independent variables differ markedly between the validation and estimation periods.    
 
On the contrary, the assessment of Type I and II errors indicates that the results are mixed. 
First, the theoretical models record lower type I errors in both estimation (ET1) and 
validation (VT1) of 8.71% and 11.43%, followed by the statistical and AIES. The AIES, 
however, records lower Type II errors of 7.12% in both the estimation (ETII) and  validation 
(VTII), compared to estimation (validation) of 7.43%(10.57%) and 8.95%(9.23%) for 
theoretical and statistical techniques, respectively. This inconsistency is due in part to 
different techniques of validation. These confirm Aziz and Dar‘s (2006) notion, suggesting 
that choosing between techniques is problematic.  
 
However, the estimation (validation) result of individual studies using AIES, statistical 
techniques and theoretical arguments are between 100%(99%)-61%(58%), 100%(100%)-
56%(50%), 94%(90%)-83%(68%), respectively. This possibly confirms Scott‘s (1980) 
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findings, suggesting that failure prediction is both empirically possible and theoretically 
understandable.  
 
(f) Data Sources for Prior Studies 
The US and UK offer multiplicity of data sources for prediction of corporate failure studies. 
The US data sources include but not limited to Moody Industrial Manual, Compustat 
Industrial Tape, OTC Manual, Wall Street Journal Index, and The Standard & Poor Stock 
Reports. The UK studies data sources are mainly from the Jordan Dataquest Database, 
DataStream, Compustat and Worldscope, Financial Times Actuaries All Share Index, and 
Department of Trade Databank. The Australian data sources include Sydney Stock Exchange 
and Australian Graduate School of Management Annual Report File. The rest are: Centrate 
dei Bilanci, Korean Stock Exchange, Compustat, SABI Bureau Van Djik, French Database 
Diane and National Bank of Belgian for Italy, Korea, Canada, Spain, France and Belgium, 
respectively.    
 
3.3 DISCUSSION 
This section presents the answer to RQ1: What techniques have been employed in this field? 
Consistent with the literature evolution, the section is structured as follows: statistical (3.3.1), 
artificially intelligent expert systems (3.3.2) and theoretical studies (3.3.3).  
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Figure 8: Statistical Methods used in Prior Studies 
 
3.3.1 Review of Statistical Approaches Studies 
Figure 8 contains the statistical methods used in prior studies. This sub-section presents a 
comprehensive discussion of the numerous statistical approaches as follows: (a) Univariate 
Analysis, (b) Multivariate Discriminant Analysis, (c) Multivariate Conditional Probability, 
and (d) Advanced Probability Modelling. 
 
a. Empirical Studies Using Univariate Analysis  
Univariate approach (UA) is analysing the predictive ability of independent variables, one at 
a time. Beaver‘s (1966) study, for example, finds that cash flow to total debt can predict 
failure five years prior to the event. Pompe and Bilderbeek‘s (2005) study confirms the 
predictive power of the cash flow to total debt. 
 
Casey and Bartczak (1984), however, suggest that a firm‘s debt level, access to capital 
markets and the saleability of its capital assets as well as its reservoir of liquid assets may be 
better indicators of its likelihood of failure rather than cash flow data. Nonetheless, the 
comparison of these studies is inappropriate due in part to the huge sample size of Casey and 
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Bartczak (1984) and the subsample approach of Beaver, which in turn, makes both results 
misleading. 
 
Altman (1968) concurs; stressing that UA‘s results adaptation for assessing the likelihood of 
a firm‘s failure is questionable. Others, too, give emphasis to the weaknesses in the UA‘s 
assumptions (e.g. Whittington, 1980; Keasey and Watson, 1991). UA is based on the rigorous 
assumption of linear relationship between all independent and the dependent measures 
(Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006). As well, UA ignores the holistic view of the explanatory 
variables. Casey and Bartczak (1984), however, argue that unlimited factors affect the 
likelihood of a firm‘s failure, implying that one variable cannot accurately and consistently 
predict failure. In sum, Zavgren (1983) contends that UA is the simplest and the weakest 
methodology in the corporate failure context. Discriminant Analysis, which is the focus of 
the next subsection, overcomes the deficiencies in UA by capturing predictors concurrently to 
discriminate between the failed and non-failed firms. 
 
b. Empirical Studies Using Multivariate Discriminant Analysis   
Fisher‘s (1930) Multivariate Discriminant Analysis (MDA) forms a linear combination (Z-
Score) by drawing the multidimensional features of the density function of the population‘s 
variables (Zavgren, 1983). Thus, Z= α + β1 X 1+ β2 X2 +........................ βn Xn., where Z is the score 
used to predict group membership, whereas, β1, β2 and βn are the coefficients, X1,X2, Xn are 
the independent variables and finally α, is the constant (see Lachenbruch, 1975). Prior studies 
employ two main MDA methods. These are: (i) linear discriminant analysis (LDA), and (ii) 
quadratic discriminant analysis (QDA), the analysis of which I turn to. 
 
(i) Linear Discriminant Analysis 
Following Altman‘s (1968) seminal paper, researchers apply LDA with varying degrees of 
success in: (1) homogeneous groups of firms (e.g. Altman and Loris, 1976, Vinso, 1979; Kim 
and Gu, 2006), (2) re-estimation (e.g. Moyer, 1977), (3) going concern evaluation (e.g. Koh 
and Killough, 1990). Other extensions include: induction of stability measures (Altman et al, 
1977; Dambolena and Khoury, 1980; Betts and Belhoul, 1987), assignment of prior 
probability membership classes (Deakin, 1972), balance sheet decomposition (Booth, 1983), 
cash management models (Blum, 1974), quarterly annual account information (Baldwin and 
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Glezen, 1992), and current cost information (Keasey and Watson, 1987; Aly, Barlow and 
Jones, 1992).  In addition, classical country extensions include: Brazil (Altman, Baidya and 
Dias, 1979), England (Taffler and Tisshaw, 1977) and beyond (see Altman and Narayanan, 
1997).  
 
Nevertheless, LDA models‘ application seems to be problematic due in part to the violation 
of its assumption in the real world (Lo, 1986; Lacher, Coats, Sharma, and Fant, 1995).These 
assumptions include linear separability, multivariate normality, and equal and within group 
covariance (Eisenbeis, 1977). Ohlson (1980) also argues that the output of the application is a 
Z-Score, which has slight intuitive interpretation. As a result, Taffler (1983) and Eisenbeis 
and Avery (1972) prefer the quadratic function, despite the substantial complexity (Eisenbeis, 
1977), the analysis of which I turn to. 
 
(ii) Quadratic Discriminant Analysis (QDA) 
Altman and Loris (1976) six variable quadratic model employs dataset from 40 failed and 
113 non-failed broker dealer firms and records 90% (86%) estimation (validation) predictive 
accuracy a year to failure. Altman‘s (1977) integrated system of three separate, two-group 
quadratic discriminant models predict savings and loans performance up to 3 semi-annual 
reporting periods prior to a specific critical date.  
 
Altman (1977), however, observes that QDA may not produce accuracies better than the 
LDA, emphasising that the former is highly sensitive to individual sample observations. 
Lachenbruck, Sneeringer and Revo (1973) also observe that the quadratic rule is badly 
affected by departure from normality. Boritz et al‘s (1995) findings suggest that NPDA 
(99%/99%), LDA (99%/98%) and probit (99%/99%) produce similar results 
(estimation/validation) and are superior to QDA (63%/62).  
 
Avery, Eisenbeis and Sinkey (1981) note that DA techniques suffer from four other related 
problems namely: (1) relative impact of the individual predictors, (2) reduction of 
dimensionality, (3) elimination of insignificant predictors, and (4) existence of time series 
associations. As a result, practitioners prefer multivariate conditional probability over DA 
(Press and Wilson, 1978; Maddala, 1991), on two grounds. First, logit is practically as 
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efficient as a linear classifier (Harrell and Lee, 1985), whether or not the assumptions of DA 
hold. Second, probit, in particular, is considered theoretically superior to MDA, ID3 and NN 
(see Dietrich and Kaplan, 1982). 
 
b. Empirical Studies Using Multivariate Conditional Probability  
Multivariate Conditional Probability employs the explanatory variables‘ coefficients or 
marginal effects to predict the occurrence likelihood of a binary dependent measure 
(Dielman, 2001). It considers the explanatory measures and, in this way, generates firm‘s 
score in order to categorise as failed or otherwise (Charitou, Neophytou, and Charalambous, 
2004). I discuss the multivariate conditional probability methods as follows: (i) logistic, 
probit and linear probability models and (ii) advanced probability modelling. 
 
(i) Logistic, Probit and Linear Probability Models 
 Logistic regression examines the probability that the firm fails in a pre-specified time period 
(Maddala, 1986; Gujarati, 2003). No assumption is required on prior probabilities of failure 
and/or predictors. Logit is a nonlinear logistic function modelled as: 
      
  
     
                                                                    (1) 
where    is the log of the odd ratio (i.e. logit), Zi is the dependent variable (e.g. ―failed‖ vs. 
―non-failed‖). As well, β0,  and   are the regression intercept, coefficient and the error term, 
respectively. The regression coefficient describes the size of the risk factor‘s contribution, 
suggesting that a positive and large coefficient indicates that the independent variable 
increases the probability of the outcome and vice-versa. Further, but for the use of cumulative 
logistic function by the logit, cumulative normal distribution by the probit, as well as the 
boundary values by the linear probability model (LPM), the three are similar (Boritz, et 
al,1995). 
 
Martin‘s (1977) findings suggest that bank capital adequacy is significantly related to the 
likelihood of a firm‘s survival. Martin also records similar accuracies for the logit (91.20%) 
and the discriminant analysis (91.65%). Casey and Bartczak‘s (1985) study verifies other 
studies in the US (e.g. Martin, 1977; Gentry, Newbold, and Whitford, 1985; Ohlson, 1980) 
and Korea (Min and Lee, 2005), suggesting that LDA and Logit models generate similar 
results, despite the shortcomings of the former. Aly, Barlow and Jones (1992), however, have 
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evidence from 23 matched pairs of failed and non-failed US firms to refute this assertion. 
Specifically, Aly et al use combined historical cost and current cost accounting and show the 
superiority of Logit (100%) over MDA (90%) as far as three years prior to failure.  Lo (1986) 
notes that logistics is more robust than MDA, but under specific distributional assumptions 
both procedures yield consistent estimates and the latter is asymptotically efficient. In this 
regard, Ohlson (1980) contends that a model‘s predictive power is based on the time the 
information is assumed to be available.  
 
Mensah‘s (1984) study shows that specific price level data do not greatly enhance prediction 
model. This supports Moyer‘s (1977) findings, suggesting that failure prediction models are 
fundamentally unstable, due in part to the prevailing macroeconomic factors. For this reason, 
it is argued that efforts to overcome inter-sectoral and inter-temporal development of the 
models may produce reliable results (see Moyer, 1977). 
 
Theodossiou (1991) illustrates that both logit and probit outperformed LPM (see also Press 
and Wilson 1978; Lo 1986; Lennox 1999). Further, Theodossiou‘s (1991) LPM result is 
similar to Collins‘ (1980) re-estimation models for Altman (94%) and Meyer and Pifer 
(93%). The comparison, however, between logit and probit is not straightforward. 
Nonetheless, Theodossiou (1991) advances the notion that logit is better, due to the 
computational difficulties associated with the probit model. 
 
(ii) Advanced Probability Modelling 
Contemporary researchers employ theoretical and econometric underpinnings of advanced 
probability modelling in the prediction of corporate failure context. Among these models are 
closed form generalised extreme value such as the nested logit model (Jones and Henser, 
2007), and open-form simulation based approaches such as mixed logit (Jones and Henser, 
2004; Hensher and Jones, 2007) and error component logit (Hensher and Jones, 2007). These 
advanced probability models, and mixed logit in particular, provide appreciably superior 
explanatory and statistical power than the standard logit models. As Hensher and Jones 
(2007) note, mixed logit appears to have the greatest promise in terms of essential 
behavioural realism, necessary econometric properties and overall efficacy. Mixed logit, 
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however, captures unobserved elements representing the random component of each utility 
expression.      
 
Lau (1987) extends previous corporate failure prediction models in two ways. First, Lau uses 
five financial states to measure financial health, implying a sharp contrast to the conventional 
failing and non-failing. Second, Lau‘s model predicts the probabilities that a firm will enter 
each of the five states, instead of classifying a firm into a certain financial state. In particular, 
Lau‘s multivariate logit analysis model records overall accuracy rates of 96%, 92%, and 90% 
for years 1-3. 
 
Peel and Peel‘s (1988) study shows that multilogit model allows analysts with the latest 
accounts of a firm to generate four probabilities, up to three years prior to failure. In a follow-
up study, Keasey, McGuinness and Short‘s (1990) study show that the notion of signal 
consistency is far from straightforward. On one hand, the healthy firms exhibit consistent 
pattern of signals. On the other, dating is more haphazard process, in particular distant 
failures. 
 
Neophytou and Molinero‘s (2004) Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) model suggests firms‘ 
leverage, profitability, and liquidity are crucial measures in predicting financial health of UK 
firms. However, the main setback of the MDS is that practitioners interested in the health of 
firms excluded from the original sample must add these, in order to assess its health through 
another plot.  
 
There are disadvantages, however, to using Multivariate Conditional Probability statistical 
methodology. For instance, when nominal variables exist the assumption that the dependent 
variable is a linear function of the independent variables may be questionable (Liang, 
Chandler, Han, and Roan, 1992). The cumulative normal distribution error assumption of the 
probit, for example, may be violated due in part to the presence of nominal variables. 
Artificially Intelligent Expert System is considered as alternative to parametric multivariate 
methods in the corporate failure context, the analysis of which I turn to. 
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3.3.2 Empirical Studies Using Artificially Intelligent Expert Systems (AIES)  
Artificially Intelligent Expert Systems (AIES) overcome non-linearity issues in statistical 
models studies. AIES are computer systems ‗trained‘ to spot full patterns by taking 
simulation from recognized facts about how the brain functions. Our results show that 34 
different architects have been employed in prior studies. The Back Propagation Neural 
Network (BPNN) accounts for 25%, whereas Iterative dichotomizer 3 (ID3), Generalised 
Adaptive Neural Networks Algorithm (GANN), and Case-based Reasoning (CBR) record 
7%, 5%, and 5%, respectively. This section proceeds as follows: (a) artificial neural 
networks, (b) case-based reasoning, (c) decision tree techniques, (d) evolutionary approaches, 
and (e) rough set models. 
 
a. Artificial Neural Networks Techniques 
Artificial Neural Network (ANN) comprises of interconnected homogeneous processing units 
of artificial neurons, which is motivated by the functional features of genetic neural network. 
As Tam and Kiang (1992) note, ANN is characterized by a weighted directed graph with 
units and connections. 
 
Similarly, the feed forward networks display three types of units namely: input, output and 
hidden layers of neurons (Tam and Kiang, 1992; Boritz et al, 1995; O‘Leary, 1998). 
Likewise, the back-propagation learning algorithm is designed to train multi-layer network in 
the feed forward. Further, ANN prohibits links within and/or higher to lower layer but 
changes its structure based on information that flows through the network. Following Kumar 
and Ravi‘s (2007) review, I discuss ANN applications as follows: (i) back propagation 
trained NN, (ii) self-organising feature map, and (iii) other ANN topologies. 
 
(i) Back Propagation Trained Neural Network (BPNN) 
Back propagation trained neural network (BPNN) minimizes the mean-squared error in the 
network and thus, more suitable for prediction but not classification problems. Tam (1991), 
for example, suggests that BPNN is more robust for assessing firms‘ failure.  Salchenberger, 
Cinar and Lash (1992), Fletcher and Goss (1993), Zhang, Hu, Eddy Patuwo, and Indro, 1999) 
and Charitou, Neophytou, and Charalambous (2004) confirm this notion, emphasizing on the 
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superiority of BPNN over the Logit models. Wilson and Sharda (1994), Odom and Sharda 
(1990) also show that the BPNN performs significantly better than LDA. 
 
Altman, Marco and Varetto‘s (1994) study, however, reports conflicting results between the 
BPNN and LDA. From this point, Yang, Platt and Platt (1999) use dataset of 122 oil and gas 
companies in the US, and show the superiority of the MDA over the BPNN and other 
probabilistic NN (see also Swicegood and Clark, 2001). Elsewhere in Belgium, Piramuthu, 
Ragavan, and Shaw (1998) have evidence to advance the predictive power of BPNN with 
feature construction over the ordinary ANN (see also Lee, Booth and Alam, 2005). 
 
Boritz et al‘s (1995) study, however, suggests that the BPNN does not achieve the ‗magical‘ 
results that the literature claims. Specifically, Boritz et al (1995) show that the combinations 
of proportions of failed firms in the training and testing data sets and assumptions about 
misclassification costs affect the BPNN‘s results. Salchenberger, Mine Cinar and Lash‘s 
(1992) study posits that better results might be expected with the NNs when the relationship 
between the variables does not fit the assumed model. The BPNN method requires user 
expertise due to its computational intensity and lack of formal theory. In fact, BPNN may 
yield illogical behavioural estimates when input values are varied (Altman, Marco and 
Varetto, 1994) due to the distribution nature of the network and the unboundedness of the 
transfer functions (NeuralWare, 1996), is germane here.  
 
(ii) Self-Organizing Feature Maps (SOFM)  
Self-Organising Feature Maps (SOFM) display a multidimensional input space over a plane 
and conserve its topological features (Serrano-Cinca, 1996). Lee, Han and Kwon (1996) have 
evidence from 83 matched pairs of failed and non-failed firms in Korea to suggest that hybrid 
neural network models are very promising in terms of predictive accuracy and adaptability. 
Serrano-Cinca (1996) concurs, asserting that SOFM provide a complete analysis, without 
renouncing simplicity for the analyst. 
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(iii) Other Neural Network Topologies 
Lacher, Coats, Sharma and Fant‘s (1995) cascade correlation model documents an accuracy 
of 84.1%, 89.4%, 94.7% for years 3, 2 and 1, compared to the re-estimated Altman‘s results 
of 72.3%, 74.5%, and 86.2%. This indicates that cascor is more accurate in pattern 
classification in comparison with Altman‘s LDA. 
 
Yang, Platt and Platt‘s (1999) U.S. oil and gas industry study shows that probabilistic neural 
networks without pattern normalization and LDA produce similar results but the latter shows 
lower type I errors. However, both categorical learning and probabilistic NN are trained to 
categorise data patterns into discrete categories, whereas BPNN forecasts continuous output 
values based on a set of continuous input parameters (Etheridge, Sriram, and Hsu, 2000), and 
thus, not suitable for binary outcome 
 
Kim and Kiang‘s (2010) findings suggest that bagged NN produces a more accurate single 
classifier vis-à-vis boosted NN, due to the constraint of new classifier generation of the latter. 
The generalisation of Kim and Kiang‘s results, however, is misleading, due in part to non-
consideration of the impact of the interdependence of combined classifiers on joint accuracy 
(Opitz and Maclin, 1999). Kim and Kiang‘s boosted NN ignores boosting algorithms such as 
confidence rated boosting (Schapire and Singer, 1999), and logit boost (Friedman, 2001).  
 
The ANN, however, is often referred to as ‗black boxes‘, suggesting that the user cannot 
readily comprehend the final rules that the NN models acquire (Shin and Lee, 2002). Other 
limitations of the NNs include but not limited to configuration issues (see Pao, 1989), 
computational efficiency and explanatory capability (see Tam, 1991).  For these reasons, 
Bryant (1997) proposes the case-based reasoning as a viable machine learning technique that 
mitigates the deficiencies in statistical and neural networks models, the analysis of which I 
turn to. 
 
b. Case-Based Reasoning Techniques (CBR) 
Case-Based Forecasting System (CBFS) employs the past analogous cases‘ result to forecast 
the present case‘s outcome (Jo, Han and Lee, 1997; Bryant, 1997; Park and Han, 2002). For 
this reason, it is regarded as forecasting-by-analogy (Kolodneer, 1991). Jo, Han and Lee 
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(1997) show that CBFS consists of three sub-processes: (1) classifying cases to forecast the 
object variable, (2) retrieving related cases, and (3) producing a prediction through combining 
the related cases nominated. 
 
Bryant‘s (1997) study employs the v-fold cross validation procedure and 3 case libraries of 
30 decisions trees to develop three CBR models with dataset covering the period 1978-94. 
Bryant (1997) records 72.70% (82.90%) for estimation (validation) Type I error, implying 
that CBR‘s models lack power. This probably contradicts Park and Han (2002) notion, 
suggesting that CBR is an effective technique which integrates knowledge and reasoning 
approach. 
 
Jo, Han and Lee‘s (1997) study also suggests that LDA (82.22%) and CBR (81.52%) produce 
similar results, but both are inferior to BPNN (83.79%).Jo, Han and Lee attribute the CBFS‘s 
inferior performance to the low correlation between dependent and independent variables as 
well as the binary dependent variable. 
 
Park and Han‘s (2002) study proposes an analogical reasoning structure for feature weighting 
using analytic hierarchy process (AHP)-weighted k-nearest neighbour (K-NN) algorithm. 
Park and Han (2002) record errors of 17% for the K-NN hybrid (AHP-K-NN-CBR) model 
compared to 20.8% and 31.7% of the Logit-CBR and pure CBR, respectively.  
 
c. Decision Trees Techniques (Recursive Partitioning Algorithm&ID3) 
Inductive algorithms or Iterative dichotomizer 3 (ID3) shows a tree structure by organising 
cases in memory (Quinlan, 1986). Unlike statistical approach, inductive learning approach 
generates knowledge structures by employing different assumptions and algorithms. 
Frydman, Altman and Kao‘s (1985) study shows that both RPA and the LDA techniques lead 
to accurate results in the bankruptcy context, but the former dominates in the results of the 
actual, cross-validation, and bootstrapped. Mckee‘s (1995) study proposes a parsimonious 
ID3 model which predicts as high as 97% in all cases. Mckee‘s model result, however, is 
misleading due in part to the subjective approach in determining the optimal model and the 
pruning rules. Messier and Hansen (1988) document that the attribute sets induced for the 
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production systems only partially intersect the attribute sets included in the discriminant 
models, but the former outperforms the latter in all cases 
 
Chung and Tam (1992), however, contend that the inductive learning algorithms, particularly, 
ID3 and AQ (79.5%) are more understandable but exhibit lower accuracy compared to NNs 
(85.3%). Recently, Cielen, Peeters and Vanhoof‗s (2004) study indicates that data 
envelopment (DEA) model outperforms linear programming model (MSD) and rule induction 
(C5.0).  
 
d. Evolutionary Approaches 
Genetic algorithms (GAs) use four steps (i.e. initialisation, selection, crossover, and 
mutation) to search complex and large spaces with a set of random possible solutions (Davis, 
1991). Fanning and Cogger (1994) show the time savings and the predictive accuracies 
available from generalised adaptive neural network algorithm (GANNA). Practical 
application of GANNA, however, is not feasible because the most effective network may not 
be as suitable with other sets of independent cases (Altman, Marco and Varetto, 1994). This 
partly explains why the countless researchers using the AIES methodology ignore validation 
test.  
 
Varetto‘s (1998) study shows the efficacy of GA in the failure context, despite the supremacy 
of LDA over GA. Nanda and Pendharkar (2001) contend that an integrated misclassification 
cost preferences (ICPB) based classification approach (example: ICPB-MSD and ICPB-GA) 
results in lower misclassification costs compared to goal programming approach (MSD) and 
GA approaches without misclassification cost. Shin and Lee‘s (2002) results from Korean 
SMEs suggest that GA extracts rules that are understandable to users, unlike NNs.  
 
e. Rough Sets 
Rough set considers the problem of indiscernibility between objects in a set (Pawlak, 1991). 
For this reason, rough set applications include dominance relations (Greco, Matarazzo, 
Slowinski, 1998) and in particular, corporate failure (see Slowinski and Zopounidis,1995, 
Mckee 2003, Dimitras, Slowinski, Susmaga, and Zopounidis, 1999). Mckee‘s (2003) study, 
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however, disputes the notion that rough set theory offered significant predictive power over 
the actual auditors‘ approaches.    
 
AIES is also limited in several respects. First, AIES requires too much efforts and time 
(Lawrence, Giles, and Tsoi, 1997). Second, analysts have difficulty in clarifying the 
predictive results. Finally, AIES suffers from difficulties with generalization due to lack of 
explanatory power and over fitting. This paves the way for a review of models with 
theoretical foundation, in the next section. 
 
3.3.3 Review of Models with Theoretical Foundation 
The previous section has shown that researchers select predictive variables with no 
underpinning theory, suggesting that resultant models depict the signs of failure but not the 
causes. This, perhaps in part, accounts for why practitioners have not embraced corporate 
failure prediction models, despite their outstanding predictive accuracies.  
 
This section reviews the few notable efforts by prior studies to predict failure using 
theoretical arguments to select variables for modelling. The section proceeds as follows: (a) 
Gambler‘s Ruin Theory, (b) Balance Sheet Decomposition Measure/Entropy and finally, and 
(c) Cash Management Theory. 
 
(a) Empirical Studies Using the Gambler’s Ruin Theory 
Wilcox‘s (1971; 1973; 1976) ruin model offers a more reliable option to assessing the 
probability of a firm‘s failure. Wilcox considers the firm as a gambler with an initial amount 
of money (hereafter net worth). The firm utilises the net worth in a series of independent 
trials, implying that the firm may win or lose a dollar, representing probability p and 1-p, 
respectively. During these series of trial the firm meets losses by disposing its assets. 
Ultimately, the net worth may either grow or fall to zero, indicating non-failed and failed 
firms, respectively. Wilcox acknowledges that this is simplistic view of a firm, pointing out 
that injection of capital and managerial resources, can rescue the firm. For this reason, 
Wilcox argues that a better model is feasible if additional capital and management talent 
injection is considered as failures.  
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Further, Wilcox (1973) proposes adjusted cash position, mean adjusted cash flow and 
variance of the adjusted cash flow as significant predictors of long term business risk, 
however, the empirical evidence is abysmal. Nonetheless, Wilcox (1976) outlines how the 
information gained under this approach may be used by boards to reduce the likelihood of 
firms‘ failure. 
 
Santomero and Vinso‘s (1977) study shows that financial institutions are exposed to a 
reasonable risk of suspended operations, which changes very little with variations in the 
capital account buffer. Likewise, Vinso (1979) concludes that, it is possible to quantify the 
risk of ruin through a safety index determined using a variation of the annuity process of 
collective risk theory. In comparison to Altman‘s (1968) study, Vinso claims superiority of 
his model despite the major differences in approach. Wilcox (1971; 1973; 1976), Santomero 
and Vinso‗s (1977) results are misleading due to lack of ex-ante or ex-post validation. 
 
(b) Balance Sheet Decomposition Measure 
Booth (1983) confirms the proposition that decomposition measures are useful as variables in 
financial statement scanning device (Lev, 1973), despite the huge Type II errors (50%). 
Booth (1983) also confirms the significant predictive power of firm size recorded by prior 
studies (e.g. Ohlson, 1980).  
 
Similarly, the profile analysis indicates that the decomposition measures of failed companies 
are larger and less stable over time than those of similar non-failed companies. Nevertheless, 
the robustness of Booth‘s model is compromised due to the small sample size for validation 
vis-à-vis the huge Type II error. 
 
(c) Empirical Studies Using the Cash Management Theory 
Blum (1974) introduces three theoretical underpinning in corporate failure context namely: 
(1) a theory of symptoms, (2) a cash-flow framework and (3) the failing company model. 
Blum also employs the Cash flow framework to select his independent variables, 
emphasising that accounting ratios represent principals. Blum‘s (1974) model considers the 
entity as a reservoir of financial resources, implying that its likelihood of failure is based on 
the expected flows of those resources ‗ceteris paribus’.  
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Gentry, Newbold and Whitford‘s (1985) study employs cash-based funds flow model and 
documents that MDA and probit produce similar results. They also argue that the cash-flow 
based funds flow components offer a viable alternative for classifying failed and non-failed 
firms. This probably contradicts Casey and Bartczak‘s (1984) findings, but there are 
fundamental differences in the research design of the two studies. Laitinen and Laitinen‘s 
(1998) study supports the efficacy of inventory cash management to predict failure using data 
from Finland, is relevant here. Aziz, Emanuel and Lawson (1988) use Lawson‘s (1971) cash 
flow identity, and find that fund flow measures are better suited than accrual based ratios to 
detect impending failure(see also Huyhebaert, Gaeremynck, Roodhooft, and Van de Gucht, 
2000).   
 
3.4 THE RESEARCH GAP IN CORPORATE FAILURE LITERATURE 
Following a detailed review of the literature, I are overwhelmed by the valuable contributions 
made by studies reviewed and those cited to the existing body of Accounting, Finance and 
Economics Literature, particularly in the area of prediction of corporate failure. Prior studies 
address the problems applying useful: (1) statistical techniques (e.g. Beaver, 1966; Altman, 
1968; Martin, 1977; Zmijewski, 1984), (2) AIES (e.g. Lacher, Coats, Sharma, and Fant, 
1995; Kumar and Ravi, 2007; Jo, Han and Lee, 1997) and (3) theoretical models (Wilcox 
1971; 1973; 1976), and most have successfully accomplished their stated objectives.  
 
However, there is no logical theory underpinning the use of independent variables but weak 
guidance on the suitable measures is provided in diverse studies (Taffler, 1982). Put simply, 
there is no consistency in variable selection and/or definition, to answer the practical 
questions of why firms fail. Wilcox (1973), Vinso (1979), and Taffler (1982, 1983), however, 
identify this gap, but followed the norm of the ad hoc means of selecting variables. The first 
two researchers on the above list, attempt to fill the gap by looking for a single measure, 
despite the criticisms of the UA.  
 
In summary, the SLR reiterates Taffler (1983) assertions that ―The lack of any real theory 
relating to the use of financial ratio analysis constitutes a serious gap in the accounting 
literature (Taffler, 1983. p.3). In this respect, future empirical researchers should consider 
theoretical arguments from classical theories such as resource dependency and agency in 
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selecting predictive variables for their models. This in turn, may offer insightful findings to 
deepen our understanding on the corporate failure phenomena. In particular, I argue that these 
theories can answer the grey question of when and why businesses fail.   
 
Concerning objective of prior studies, the SLR reviews the need for developing models to 
predict corporate failure. Only 14% of the reviewed studies have attempted to develop 
models to predict corporate failure. More importantly, only two models (i.e. Altman 1968; 
Taffler, 1983) are extensively used by both practitioners and academies (see Charitou et al, 
2004; Agarwal and Taffler, 2007). This suggests that future research direction must focus on 
the development and testing of models to predict failure.  
 
On the subject of independent variables, the SLR notes the neglect of non-financial 
information as a major gap in the literature. Only 1% of the reviewed studies have employed 
exclusively non-financial information in the corporate failure context. For this reason, I 
encourage future research to examine non-fanancial information ranging from corporate 
governance to the five measures of the balanced scorecard (i.e. financial, customers, internal 
business process, learning and growth, and the community) 
 
On the topic of dataset, the SLR records the neglect of dataset from unincorporated entities as 
one of the gaps in the extant corporate failure literature. While the incidence of failure is 
greater in unincorporated entities, only one study (i.e. Luoma and Laitinen, 1991) has used 
dataset from unincorporated entities. Therefore, I encourage future studies to examine the 
causes of failure in unincorporated entities.  
 
On the definition of ‗corporate failure, the SLR reviews the need to broaden the legal 
definition to include more than one of the Morris‘s (1997) indicators of corporate distressed. 
Only 13.75% of the reviewed studies have defined the term ‗corporate failure‘ to include 
delisting, reduction in dividend (Lee, Han and Kwon, 1996), default of debt agreement 
(Beaver, 1966; Jones and Hensher, 2007) and zero capital (Theodossiou, 1991). 
Consequently, I encourage future studies to broaden the scope of the definition of corporate 
failure to include other issues which may be termed as financial distressed.  
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On the topic of matching technique, the SLR notes matching by size and industry dominates 
the literature. It also notes the numerous disadvantages associated with matching by size and 
industry. This notwithstanding, Ohlson (1980) argues the apprioriate criteria for matching are 
not obvious. While, Zmijewski‘s (1984) studies claim the arbitrary matching and random 
sample techniques are comparable. The important implication is that more research is needed 
to clarify issues surrounding matching techniques to depeen our understanding on the 
appropriate criteria for matching in the corporate failure context. Specifically, I encourage 
future research to consider more advanced matching techniques such as propensity score 
matching. 
 
Regarding sample selectivity issues, the SLR notes the neglect of time dimension as one of 
the gaps in the literature. Only 22.5% of the reviewed studies have employed five year data to 
analysis the corporate failure phenomena. Further, only 13% of these five year data models 
have used dataset beyond the US and UK. This suggests that future research direction must 
focus on five year dataset from countries other than the US and UK.  
 
3.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE SLR 
The limitations of the present SLR are as follows. First, the searches in this SLR are defined 
by using certain synonymous words with corporate failure to six search engines (see section 
3.1.3). Thus, I cannot promise that all relevant papers to the scope of the SLR have been 
found. For instance, 10 important papers in this SLR is directly included in the review as a 
result its citation in prior reviews. However, after checking the references to the papers 
included in the SLR, 40, 95, 23 have been published in four, three and two, star journals of 
ABS Guide, respectively. This implies that I have analysed the contents of an illustrative 
sample of the field. This notwithstanding, the repetition of the SLR is not feasible due to the 
deviation from protocol stated in 3.2.1. This deviation, however, is inevitable in other to have 
a complete sample for more comprehensive discussion. I consider reasonable sample 
estimation and validation sample as well as models robustness, predictive accuracy, 
adaptability and explanatory capability to be part of quality assessment criteria (see section 
3.1.5), but these items are difficult to quantify with precision.  
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3.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presents a SLR, during the period 1966-2012, in the application of statistical, 
intelligent techniques and theoretical approaches to solve the bankruptcy prediction problem 
faced by firms in twelve different countries. This review answers three main questions. First, 
what techniques are employed in this field? Second, what are the methodological issues in the 
literature? Finally, what is the main research gap in the literature? 
 
The search engines of, Google Scholar, Wiley Interscience, Science Direct, Web of 
Knowledge, Business Source Complete of the Social Sciences are systematically searched for 
the reviewed papers using a defined search string. The review intergrates the approaches used 
by previous review researchers namely: Aziz and Dar (2006), Kumar and Ravi (2007) 
Balcaen and Ooghe (2006). Thus, for each paper I extract study attributes such as author, 
year, period, accuracy, errors, sample, matching technique, variables, origin, firm type, 
journal of publication (see Aziz and Dar, 2006; Kumar and  Ravi, 2007). 
  
Second, following Balcaen and Ooghe‘s (2006) study, I propose a synthesis of the proposal to 
discuss the methodological issues in the literature. Third, the rationale behind research and 
operational definition of failure are extracted and discussed using a template from Dietrich 
(1984) and Morris (1997), respectively. Finally, I discuss the significant contributions of each 
paper in the relevant section and concluded the review with suggestions to shift the focus 
from the recent paradigm to innovative ways to enhance the robustness of future prediction 
models as well as enrich our understanding in the corporate failure syndrome. The approach 
followed in all the papers reviewed may be termed ex post empirical. Thus, a group of actual 
failures is identified from an arbitrary period and the characteristics of these firms at least one 
year prior to failure are compared with a group of firms which did not fail. In addition, the 
results indicate significant body of literature on but a sound, accurate, simple and widely used 
theoretical framework for prediction of corporate failure is yet to be developed. Thus, despite 
the countless models, the question of why businesses fail is still a grey area. 
 
For this reason, future researchers must consider the link between the corporate failure 
phenomena and theoretical arguments from proponents of existing economics theories. In 
particular, sound theoretical arguments based on agency and resource dependency 
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perspectives using the corporate governance lens may offer insight and deepen our 
understanding in the corporate failure process. This has set the scene for the next chapter, 
which seeks to contribute by exploring the nexus between corporate governance and the 
corporate failure syndrome. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
90 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
CORPORATE FAILURE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE THEORIES 
 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter highlights that prior corporate failure studies attempt to predict failure 
using financial symptoms (e.g. profitability, liquidity, leverage). Put simply, prior studies 
neglect the question of how the firm got into financial trouble (Daily and Dalton, 1994a). As 
Argenti (1985) observes, the corporate failure process becomes financial as a firm moves to 
the penultimate phase of failure.  
 
Similarly, the recent Enron-Andersen debacle, as well as those at WorldCom, Lehman 
Brothers, Parmalat and others provide signal that accounting data can be influenced to 
disguise deteriorating financial performance. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) confirm this notion 
and contend that CEOs can potentially influence the accuracy of the business disclosures. 
Daily and Dalton (1994a, 1994b), Gales and Kesner (1994) and Platt and Platt (2012) concur, 
emphasising that corporate governance failures of firms may provide one possible 
explanation of corporate failure.  
 
This chapter discusses significant insights connected to corporate failure from two main 
theoretical approaches namely: agency and resource dependency perspectives. The 
motivation is threefold. First, I answer the call that the corporate failure context is one of the 
opportunities for linking the aforementioned theories (see Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Hillman 
and Dalziel, 2003). Second, I propose an integrative model to explain the corporate failure 
phenomenon (see Mellahi and Wilkinson 2004; Amankwah-Amoah and Debrah, 2010). 
Finally, I review the literature with respect to corporate governance attributes and relate it to 
corporate failure.  
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The link between corporate failure and the agency and 
resource dependency perspectives are set out in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. Section 
4.3 describes the synthesis integrating the corporate governance theories. Section 4.4 presents 
the theoretical model. Section 4.5 concludes the chapter. 
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4.1 CORPORATE FAILURE: THE AGENCY THEORY PERSPECTIVE 
The agency theory considers the universal agency relationship, in which the principal gives 
work to the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Berle and Means (1932) contend that the dispersion of 
shareholding in listed firms has resulted to a separation of ownership and control, hence the 
agency problems. Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson (1997), Gomez-Mejia, and Wiseman, 
(2007) concur, emphasizing that the delegation allows CEOs to opportunistically seek their 
interest at the expense of shareholders‘ value. Jensen and Meckling (1976), for example, 
suggest top management and shareholders may extract perks (e.g. private jets) out of a firm‘s 
assets rather than maximizing shareholders wealth. Others suggest CEOs may excessively 
increase their compensation and prestige by pursuing diversification strategies (Amihud and 
Lev, 1981; Goforth, 1993).  
 
In this vein, Black, (1976), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977) consider the firm as a 
collection of groups with conflicting interest. For this reason, agency theory is concerned 
with resolving conflict of interest and problem of risk sharing. Simply put, it focuses on 
determining the best efficient contract governing the principal agent relationships (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976: Eisenhardt, 1989). Thus, the principal agent relationships should reflect 
efficient form of organisation of information and risk-bearing cost (Fama, 1980), if the firm is 
to survive. 
 
Consequently, agency scholars endorse alternative executive compensation schemes and 
governance structures to decrease the agency cost (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus, agency 
theory advocates for enhanced agent controls to bridge the goal conflict between the 
principals and the agents (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This in turn, moderates the agency 
loss (Eisenhardt, 1989) through reducing the potential adverse selection problems 
(Williamson, 1985; Gomez-Mejia, and Wiseman, 2007), and ultimately, enhances the 
survival of the firm. 
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) advocate that the agency problem is controlled by check and 
balances that separate the firm‘s management and control of decisions. Smith and Jensen 
(2000) concur, emphasising that a firm‘s survival is enhanced through undertakings where 
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specific knowledge significant for decisions is expansively diffused among professional 
managers. 
 
Similarly, Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that 
boards enhance firms‘ survival by performing the critical function of monitoring and 
rewarding the CEO. Thus, effective board monitoring reduces agency cost (Waldo, 1985) 
which in turn, reduces the likelihood of a firm‘s failure.  
 
The boards‘ monitoring task includes planning CEO succession (Picher, Chreim and Kisfalvi, 
2000) and evaluating CEO‘s performance (Boyd, 1995). The aim of board monitoring is the 
obligation to ensure that management maximizes shareholders‘ value. This fiduciary 
obligation demands a thoroughly review of the CEO‘s agenda by the board (Hillman and 
Dalziel 2003), thus, if the firm is to survive. 
 
Therefore, Fama (1980) suggests that the board composition determines directors‘ ability to 
be effective monitors of the CEO‘s actions. Fama and Jensen (1983) and Baysinger and 
Hoskisson (1990) agree, stressing that board‘s effectiveness in monitoring CEO is a task of 
both insiders and outsiders directors. Chancharat, Krishnamurti, Tian (2012) confirm this 
notion and show that inside directors play a complementary role to outsiders in mitigating a 
firm‘s failure. Critics (e.g. Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Daily and Dalton, 1994a, b: 1995; 
Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) suggest, however, that inside directors‘ loyalty to the CEO, may 
reduce their ability to provide a fair evaluation. This, in part, may lead to expropriation of 
shareholders‘ wealth (Fama, 1980), thereby increasing the likelihood of a firm‘s failure.  
 
Accordingly, Carter, Simkins and Simpson (2003) argue that the viability of the board is 
enhanced by including outside directors to reduce the likelihood of collusive arrangements. 
Thus, outside directors are viewed as mediators whose task is to encourage and oversee 
competition among firms management (Fama, 1980). Fama and Jensen (1983) concur, 
stressing that outside directors act as arbiters in disagreements among insiders and approve 
resolutions that include severe agency problems. Put simply, there is growing body of 
conceptual literature that effective boards will consist of higher proportions of outside 
directors (e.g. Lorsch and Maciver, 1989; Beasley, 1996). 
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Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson (1998) also contend that the corporate community is 
more outspoken on outside dominated boards. For instance, the UK Code stipulates that half 
the board, excluding the chairman, should comprise independent non-executive directors, 
save for smaller firms. Smith (2003) recommends that audit committees should include at 
least three independent non-executive directors. The remuneration committee members must 
be exclusively non-executive directors (Greenbury, 1995).   
 
Evidence, however, on the impact of outside directors on board performance is mixed. Some 
scholars (e.g. Ezzamel and Watson 1993; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990) find a positive nexus 
between proportion of outside director and firm performance. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990), 
for example, show inclusion of outside directors on boards is associated with a positive 
abnormal stock return. In parallel, Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson‘s (1998) meta-
analysis of fifty-four studies shows no significant statistical relationship between board 
independence (proportion of outside directors), and firm performance. Chancharat, 
Krishnamurti, Tian‘s (2012) result indicates that the relationship between board 
independence and performance, is nonlinear. They attribute this to the increased monitoring 
costs faced by outsiders due to higher information asymmetry.  
 
Fama (1980) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that when incentives are aligned with 
shareholders‘ interest, boards will be more effective monitors of management, and corporate 
failure will be avoided. Spence and Zeckhauser (1971) and Ross (1973) concur, but pinpoint 
the problems associated with this incentive. Dalton, Daily, Certo, Roengpitya‘s (2003) meta-
analysis fails to find statistical significance to support the notion that equity compensation 
links the interest of agent and principal.  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980) and Smith and Jensen (2000) contend that capital 
and managerial-labour markets regulate the degree to which CEO‘s action can deviate from 
value-maximizing behaviour. Thus, the corporate-control market limits managerial 
investment, financing, and dividend decisions, thereby enhancing the survival of firms 
(Manne, 1965). Jensen and Ruback (1983), for example, argue management teams contest for 
the privileges to manage corporate resources in the capital market.  
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The managerial labour market also disciplines ineffective CEOs of distressed firms with the 
stigma of failure (see Sutton and Callahan, 1987; D'Aveni, 1990; Efrat, 2005). This in turn, 
reduces the value of their human capital and reputation (Ezzamel and Watson, 2005). Gilson 
(1990) confirms this notion and shows that directors of financially distressed firms are not 
employed in the board network for a minimum of three years. Kaplan and Reishus (1990) 
find that CEOs in dividend reducing firms have less than 50% chance to serve as outside 
directors for an exchange-listed firm.  
 
Similarly, the right to speak and vote on major corporate matters (e.g. takeovers and elections 
of directors), is noted as the greatest legal right of shareholders (Manne, 1965; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). In particular, shareholders of failing firms may invoke corporate governance 
mechanisms resulting in, but not limited to: hostile takeover, CEO replacement (e.g. Gilson, 
1990; Kang and Shivdasani, 1997, Frank and Mayer 2001), and reducing CEO pay (Gilson 
and Vetsuypens, 1993; Kaplan, 2005).  
 
The above analysis suggests as follows. First, outside directors, due to their independence 
from firm‘s management, may enhance firm‘s survival by monitoring the CEO‘s agenda 
(Carter, Simkins and Simpson, 2003; Dalton, Daily, Certo, Roengpitya, 2003). However, 
second, empirical evidence is mixed, suggesting that not all outside directors are independent 
of firm management (see Bainbridge, 1993; Daily and Dalton, 1994a). Hence, third, outside 
directors may not be effective monitors of top management. Nonetheless, Kosnik (1987) 
shows that, agency theory explains the question of how firms react to ―greenmail.‖ Therefore, 
finally, if outsider directors fail to monitor CEO, external mechanisms such as bankruptcy 
will emerge to control CEOs (Walsh and Seward, 1990). Thus, I argue that bankruptcy can be 
viewed as the legal resolution of severe shareholder-top management conflicts about the 
levels of financial assets and performance that the latter should maintain.  
 
In addition to the shareholder-top executive conflict, another contributing factor to corporate 
failure is the shareholder-creditor conflict. D‘Aveni (1989b), for example, contends that 
bankruptcy can be viewed as the legal resolution of severe shareholder-creditor conflicts 
about the levels of assets that the firm should possess. The creditors have the legal right to 
dissolve the debtor. The creditor may invoke his right if the board of directors and outside 
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directors, in particular, fail to resolve the shareholder-creditor conflicts. Agency logic (see 
Jensen and Meckling 1976) suggests that creditors and shareholders have divergent interest, 
which must be resolved if the firm is to survive (D‘Aveni, 1989b). For example, they differ 
over how a firm should be managed. Warner (1977) identifies four major sources of conflict 
between the creditor and shareholder namely: (1) claim dilution, (2) assets substitution, (3) 
underinvestment and (4) dividend pay-out
6
.   
 
Concerning claim dilution, it is argued that the interests of current creditors are endangered if 
a firm takes on new debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Further, in times of crises controlling 
shareholders may take undue risks (Green, 1984). This excessive risk is exaggerated if the 
controlling shareholders are expected to lose their residual claim of a failing firm‘s resources 
(D‘Aveni, 1989b). Thus, shareholders may assume strategies that are extremely risky for the 
creditors and this conflict is deepened if the firm is distressed (D‘Aveni, 1989b). Agency 
logic, therefore, expects outside directors to monitor and evaluate firm‘s financing decisions 
with the view of resolving shareholder-creditor conflict, if the firm is to survive. 
 
Turning to asset substitution and underinvestment, Green (1984) posit that if the firm 
alternates high-risk for low risk projects, this increases shareholders‘ value but not the 
creditors‘ claim. Thus, the value of equity, due to its limited liability feature, is considered an 
option (Ju and Ou-Yang 2006). As well, Myers (1977) argues that firms with outstanding 
risky bonds may reject positive net present value (NPV) projects when the project‘s benefit 
accrues to bondholders. This is because controlling shareholders bear the costs of the projects 
but shares the benefits with creditors (Ju and Ou-Yang 2006). In sum, asset substitution and 
underinvestment suggest that certain decisions increase shareholders‘ value but reduce 
creditors‘ wealth. Thus, agency logic expects the outside directors to monitor and evaluate 
firms‘ investment strategies with the view of resolving shareholder-creditor conflict, if the 
firm is to survive. 
 
Concerning dividend pay-out, Kalay (1982) proposes that the value of debt is reduced by 
unforeseen dividend increases, if debts are priced on the assumption that the firm‘s dividend 
                                                          
6
 Jensen and Smith (1985) present a comprehensive discussion of the sources of conflict between the creditor 
and shareholder. 
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policy will be unchanged. Black (1976) contends that shareholders have the incentive to pay 
out the entire assets in the form of dividend, and thus, leave the creditors holding an empty 
shell. This practice is particularly tempting if a firm is incurring prolong losses, which 
suggest that shareholders have no chance of receiving any dividends from the future cash 
flows of the firm (D‘Aveni, 1989b). In this regard, Smith and Jensen (2000) argue that there 
is a natural conflict over the level of liquidity that a debtor must maintain and this conflict is 
worse when the debtor is financially troubled. This conflict is heightened by the limited 
liability feature of equity claims, implying that creditors may have an empty shell in the event 
of bankruptcy (see, Black, 1976; Jensen and Meckling 1976). Accordingly, using the agency 
lens, the outside directors must monitor and evaluate firms‘ dividend pay-out policy with the 
view of resolving shareholder-creditor conflict, if the firm is to survive.  
 
In sum, these conflicts must be managed and resolved by the board and outside directors, in 
particular (Fama 1980). Borrowing from the legalistic and class managerial hegemony 
perspectives boards are weak vis-à-vis top management (Mace, 1971). Drucker (1981), for 
example, blames boards of being 'the last to know' in every financial scandal over the past 
five decades. This suggests that the shareholder-creditor conflict, in practice, is resolved by a 
firm's CEO (Donaldson and Lorsch, 1983). Using the agency lens, firm's top management is 
untrustworthy, hence shareholder-creditor conflicts will not be resolved well (Fama 1980).  
 
As a result, corporate governance mechanisms ensure that creditors exchange their finances 
for control rights. These control rights include cessation of assets, petition to the court for 
liquidation, speak and remove vote in reorganizations.  It is worth noting that bankruptcy 
rules offer creditors more legal protection than that of the shareholder. This implies that 
creditors would resort to bankruptcy laws to resolve the dominant shareholder-creditor 
conflict.                 
 
However, empirical studies of the degree to which agency theory contributes to the board's 
governing effectiveness and corporate failure, in particular, are limited. This study 
contributes to this debate. It attempts to fill the gap on the agency logic and corporate failure 
prediction, using empirical evidence from the UK. Accordingly, building on the agency logic, 
this study examines the presence of women representation on board, outside directors and 
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board standing committees (i.e. nomination, audit and remuneration) and corporate failure. 
This study also argues that the resource dependency perspective of boards complement the 
agency theory. According, I turn to the analysis of the link between the resource dependency 
theory and corporate failure in the next section.  
 
4.2 CORPORATE FAILURE: THE RESOURCE DEPENDENCE THEORY 
PERSPECTIVE 
The resource dependency theory suggests that a firm‘s survival is dependent on its ability to 
gain control over resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Thus, a primary tenet of resource 
dependency theory is resource scarcity, suggesting that firms compete for limited resources 
(Hessels and Terjesen, 2010). Resource dependency theory therefore focuses on the firm‘s 
ability to establish contacts with coalition to access resources (Van Witteloostuijn and Boone 
2006). Coalition (Pearce, 1982) is a group with a stake in organisational action (Goodman 
and Pennings, 1977). These coalitions can be internal (e.g. shareholders and employees) or 
external (e.g. suppliers and regulators) (see Cyert and March, 1963). Each group of coalition 
possess means to controls the use, access and possession of critical resources necessary for a 
firm‘s survival (Sheppard, 1995). Diverse coalitions groups, however, monitor contradictory 
aims, indicating that the firm must encompass a variety of inconsistent goals, if the firm is to 
survive (Cyert and March, 1963).  
 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) also contend that a firm reacts in diverse ways (e.g. refusal, 
avoidance, compliance etc.) to coalitions‘ demands, implying that firms are not bound by 
such demands. Sheppard (1995) agrees, emphasising that four factors are critical to the firm‘s 
ability to effectively employ a response. These are: (1) the firm‘s reliance on the coalition, (2) 
its resources, (3) environmental uncertainty, and (4) accurate management of information.  
 
Following Sheppard (1995), I present a resource dependence model in Figure 9. The model 
shows the interface between coalitions and their power and demands in column 1. Column 2 
describes the source of control by internal and external claimants of the firm. Columns 4 and 
3 also outline potential strategies which firms employ to manage coalition demands and 
moderating factors, respectively. The final column, in particular, shows vital elements in the 
resource dependence model (e.g. diversification, director interlocks, board outsider and firm 
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size). Thus, firms  minimise the effects of external dependence and thereby increase their 
chances of survival if they select more profitable domains (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), and 
establish external linkages (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) to minimise dependency effects 
(Thompson, 1967). This implies that firm‘s survival is dependent on vital strategic decision: 
corporate, business, networking, and financial. I will discuss each in turn. 
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COALITIONS AND THEIR 
TYPICAL DEMANDS 
SOURCE OF CONTROL WHY FIRMS FAIL TO COPE WITH 
CLAIMANT DEMANDS 
STRATEGIES FIRMS EMPLOY TO COPE WITH 
EXTERNAL DEMANDS 
REFLECTED IN  
(TYPES OF VARIABLES) 
SHAREHOLDERS: 
SEEK HIGHER RETURN ON 
INVESTMENT 
MANAGEMENT: 
SEEK BETTER 
REMUNERATION PACKAGE 
CLIENTS: 
SEEK QUALITY & 
AFFORDABLE PRODUCTS 
COMPETITORS: 
SEEK FAIR PRACTICES 
VENDORS: 
SEEK PROFITABILITY 
ORDERS 
REGULATORS:: 
MONITOR COMPLIANCE 
MISCELLANEOUS GROUPS: 
SEEK DIVERSE DEMANDS 
STAFF:  
SEEK BETTER SERVIVE 
CONDITIONS 
Possess stock and thus impact on firm 
governance and legitimacy 
Manage the affairs of the firm and 
thus, controls internal decision making 
legitimacy 
Control firm’s access to labour & can 
make demand effecting firm’s value & 
legitimacy.  
 Possess resources which affect product 
quality and thus can impact on firm’s 
value 
Legal rights help regulators to control 
resource possession and thus affect firm’s 
legitimacy  
Effect firm’s value, due to possession of 
revenue resource or control access by 
protest or regulate possession through 
government 
Possess firm’s revenue resources & can 
impact on corporate survival 
Limited resources, environmental 
uncertainty, and poor management of 
information. 
Uncertain Environments & poor 
management of data 
Environmental uncertainty, firm 
interdependence & poor processing of 
information 
Inconsistent claimants’ demands & poor 
management of information 
REFUSAL (marginal impact for non-
compliance) 
……………………………………………… 
 
AVOIDANCE (compliance is not possible) 
MANAGEMENT of environmental demands 
(e.g. control access to those who affect 
change) 
 
Control Definition of satisfaction (e.g. 
analysing demands to make compliance easy) 
 
Control formation of demands  
(e.g. via industry self-regulation, etc.) 
ADAPTATION to environmental demands: 
……………………………………………….. 
Change behaviour to meet demands 
(e.g. the marketing concept) 
…………………………………………… 
Operate on the environment via: 
……………………………………………… 
ALTERATION of the firm interdependencies, 
via: 
-Merger (reduced dependence) 
-Size (raise degree to which others are 
dependent on your firm 
…………………………………………………. 
NEGOTIATION of the organisational 
interdependence, via: 
-COORDINATION/REGULATION using 
government, trade assn.., etc. 
-COOPTATION by board interlocks  
-COOPERATION (Joint ventures) 
 
 
COMPLIANCE (non-compliance is expensive) 
costly) 
IND CONDITIONS 
……………………….. 
CORP. RESOURCES 
DIR. INTERLOCKS 
…………………….. 
BOARD OUTSIDERS 
 
DIVERSIFICATION 
Legal rights help competitors to 
control resource possession and 
thus affect firm’s profitability 
DIR. INTERLOCKS 
…………………….. 
BOARD OUTSIDERS 
  
DIVERSIFICATION 
FIRM SIZE 
……………….. 
MARKET SHARE 
Government 
Regulation 
DIR. INTERLOCKS 
…………………….. 
BOARD OUTSIDERS 
  
JOINT VENTURES 
CORP. RESOURCES 
Internal Claimants: 
DEMANDS 
 
External Claimants: 
CLAIMANTS AND 
 THEIR DEMANDS 
ADOPTED FROM SHEPPARD (1995)  
 
Figure 9: Resource Dependence Model 
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4.2.1 Corporate Level Strategy 
Corporate level strategy comprises issues concerning choosing the firms‘ operating domains 
(Hofer and Schendel 1978; Hill and Jones, 1992). This entails the dissemination of firm 
resources among the diverse industries and/or national markets (Beard and Dess, 1981). 
Sheppard (1995) claims that a firm‘s operating domains can play a vital role in its survival. 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) agree, highlighting that the presence of conflict in the firm‘s 
environment indicates a lack of ability to coordinate interdependent activities between firm 
and its environment. The conflict is anchored in resource scarcity (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). Industry growth (Porter, 1980), industry instability (Dess and Beard, 1984) and 
industry profitability (Dalton and Penn, 1976) are identified as indicators of resource scarcity.   
 
Porter (1980) observes that, firms in high growth industries can increase market share without 
pilfering sales from competitors. Firms in deteriorating industries, however, contest each 
other for sales (Sheppard, 1995). Dess and Beard (1984) also contend that corporate failure is 
pronounced in unstable environments, due in part to resource scarcity. In parallel, Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978) maintain that firms in stable industries reduce their environmental 
uncertainties through cooperative agreements. Diversification, in particular, may reduce 
firm‘s dependence on a specific domain of activity. This in turn, may reduce the possibility of 
firm‘s failure (Wernerfelt and Montgomery 1988; Rumelt, 2006), implying that 
diversification reduces the impact of market decline in a specific market.  
 
Industry profitability indicates a firm‘s ability to access of resources. Thus, the conflict 
between firms in profitable industries is negligible (Sheppard, 1994; 1995) due in part to the 
comparatively ease to obtain resources. Simply put, firms in a profitability industry are more 
profitable (Lieberson and O‘Conner, 1972), thereby reducing the probability of firm‘s failure 
(Drucker, 1970). 
 
In sum, researchers (e.g. Ravenscraft, 1983) suggest industry structure is positively related to 
firm performance, which probably transfers into prospect of firm‘s survival (Drucker, 1970; 
Sheppard, 1995).  In this respect, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) and Amihud and Lev (1981) 
argue that firms move into wide range of industry to reduce industry effects and thereby 
reduces the probability of failure.  
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4.2.2 Business Level Strategy 
Hofer and Schendel (1978) speculate that ―at the business level, strategy focuses on how to 
compete in a particular industry or product-market segment. Thus, distinctive competences 
and competitive advantage are usually the most important components of strategy at this level 
(p. 27, 28)‖. In this vein, Hambrick, (1980: p.567) notes, a business-level strategy answers 
the question, "How do I compete in this business?" vis-à-vis corporate-level strategies, which 
answers "What business should I be in?" This implies that a firm employs distinct business-
level strategy for each operating domain (Beard and Dess, 1981). Porter‘s (1980) generic 
strategy is considered a useful topology in describing business level strategies. Nonetheless, 
in the resource dependency context market share and firm size are vital elements to 
manipulate exchange partners (see Sheppard, 1995). The rationale is as follows.  
 
First, Boston Consulting Group (1972) argues that firms remain cost competitive by securing 
greater market share. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) concur, pinpointing that a firm with large 
sales volume controls the industry through their market share. As Schelling (1980) observes 
that a firm keeps revenues high through price setting by dominating firms in a concentrated 
market. Buzzell, Gale and Sultan (1975) confirm this assertion and show that market share is 
related to a firm‘s profitability and ultimately, survival (Drucker, 1970). Prescott, Kohli and 
Venkatraman (1986), however, illustrate that the association between market share and 
performance is context-specific. 
 
Second, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue that firm size adds to the firm‘s ability to control 
its exchange partners. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) and Moulton and Thomas (1993) support 
this notion. Moulton and Thomas (1993:125), for example, explain that ―firm size dominates 
all other factors in predicting success in completing the reorganisation process‖. Small firms, 
due to deficiencies in both financial and managerial knowledge (Thornhill and Amit, 2003), 
lack legitimacy and thus, are prone to failure (Baum and Oliver 1992; 1996). 
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4.2.3 Networking Strategy  
The previous section outlines among others the significance of manipulating exchange 
partners through firm size. This section considers networking strategies use to access external 
resources. Firms manage their interdependence through networking (Jarillo, 1989) or 
collective (Bresser, 1988), or cooperative (Nielsen, 1988) strategies.  Networking, in turn, 
influences the behaviour of the firm‘s resource providers (Bresser, 1988).  
 
The composition of the board is noted as one of the several means firms control outside 
interdependencies and decrease uncertainty (Gales and Kesner, 1994). This implies that the 
composition of the board should be affected by environmental pressures. Conceptual 
literature also suggests that board composition enhance board effectiveness and thus 
influence firm's survival (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson, 1998). The discussion of the 
networking strategies proceeds as follows: (a) board size, (b) board interlocks, (c) outside 
directors, (d) female directors, and (e) joint ventures. 
 
(a) Board Size and Resource Dependency Theory 
Corporate failure indicates a firm‘s inability to cope with its environment (Hambrick and 
D‘Aveni, 1988) due in part to ineffective linkage (Pfeffer, 1972). Pfeffer (1972) and Pfeffer 
and Salancik (1978) suggest that large boards provide more effective external linkage. Thus, 
board size is regarded as a degree of the firm‘s ability to form environmental linkages (Gales 
and Kesner, 1994). Environmental linkage, in turn, is necessary to access critical resources 
for firm‘s survival.  
 
Pfeffer and Salancik‘s (1978) advance that ―when an organisation appoints an individual to a 
board, it expects the individual will come to support the organisation, will concern himself 
with its problems, will variably present it to others, and will try to aid it‖ (p.163). Put simply, 
boards, due to their prestige, are ―vehicles for co-opting important external organisations‖ 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; p.167) to enhance legitimacy to access resources (Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003). This in turn reduces environmental unpredictability and the likelihood of a 
firms‘ failure (Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand, 1996).                    
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(b) Director Interlocks and Resource Dependency Theory 
Firms employ director interlock ties as a strategy to control its resource community (Boyd, 
1990; Hung 1998). Thus, firms mitigate possible uncertainties by absorbing potential 
‗disruptive elements‘ (Markóczy, Sun, Shi, and Ren, 2013) through director interlocks 
(Mizruchi, 1996). Interlock ties improve coordination among firms, which in turn, enhances 
firms‘ ability to acquire of valuable financial and managerial resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978; Bresser, 1988). Thus, greater board interlock, due to presumed coordination, enhances 
the firm‘s reputation to access resources and thus, reduces the likelihood of firm‘s failure 
(Penning, 1980; Schoorman, Bazerman and Atkin, 1981). 
 
 For instance, director interlocks between competitors provide access to operations (Hung, 
1998). Penning (1980), Hung (1998) and Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold (2000) also suggest 
the board interlocks provide the first step in obtaining support from critical resource 
providers. Pfeffer (1972), Mizruchi and Stearns (1988), Streams and Mizruchi (1993) and 
Simmons (2012), for example, suggest that the presence of financial agents may grant access 
to funds. Hillman, Keim and Luce (2001) also illustrate that a firm increases stakeholders‘ 
commitment by inviting key coalitions groups to serve on board. In short, board interlocks 
improves the strategic decision-making process (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001) and 
legitimacy (Pfeffer, 1972), thereby enhancing board effectiveness to reduce the possibility of 
firm‘s failure (Sheppard, 1995). 
 
(c) Proportion of Outside Directors and Resource Dependency Theory 
Fich and Shivdasani (2006) define outside directors as non-employees board members. 
Proportion of outside directors (i.e. ratio of outside directors to board size) indicates the 
degree to which outsiders are represented on the board. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) observe 
that, ―One would expect that as the potential environment pressures confronting the 
organisation increases, the need for outside support would increase as well, leading to a larger 
proportion of outside directors on the board‖ (p.168).  
 
Contemporary scholars predict that prestigious-resource outside directors provide access to 
key claimants and legitimacy (Hillman and Dalziel 2003; Peng 2004), thereby enhancing 
firms survival. Boyd (1990) and Hillman, Cannella, and Paetzold (2000) confirm this notion 
and state that resource-rich outsiders are likely to be appointed to the board during crisis.  
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(d) Women Representation on Board and Resource Dependency Theory 
The case for board gender diversity can be made on a number of grounds. These are 
theoretical (e.g. agency and resource dependency perspectives), business philanthropy 
(Coffey and Wang, 1998), useful motives (van der Walt and Ingley, 2003) and a duty to 
stakeholders (Keasey, Thompson and Wright, 1997) as well as shareholders (Carver, 2002). 
However, for the purpose of this section, the resource dependency perspective is examined as 
reasons for promoting the case for women representation on board.  
 
As discussed above, the board is a means to co-opt external resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978; Ingley and van der Walt, 2001), suggesting that the board is a significant strategic 
resource (van der Walt and Ingley, 2003). Ingley and van der Walt (2001), for instance, 
suggest that the board provides a linkage to a ‗nation‘s business elite, access to funds, 
connections to competitors, and industry intelligence‘. The board also offers advice to CEO 
and contribute to, approving major business strategy decisions.  For these reasons, conceptual 
literature advocates the inclusion of qualified women on boards.  
 
Burke (2000), for example, contends that talented male CEOs are overstretched. This perhaps 
may account for the lower board quality. As well, the male pool of candidates shrinks, 
suggesting that male CEOs refuse offers to serve on boards. Further, Burke (2000) argues that 
male directors lack know-how and information and thus display inability to add to board 
decision process. For these reasons, Burke (2000) posits that ―increasing women's board 
presence enriches board information, perspectives, debate and decision making‖ (p.193). 
 
Campbell and Minquez-Vera (2008) posit that gender diverse board can improve board 
quality. In particular, Bilimoria and Wheeler (2000) argue that women directors promote a 
more fruitful discourse by probing the CEO more freely. Bilimoria and Wheeler (2000), 
Campbell and Minquez-Vera, 2008), Burke (2000) and Mattis (2000) concur, stressing that 
women can add value to boards. These values include but not limited to significant symbolic 
value for the firm. Fondas (2000) and Bilimoria and Wheeler‘s (2000) study supports the 
resource dependency notion that board gender diversity improves environment linkages, 
thereby bringing strategic resources to enhance firm‘s survival.    
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(e) Joint Ventures and Resource Dependency Theory 
Joint venture arises when firms jointly form a new entity for strategic reasons (Kogut 1988). 
Firms employ joint ventures as a means to acquire information, co-opt resource providers 
and share technology (Ahuja, 2000). Joint ventures also promote exchange of resources 
among partner firms (Drees and Heugens, 2012).  
 
Building on the resource dependency logic (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), joint ventures reduce 
uncertainty and regulate interdependency on a firms‘ coalition. It is argued that as complexity 
and uncertainty surrounding a firm‘s operating environment increases, the need for external 
support becomes inevitable, resulting to ties through ownership. Young/small firms, in 
particular, can enhance their resources‘ accessibility through joint ventures (Baum, 
Calabrese, and Silverman, 2000). This in turn, mitigates the effects of liability of 
newness/smallness and thus improves survival prospects (Baum and Oliver, 1991). 
  
 4.2.4 Summary of Corporate Failure: Resource Dependency Theory Perspective 
The above analysis suggests a range of means in which a firm can ultimately safeguard the 
supply of critical resources needed for survival. Accordingly, I invoke Sheppard‘s (1995) 
notion that failed firms apply fewer of these proposals compared to non-failed firms. Firms 
employ more of these submissions from the resource dependency perspective to limit their 
dependence on critical coalitions of resources providers (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978; Bazerman and Schoorman, 1983). This in turn, reduces uncertainty and transaction 
costs (Williamson, 1985) on one hand, and enhances firm‘s legitimacy and its survival 
chances (Singh, House, and Tucker, 1986) on the other. In this spirit, firms obtain continual 
support from critical constituencies, so long as it maintains the required legitimacy. Failure 
occurs when the firm uses fewer of the proposals, and thus lack adequate resources to 
maintain support of critical coalitions. The expectation is that a firm critical coalition groups 
attempt to extract payments for past support due to the firm‘s inability to provide 
inducements (Sheppard, 1995). Accordingly, I argue that early warning signs of corporate 
failure first appear when the firm no longer possess sufficient resources to meet the 
coalitional demands for payment.  
 
However, evidence on the degree to which resource dependency theory contributes to the 
board's governing effectiveness and corporate failure, in particular, is limited. This study 
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contributes to this debate. Specifically, I examine the effects of proportion of outside 
directors, presence of female directors, board size and former government officials on 
corporate failure. 
 
In short, agency and resource dependence theories provide complementary perspectives to 
study antecedents of corporate failure. The integrative model may mirror the real world and 
thus, overcome theoretical weaknesses (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003), suggesting a richer 
model of the link between boards and corporate failure (Bergh 1995). This, in turn, may 
improve our understanding of how boards‘ monitoring and resources provision functions 
contribute to corporate failure, beyond that provided by an exclusive dependence on financial 
proxies (Daily and Dalton, 1994a). Little, however, is known about models that integrate 
agency and resource dependence perspectives in the corporate failure context (Daily and 
Dalton, 1994a; Darrat, Gray and Wu, 2010). This study attempts to fill this gap. This paves 
the way for a case for the integration of the two theories on board performance in the next 
section.  
 
4.3 A SYNTHESIS TOWARD AN INTEGRATIVE MODEL 
 The above analysis shows how resource dependency and agency theories share a related 
incentive. These theories consider roles and attributes boards have to embrace in order to add 
to the firm‘s survival (Ricart, Rodriguez and Sanchez, 2005). The agency theory focuses on 
the board's relationship to top management and shareholders. The resource dependency 
theory, however, enlarges the board‘s relationship to critical coalition groups. As well, the 
aforementioned perspectives assume the dominance of a business control problem that 
induces conflicts with negative consequences on firm‘s performance and survival prospects 
(Kosnik, 1987). Directors, for example, may face conflicts in discharging their monitoring 
duties due to their personal association with CEO (Eisenhardt, 1989; Baysinger and 
Hoskisson, 1990; Bainbridge, 1993).    
 
These theories, however, differ marginally with regards to directors‘ role (Kosnik, 1987; 
Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand, 1996; Payne, Benson, and Finegold, 2009; Minichilli, Zattoni, 
and Zona, 2009). This divergence may, in part, be a function of the on-going debate 
concerning the extent to which CEOs dominate boards (Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand, 1996). 
Agency theory emphasizes the need for board as a monitoring mechanism, but also suggests 
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other incentives and disciplinary mechanisms (see Fama and Jensen, 1983). The resource 
dependency theory considers boards as a tool to extract resources required for firm‘s survival 
(Pfeffer, 1978; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).  
 
Further, the two perspectives differ in identifying board roles (i.e. strategy, service, control, 
and resources). First, evidence on the association between boards and strategy is mixed 
(Johnson Daily and Ellstrand 1996; Deutsch, 2005). Evidence (e.g. Mace 1971; Clendenin, 
1972; Golden and Zalac, 2001) in the wake of corporate failures, report that boards‘ input to 
strategy is limited, due in part to lack of board power (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). Put 
differently, directors‘ contribution in formulating strategy and monitoring its effective 
execution is ineffective (Baysinger and Bultler, 1985; Kosnik, 1987). In parallel, others (e.g. 
Sheridan, Jones and Marston, 2006, Aguilera, and Cuervo‐Cazurra, 2009) suggest increasing 
influence of institutional investors and recent corporate governance reforms have stimulated 
boards involvement in strategy (see also Judge and Zeithami, 1992). Ruigrok, Peck, Keller 
(2006)  confirm this notion and show that boards constructively challenge CEOs‘ strategy, an 
area hitherto controlled by top management (Pugliese, Bezemer, Zattoni, Huse, Van den 
Bosch, Volberda, 2009).  
 
Similarly, evidence on the association between boards and service role is well documented 
(Vance, 1983; Westphal and Stern, 2007), but results are inconclusive (Zahra and Pearce, 
1989). The board service roles include advising the CEO (Lorsch and Maciver, 1989; Daily, 
Catherine, Daily, Dalton and Cannella 2003; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Huse, 2005) and 
enhancing firm‘s legitimacy (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The recent financial scandals, 
however, provide circumstantial evidence to suggest that directors have immensely failed to 
discharge their service roles. As Zahra and Pearce (1989) put it ―……, directors have failed 
to reflect changing societal values in shaping corporate identity because boards lack requisite 
power to bring about desired changes in the role of the corporation‖(p.304).  
 
Westphal and Stern (2007), however, show that directors engage in more ‗ingratiatory 
behaviour‘, provision of advice to CEOs and lesser CEOs‘ performance evaluation to retain 
their seats in the board network. This implies that reaching an effective board composition is 
fraught with internal conflicts (Wincent, Anokhin and Örtqvist, 2012). Put simply, a board 
which is good in monitoring can inhibit its strategy abilities and vice versa.   
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The control role of boards is well documented in the theoretical and empirical literature 
(Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson, 1998; Dalton, Daily Certo, and Reongpitya, 2003). 
Critics, however, suggest that some boards fail to assess the CEOs‘ performance and /or 
outline the executive remuneration strategies (Monks and Minow, 1995; Westphal and Stern 
2007). Carpenter and Westphal (2001), however, find that relevant board capital is positively 
associated with board monitoring. Put differently, boards with appropriate capital are more 
likely to be effective monitors of CEO‘s actions and thus enhance the long term success of 
the firm.  
 
The resource role requires boards to facilitate acquisition of critical resources through their 
external ties (Pfeffer 1972). Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold‘s (2000) study supports this 
notion, emphasising that firms respond to significant changes in the environment by varying 
the board composition. Drees and Heugens‘ (2013) meta-analysis, however, suggests that the 
association between the board resource role and firm performance is unclear. Specifically, 
Drees and Heugens (2013) show the link between firm performance and interorganisational 
arrangement is positively mediated by autonomy but not legitimacy.    
 
Altogether, I concur with Kosnik (1987) notion that ‗‘imbedded in each theory is a qualified 
perspective on the governing performance of boards that, with varying degrees of 
explicitness, identifies the conditions and attributes believed to lead to either effective or 
ineffective board governance‖(p.169). The agency theory, for example, assumes some degree 
of homo-economicus, which describes the CEO and his executives as self-seeking (Davis, 
Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997). For agency theorists, an extreme incentive for effective 
board monitoring is the board's equity compensation. For resource dependency view, board‘s 
performance role rest on three contingencies namely: the company life cycle, type of business 
and the external environment. Contemporary scholars (e.g. Haynes and Hillman, 2010) also 
suggest extreme incentives for effective board resource and strategy role is board capital 
breadth but not board capital depth. 
 
Further, the above analysis suggests prior studies produce inconsistent findings. This does not 
indicate a conflict exists between theoretical predictions and empirical evidence. However, it 
may be due in part to numerous limitations identified in prior studies (see also Johnson, Daily 
and Ellstrand 1996; Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003). Prior studies are limited in scope, 
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based on survival bias sample and lack consistency in operationalization dependent and 
independent variables. Prior studies, however, neglect the interaction effects of corporate 
governance proxies and performance; this in particular, is likely to cloud the interpretation of 
prior findings. These limitations notwithstanding, prior studies suggest that some boards are 
ineffective due to poor composition and poor structure. In turn, these poor board attributes 
allow the CEO to dominate the board decision-making processes (see Zahra and Pearce, 
1989; Johnson, Catherine, Daily and Ellstrand, 1996; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2010; Zhang, 
2010). 
 
However, this raises another related limitation of past studies. Taken separately the diverse 
theoretical perspectives are rather one dimensional, only revealing a particular aspect of the 
board‘s role (Cornforth, 2004). Hence, contemporary researchers (e.g. Zahra and Pearce, 
1989; Hung 1998; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Cornforth, 2004) are calling for a new 
conceptual framework that can help integrate the insights of these different perspectives. 
Kosnik‘s (1987) study illustrates the creative synthesis of the class managerial hegemony and 
agency theories. Theoretical (e.g. Zahra and Pearce, 1989; and Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) 
attempts also suggest that multi-theoretical models can add precision to an area fraught with 
conflicting empirical findings. Thus, I invoke Cornforth‘s (2004) notion, suggesting that a 
multi-paradigm paradox perspective offers a promising approach to explain the corporate 
failure phenomena.  
 
Nonetheless, despite the strong theoretical underpinning of these theories, little effort has 
been made to articulate its managerial implications (Zahra and Pearce, 1989), particularly the 
corporate failure context. Put simply, no attempt has been made to use a multi-theoretical 
approach to conceptualise corporate governance and corporate failure for empirical testing. 
Although there has been much discussion on this topic, there is almost no empirical research 
that comprehensively tests for a relation between corporate governance and corporate failure, 
particularly in the UK. This research begins to fill this void.  
 
I argue that the corporate failure context provides a prominent illustration of the intersection 
of the agency and resource dependency perspectives. I also argue that these theories 
complement each other to identify the essential board attributes and functions that might 
explain the corporate failure syndrome. For example, using agency logic, top management 
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seen as self-serving and thus, will misappropriate shareholders wealth. In short, boards are 
ineffective in discharging their monitoring roles. Similarly, their resource function is 
ineffective, due to lack of inducement to critical coalition groups. Critical resource providers, 
in turn, may resort to insolvency/bankruptcy laws to safeguard their interest. This is because 
directors‘ fiduciary duty shifts to protecting the interests of the firm‘s creditors when the firm 
is considered insolvent (Miller, 1992; Waldera and Sullivian, 1993 and Cieri, Sullivan and 
Lennox, 1994). This is an incentive for creditors to invoke their legal right to dissolve the 
firm (Blum and Kaplan, 1976) but in reality, this is rare (Mumford, 2003).  
 
All the two theories suggest that competing interest of creditors and shareholders as well as 
those between top management and shareholders must be resolved if the firm is to survive 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus, filing of insolvency is a consequence of boards‘ inability 
to resolve these conflicts. Further, within our empirical setting, compliance to the UK Code is 
at least circumstantial evidence of board adherence to their monitoring role. This in turn, 
enhances board effectiveness due in part to alignment of management and shareholders 
interest. The expectation is that an effective board is linked to effective monitoring and in this 
way, facilitate resources inflow, autonomy and legitimacy from firm‘s constituencies. In turn, 
these factors may enhance the survival prospects of a firm. I turn next to our proposed 
integrative model of corporate failure.   
 
4.4 AN INTEGRATIVE MODEL 
Overall, the two theories (i.e. agency and resource dependency) suggest that corporate 
reformers‘ attempt to reconstruct boards with more independent directors may increase the 
likelihood of a firm‘s failure (Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand, 1996). Thus, although the two 
perspectives draw on diverse disciplines, they complement each other in identifying the 
essential board attributes that might affect corporate failure. Accordingly, I invoke Zahra and 
Pearce (1989) assertion that the resource dependency and agency theories suggest an 
integrative model that synthesises past studies and specifies relationships between board 
measures and corporate failure. Figure 10 depicts our integrative model. It builds on prior 
studies and more notably, advances particular associations between corporate governance 
variables and their impact on corporate failure. Three key features of the model merit 
attention.  
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First, I follow Hillman and Dalziel (2003) and in turn, limit the model to two important board 
functions: monitoring and resources. The rationale is threefold.  
 
1. Board Monitoring Function: The agency perspective identifies board‘s control role as 
conceptually key to a firm survival (see; Fama, 1980; Mizruchi, 1983; Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003). This view is also supported by legalistic perspective. Specifically, the 
legal theory suggests that BODs, particularly outside directors, prevent corporate 
failure of their firms by discharging their fiduciary duty of monitoring the CEO (e.g. 
Bainbridge, 1993; Cieri, Sullivan, Lennox, 1994; Minichilli, Zattoni and Zona, 2009) 
and overall firm performance (e.g. Carpenter, 1988; Vance, 1983; Stiles and Taylor, 
2001).This implies that both the agency and legal perspectives consider outside 
directors as shareholders‘ primary line of resistance against self-serving CEOs 
(Weisbach, 1988; Stiles and Taylor, 2001). Accordingly, scholars (e.g. Lorsch and 
Maciver, 1989; Mizruchi 1983; Bainbridge, 1993; Baysinger and Butler, 1985), 
reformers (e.g. Higgs, 2003) and research (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990) stress that, 
effective boards comprise mostly of independent non-executive directors. 
 
2.  The Board Resource Function: The resource dependency theory suggests that boards 
provide resources (e.g. legitimacy, advice and counsel). Thus, from the resource 
dependency perspective, boards provide diverse resources to the firm by performing 
their service task (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Minichilli, Zattoni and 
Zona, 2009). Minichilli, Zattoni and Zona (2009) and Huse (2005) also outline advice, 
networking and strategic participation as three tasks related to board service task 
performance. The important implication is that the service and strategy roles are 
imbedded in the board resource function.  
 
Resource dependency theory could be seen as connected to class managerial 
hegemony theory. The class managerial hegemony theory (Mills, 2000) considers the 
role boards play in preserving the cohesion of the social elite. Davis, Yoo, and Baker 
(2003) confirm this notion and show that the level of connectivity among directors is 
well established. This is due in part to the CEO‘s dominance in the board selection 
process (Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella, 2007). As Davis, Yao and Baker 
(2003:304) observe, ―[A] recruitment process that relies on personal familiarity 
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allows a handful of directors to become and remain highly central in the director 
network, thereby creating many ties among companies‖. Mizruchi (1996) views board 
networks as collusion, co-optation, monitoring, and social cohesion mechanisms. In 
particular, board networks facilitate use of competitors‘ strategies and pacify resource 
provider‘s management (Mizruchi, 1996).  
 
In sum, the resource dependency and class managerial hegemony theories view 
interlocks as a means to control interdependencies (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978), maintain power and control for social elites (Useem, 1980; Burris, 
2005). This implies that boards via their network ties enhance firms‘ legitimacy 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003), which in turn, reduces uncertainties (Borgatti and Foster, 
2003), especially in uncertain environments (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). As 
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) put it, BODs offer counsel to the CEO (Stiles and Taylor, 
2001) and legitimacy to the firm (Bazerman and Schoorman, 1983; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978; Stearns and Mizruchi, 1993; Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand, 1996). In 
turn, these resources reduce uncertainties to induced exchange partners for continual 
support to enhance firm‘s long term success. (Appendix 3 contains the differences of 
the legal, agency class managerial hegemony and resource dependency perspectives 
of boards). 
 
3. Korn/Ferry‘s (1999) survey reports that boards monitor CEO on behalf of 
shareholders and provide resources to the firm. In turn, these functions are associated 
to the likelihood of corporate failure (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Brown, 2005). As 
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) observe, integration of the control and resource functions 
may overcome theoretical weaknesses and thus more precisely mirror the real world. 
 
Second, the model recognises the multidimensional nature of corporate failure. Thus, this 
study departs from prior corporate failure studies, discussed in chapter 3. In this regard, the 
multidimensional nature of corporate failure is well documented in past theoretical literature, 
but neglected in empirical consideration. Finally, the model advances the interplay among 
board attributes and functions on corporate failure. Anchored in the agency and resource 
dependency theories and empirical studies, this sequence offers a means of integrating 
corporate governance and prediction of corporate failure research streams.  
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Figure 10: The Integrated Model of Board Attributes and Functions on Corporate 
Failure 
 
A similar approach has been used by Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003 
 
The model shows that the interactions between board functions and attributes variables affect 
corporate failure. The vast literature describes four main board attributes: composition, 
structure, characteristics, and process. Hillman, Cannella and Paetzol‘s (2000) study 
suggests board composition denotes board size (i.e. number of directors), director types (i.e. 
inside and outside directors) and minority representation (i.e. ethnic minorities and females). 
Zahra and Pearce‘s (1989) study suggests board structure covers the several dimensions of 
board oversight committees (e.g. types of board committees and committee membership). 
Zahra and Pearce (1989) also suggest board characteristics are board personality and directors 
background (e.g. age, educational background, and experience). Vance (1983) suggests board 
process includes various dimensions of the board meetings (e.g. frequency, duration and 
quality of board meetings).  
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- Audit Committee 
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CORPORATE FAILURE 
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- Firm Age 
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Zahra and Pearce‘s (1989) review, however, suggests composition influences directors‘ 
characteristics. Board characteristics, in turn affects board structure. Board structure reflects 
board processes. For these reasons, I consider board composition and structure as significant 
board attributes in the model. Each board attribute represents numerous relevant features that 
may add indirectly, through board functions, to corporate failure. Based on prior empirical 
studies, the model pinpoints the most important of these elements. Put differently, the model 
(Figure 10) outlines three board composition variables: board independence, board gender 
diversity and board size. For board independence, I focus on proportion of outside directors, 
which arguably captures the extent of outside directors‘ dominance of the CEO and his or her 
management (Wincent, Anokhin and Örtqvist, 2012). Board gender diversity refers to the 
representation of women on board. For board structure, the model (Figure 10) covers three 
board oversight committees: nomination, audit and remuneration. This implies that the model 
covers three critical decision dimensions of the board: appointment, accountability and 
remuneration. Finally, the model identifies six major controls from key decision dimensions: 
firm age, firm size, liquidity, profitability, industry effects and leverage.  
 
The Model (Figure 10) depicts that the influence of boards on corporate failure may follow a 
direct and an interaction effects. The former considers link between board attributes and 
corporate failure. The interaction effects, however, show that therelationship between board 
attributes and corporate failure is moderated by the two board functions. To date, relevant 
empirical studies focus on the direct effect of board attributes on corporate failure (e.g. 
Chaganti, Mahajan and Sharma, 1985; Sheppard, 1994; 1995), although the interaction effect 
is more likely through the agency and resource dependency perspectives (Zahra and Pearce, 
1989). The interaction effects consider the interplay between board attribute and functions 
and the influence these exert on corporate failure. The subsequent paragraphs explain the 
direct and the interactions effects in turn. 
 
4.4.1 Direct Effect of Board Attributes on Corporate Failure 
Board Composition: The agency and resource dependency theories underscore the 
significance of board composition and corporate failure (see Appendix 3). For instance, using 
the agency theory, board composition mirrors the degree to which the CEO controls the board 
and vice versa (Wincent, Anokhin and Örtqvist, 2012). Scholars (e.g. Hermalin and 
Weisbach 1991; Kesner, Victor and Lamont, 1986; Daily and Dalton, 1995; Erkens, Hung, 
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Matos 2012) suggest that greater proportion of outside directors strengthens board‘s power 
and independence over the CEO, and in this way, enhances the board monitoring function. 
Thus, agency approach observes outside directors as essential for the monitoring function. 
Borrowing from the class managerial hegemony perspective, board composition shows 
whether selective recruitment of directors is done to preserve capitalist. Lastly, the resource 
dependency lens (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) suggests board composition reflects the 
characteristics of the firm‘s environment, enhancing the firm‘s ability to access resources 
required to control uncertainty and thus avoid corporate failure.  
 
Board Structure: Agency scholars suggest that the internal structure of the board is a major 
element of corporate failure. Thus, efficient board structure is vital to facilitate directors‘ 
commitment to firm strategies, and in reducing the CEO‘s power (Faleye, Hoitash and 
Hoitash, 2011). As in Figure 10, a board structure refers to the separation of key decisions 
among committees, implying that board structure impacts directors‘ decision-making styles 
and communication with CEO. In turn, these may impact on the quality of boards‘ decisions 
and ultimately, the likelihood of a firm‘s failure. 
 
4.4.2 Interaction Effect of Board Attributes and Functions on Corporate Failure 
Board Composition: Evidence suggests that greater board composition enhances the board 
functions: control function (see, Kosnik 1987; Beasley, 1996; Peasnell, Pope, and Young 
2005) and resources (see Mace, 1971; Patton and Barker, 1987). Put diffidently, the board 
composition may affect directors‘ ability to monitor the CEO on behalf of shareholders as 
well as provide resources for firm‘s survival (Patton and Barker, 1987). Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978), for example, assert that outside directors are crucial in securing resources for the 
firm. For boards‘ control function, Zahra and Pearce‘s (1989) review pinpoints that larger 
boards, due to presumed diversity, are not prone to CEO‘s dominance. Mahadeo, Soobaroyen 
and Hanuman (2012) find that board size is significantly and positively correlated to 
educational background. Thus, larger boards can accommodate board members with diverse 
education, skills and values background.  Recent evidence (see Kim, Cha, Cichy, Kim and 
Tkach, 2012) suggests that directors‘ involvement in strategy and the board size have a 
positive influence on financial performance. Contemporary scholars (e.g. Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003) argue that board dependence will negatively impact the relationship among a 
board‘s ability to monitor and actual monitoring. In contrast, board dependence is desirable 
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for the resource provision function (Dalton, Daily, Johnson and Ellstrand, 1999). In short, an 
effective board composition is essential to successful performance of the board resource and 
control function, which in turn influences the probability of corporate failure.  
 
Board Structure: Kogan and Wallach (1964) argue that the size of the decision-making group 
is negatively related to its propensity to absorb risks. The rationale is that larger boards, due 
to presumed free rider issues, are less effective than smaller board (Jensen, 1993). Yermack, 
(1996) confirms this notion. For this reason, the legalistic and agency perspectives require 
boards to delegate their authority to oversight committees. As in Figure 10, effective board 
structure is a major condition for effective control board function. Klein (1998), for example, 
contends that the audit committee facilitate the timely issue of reliable accounting 
information and thus helps lessen the agency problem. Wild (1994) confirms this notion and 
shows that the audit committee enhances managerial accountability to principals. The 
remuneration committee similarly may lessen the principal agency problem by motivating top 
management to pursue a mutual interest with shareholders. The inclusion of nomination 
committee is consistent with board governance literature which identifies the value of an 
independent nomination committee that screens potential candidates. Using the agency and 
the legalistic perspectives clear selection criteria may strengthen directors‘ independence and 
knowledge base. This in turn, may minimise the moral hazard problem, agency problems and 
overcome the view suggested by the class managerial hegemony perspective, thereby 
enhancing the survival prospects of a firm.  
 
4.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provides an overview of corporate failure and corporate governance theories. 
Perhaps and more importantly, it discusses the link between corporate failure and two main 
theories: Agency and Resource Dependency. An integrative model that stimulates the 
empirical study in corporate failure prediction, the object of this study, is set out in the 
relevant section. As Kosnik (1987) observes, although the agency perspective on boards is 
integrated in a better developed and structured model of corporate control, these theories are 
complementary in identifying the essential board attributes that might affect corporate failure. 
Thus, the theoretical basis of the thesis contains the fusion of the two theories to explain the 
corporate failure syndrome. This approach provides the opportunity to study the corporate 
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failures in the UK. I turn next to the hypotheses based on theoretical arguments (i.e. using 
agency and resource dependency theories) in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter one highlights the motivation and research problem of the study. Chapter two 
outlines corporate governance and corporate insolvency frameworks in the UK. It also 
discusses the five main thematic areas; leadership, effectiveness, accountability, 
remuneration, and board-shareholder relationship, that underpin the UK corporate 
governance Code. Chapter three reviews the extant literature on corporate failure prediction 
and highlights the ad hoc selection of variables approach, in particular. Chapter four presents 
the underlying theories to motivate hypotheses about board attributes and the occurrence of 
corporate failure. Specifically, the corporate failure phenomenon is explained from the 
agency and the resource dependency perspectives in the context of two board functions (i.e. 
control and resources). The central tenet of chapter four is that a multi–theoretical model can 
deepen our understanding of the corporate failure phenomenon.  
 
In this chapter, I pull together work covered in chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4 by generating 
hypotheses. The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.1 provides a summary of the 
motivation for developing hypotheses using a multi-theoretical approach. Section 5.2 presents 
the hypotheses. Section 5.3 concludes. 
 
5.1 THE RATIONALE OF DEVELOPING HYPOTHESES FROM A  
MULTI-THEORETICAL APPROACH 
In this section, I provide a summary of the motivation for developing hypothesis via a multi-
theoretical approach. First, section 5.1.1 briefly presents the link between corporate failure 
and the monitoring function of boards using the agency theory. Section 5.1.2 follows with a 
brief outline of the link between corporate failure and the resource function of boards using 
the resource dependency theory.   
 
5.1.1 Agency Theory and the Monitoring Function  
Agency theory describes bankruptcy/insolvency as the legal resolution of severe shareholder-
creditor conflicts regarding the financial management decisions of the firm (D‘Aveni, 
1989b). Black (1976), for example, argues that in times of crisis, shareholders may influence 
top management to distribute all the firm‘s resources in the form of dividend. It is argued that 
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boards, due to their presumed independence, can enhance the firm‘s survival by resolving the 
diverse interests of creditors and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
 
As well, the divorce of ownership and control in listed firms has induced acute top 
management-shareholder conflict regarding the firm‘s strategic orientation (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Baysinger, Kosnik and Turk, 1991; Mizruchi, 2004). Baysinger, Kosnik and Turk, (1991), 
for example, contend that professional managers seek personal wealth and less 
interested in enhancing the shareholders‘ value. Agency scholars, therefore, advocate 
enhanced controls to reduce the shareholder-top management conflict (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). This in turn, lessens the agency loss (Eisenhardt, 1989) via reducing the moral hazards 
and adverse selection problems (Williamson, 1985; Gomez-Mejia, and Wiseman, 2007), and 
ultimately, enhancing the survival of the firm. Scholars propose incentives that tie executives‘ 
rewards to shareholders‘ value as well as monitoring of CEO‘s agenda as mechanisms 
required to reduce the agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Combs, Ketchen, 
Perryman and Donahue 2007).These duties fall first to the board and outside directors, in 
particular (Combs, Ketchen, Perryman and Donahue 2007). For this reason, this study limits 
its scope to the BODs. Monitoring by BODs and outside directors, particularly, reduce the 
agency problems, and, in this way, reduce the likelihood of a firm‘s failure (Fama, 1980; 
Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).  
 
5.1.2 Resource Dependency Theory and the Provision of Resource Function  
The resource dependency theory suggests that corporate failure is an indication of a firm‘s 
lack of legitimacy to access critical resources from its constituents (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978; D‘Aveni, 1989a: b). Put simply, a firm‘s survival is legitimated by its critical resources 
providers (Thompson 1967; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; D‘Aveni, 1989). This suggests that 
firm interdependence with exchange partners reduce its independence and increase 
uncertainty (Eisenhardt, 1989; Rivas, 2012). In turn, uncertainty obscures the firm‘s control 
of resources (Rivas, 2012) thereby, reducing shareholders‘ value (Combs, Ketchen, Perryman 
and Donahue, 2007).  
 
To mitigate this, firms can take actions to reduce environmental uncertainty (Alchian, 1950; 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Rivas, 2012) and thus, enhance firm‘s legitimacy (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978) and survival (Cyert and March, 1963; Singh, House and Tucker, 1986).  
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Pfeffer (1972) suggests two diverse strategies namely: internal and external. The internal 
strategy requires firms to improve the efficacy of the internal processes to manipulate their 
exchange partners (Rivas, 2012).  However, this is beyond the scope of this study. A second 
strategy is to ensure constructive interactions with its environment through the board. This 
implies that BOD links the firm with its external environment, thereby reducing uncertainty 
(Rivas, 2012), and enhancing firm‘s long-term viability (Mizruchi and Stearns, 1988; Gales 
and Kesner, 1994; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978:167), for example, 
describe boards as ―vehicles for co-opting important external organisations‖ to enhance 
firm‘s access to managerial expertise (Rivas, 2012) and financial resources (Mizruchi and 
Stearns, 1988). In turn, these resources help increase autonomy (Oliver, 1991), diminish 
firm‘s uncertainty (Pfeffer, 1972), and ultimately enhance the firm‘s survival (Sing, House, 
Tucker, 1986).  
 
5.2 BOARD ATTRIBUTES AND CORPORATE FAILURE 
This section presents how board attributes (i.e. board composition and structures) can 
intervene in the corporate failure process.  Section 5.2.1 outlines the nexus between board 
composition and corporate failure. Section 5.2.2 addresses board structure and corporate 
failure.  
 
5.2.1 Board Composition and Corporate Failure 
In this section, I briefly review the literature with respect to board composition and relate 
them to corporate failure. Drawing from our conceptual model, I limit our discussion to board 
independence, board gender diversity and board size. 
 
Board Independence:  Insider or Outsider Dominated Board? 
By definition, outside directors are all non-employee directors (Daily and Dalton, 1992), with 
inside directors being classified as those employee-directors (Byrd and Hickman, 1992). 
Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest boards can reduce information asymmetry via inclusion of 
few inside directors in addition to the CEO. Bainbridge (1993), Baysinger and Butler (1985) 
Daily and Dalton (1994b), however, suggest that interdependent directors may be less 
effective monitors of the CEO. Put differently, Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) contend that 
inside directors‘ loyalty to the CEO may consider CEO evaluation as a sensitive issue. This 
implies that effective boards arguably consist of a high proportion of outside directors 
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(Mizruchi, 1983; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). In parallel, the class managerial hegemony 
perspective argues that the board‘s ineffectiveness in monitoring and constructively 
challenging CEO‘s decisions is induced by outside directors‘ dependence on CEO, due to the 
board recruitment process. Put simply, the literature seems to converge on the notion that   
the individual directors‘ independence of the CEO is essential for board‘s ability to fulfil the 
control function (Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand, 1996; Chancharat, Krishnamurti and Tian, 
2012). 
 
Empirical evidence regarding the performance implications of board independence, however, 
is not persuasive on this point (Daily and Dalton, 1994a; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Kumar 
and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008; Chancharat, Krishnamurti, Tian, 2012). Baysinger and 
Hoskisson (1990), Baysinger, Kosnik, and Turk, (1991), and Kroll, Walters and Son (2007) 
document the potential benefits of inside-dominated boards. Kroll, Walters and Son‘s (2007) 
findings suggest that the boards of small firms with initial public offering should comprise of 
majority of original top management team (TMT) members, rather than independent 
outsiders. They argue that such board members possess valuable tacit knowledge of the firms 
and are in the best position to provide oversight. In addition, empirical evidence (e.g. 
Chaganti, Mahajan and Sharma 1985; Baysinger, Kosnik and Turk, 1991; Goodstein and 
Boeker, 1991; Byrd and Hickman 1992; Daily and Dalton 1994a; Gales and Kesner 1994) 
shows that a large number of outsiders representing diverse interests may politicise the board 
process (Mace, 1971). This in turn may dilute effective leadership (Barnard, 1968), resulting 
in top management team conflict (Chaganti, Mahajan and Sharma 1985) and reduce the 
firm‘s economic flexibility. Further, top management, when faced with such conflicts, may 
seek ways of avoiding the pressures, rendering the board ineffective (Sethi, Cunningham, and 
Swanson, 1979), due to their lack of expertise, independence and satisfactory time to monitor 
the CEO (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Chaganti, Mahajan and Sharma 1985). Klein (1998) 
confirms this notion and reports a negative relation between firm performance and the 
proportion of outsiders on committees focused on advising. This implies that insiders play an 
important informational role.  In sum, Mace (1971) argues that outside directors are mere nod 
through with no influence over the firm‘s fate, thus this is the essence of corporate failure.  
Another stream of research shows a positive association between the proportion of outside 
directors and firm financial performance (e.g. Faleye, Hoitash and Hoitash, 2011), 
negotiating takeover premiums (e.g. Byrd and Hickman, 1992), CEO turnover (Borokhovich, 
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Parrino, and Trapani, 1996), and adoption of anti-takeover mechanisms (Brickley, Coles, and 
Terry, 1994).  Faleye, Hoitash and Hoitash (2011) for example, find that monitoring quality 
improves when majority of independent directors serve on at least two principal monitoring 
committees. Peng‘s (2004) findings, based on 405 publicly listed firms in China, suggest that 
outsider directors do make a difference in sales growth, and little impact on return on equity 
(ROE). Recently, Duchin, Masusaka and Osbaz (2010) examine the impact of SOX rules 
requiring increase in the number of outside directors on boards. They find that outside 
directors are associated with significantly better performance when their cost of acquiring 
information is low, and vice versa. This in part may explain failure of previous studies (e.g. 
Chaganti, Mahajan, and Sharma, 1985; Hermalin and Weisbach 1991; Daily and Dalton 
1992; Klein, 1998; Bhagat and Black, 2001) to find an effect of outside directors on 
performance. 
 
Using the resource dependency lens, outside representation on boards is viewed as efforts to 
prevent performance declines and failure itself. I can speculate that during financial decline 
firms seek more support from outside constituencies (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Sutton and 
Callahan, 1987), through the network of contacts of outside directors (Borch and Huse, 
1993). Thus, resource dependency perspective suggests that number of outside directors on 
board is an indication of the board‘s leadership efforts to lobby support from resources 
providers. 
 
Outside directors, due to due diverse background and independence, offer independent 
alternative views to the board (Zahra and Pearce, 1989) and linkages to external stakeholders 
that control the firm‘s access to resources (Goodstein, Gautam, and Boeker, 1994). Put 
simply, outside directors reduce the likelihood of firm‘s failure by complementing the 
board‘s knowledge base and resource access (Pfeffer, 1972). Thus, higher representation of 
outside directors on board enhances strategic decision making (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 
1990; Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999), which in turn, enhances 
firm‘s survival (see Baysinger and Butler, 1985;  Rosentein and Wyatt, 1990; Ezzamel and 
Watson, 1993). For example, several outside representatives on board facilitate access to 
valued resources, inter firm commitment and thus, enhance legitimacy (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). In turn, legitimacy reduces uncertainty and, in this way, enhances survival prospects 
of a firm. Hambrick and D‘Aveni (1992), Stearns and Mizruchi (1993) and Kroll, Walters 
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and Son, (2007) confirm this notion. For instance, Kroll and Walters and Son (2007) use 
dataset from 524 initial public offerings and find that outside directors may not monitor 
executives but provide resources that firms‘ TMTs need for effective execution of their 
strategies. In this respect, class managerial hegemony theory suggests that board interlock 
protects the interests of members in the board network and ultimately, impact negatively on 
firm performance (Koenig and Gogel, 1981). Empirical evidence in the UK and USA 
(Useem, 1982) and France (Nguyen-Dang, 2012) confirms this notion. 
 
The above analysis indicates that evidence on proportion of outside directors (board 
independence) is mixed due in part to multiple theoretical perspectives, diverse operational 
definitions for board independence and performance (see Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand, 
1996). For instance, board independence is defined as: (1)  percentage or ratio of inside 
directors to total directors (e.g. Baysinger, Kosnik and Turk, 1991; Sheppard, 1994; 
Borokhovich, Parrino, and Trapani, 1996; Faleye, Hoitash and Hoitash, 2011), (2) absolute 
number of outside directors (e.g. Gales and Kesner, 1994), (3) independent-interdependent 
distinction (e.g. Wade O‘Reilly and Chandratat 1990; Daily and Dalton, 1995), (4) Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC‘s) regulation 14A (e.g. Pearce and Zahra, 1991).  
 
However, in the UK, the issue of the non-executive directors on board is addressed 
extensively in the Code, and thus the issue is seen to be important. The Cadbury and 
subsequent amendments recommend that half of the board, as well as the chairman, should be 
outside directors (Code, 2010: B.1.2). Thus, the code invokes Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) 
insightful perspective that outside directors offer expertise, control and resources to enhance 
the board process thereby enhancing the firm‘s survival. Accordingly, I reiterate the notion 
that, outside-dominated boards are effective boards (Lorsch and Maciver, 1989; Mizruchi, 
1983; Zahra and Pearce, 1989), grounded in both the agency and the resource dependency 
theories on the other. Agency theory, however, cautions that some outside directors are not 
crucial in reversing the downward spiral (see Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990), but monitors 
of the CEO‘s agenda to protect shareholders rights (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). The expectation is that outsider dominated boards will exhibit a positive 
relationship with effective board control (Johnson, Daily, and Ellstrand, 1996) and resource 
provision function (Pfeffer, 1972; Pearce and Zahra, 1991; Fich, 2005) and, in this way, 
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reduce the likelihood of a firm‘s failure. Thus, agency and resource dependence theories lead 
to the same prediction, with respect to outside directors and corporate failure. Accordingly,  
H1a. Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relationship between the proportion of outside 
directors on a firm‘s board and corporate failure.  
H1b. Ceteris paribus, the lower the level of (i) monitoring and (ii) resources, the stronger is 
the negative relationship between the proportion of outside directors on a firm‘s board and 
corporate failure.  
 
Board Gender Diversity: Male or Female dominated? 
Female representation on boards is a major concern for legislators in Europe, due to the 
persistent lack of women in decision making roles (Singh and Vinnicombe 2003). For this 
reason, the composition of boards is taking a legalistic perspective as the UK government 
motivated by Davies (2011) requires FTSE firms to have a minimum 25% of female directors 
by 2015 (see Sealy and Vinnicombe, 2012). Norwegian and Spanish laws require a 40 per 
cent quota for women on all boards by the end of 2005 and at the beginning of 2015, 
respectively (Rose 2007; Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Thus, recent board reforms seem to 
suggest that female directors may enhance board effectiveness by providing diverse 
perspectives to the board process. 
 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue that board linkages provide resources, counsel, legitimacy, 
and communication channels, but scholars (e.g. Hillman, Cannella, and Paetzold 2000; 
Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Terjesen, Sealy and Singh 2009) suggest the resource role‘s 
impact on performance is mediated by directors‘ human capital. Thus, today‘s increasingly 
uncertain business environment requires governance from individuals who can provide a 
breadth and depth of resources including diversity, prestige, legitimacy, and financing 
(D‘Aveni, 1990). For this reason, investors are increasingly including board gender diversity 
as an investment criterion (Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003), indicating that the absence of 
female director on a board signals negative publicity. As well, board gender diversity is 
linked to firm diversification strategy and network effects of linkages to other boards with 
female directors (Hillman, Shropshire and Canella, 2007). In particular, women can enrich 
the boardroom dynamics by bringing different values and perspectives (Ruigrok, Peck, 
Tacheva, Greve and Hu, 2006). Fondas and Sassalos (2000) concur, emphasising that women 
are more able to influence the board decision process due to their broader experiences and 
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different ―voices‖. From the class managerial hegemony perspectives women directors are 
arguably  not considered part of the ‗old boy‘ network, and thus, less likely to rubber-stamp 
to CEO‘s decision (see Pearce and Zahra, 1991). Adams and Ferreira (2009) confirm this 
notion, emphasising that more women on monitoring committees is linked to firing of poorly 
performing CEOs. 
 
Accordingly, empirical evidence associates board gender diversity with better performance 
(e.g.Shrader, Blackburn, and Iles, 1997; Carter, Simkins and Simpson 2003; Erhardt, Werbel 
and Shrader 2003; Campbell and Minguez-Vera 2008; Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2010; 
Carter, Simkins, D‘Souza and Simpson, 2010).  For instance, Campbell and Minguez-Vera 
(2008) examine a sample of Spanish firms, and find that board gender diversity has a positive 
effect on firm value as measured by Tobin's Q. Similarly, Carter and Simkins and Simpson 
(2003) have evidence from 797 Fortune 1000 firms to suggest that compared to firms with 
all-male boards, firms with at least two women on the board performed better on Tobin‘s Q 
and ROA. Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader (2003) correlation and regression analyses of 127 
large US companies indicate board gender diversity is positively associated with various 
measures of accounting profit. As well, Shrader, Blackburn, and IIes (1997) examine data 
from the Wall Street Journal for 200 large firms, and find positive relationships between the 
firm's total percentage of women managers, and Return on Shareholders Fund (ROS), ROA, 
ROI and return on equity (ROE). Recent evidence from Carter, Simkins, D‘Souza and 
Simpson (2010) suggests that gender diversity has a positive effect on financial performance 
primarily through the audit function. This suggests that today‘s firms must recruit from a 
relatively larger talent pool, and subsequently recruit more qualified applicants regardless of 
gender (Shrader et al, 1997). 
 
Critics however, contend that women representation on board can potentially be a drawback 
in terms of performance. For example, Adams and Ferreira (2009) find a negative 
relationship between the proportion of women on the board and Tobin‘s Q in an analysis of 
US firms.  As well, Carter, D‘Souza, Simkins and Simpson (2010) show that there is no 
statistically significant relationship between the board gender diversity and numerous other 
accounting measures of performance. Carter, D‘Souza, Simkins and Simpson (2010) posit 
that the gender and ethnic minority diversity of the board and firm financial performance 
appear to be endogenous. Farrell and Hersch (2005) find positive but insignificant evidence 
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between gender diversity and ROA or market returns to shareholders (see also Shrader, et al, 
1997). Rose (2007) finds no significant link between firm performance as a measure by 
Tobin's Q and female board representation on Danish Listed Firms. In sum, critics argue that 
gender diversity is not a value enhancing strategy. 
 
Overall, the results of the extant literature on board gender diversity and performance differ 
due to diverse methodologies and inconsistency in operationalization of performance. 
However, the negative and/or no significant results suggest that women serve on boards to 
reflect the present generation of stakeholders (Terjesen, Sealy and Singh, 2009). In this spirit, 
Jensen (1993) argues that the board should not be modelled after the democratic political 
model that represents other constituencies in addition to shareholders. The positive and 
significant results cement the argument that female representation on boards result in better 
governance which causes the business growth (Carter, D‘Souza, Simkins and Simpson 2010). 
In sum, the evidence on board gender diversity and performance to date is vexing. In 
particular, evidence on board gender diversity in the corporate failure prediction context is 
distinctively lacking. 
 
This study posits that an analysis of female representation on board in the corporate failure 
prediction context may provide a different and stronger test of the link between gender 
diversity and firm performance. The Code (2010) states that, the board appointment should 
be made, on merit, against objective criteria and with due regard for the benefits of board 
gender diversity. The expectation is that male dominated boards will exhibit a negative 
relationship with effective board control and resource provision and thus increase the 
likelihood of a firm‘s failure.  I formally posit this as: 
H2a. Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relationship between the presence of female 
directors on a firm‘s board and corporate failure.  
H2b. Ceteris paribus, the lower the level of (i) monitoring and (ii) resources, the stronger is 
the negative relationship between the presence of female directors on a firm‘s board and 
corporate failure.  
 
 Board Size: Small or Large? 
 Board size reflects board‘s ability to resist CEO control (Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells, 
1998), thereby, reducing agency problems to facilitate the firm‘s legitimacy to access critical 
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resources for survival. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) note, boards are vehicles for co-opting 
important external organisations with which firms are interdependent, for enhancing the flow 
of resources and reducing uncertainty. Thus, large boards are viewed as effective due in part 
to the greater linkage. Put differently, during financial distress, firms with smaller boards 
(Chaganti, Mahajan and Sharma, 1985; Gales and Kesner, 1994) are seen as ineffective due 
to lessened ability of directors to co-opt resources from its environment (Pfeffer, 1972). 
Alexander, Fennell, and Halpern (1993) and Dalton, Daily, Johnson and Ellstrand (1999), and 
Cheng (2008) confirm this notion and report a positive relationship between board size and 
financial performance. In particular, Cheng‘s (2008) results suggest that larger boards have 
lower variability of financial performance. In times of crisis, such as those faced by distressed 
firms, larger boards will be effective since they are expected to avoid making risky decisions 
(Chanchart, Krishnamurti and Tian 2012) and, in this way, signal firm‘s access to critical 
resources (Lorsch and Mciver, 1989; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
 
Fischer and Pollock (2004), however, have evidence that smaller boards are more effective in 
monitoring CEO, due to reduced coordination and free-rider problems (Yermack, 1996; 
Chanchart, Krishnamurti and Tian 2012). Fich and Slezak (2008) also show that smaller 
boards with higher ratio of outside directors and with larger ownership stakes of inside 
directors are more effective at avoiding bankruptcy. In this spirit, Jensen (1993) suggests 
boards should be kept small (seven or eight members) so they can function more efficiently 
and not controlled by the CEO. This implies that increasingly board size is window dressing 
strategy to create a favourable signal but not a genuine change in the way the board functions 
(Ezzamel and Watson, 2005). 
 
In sum, empirical evidence on the relationship between board size and firm performance is 
mixed. Nevertheless, smaller boards are susceptible to managerial domination (Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989), implying that smaller boards are ‗manageable‘ from the CEOs‘ perspective 
(Chaganti, Mahajan, and Sharma, 1985). From this point, CEOs may pursue corporate 
strategies inconsistent with shareholders‘ interest, thereby reducing firms‘ long-term survival 
(Miller, 1990). In the corporate failure context, board size is used as a device to access 
resource as well as an indicator of board control over the CEO (Pearce and Zahra, 1991). 
Larger board is valuable for the breath of its ‗services‘ (Chaganti, Mahajan, and Sharma, 
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1985; Dalton, Daily, Johnson, and Ellstrand, 1999), thus surviving firms have larger boards. 
Accordingly,  
H3a. Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relationship between the board size and corporate 
failure.  
H3b. Ceteris paribus, the lower the level of (i) monitoring and (ii) resources, the stronger is 
the negative relationship between the board size and corporate failure. 
 
5.2.2 Board Structure and Corporate Failure 
In this section, I briefly review the literature with respect to board structure and relate them to 
corporate failure. Drawing from our conceptual model, I limit our discussion to three main 
board oversight committees namely: nomination, audit and remuneration. 
 
 Nomination Committee Effectiveness and Corporate Failure 
The significance of board diversity has been increasingly recognized especially after the 
recent financial fiascos and high profile failures (Kaczmarek, Kimino, and Pye, 2012). 
Nomination committees (NCs) play a significant role to strengthen the board composition via 
the director selection process (Cadbury, 1992). In other words, NCs help to ensure the ―right‖ 
candidates are selected on the board (Ruigrok, Peck, Tacheva, Greve and Hu, 2006). In this 
vein, the ability of outside directors to perform their monitoring role is linked to their 
independence, which in turn is related to the board recruitment process (Conyon and Peck, 
1998). 
 
Vafeas (1999b) contends that director appointments are made by shareholders, in theory. 
However, shareholders merely approve director candidates selected by the board, in practise 
(Bainbridge, 2002). Consistent with class managerial hegemony perspective, Hart (1995) 
contends that interdependent directors may not perform their duties in the manner compatible 
with shareholder interests. Thus, the recruitment process clearly affects new appointees‘ 
ability to accurately assess the performance of the CEO (Conyon and Peck, 1998). The NC is 
a crucial institutional mechanism to overcome the limitations of the board selection process 
(Ruigrok, Peck, Tacheva, Greve and Hu, 2006; Kaczmarek, Kimino, and Pye, 2012). The 
rationale is three-fold. First, NCs reduce the CEO influence on the selection process and thus, 
enhance board members‘ independence (Westphal and Zajac 1995 and Westphal, 1998). 
Second, NCs resolve the power asymmetry between boards and management (Ruigrok, Peck, 
  
130 
 
Tacheva, Greve and Hu 2006). Third, NCs improve the board‘s effectiveness (Vafeas, 1999b) 
by raising directors‘ qualifications and independence. Evidence shows that the absence of 
nominating committees is associated with more affiliated outside directors, who lack the 
confidence to evaluate CEO performance, due to potential conflicts of interest (Shivdasani 
and Yermack, 2002). In turn, poor CEO evaluation may result in excessive cash 
compensation for CEOs (Westphal and Zajac 1995) thereby resulting in a firm‘s failure. 
 
The existence of the NC effectively delegates the director selection process to an independent 
group, powerful enough to recruit independent thinkers who possess the necessary expertise 
to accomplish their role. Conversely, the NC is not a separate organ reporting directly to the 
shareholders, implying that NC‘s decisions are ratified by the board. For this reason, 
Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella (1996) suggest that the board nomination process may 
be affected by the distribution of power between the CEO and the board. This suggests that 
the mere presence of the NC is not sufficient to mitigate the agency problem and/or enhance 
survival of a firm. For instance, an inside director serving on the NC may resist the 
appointment of independent thinkers. Put differently, NCs consisting of independent NEDs 
are more likely to safeguard shareholders‘ interest (Ruigrok, Peck, Tacheva, Greve and Hu 
(2006) by assuring that new appointees possess the necessary independence and expertise to 
strengthen the board effectiveness (Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994). ICSA (2007) also highlights 
three key attributes the NC needs to discharge its responsibilities properly. First, the NC 
should consist of at least three independent NEDs but four or five for large boards. Second, 
the NC should meet at least twice in the financial year. Third, the board chairman shall not 
chair the committee on issues regarding his/her succession. 
 
Legal and agency theories (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 
1993) suggest that firms can reduce the agency conflicts by raising the effectiveness of board 
NC. This is because effective NCs enhance the boards‘ ability to ratify CEOs‘ decisions by 
screening new board applicants on the basis of their independence (Bacon and Brown, 1975). 
In sum, the expectation is that NC reduces the likelihood of a firm‘s failure by enhancing the 
board monitoring role. Little, however, is known about the effects of NC on corporate failure. 
To this end, based on the predictions from legal and agency theories, this study argues that 
the nomination committee may enrich our understanding on the corporate failure syndrome. I 
therefore posit our hypothesis regarding nomination committee as follows: 
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H4a. Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relationship between the board nomination 
committee effectiveness and corporate failure.  
H4b. Ceteris paribus, the lower the level of monitoring the stronger is the negative 
relationship between the board nomination committee effectiveness and corporate failure. 
H4c. Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relationship between the board nomination 
committee presence and corporate failure.  
H4d. Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relationship between the board nomination 
committee independence and corporate failure.  
H4e. Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relationship between the board nomination 
committee meetings and corporate failure.  
H4f. Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relationship between the board nomination 
committee size and corporate failure.  
H4g. Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relationship between the board nomination 
committee chairman and corporate failure. 
 
 Audit Committee Effectiveness and Corporate Failure 
Accounting studies (e.g. Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, Wright, 2002; Hermanson, 2000) explore 
mechanisms of transparency (e.g. financial reporting) and accountability (e.g. audit 
committees), which seek to reduce conflicts between CEO and shareholders (Brennan and 
Solomon, 2008). In this respect, researchers use the agency lens and posit that full disclosure 
to shareholders is a vital mechanism to reduce the agency problem (see Healy, Hutton and 
Palepu 1999; Healey and Palepu, 2001). Evidence suggests a positive relationship between 
corporate governance and transparency (e.g. Beeks and Brown, 2006; Cheng, Courtenay, and 
Krishnamurti, 2006), but the governance variable vary from external to internal mechanisms 
(Brennan and Solomon, 2008). 
 
Recently, Audit Committees (henceforth ACs) is noted as a standard mechanism of corporate 
governance internationally (Turley and Zaman, 2004), which reduce information 
asymmetries (Pincus, Rusbarsky and Wong, 1989) and protect shareholders‘ interest (Klein, 
1998; Méndez and Garcia, 2007), due in part to its role in the financial reporting process. Put 
simply, effective ACs demand higher transparency and thus, improve the quality of financial 
statements. 
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Turley and Zaman (2004) identify the potential contributions of the ACs. First, ACs 
strengthen the external and internal audit function as well as the risk management process 
(see also Klein, 1998). This suggests that ACs may enhance firm‘s survival by assessing risks 
and threats facing the firm in attaining its goals. Second, ACs improve accuracy of financial 
data and the quality of the audit process by strengthening the independence of the internal 
and external auditors (see also, McMullen, 1996). The quality financial and audit process 
lessens the likelihood of financial statement fraud (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy and Wright, 
2002). Finally, AC may enhance financial performance by improving CEO monitoring. 
 
Critics (e.g. Turley and Zaman 2004; Chan and Li 2008), however, contend that regulators 
worldwide are worried with ACs‘ effectiveness and impact to the governance process. This 
notion is heightened by the recent financial reporting scandals and corporate failures. Thus, 
these unprecedented failures provide at least anecdotal proof to cement concerns about the 
adequacy of the monitoring provided by ACs (Turley and Zaman 2004). In this regard, 
Cohen, Krishnamoorthy and Wright (2002) and Guy and Zeff (2002) posit that most AC 
members lack critical attributes (e.g. independence, expertise and experience) to discharge 
their board oversight responsibilities. The adoption of ACs may be symbolic (Kalbers and 
Fogarty, 1998) and thus, have no substantive value (DeZoort, 1997) on the firm‘s long term 
viability. In short, AC‘s existence does not promote greater board monitoring (Menon and 
Deahl, 1994).  
 
Consequently, the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2003) and Smith (2003) in the UK and others 
suggest proposals to strengthen corporate governance through enriched roles for AC (Turley 
and Zaman, 2007). These proposals highlight four main attributes: (1) activity (Menon and 
Deahl, 1994, Collier and Gregory 1999), (2) independence (Klein, 1998), (3) size (Pucheta-
Martinez and Fuentes 2007), and (4) financial expertise member (SOX, 2002; Smith, 2003), 
as potential indicators of AC impact in practice. Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, and Lapides 
(2000) confirm this notion, emphasising that higher AC meeting and independence reduce the 
occurrence of fraud.  Beasley (1996), Hudaib and Cooke (2005) also find that independent 
NEDs reduce the likelihood of fraud and earnings management by demanding high quality 
from external auditors. Put otherwise, interdependent directors are not considered as 
independent thinkers and thus may lessen the AC effectiveness (Menon and Deahl, 1994). 
Likewise, Carcello and Neal (2003) find a positive link between AC independence and 
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accounting reporting quality. Further, meeting frequency is considered as a signal of audit 
committee diligence (Menon and Deahl, 1994). In this spirit, it is argued that a larger audit 
committee, probably due to increase in resources and financial expertise members, are more 
likely to discover potential misstatements (Pincus, Rusbarsky, and Wong, 1989) and, in this 
way, demand high quality audit (Kalbers and Fogartry,1993). Hatherly (1999) suggests that 
the level of interaction between the AC and auditors undermines the AC‘s value as an 
effective vehicle for pursuing shareholders‘ interests, is germane here. Likewise, Xie, 
Davidson and DaDalt (2003) find that financial expertise is an important factor to limit 
executives in engaging in earnings management. Bedard and Gendron‘s (2010) review of 103 
AC studies suggests that the effectiveness of AC is linked to its presence, members‘ 
independence and expertise but not its size and meetings.  
 
From the above analysis, it is reasonable to expect the level of agency cost to be positively 
related to the effectiveness of the AC, in an Anglo-Saxon environment. Thus, the AC 
functions is viewed as monitoring mechanism which is employed in high agency cost 
situations to improve the quality of information flows between principal and agent (Pincus, 
Rusbarsky and Wong 1989). Spira (2003) notes, ACs are presumed, with a lesser amount of 
evidence, to be an effective monitoring device, thereby enhancing the prospects of the firm‘s 
survival. 
 
Nonetheless, empirical evidence is limited, leaving plenty of scope for further investigation. 
In particular, despite the much discussion on AC and corporate failure, there is no empirical 
research that tests for a relation between the two. This research is an attempt to fill this gap. 
Thus, I argue that an examination of the impact of ACs in the corporate failure context may 
offer insights and evidence on the value of ACs in companies (Turley and Zaman, 2004). I 
therefore posit this as: 
H5a. Ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between the board audit committee 
effectiveness and corporate failure.  
H5b. Ceteris paribus, the lower the level of monitoring the stronger is the negative 
relationship between the audit committee effectiveness and corporate failure. 
H5c. Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relationship between the board audit committee 
presence and corporate failure.  
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H5d. Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relationship between the board audit committee 
independence and corporate failure.  
H5e. Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relationship between the board audit committee 
meetings and corporate failure.  
H5f. Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relationship between the board audit committee size 
and corporate failure.  
H5g. Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relationship between the board audit committee 
expertise and corporate failure. 
 
Remuneration Committee Effectiveness and Corporate Failure 
Greenbury (1995) proposes that defining suitable reward packages is one of the significant 
monitoring functions of directors. Thus, the formation of remuneration committee 
(henceforth RC) is consistent with agency theory, which advocates the separation of 
management and control (Fama and Jensen, 1983), thereby reducing the likelihood of a 
firm‘s failure. RC‘s primary function is to assess the inside directors‘ performance and 
determine their reward (Klein, 1998), taking into account the shareholders‘ interest (Bosch, 
1995).  In this regard, RCs may provide fair and equitable remuneration packages required to 
attract, retain and motivate directors to manage the firm effectively (Code, 2010). 
 
Accordingly, RCs can reduce the agency cost that arises if executives are responsible for 
determining their own remuneration (Cotter and Silvester, 2003).  Fama and Jensen (1983) 
and Jensen and Meckling (1976) contend that professional managers are self-serving and that 
monitoring and reward structures are meant to reduce the severe principal-agent conflict. 
Hence, a positive association between executive compensation and firm performance and 
lowers the probability of failure is expected using the agency lens. Conyon and Peck (1998), 
however, find that the presence of RC is not associated with lower levels of top management 
pay. Ezzamel and Watson (1998) claim that CEOs must be paid at least the competitive rate 
to retain them in the firm. Put differently, CEO pay upward bias is expected for CEOs who 
earned below the market rate (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). The important implication 
of this is that the mere presence of the RC is not sufficient to mitigate the agency problem in 
the Anglo-Saxon environment. Ezzamel and Watson (2002) confirm this notion and show 
that remuneration committees award reward packages comparable to competitors, for two 
reasons. First, they contend that outside directors may not be genuinely independent from top 
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management. This implies that outside directors on the RC may desire to maintain a 
favourable relationship with the CEO. Second, RCs may prevent the possibility that CEO exit 
to major competitors by paying the competitors and thus, avoid adverse signals. This implies 
that RCs‘ recommendations may favour the CEO, thereby, negatively affecting the wealth of 
shareholders.  
 
Therefore, Greenbury (1995) and others (e.g. Higgs, 2003; ICSA, 2010) set out specific 
guidelines regarding RC to ensure its impact on executive compensation. First, the RC shall 
be made up of at least three independent NEDs. The expectation is that independent NEDs 
act as objective decision thinkers who may ensure that the CEO's reward is set at right levels 
(Bowen, 1994). Fama and Jensen (1983) note that outside board members reduce agency 
problem by acting as arbiters in disagreements between internal management and residual 
claimants, particularly, setting executive compensation, is important here. Conyon and Peck 
(1998), for example, find a positive link between the proportion of outside directors on an RC 
and both the level of CEO pay and the link between top management pay and performance. 
Newman and Mozes (1999), however, suggest that the relation between CEO pay and 
performance is more favourable toward the CEO among the firms that have inside directors 
on the RC.  
 
In sum, compensation practices are more favoured toward the CEO, and at shareholders 
expense, when the RC is ineffective. The on-going public concerns about executives large 
pay increases, enormous gains from share options (Greenbury 1995) and high profile failures 
partly cement this notion. Newman and Mozes (1999) stress the importance of the RC in 
CEO compensation. Little, however, is known about the effect of RC on corporate failure. 
This study begins to fill the vacuum. Consistent with the agency logic, I can speculate that 
RC should be effective to enhance its oversight responsibilities. I hypothesize the following:  
H6a. Ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between the board remuneration 
committee effectiveness and corporate failure.  
H6b. Ceteris paribus, the lower the level of monitoring the stronger is the negative 
relationship between the remuneration committee effectiveness and corporate failure. 
H6c. Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relationship between the board remuneration 
committee presence independence and corporate failure.  
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H6d. Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relationship between the board remuneration 
committee independence and corporate failure.  
H6e. Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relationship between the board remuneration 
committee chairman‘s independence and corporate failure. 
H6f. Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relationship between the board remuneration 
committee size and corporate failure.  
H6g. Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relationship between the board remuneration 
committee meetings and corporate failure.  
 
5.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter sets out hypotheses of the study. Specifically, it proposes governance variables, 
which may be vital in avoiding corporate failure. As well, it reviews prior studies by scholars, 
frequently cited and considered to have added significantly to the literature on corporate 
governance and corporate failure. 
 
In most cases, however, the direction of the link between corporate governance and 
performance and/or corporate failure is not clear. Nevertheless, the sequence in which these 
governance characteristics may influence decline, or be influenced by decline, is still 
regarded as unchartered waters. This is because, all the limited studies in this direction failed 
to validate their respective predictive models and/or variables with either ex-ante and or ex-
post data. Overall, the extant corporate governance and performance literature suggests 
several dimensions of corporate governance which may have links to organisational decline. 
Consequently, the study identifies hypotheses for empirical testing, which in turn set the 
scene for the research methodology, in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE RESEARCH DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
6.0 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to provide the empirical setting of the study. In particular, it 
describes data collection and the estimation method. I collect data from several sources using 
a number of methods. I employ logistic regression analysis due to the binary nature of the 
dependent variable: failed or non-failed firms.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.1 describes the philosophical approach behind 
the research. Section 6.2 describes the data. Section 6.3 outlines the time horizons. Section 
6.4 presents the sample design. Section 6.5 describes the variables of the study. Section 6.6 
sets out the statistical technique. Section 6.7 concludes. 
 
6.1 THE PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH OF THE STUDY 
Trigg (1985) contends that the philosophical stance is the indispensable starting point for all 
social science research. This is because ―where you stand can influence what you see‖ 
(Fischer, 1998; p.128). However, prior studies in prediction of corporate failure employ 
statistical techniques in search of predictors (e.g. financial proxies), without a clear 
philosophical base. Thus, the literature in corporate failure is dominated by ad hoc selection 
of variables approach, without any theoretical underpinning. The saying ―never mind the 
concepts, look at the techniques‖ (Sayer, 1992: p. 2,) seems applicable for the majority of 
failure prediction research. The few exceptions include Lyandres and Zhdanov (2013). 
 
Nonetheless, the empiricism approach integrates most of the features of positivism namely: 
scientism, phenomenalism, empiricism, value freedom, instrumental knowledge (Easterby-
Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 1991; Stiles, 2003). Thus, positivism approach seems to be implicit 
philosophical doctrine, adopted by prior corporate failure studies. This, in part, is attributed to 
its epistemological position, which suggests an application of natural sciences‘ methods to 
the analysis of social reality (Blaikie, 2007). The positivist approach proposes that the subject 
under investigation should be measured via objective methods rather than being inferred 
subjectively (Swartz, Money, Remenyi, and Williams, 1998). The positivism approach is 
anchored in the epistemological assumptions that ―belief in an external reality constituted of 
facts that are structured in a law-like manner‖ (Evered and Louis, 1991). This suggests that 
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the positivist approach is about constructing ‗objective‘ realities based on observable 
phenomena (Wainwright and Forbes, 2000). Thus, positivism approach stresses on the use of 
formal propositions, hypothesis testing, random sampling, aggregation, precision and 
quantifiable measures of variables (Stiles, 2003). The rationale is to construct a set of 
hypothetical statements that can be generalizable to universal knowledge (Evered and Louis, 
1991). In other words, positivism seeks for fundamental laws, causal explanations, and 
reduces the whole into its simplest elements to facilitate in-depth analysis (Easterby-Smith, 
Thorpe and Lowe, 1991; Remenyi, Williams, Money, and Swartz, 1998), thereby generating 
clear results that fulfil the requirements of generalizability and reliability (Stiles, 2003). 
 
Critics (e.g. Morgan, 1983) suggest, however, that positivism is the least appropriate in the 
social sciences. Easterby-Smith Thorpe and Lowe, (1991), for example, contend that 
positivism refines what is already ‗known‘ and, in this way, overlook critical variables not 
embodied within the quantitative approach. In other words, its results are less useful vis-à-vis 
alternative methods.  Others claim it fails to adequately manage the subjective variety of 
individual life and thus, not appropriate to the social world (Giddens, 1974). 
 
Consequently, researchers opt for interpretive or phenomenological approach, which seeks to 
translate the dialogue that connects the inner and outer worlds of the human experience 
(Wainwright and Forbes, 2000), as a viable alternative that overcomes the short comings in 
the positivism approach. Delanty (1998) provides six key features of the interpretativist 
tradition namely: (1) Interpretation of meanings, (2) Anti-scientism, (3) Value-freedom, (4) 
Humanism, (5) Linguistic constructivism, and (6) Inter-subjectivity. In short, interpretive 
epistemological foundation is anchored in Evered and Louis‘ (1991) notion that knowledge 
originates from continuous human experience, which is non-logical. This implies that 
interpretive studies require direct, experiential contact with the object under investigation 
(Stiles, 2003). Put simply, the interpretive approach selects a more qualitative approach to 
data collection and interpretation. Proponents of the interpretive approach cite Bowen‘s 
(2005) notion that qualitative research “yields data that provide depth and detail to create 
understanding of phenomena and live experience” (p.2), as its main strength.  
 
 The above analysis indicates that both the positivism and phenomenology approaches have 
their strengths and weaknesses. Accordingly, there is a near consensus in the literature to 
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embrace a middle ground (see Easterby-Smith Thorpe and Lowe, 1991; Miles and Huberman, 
1994; Stiles, 2003; May, 2011). As Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Lowe (2008) note, the 
interpretative and positivist approaches are ontologically and epistemologically different; 
however, in actual research this incompatibility is distorted.  
 
In turn, these arguments suggest that choosing between the interpretive and positivism 
approaches is not straightforward. The interpretive approach, however, is not practically 
feasible due to the difficulties of obtaining data through interviews from directors of failed 
firms. For this reason, the study adopts the positivism approach. I turn to the discussion of the 
data collection methods, variables and the statistical method adopted for the study in 
accordance with the central tenets of the positivism approach. 
 
6.2. DATA SETS OF THE STUDY 
Data collection for failed firms requires a definition of the term ―corporate failure‖ and 
specification of the population from which firms are drawn (Ohlson, 1980). Consistent with 
major UK studies (e.g. Charitou, Neophytou and Charalambous, 2004), the legal definition is 
used in the study. Thus, a firm is defined as having failed, if it filed for insolvency under the 
UK Insolvency Act of 1986. 
 
The population period is restricted to 1
st
 January 1999 to 31
st
 December 2011, for three 
reasons. First, I seek to collect at least five years‘ corporate governance data post Cadbury 
(1992). This is because corporate governance was formalised in the UK after Cadbury. 
Second, I build on the recent UK study‘s sample period; 1988-1999 (see Charitou, 
Neophytou and Charalambous, 2004; and Neophytou and Molinero, 2004). Third, I choose 
the sample period for practical reasons (see Ohlson, 1980). Keasey and Watson (1991) stress 
that model derivation should be close as possible to the period over which prediction are to be 
made, due in part to data stability and stationarity issues (see Moyer, 1977; Mensah,1984). 
 
Our sample of failed firms is constructed as follows. First, I identify a list of 4,233 insolvent 
and/or inactive firms and dates of insolvency (if available) from Financial Analysis Made 
Easy (50 firms) and Thomson One Banker (4,183 firms) databases. This approach is 
inevitable due to the lack of funding to obtain the list of insolvent firms and dates as well as 
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reasons for filing insolvency from the Stationary Office, Companies House, and Insolvency 
Office in the UK.  
 
Next, I confirm the status of each firm and extract the date of insolvency from the Companies 
House Website (http://www.companieshouse.gov.uk). The goal is to ensure that the failed 
firms consist of companies in administration, company voluntary arrangement (CVA), 
receivership, liquidation and dissolution (see chapter 2 for an extensive discussion on these 
five routes). The reason for insolvency filing, however, is not available in the Companies 
House Website. This implies that our sample may include companies that may have filed for 
insolvency intentionally (e.g. to avoid takeover). This, however, is noted as a limitation, but 
this compares favourably with the lead studies (e.g. Altman 1968, Taffler, 1983). Hambrick 
and D‘Aveni (1992) and Daily and Dalton (1994a: b) are, however, a few notable exceptions. 
 
I identify the control sample (i.e. non-failed firms) from the Financial Analysis Made Easy 
(FAME) database. The non-failed firms are relatively large and within the top 500 publicly 
quoted firms in the London Stock Exchange Market. The criteria for the selection of the non-
failed-firms are not materially different from the failed. For example, the status of each of the 
non-failed firms is confirmed from the Companies House Website. The objective is to ensure 
that companies in the non-failed sample are solvent within the sample period, 1st January, 
1999 to 31
st
 December, 2011.  
 
The next stage is to collect published financial and non-financial data to facilitate the models 
development and hypotheses testing, in particular. The data on corporate governance is 
extracted manually from each company‘s annual reports, available from the Thomson One 
Banker and Northcote databases. I collect company financial information from Worldscope 
using the Thomson One Banker database. The FAME database is used to complement 
financial information data.  
 
The criteria for inclusion or exclusion of a firm‘s data are as follows. First, consistent with 
prior studies (e.g. Shunway, 2001; Wu, Gaunt and Gray, 2010) I exclude companies from 
specially regulated industry (e.g. banks, insurance companies, utilities, and other financial 
institutions). Thus, I invoke Gilbert, Menon and Schwartz‘s (1990) notion that industries are 
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structurally different, hence combining them with entities from specially regulated industry in 
model development is problematic (see also Ohlson, 1980). 
 
Second, I exclude private entities. Agarwal and Taffler (2007) observe that the financial and 
corporate governance profiles of privately owned firms differ significantly to those of listed 
firms.  This suggests that it would be invalid to derive a model with both private and public 
listed firms.  From this point, our sample consists of publicly quoted and unquoted companies 
under the UK Companies Act of 2006. This criterion is unavoidable because failing firms 
delist to private or public unquoted prior to filing for insolvency (see Charitou, Neophytou 
and Charalambous, 2004). The motivation for excluding the former is due in part to the 
perceived compromised corporate governance mechanisms in such entities. For instance, 
private entities may consider or judge most of the provisions of the UK‘s Combined Code as 
less relevant in their case. Furthermore, the data available for research on corporate 
governance in privately-held firms is limited (Uhlaner, Wright, Huse, 2007), relative to listed 
firms. 
 
Third, I omit the following: (i) foreign firms, (ii) firms with accounting year gap, (iii) firms 
with accounting period exceeding 12 months or less, and/or (iv) have demerged within the 
sample period. The rationale for excluding foreign firms is to avoid effects of exchange rate 
fluctuations in translating the original currencies to the British Pound. The second and third 
criteria are necessary to ensure consistency of accounting period for sample firms.  The 
fourth criterion is critical to avoid double counting of common dataset prior to the demerger.  
 
Fourth, I include entities with at least five years: (i) full financial statements and (ii) annual 
report, prior to the date of petition of insolvency.  The goal is to omit entities less than five 
years and thus obtain five years data prior to the date of bankruptcy for in-depth analysis. 
This implies that I omit data on and/or after the insolvency date. Thus, the study avoids back-
casting, one of the dominant problems in the extant literature of corporate failure prediction 
(see Ohlson, 1980; Balcaen, and Ooghe, 2006). Further, I omit failed firms without data on 
employees and/or turnover. The aim is to avoid predicting failure at a stage when it is already 
known by its major stakeholders. I also include only entities with complete data for 
computation of financial ratios and corporate governance proxies. Thus, I omit the entire 
year‘s data due to missing data for at least a variable. Similarly, I delete outliers based on an 
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initial descriptive analysis report. Finally, I discard the 1% lowest and highest observations 
on the basis of total assets. The intention is to obtain robust statistics. 
 
The above criteria reduce the final sample to 358 firms and 1748 firm-years observations, 
consisting of 95 failed firms and 263 non-failed firms. Appendix 4 reports a brief profile of 
each firm in terms of name, insolvency history, lead time, standard industry classification 
code, firm size and data examination period. Overall, the financial statements and the 
insolvency petition dates show a lead time in days of 568.73, 434.00 and 298.00 for mean, 
median and mode, respectively. Table 4 sets out the composition of the final sample of failed 
firms in terms of year and insolvency status in the examination period. In particular, Table 4 
depicts that 46.32% of the failed companies have been dissolved, whereas 35.79% and 
17.89% are in liquidation and receivership, respectively. 
 
Table 4: Composition of Failed Firms in terms of Year and Status 
Status/Year 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 Total % 
Liquidation 0 1 0 3 0 3 2 2 3 0 12 6 2 34 35.79 
Receivership 0 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 9 1 17 17.89 
Dissolved 3 4 2 4 5 5 4 5 2 3 2 5 0 44 46.32 
                
Total 3 6 4 7 6 8 6 7 5 6 14 20 3 95  
 
6.3 TIME HORIZONS OF THE STUDY 
Zavgren (1985) observes that temporal distance in the corporate failure context is a 
significant factor, which may impact other variables under study. Hence, I follow El 
Hennawy and Morris (1983), Hambrick and D'Aveni (1992), Sheppard (1994) and in turn, 
stratify the dataset into five cross sectional sub-samples on the basis of year prior to failure or 
otherwise (i.e. from year t - 5 to t - 1, where t is the year of a firm‘s failure).Table 5 reports 
the number of observations of 353, 351, 350, 346, and 346 for year t - 1 to t - 5. This in turn, 
results in total observations of 1,748 firm-year observations, 462 failed and 1286 non-failed 
firm-year obsevations.  
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Table 5: Composition of Sample in Terms of YEAR, PANEL and GROUP 
 YEARS PRIOR TO FAILURE  
 t-1 t-2 t-3 t-4 t-5 Total  
PANEL A-Estimation Sample 
Failed 47 47 47 45 45 231 
Non-failed 130 129 129 128 128 644 
Total 177 176 176 173 173 875 
       
PANEL B-Holdout Sample 
Failed 46 46 48 46 45 231 
Non-failed 130 129 128 127 128 642 
Total 176 175 176 173 173 873 
       
PANEL C-Combined  Sample 
Failed 93 93 95 91 90 462 
Non-failed 260 258 257 255 256 1286 
Total 353 351 352 346 346 1748 
 
The rationale for application of the cross-sectional analysis is twofold. First, this recognises 
that corporate failure is a process, rather than a sudden event. In this respect, I allow a five 
year lag period for thorough analysis (see Hambrick and D'Aveni, 1992). Second, the cross 
sectional analysis facilitates prediction prior to potential failure. Thus, the cross-sectional 
analysis provides insight into the failure process. Put simply, the analysis may uncover 
potential ways in which firms change as they approach failure. This is because data at t - 1, t -
2, t - 3, t - 4, and t - 5 reflects firms‘ governance and financial conditions in years one, two, 
three, four and five prior to the date of insolvency petition (or target year) or otherwise (lead 
time).  
 
Sheppard (1994) contends, however, that these changes may be data and sample specific. To 
overcome this limitation, the data set under each year is randomly sampled into two sub-
samples: estimation and holdout
7
tests (see Sheppard 1994; Zmijewski, 1984; Hambrick and 
D‘Aveni, 1988). Table 5 shows the number of firms for years one through five and also 
indicates a total observation for each panel and group. In particular, the estimation sample 
(Panel A) is 875 firm-year observations, 231 failed and 644 non-failed firm-year 
observations. A further scrutiny in terms of year indicates failed (non-failed) firms of 
47(130), 47(129), 47(129), 45(128), and 45(128) for years one to five respectively. In the 
same vein, the holdout sample (Panel B) is 873 firm-year observations, consisting of 
                                                          
7
Holdout sample denotes an out-of-sample data. The aim of validating the estimated model with a holdout 
sample and jackknife procedure is to insure models‘ predictive validity. 
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231(642) failed (non-failed) firm-year observations. The detailed analysis in terms of year 
indicates failed (non-failed) firms of 46(130), 46(129), 48(128), 46(127), and 46(128) for 
years one to five, respectively. Finally, the combined sample (Panel C) consists of the 
estimation and holdout samples resulting in 1748 firm-year observations made up of 462 
failed and 1286 non-failed firm-year observations. I turn to the justification for the sample 
design in the next section. 
 
6.4 SAMPLE DESIGN OF THE STUDY 
The paired sample approach is pervasive and dominant in the extant corporate failure 
prediction literature (e.g. Rosner, 2010; Platt and Platt, 2012). This is a non-random sample 
approach, where a number of failed firms are matched with the same number of non-failed 
firms on the basis of size, industry, and year among others. 
 
This judgemental method and particularly matching by size and industry has several 
limitations. Martin (1977) and Zmijewski (1984), for example, argue that non-random sample 
approach leads to sample selection bias, thereby resulting in asymptotic bias parameter and 
probability estimates (Menski and Lerman, 1977). On one hand, matching on the basis of 
firm size leads to more small firms in the non-failed sample. Barnes (1990), however, is of 
the view that random sample leads to a sample mostly including of non-failed firms. On the 
other hand, matching on the basis of industry leads to more firms from recession-hit 
industries in the failed sample (Lennox, 1999). In sum, the estimation samples of failed and 
non-failed firms are not illustrative of the overall population of firms (Ooghe and Joos, 1990).  
 
Likewise, it is not possible to investigate the effects of industry or firm size on the probability 
of corporate failure (Jones, 1987). As well, this non-random sample approach may result in 
relatively small sample. In turn, small sample may result in over-fitting and thus, impacts on 
the stability of the models (Platt and Platt, 1990). The important implication of this is that the 
estimated model‘s predictive accuracy is misleading (Hambrick and D‘Aveni, 1988) and, in 
this manner, limits the model‘s applicability (Casey and Bartczak, 1985). This in part may 
account for why the investment community does not appear to depend on the existing 
prediction failure models (Morris, 1997).  
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Zmijewski‘s (1984) study, however, finds that both the paired and random sample approaches 
register similar qualitative results. For this reason, Ohlson (1980) and Taffler (1983) contend 
that the appropriate criterion for matching is not obvious, but the present study opts for the 
random sample approach, primarily to avoid the over-sampling issues and misclassification 
biases associated with the matched technique discussed above (see also Martin, 1977; Taffler, 
1982; Frydman, Altman, and Kao, 1985; Jones and Hensher, 2004). Put differently, no 
attempt is made to match failed and non-failed firms by firm age, size and industry (see also 
Peel and Peel, 1988; Agarwal and Taffler, 2007), rather I follow Watson (2007), Wu, Gaunt 
and Gray (2010), Drees and Heugens, (2012) and in turn, examine these confronting firm 
demographics. Thus, I concur with Peel, Peel and Pope‘s (1986) notion that ―a superior 
methodology would appear to be to use variables as predictors, rather than to use them for 
matching purposes‖ (p.7). We, also acknowledge that other sample approaches (e.g. stratified 
random sample) are problematic to handle without having a full access to information in 
respect of all members of the population (Sheppard, 1994).  
 
6.5 VARIABLES OF THE STUDY 
The aim of this section is to define the measures used in the study. The dependent, 
independent, and control variables are defined accordingly in the relevant sub-sections.  
 
6.5.1 Dependent Variable of the Study 
The dependant variable is failure, as defined above, is the filing of insolvency petition. 
Failure (STAT1) is a binary variable that takes the value of ―1‖, if the firm is classified as 
failed and ―0‖ otherwise. This measure is the standard definition in corporate failure 
prediction studies (e.g. Hambrick and D‘Aveni, 1992; Charitou, Neophytou, Charalambous, 
2004).  
 
6.5.2 Independent Variables of the Study 
The independent variables are as follows:  proportion of outside directors, presence of female 
director on board, board size, nomination committee effectiveness, audit committee 
effectiveness, and remuneration committee effectiveness. I define each in turn. 
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Measurement of Board Independence 
To test hypothesis one, the main variable of interest is proportion of outside directors 
(BODC), a proxy for board independence, which is calculated as the number of outside 
directors divided by board size (Weisbach, 1988; Chancharat, Krishnamurti, and Tian, 2012). 
Consistent with prior studies (e.g. Kang, Cheng, and Gray 2007), I define an outside director 
as non-employee directors. Put differently, board independence is calculated as independent 
and non-independent non-executive directors divided by the board size (Dalton, Daily, 
Johnson, and Ellstrand, 1999).The use of this measure as a proxy for board independence is 
well-established in the literature due in part to agency theory proposition, which requires 
outside directors to be independent due to their monitoring function (Fama, 1980).  
 
Measurement of Board Gender Diversity 
To test hypothesis two, the core variable of interest is presence of female director on board 
(FMALE), a proxy for board gender diversity, a binary variable equal to ―1‖, if there is at 
least a woman on the board, otherwise ―0‖ (Hillman, Shropshire and Cannella Jr 2007; Rose, 
2007). This measure is one of the standard measures of board gender diversity (see Campbell 
and Minguez-Vera, 2008). The rationale for the use of this variable is anchored in agency 
theory. Particularly, agency theory suggests that boards with at least a woman director on 
board are less likely to be ‗rubber-stamp‘ to CEO decisions (Adams and Ferreira 2009). This 
suggests that board gender diversity yields different perspectives of looking at corporate 
financing, investment and dividend decisions and, in this way, impacts positively on firm 
performance and ultimately, reduces the likelihood of corporate failure.   
 
Measurement of Board Size 
To test hypothesis three, the central variable of interest is board size (BODS), which is a 
count of the number of directors (Yermack, 1996; Certo, Daily and Dalton, 2001; Coles, 
Daniel and Naveen, 2008). This measure has been widely used in prior research (e.g. 
Chaganti, Mahajan and Sharma 1985; Yermack 1996; Conyon and Peck, 1998; Coles, Daniel 
and Naveen, 2008), but the existing evidence is inconclusive. There is, however, a near 
consensus in the literature that large boards are more effective (Alexander, Fennell, and 
Halpern, 1993) for the resource dependence (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; 
Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand, 1996; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003), and the control roles (Zahra 
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and Pearce, 1989) and, in this way, negatively related to the likelihood of a firm‘s failure 
(Dalton, Daily, Johnson and Ellstrand, 1999) 
Measurement of Nomination Committee Effectiveness 
To test hypothesis four, the primary variable of interest is nomination committee 
effectiveness (NCE), a proxy for board effectiveness, is a composite index consisting of the 
nomination committee‘s presence (NCP), independence (NCI), chairman independence 
(NCCI), size (NCS) and frequency of meetings (NCM1). Thus, NCE Index is constructed as 
follows:  
                                 
This index is inspired by Cadbury (1992), prior studies (e.g. Hart, 1995; Vafeas, 1999; 
Ruigrok, Peck, Tacheva, Greve and Hu, 2006) and recent reforms (Higgs, 2003), which 
require firms to maintain nomination committees based on these five main constructs. 
 
I define the five main constructs as follows. First, NCP is a binary variable with ―1‖ denoting 
presence of appointment committee and ―0‖ otherwise (Cadbury, 1992; Conyon and Peck, 
1998; Ruigrok, Peck, Tacheva, Greve and Hu, 2006). Second, NCI is a dummy variable, 
where ―1‖ means all members of the nomination committee are independent non-executive 
directors and ―0‖ otherwise (Hart, 1995; Conyon and Mallin, 1997). Third, NCCI is a binary 
variable, where ―1‖ means the committee‘s chair is an independent non-executive director or 
independent chairman of the board, save when the chairman‘s successor is being sought, and 
―0‖ otherwise (Conyon and Mallin, 1997; Code, 2010). Finally, NCS and NCM1 are both 
continuous variables, but NCS is coded ―1‖, when nomination committee consists of at least 
three independent NED and ―0‖ otherwise (see ICSA, 2007), due to the composite measure 
NCE (see Ruigrok, Peck, Tacheva, Greve and Hu, 2006). Likewise, NCM1 is coded ―1‖, 
when nomination committee members meet at least twice and ―0‖ otherwise (see ICSA, 
2007).   
 
Measurement of Audit and Risk Committee Effectiveness 
To test hypothesis five, the basic variable of interest is audit and risk committee 
effectiveness (ACE), a proxy for board accountability, which is a composite index consisting 
of audit committee‘s presence (ACP), independence (ACI), expertise (ACX), size (ACS), and 
frequency of meetings (ACM1). In line with Smith (2003), Pucheta-Martinez and De Fuentes 
(2007) and Zaman, Hudaib and Haniffa (2011), ACE Index is constructed as follows:  
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I define the five main constructs as follows. ACP is a binary variable of ―1‖ meaning 
presence of audit committee and ―0‖ otherwise (Beasley, 1996). Second, ACI is coded ―1‖, 
when the committee members are independent non-executive directors (exclusive of 
independent non-executive chairman) and ―0‖ otherwise (see; Smith 2003; Zaman, Hudaib 
and Haniffa 2011). In addition, ACS, ACX and ACM1 are continuous variables but ACX 
takes a value of ―1‖, when at least a member of the audit committee has accounting, finance 
or professional accounting qualifications and ―0‖ otherwise (Chan and Li, 2008), due to the 
composite measure for ACE (see Zaman, Hudaib, Haniffa, 2011). Likewise, ACS takes a 
value of ―1‖ if there are three or more independent NED membership throughout the year and 
―0‖ otherwise (Beasley, 1996; Chan and Li, 2008). As well, ACM1 is treated as a dummy 
variable with value ―1‖, when three or more meetings are held by the audit committee and 
―0‖ otherwise (see Zaman, Hudaib and Haniffa 2011; Smith 2003; Mendez and Garcia, 
2007). Mendez and Garcia (2007), for example, suggest that meeting frequency measures the 
degree and intensity of audit committee‘s activity and thus, high frequency is an indicator of 
audit committee‘s firm control and diligence.   
 
Measurement of Remuneration Committee Effectiveness 
To test hypothesis six, the principal variable of interest is remuneration committee 
effectiveness (RCE), which is a composite index consisting of remuneration committee‘s 
presence (RCP), independence (RCI), size (RCS), chair independence (RCCI), and frequency 
of meetings (RCM1). Thus, RCE Index is constructed as follows:  
                                 
This is inspired by the Greenbury (1995), which requires firms to maintain remuneration 
committee based on these five main constructs.  
 
I define the five main constructs as follows. First, RCP is a binary variable of ―1‖ meaning 
presence of remuneration committee and ―0‖ otherwise (Conyon, 1997; Conyon and Peck, 
1998). Second, RCI is coded ―1‖, when the committee members are independent non–
executive directors (inclusive of independent non-executive chairman) and ―0‖ otherwise 
(Conyon, Gregg and Machin 1995; Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand and Dalton, 1998). Third, RCS 
is a binary variable with ―1‖ denoting membership of at least three independent NED and ―0‖ 
(Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand and Dalton 1998). The Code (2010), however, requires at least two 
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members for smaller companies; hence a control variable of size is relevant in the model 
estimation. Fourth, RCCI is coded ―1‖, when its chairman is independent NED but not the 
chairman of the board and ―0‖ otherwise (Greenbury, 1995; Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand, 
Dalton, 1998).  Finally, RCM1 is coded ―1‖, when the committee members meet at least 
twice and ―0‖ otherwise (see ICSA, 2010; Vafeas, 1999a). Vafeas (1999a), for example, 
suggests that boards are able to turn around poorly performing firms by meeting more often. I 
turn to the operationalization of the board functions in the subsequent paragraphs. 
 
Measurement of Board Monitoring Function 
 In relation to the interaction effects, the frequency of board meetings and CEO performance 
evaluation are used as proxies for board monitoring function. I justify and define each in turn. 
 
Frequency of board meeting: Vafeas (1999a) argues that ―outside directors are likely to 
demand more board meetings to enhance their ability to monitor management‖ (p.116). 
Thus, consistent with agency theory boards that meet more frequently are more likely to 
perform their monitoring duties (see also Conger, Finegold and Lawler, 1998). Vafeas 
(1999a) explores this assertion and finds that firm‘s performance improves following years of 
higher frequency of board meeting. This, however, may suggest that board meetings are not 
proactive measure for improving firm‘s governance and performance, but consider as a fire-
fighting device (Jensen, 1993). As well, class managerial hegemony theory suggests that 
board meetings are too artificial to result in effective monitoring. In sum, the impact of 
frequency of board meetings, a proxy for board monitoring, is a contestable empirical 
question. Following Fich and Slezak (2008), frequency of board meeting is measured by the 
number of formal meetings (excluding telephone meetings) held by the entity in a financial 
year.  
 
Turning to CEO performance evaluation, Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1994) posit that a 
fundamental monitoring device is the formal evaluation of the CEO‘s performance. Young, 
Stedham, and Beekon (2000) concur, stressing that outside directors are ―more inclined to 
hold CEOs accountable for their performance through the adoption of a formal CEO 
evaluation process” (p.280). Young, Stedham, and Beekon (2000) define formal evaluation 
process as one that is based on explicit criteria. Thus, they neglect its implementation. The 
present study focuses on implementation of the written procedure of the formal evaluation 
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process. Hence, I code as ―0‖, ―1‖ and ―2‖ if the annual report indicates that the entity 
undertook an (a) informal, formal and external evaluation of the CEO‘s performance, 
respectively.     
 
Measurement of Board Resource Function 
I use director interlock, as a proxy for board resource function, due to resource dependency 
theory‘s (see Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Bazerman and Schoorman, 1983) notion, suggesting 
that interlocked directors may reduce the effects of environmental uncertainty, which in turn, 
facilitates resource exchange agreements. Pfeffer (1972), Mizruchi and Stearns (1988) and 
Dalton, Daily, Johnson, and Ellstrand (1999) confirm this notion.  
 
Class managerial hegemony perspectives, however, suggest that interlocked directorates can 
―reduce board effectiveness by generating entrenchment, lack of legitimacy, self-
protection, lack of monitoring, connivance, excessive compensation” (Nguyen-Dang, 
2012:p.9). Devos, Prevost, and Puthenpurackal (2009) confirm this notion. In sum, the 
impact of board interlock, a proxy for board resources, is an empirical question.  
 
I follow Sheppard (1994) and in turn, limit our analysis to direct director interlock. Thus, I 
invoke Pennings‘ (1980) notion that an ―indirectly linked director’s attention is much more 
diffused than that of a directly linked director‖ (p.37-38). I use three proxies for board 
interlock. First, board interlock denotes a dummy of ―1‖, if both the entity‘s chairman and 
senior NED serve on at least a board and ―0‖ otherwise. Second, board interlock denotes a 
dummy of ―1‖, if all the entity‘s lead directors (measured by the trinity-i.e. Chairman, CEO, 
and senior NED) serve on at least a board and ―0‖ otherwise. The CEO‘s interlock inclusion 
overcomes a major gap in the interlocking studies. Put differently, prior studies omit 
executive interlock (see Rivas, 2012). Finally, I consider board political connections 
(hereafter former government official) which denote a dummy of ―1‖, if any of the lead 
directors possesses any type of political appointment (e.g. Member of Parliament) over a year 
and ―0‖ otherwise. Rivas (2012) proposes that former government officials on board increase 
firm‘s ability to co-opt resources to decrease environmental insecurity and, thus, enhanced 
firm‘s survival (Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman, 1999; Hillman, 2005). 
. 
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6.5.3 Control variables of the study 
I include control variables that may affect the corporate failure process besides the corporate 
governance proxies. These are financial (i.e .liquidity, profitability, leverage) and 
demographics (i.e. industry effects, firm size and age). I justify and define each in turn. 
 
 Measurement of Liquidity 
Working Capital/Total Asset Ratio (WCTA): The liquidity ratio is calculated by dividing 
working capital of a firm by its total assets. This measures the net liquid resources of the firm 
relative to the total capitalization (Altman, 1968), a measure which is widely used in lead 
studies (e.g. Hensher and Jones, 2007; Wu, Gaunt and Gray, 2010; Premachandra, Chen, and 
Watson, 2011).  
 
Measurement of Profitability 
Earnings before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortisation /Total Assets (PROF): 
This ratio is calculated by dividing earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortisation of a firm by its total assets. It measures the true efficiency of the firm's capital 
employed due in part to the non-consideration of all non-cash movement items (Altman, 
1968). This ratio is one of the standard approaches to the measurement of profitability which 
is extensively used by prior studies (see, El Hennawy and Morris, 1983; Wu, Gaunt and 
Gray, 2010; Du Jardin and Severin, 2011). More importantly, this ratio is appropriate for 
predicting corporate failure because a firm's ultimate survival is based on the earning power 
of its assets. In theory, insolvency follows, when the total liabilities exceed the earning power 
of the firm's resources (Altman, 1968). 
 
Measurement of Financial Leverage 
Total Liabilities/Total Assets (TLTA):  This ratio is calculated by dividing total liabilities of 
a firm by its total assets. Inclusion of this ratio is motivated by Jensen and Meckling‘s (1976) 
notion, suggesting that higher leverage increases debt holders‘ need to monitor CEOs. In this 
regard, agency theory suggests that a firm‘s gearing position is appropriate for predicting a 
firm‘s failure. This is because a firm‘s going concern is based in part on its capital structure. 
Thus, the probability of a firm‘s failure is greater for a highly geared firm. As a result, this 
measure has been widely used in prior research (e.g. Shumway, 2001; Chava and Jarrow, 
2004; Lyandres and Zhdanov, 2013). 
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Measurement of Industry Effects 
Carter, Simkins, D‘Souza and Simpson (2010) contend that agency problems may differ 
across industries. Put simply, the need for executive monitoring may differ in different 
industries. Chava and Jarrow (2004) concur, emphasising that ―different industries face 
different levels of competition and, therefore, the likelihood of bankruptcy can differ for 
firms in different industries” (p.538).  Evidence from prior studies (e.g. El Hennawy and 
Morris, 1983; Chava and Jarrow, 2004) confirms this notion, implying that industry effect is 
an important component in the prediction of corporate failure.  
 
The vast literature, however, has largely overlooked industry effects (Chava and Jarrow, 
2004). I include a number of industry dummies based on the current Standard Industrial 
Classification Manual, which defines industries in accordance with the composition and 
structure of the economy (El Hennawy and Morris, 1983; Chava and Jarrow, 2004).  
 
Measurement of Company Size 
Firm Size (LOGDA): This is operationalized as the natural logarithm of book value of year-
end total assets divided by Gross Domestic Price index-Deflator (Altman, et al, 1977; Ohlson, 
1980). The index assumes a base value of 100 for 2010. The procedure assures a real-time 
implementation of the model. Logarithmic transformation is applied to help normalise the 
distribution of the variable (see Altman et al, 1977; Ohlson 1980). Inclusion of firm size is 
motivated by argument from agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980), which 
suggests that agency costs are more substantial in larger firms due to the free rider problems 
(Yermack, 1996). 
 
In parallel, large size helps a firm to function more efficiently (Argenti, 1976), due in part to 
economies of scale, which in turn, enhances a firm‘s ability to manage  environmental 
turbulence (Aldrich, 1979) and probable turnaround (Hambrick and D‘Aveni, 1988). This 
implies large size reduces business failure rate (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Sutton, 1997). 
Moulton and Thomas (1993) and Sine, Mitsuhashi, and Kirsch (2006) confirm this notion. In 
sum, small firms are prone to higher failure rates due in part to key constraints (e.g. raising 
capital) and legitimacy problems with external stakeholders (Baum and Oliver 1992, 1996). 
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Measurement of Firm Age 
Firm age is the difference between the financial data year end and the date of incorporation, a 
variable that has been used by several studies (e.g. Wiklund, Baker and Shepherd, 2010). I 
include firm age to counter potential alternative explanation for corporate failure from the 
perspective of ecological scholars (e.g. Thornhill and Amit, 2003). For instance, Stinchcombe 
(1965) argues that the concept of liability of newness accounts for the high failure rate in 
young ventures vis-à-vis their more mature counterparts (see also Sine, Mitsuhashi, and 
Kirsch, 2006). Thornhill and Amit (2003) cement this hypothesis, implying that young firms 
lack the required legitimacy (i.e. creditworthiness) to access critical resources and thus are 
more likely to fail.  
 
Agarwal and Sarkar (2002), however, argue that the liability of newness varies according to 
the stage of the industry life cycle. Advocates of liability of adolescence (e.g. Bruderl and 
Schussler 1990) confirm this notion. As Henderson (1999) notes, the liability of newness and 
adolescence scholars differ as to when the firm is likely to fail. In sum, the impact of firm age 
on corporate failure is an empirical question.  
 
6.6 STATISTICAL TECHNIQUE 
The aim of this section is to describe the statistical technique used in the study. The section is 
organised as follows. Sub-section 6.6.1 describes the logit model. The rationale for the choice 
of logit as the statistical technique for the study is the focus of sub-section 6.6.2.  
 
6.6.1 The Logit Model 
I employ multivariate logistic regression analysis (LOGIT) as the primary analytical 
technique to test the hypotheses of the study. The logit function has a number of properties, 
which make it suitable for probability function and corporate failure prediction in particular. 
For instance, it overcomes the constant marginal effect and the difficulty of interpreting 
probabilities greater than one and less than zero associated with the linear probability model 
(LPM). In addition, unlike the Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA), it does not assume 
multivariate normality and equal covariance matrices (Ohlson, 1980). From this point, 
scholars prefer the logit to the discriminant analysis, even if the assumptions of the latter are 
met. The reasons are twofold. First, it is extremely flexible due in part to its mathematical 
convenience (Green, 2004), which produces the estimated probability between 0 and 1 
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(Ohlson, 1980). Second, logit analysis produces consistent and unbiased coefficient estimates 
(Green, 2004). Following Gujarati (2004), the logistic cumulative distribution function (CDF) 
is:   
                                                           = 
 
      
 = 
  
    
                                           (6.1) 
 
where    =     +        
Where    is the probability of corporate failure occurrence for observation i.     and         are  
the intercept term and the estimated coefficient of variable      , respectively (see Hosmer and 
Lemeshow, 1989; Pampel, 2000; Chi and Tang 2006). Equation 6.1 suggests that, as    
        tends to zero and as         
   increases indefinitely (Gujarati, 2004). The 
cumulative logistic function,   , ranges from                ranges from 0 to 1 and also 
nonlinearly related to             . Further, if    is the probability of corporate failure 
occurrence, then (1 -   ), the probability of non-failed, is:  
                                                                   =  
 
     
                                                                   (6.2) 
Accordingly, I write 
                                                  
  
    
 = 
      
      
 =                                                           (6.3) 
 
Where  Pi / (1 - Pi) is simply the odd ratio in favour of failed. For instance, if Pi = 0.9, it 
shows that odds are 9 to 1 in favour of the corporate failure. Further, the natural log of 
Equation 6.3 is:  
                  Log   |      =              +                                                                       (6.4) 
 
Where    is the error term.  Equation 6.4 depicts that the dependent variable is the logarithm 
of the odds, {Log   |     }, which is the logarithm of the ratio of two probabilities of the 
occurrence of corporate failure (Chi and Tang 2006).  The log of the odds ratio is linear in its 
parameters, may be continuous, and may range from -∞ to +∞ (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 
2000). The probabilities, however, are not linear. Hence, I cannot use the familiar OLS 
procedure to estimate the parameters (Gujarati 2004), but rather the maximum likelihood 
method. Figure 11 depicts the logistic cumulative distribution function, which is very similar 
to the standard normal cumulative distribution function.  
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Figure 11: Graph of the Logistic Function 
 
Figure 11 shows that the logit function is always positive, i.e. lies between zero and one, 
approaches zero as X     and approaches one as X     (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). 
Thus, if the logit is positive, it means that when the value of the independent variable 
increases, the odds that the dependent equals one increases and vice versa. In this regard, the 
interpretation of the logit model in equation 6.4 is as follows:    the slope, measures the 
change in L for a unit change in  . Thus, I use X to denote the full set of explanatory 
variables. From this point, scholars may add more binary and continuous independent 
variables as dictated by the underlying theory (Gujarati, 2004). The intercept    is the value 
of the log odds in favour of corporate failure if the financial and non-financial indicators are 
zero.  The coefficient from logit model, however, is difficult to interpret due in part to the 
change in the unobservable L associated with a change of one unit in the independent 
variables. Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000), for example, suggest that proper interpretation of 
the logit model‘s coefficient is based on researchers‘ ability to place meaning on the 
difference between two logit. A more useful measure is the marginal effects (see Uysal, 
2011). I turn next to the justification for the choice of the logit technique.  
6.6.2 Rationale for the Choice of Logit 
It is recognised that, in addition to the logit, there are alternative techniques, such as probit, 
neural networks and multivariate discriminant analysis (MDA) models that can be used to 
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answer the research problem. Lachenbruch and Goldstein (1979) and Lo (1986), for example, 
assert that MDA is a robust technique, which can tolerate some deviations. Lo (1986), 
however, contend that logit analysis is more robust and, in this way, considered more reliable 
than discriminant analysis when dealing with samples which are not normally distributed. 
This nothwistanding, the review in chapter three, suggests that there is no single method, 
which is consistently superior method (Aziz and Dar, 2006). I employ logit for six reasons. 
 
First, logit is suitable for this study due in part to the research problem, which involves the 
classification of firms into two groups on the basis of a set of financial and non-financial 
characteristics of the firm. Particularly, logit employs the coefficient of a combination of 
continuous and categorical independent variables to predict the probability of occurrence of a 
dichotomous dependent variable (Dielman, 2001). In comparison to discriminant analysis, 
logit handles categorical independent variables easily.  
 
Second, logit estimation produces a nonlinear transformation of the input data that decreases 
the influence of outliers. This in turn, suggests that it produces reliable results (e.g. Martin, 
1977; Ohlson, 1980; Mensah, 1983; Casey and Bartczak, 1985; Charitou, Neophytou and 
Charalambous 2004). Third, logit is a straightforward statistical test (Anderson, Hair, Tatman 
and Black, 2006), which reduces the fundamental estimation problem to the following 
statement: given that a firm belongs to a predetermined population, what is the probability 
that the firm fails within some pre-set time (Mensah 1983; Ohlson, 1980). Fourth, logit 
permits the statistical significance of each of the variables in the model to be evaluated 
independently (Mensah, 1983). Advocates of logit approach cite this as its major strength 
over the numerous architects of the Artificial Intelligent Expert system. Fifth, no assumption 
is made about the distributions of the independent variables. Nonetheless, the independent 
variables should not be highly correlated with one another. For this reason, I assess the 
correlation of our explanatory variables via Spearman and Pearson‘s correlation matrix for 
each year.  
 
 Sixth, no assumptions have to be made regarding prior probabilities of bankruptcy and/or the 
distribution of predictors (Ohlson, 1980). The costs of misclassification are user-specific 
(Mensah, 1983), unlike the MDA. This permits the user to calculate the cost of 
misclassification and to select the preferred model based on the facts of any given situation. 
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Thus, adjusting the probability cut-off provides a means of incorporating the costs of 
misclassification (Jones, 1987). In this respect, I follow lead studies (e.g. Keasey and Watson, 
1986; Gilbert, Menon and Schwartz, 1990; Charitou, Neophytou and Charalambous 2004) 
and in turn, assume an equal probability of group membership, for two reasons. First, the 
study models are intended for general application by a wide range of user groups. Second, I 
seek to avoid sample specific results, which in turn might overstate the power of the 
prediction models. This suggests consistency in the results of the estimation, holdout and 
combined samples for meaningful analysis.  
 
However, large sample size is required for logit analysis to provide sufficient numbers in 
both categories of the response variable. Furthermore, the more explanatory variables, the 
larger the sample size required. With small sample sizes, the Hosmer–Lemeshow test has low 
power and is unlikely to detect subtle deviations from the logit model. Hosmer and 
Lemeshow (2000) recommend sample sizes greater than 400. In this regard, I employ a 
holdout sample and Jackknife procedures test as well as combined sample to test the 
robustness of out training models. I turn next to data analysis of the study.  
 
6.7 DATA ANALYSIS 
Data analysis proceeds in two stages: univariate and multivariate. The univariate analysis 
examines the predictive ability of independent variables one at a time.  I employ two sample 
t-tests for differences in means five year cross-sectional pooled data as well as  cross-
sectional means, an approach which has been employed by prior studies in the corporate 
failure context (e.g. Beaver, 1966; Gales and Kesner, 1994; Hambrick, and D‘Aveni, 1992; 
Rosner 2010; Platt and Platt, 2012). In addition, I conduct univariate logit analysis for each 
year and the cross-sectional pooled data to assess the predictive power and association of 
each independent variable on the likelihood of firm‘s failure. I use log likelihood chi-square, 
pseudo r-squared and overall predictive accuracy to measure a variable‘s predictive power. 
This approach has been employed by recent studies in the prediction of corporate failure in 
the UK (e.g. Charitou, Neophytou, Charalambous, 2004). 
 
The multivariate analysis examines the principal research question: whether corporate 
governance measures are related to corporate failure in the UK. Specifically, I address two 
issues: RQ1: whether board attributes are related to corporate failure, and RQ2: whether the 
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interactions between board attributes and functions are related to corporate failure. Following 
Sheppard (1994), I perform three phases of LOGIT runs: cross-sectional pooled data, cross-
sectional and multi-period LOGIT models. I turn next to the discussion of each phase. 
 
6.7.1 Pooled Cross Sectional LOGIT Model 
I follow prior studies (e.g. Sheppard, 1994; Wu, Gaunt and Gray, 2010) by using pooled 
cross-sectional data to examine the association between corporate governance measures and 
the likelihood of corporate failure. As discussed in section 6.3, I randomly split the data into 
estimation and holdout samples and merge both for combined sample.  
 
The pooled cross-sectional logit model (herafter pooled) is equivalent to Sheppard (1994) but 
differs slightly from Wu, Grant and Gray (2010). In this regard, Wu, Grant and Gray (2010) 
include one firm-year observation for each failed firm but all firm-year observations for the 
non-failed firms. As well, the pooled logit is similar to the hazard model in Shumway (2001), 
Beaver, McNicholas and Rhie (2005), Xu and Zhang (2009), save the inclusion of maximum 
five firm-year observations for each failed and non-failed firm. This indicates that there are 
multiple observations of the same firm in each sample, implying that residuals may be 
correlated across time and across firms. For this reason, I use ―robust‖ standard errors 
estimation and adjust errors by firm clustering in the training and combined samples of the 
models (see Petersen, 2009; Darrat, Gray, and Wu, 2010). The jackknife procedure is 
employed in the holdout test, an approach which is extensively used to test reliability of 
prediction models (e.g. Aziz, Emanuel and Lawson, 1988; Platt and Platt, 1990; Sheppard, 
1994; Huyhebaert, Gaeremynck, Roodhooft, & Van de Gucht, 2000).  
 
Further, I assess the adequacy of the pooled logit model with a range of measures: Log 
likelihood ratio test, log likelihood chi-squared, classification accuracy, McFadden‘s r-
squared, Hosmer-Lemeshow statistics and Receiver Operating Characteristics Area (ROC 
area). By rule of thumb, a model shows adequate fit by recording large p-value for the 
Hosmer and Lemeshow's test, a significant chi-squared and higher McFadden‘s r-squared, 
ROC, classification accuracy. These measures are widely used to assess prediction models 
(e.g. Chava and Jarrow, 2004; Agarwal and Taffler, 2007; Wu, Grant and Gray, 2010).The 
pooled logit model is estimated using the form: 
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                                                              (6.5) 
 
Where P (FAILURE it) is the likelihood of a firm‘s failure at year t. The dependent variable 
is set to 1 for failed firm-year observations. Specifically, if a firm failed in year t, it 
contributes five years data prior to failure to the pooled model. Non-failed firms also 
contribute five years data prior to target year. In this regard, the insolvency years of failed 
firms is used as a benchmark in selecting the non-failed firms.  
 
Critics may, however, argue that the pooled logit does not consider failure as a process, due 
to the aggregation of data. Specifically, the pooled approach considers failure as a 
catastrophic event instantaneously occurring at a point in time by several concurrent factors. 
This contradicts general intuition (Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006), suggesting that the pooled 
approach does not consider leading indicators of the downward spiral of a firm. Further, the 
pooled approach can report the association of governance and accounting proxies on 
corporate failure, but the principal question of when these variables are prevalent is beyond 
its scope. This limitation is addressed by cross-sectional logit models, the discussion of 
which I turn to.  
 
6.7.2 Cross-sectional Logit Models 
The pooled logit model provides a snapshot of the profile of failed and non-failed firms‘ 
corporate governance. I can speculate that as failure approaches firms may exhibit several 
corporate governance deficiencies due in part to the firms‘ lack of resources and growth 
prospects to entice the directors to be committed to the firms turnaround strategies. I argue 
that a cross-sectional analysis may uncover significant events leading to failure. In this 
regard, there is a vast literature on one annual account models prior to failure. These static 
models are based on an unrealistic assumption, which suggests that consecutive annual 
accounts are independent, repeated measurements (Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006; Du Jardin and 
Séverin, 2011). For this reason, I follow Hambrick and D‘Aveni (1992), Sheppard 1994; 
Charitou, Neophytou, Charalambous (2004), Lara, Osma, and Neophytou (2009), Beaver, 
Correia, and McNichols, (2012) and in turn, develop logit models for each of the five years 
prior to failure. In turn, the cross-sectional models provide a five year window to examine the 
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hypotheses. Put differently, these cross sectional models assess the probability of failure in t -
1, t - 2, t - 3, t - 4 and t - 5. Accordingly, when considering one year (t -5) prior to failure, the 
cross-sectional logit model takes the form: 
                                                                                                              (6.6) 
 
Where       denotes the value of independent variables lagged by five years preceding 
corporate failure or target year. Further, this five-year lag is consistent with lead (e.g. 
Hambrick and D‘Aveni, 1992; Pompe and Bilderbeek, 2005; Jones and Henser, 2004; Henser 
and Jones, 2007), suggesting that prediction of failure is possible as far as five years prior to 
the event (see Du Jardin and Séverin, 2011). 
 
The cross-sectional models‘ results may be sample specific but not due to passage of time 
(Sheppard, 1994). As well, the cross-sectional logit model may fail to provide a holistic view 
of the changes in corporate governance mechanisms as failure approaches. Put differently, a 
change model may provide insightful findings concerning the changes in failing firms‘ 
governance relative to their non-failed counterparts. I turn next to the discussion of the change 
logit models.  
 
6.7.3 Multi-period LOGIT Models 
I can speculate that as failure approaches: (1) boards may adopt accepted corporate 
governance structures; however, (2) firms may exhibit severe corporate governance 
deficiencies due in part to directors‘ unwillingness to serve on such boards, due in part to the 
stigma of bankruptcy. Prior studies examine changes in corporate governance using a 5-year 
period prior to failure (Daily and Dalton, 1995). This approach does not consider time lapse 
in the downward spiral to facilitate thorough analysis of alterations in corporate governance 
and financial indicators. For this reason, I first examine changes in governance and financial 
indicators in the four to five (4/5) year period to corporate failure on one hand (see 6.7), and 
changes one to two (1/2) years prior to failure, on the other hand (see 6.8). In sum, the multi-
period LOGIT model estimation is accomplished in two steps. Equations 6.7 and 6.8 present 
the multi-period model equations, respectively. 
                                                                             (6.7) 
                                                                              (6.8) 
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Where         (       ) indicates the value of independent variables lagged by five to four 
(two to one) years preceding corporate failure. The 4/5(1/2) year period model examines both 
failed and non-failed data in t-4 (t-1) and t-5 (t-2). Thus, a failed firms contribute maximum 
two firm-year observations to both the 4/5 year period model (i.e. year 4 and 5 prior to 
failure) and and 1/2 year period model (i.e. year 1 and 2 prior to failure). Non-failed firms 
also contribute maximum two firm-year observations each to both the 4/5 year period model 
(i.e. year 4 and 5 prior to target year) and 1/2 year period model (i.e. year 1 and 2 prior to 
target year).This approach is adopted from Sheppard (1994) because among others it allows 
two years to elapse for change to occur in the firms‘ governance and financial performance. I 
turn next to a summary of the analysis and proposed models, in particular, in the next section. 
 
6.7.4 Summary of Models 
Appendix 5 (see page 292) shows the abbreviations, meanings and expected signs of the 
measures of the study. I test the six main hypotheses using two main models:  
1. DIRECT MODEL: The association between board attributes and corporate failure. 
                                                          
                                                            
                                                                                       (6.9)                                                                                                                                                                       
 
2. INTERACTION TERMS MODEL:  The association between the interactions 
between board attributes and functions on corporate failure. 
                                                          
                                                         
                                                            
                                                          
                                                           
                                                                   
                                                                                                                                        (6.10) 
 
6.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter is dedicated to the research methodology and data collection of the study. The 
philosophical stances, data, time horizon, sample design, measures and the statistical 
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technique are discussed logically in relevant sections. The positivism approach is adapted for 
the study, due in part to the difficulties in collecting data from boards of failed firms. Data for 
the research is extracted mainly from failed and non-failed UK listed firms within the period 
1
st
 January, 1999 to 31
st
 December, 2011. The sample period is chosen to facilitate collection 
of data at least five years‘ corporate governance data post Cadbury (1992). Data collected is 
stratified into five cross-sectional sub-samples. The aim is to allow a five year time lag to 
facilitate prediction prior to potential failure. Financial and non-financial data (e.g. corporate 
governance attributes) are extracted from Thomson One Banker and FAME databases. I opt 
for the random sampling technique since the pervasive paired sampled technique gives bais 
estimates. Further, I randomly split each year‘s data to estimation and holdout to facilitate a 
robust estimation and validation of models. I outline the definitions and justified the 
dependent, independent and control variables in the relevant sections. Finally, the logit 
approach is chosen for the study due in part to its numerous advantages and the binary nature 
of the dependant variable, in particular.  The chapter ends with a discussion on the testing 
procedures of the hypotheses. I turn next to the discussion of results in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
7.0 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter sets out the research methodology and description of data. It also 
highlights the logit as the statistical method for this study due in part to the binary nature of 
the dependent variable. I use STATA 12 to run logit tests and present the findings in this 
chapter. I restate the sub-problems of this study. First, I examine how the composition and 
structure of corporate board relates to firm‘s failure. Second, I examine how the interactions 
between board attributes and functions of corporate board relate to firm‘s failure. I present 
the results in line with the hypotheses development in chapter five.  
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 7.1 presents the descriptive statistics. Section 7.2 
discusses the multicollinearity tests. Section 7.3 deals with the univariate analysis. Section 
7.4 outlines the results of the multivariate logit analysis. Section 7.5 reports the results of the 
hypotheses. Section 7.6 concludes. 
 
7.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
I calculate mean, standard deviation, minimum, lower quartile (Q1), median, upper quartile 
(Q3), maximum and three main normality tests (i.e. Skewness-kurtosis, Shapiro-Wilk and 
Shapiro-Francia) for the pooled data of all the predictive variables used in the prediction 
models for the sample period, 1999 to 2011. As Xu and Zhang (2009) and Beaver, 
McNicholas and Rhie (2005) observe, descriptive statistics calculated this way are more 
indicative of the condition in the later sample years. From this point, the sample sizes vary 
over time: 353, 351, 352, 352, and 346 observations for t – 1, t – 2, t - 3, t – 4 and t – 5 time 
periods, respectively. Tables 6 and 7 display the descriptive statistics. 
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of the Predictive Variables. This table shows the descriptive statistics (i.e. mean, standard deviations (S.D), minimum, lower quartile 
(Q1), median, upper quartile (Q3), maximum and three main normality tests; Skewness-kurtosis,  Shapiro-Wilk and Shapiro-Francia) for the cross-sectional 
distribution of the time series averages of all the independent variables used in the prediction models for the sample period from 1999-to 2011. The definition of 
variables is in Appendix 5.   
Variable Mean S.D. Min Q1 Med Q3 Max Skewness-Kurtosis Test Shapiro-Wilk Test Shapiro-Francia Test 
        
Skewness Kurtosis P-value No 
adjust 
Wilk P-value Francia W P-value 
COMPOSITION 
       
        
bodc 0.54 0.16 0.00 0.43 0.56 0.67 1.00 -0.536 3.172 (0.000) (0.000) 0.978 (0.000) 0.977 (0.000) 
fmale 0.35 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.636 1.405 (.) (.) 0.999 (0.579) 1.000 (1.000) 
bods 7.44 2.27 2.00 6.00 7.00 9.00 20.00 0.830 4.849 (0.000) (0.000) 0.970 (0.000) 0.970 (0.000) 
STRUCTURE                
nce 3.17 2.13 0.00 1.00 4.00 5.00 7.00 -0.206 1.727 (.) (0.000) 0.967 (0.000) 0.969 (0.000) 
ncp 0.75 0.43 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -1.148 2.317 (0.000) (0.000) 0.998 (0.092) 1.000 (0.000) 
nci 0.33 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 3.00 1.090 3.841 (0.000) (0.000) 0.979 (0.000) 0.996 (0.000) 
ncci 0.53 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.112 1.013 (.) (.) 0.999 (1.000) 1.000 (0.000) 
ncs 0.63 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.518 1.268 (.) (.) 0.999 (0.999) 1.000 (1.000) 
ncm1 0.39 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.450 1.203 (.) (.) 0.999 (0.939) 1.000 (1.000) 
ace 3.61 1.49 0.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 -0.724 2.414 (0.000) (0.000) 0.976 (0.000) 0.978 (0.000) 
acp 0.95 0.21 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -4.256 19.110 (.) (0.000) 0.979 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000) 
aci 0.71 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.928 1.862 (0.000) (0.000) 0.999 (0.417) 0.996 (0.000) 
acs 0.59 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 -0.337 1.189 (.) (.) 0.980 (0.000) 0.991 (0.000) 
acx 0.77 0.43 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 -1.173 2.709 (.) (0.000) 0.981 (0.000) 0.991 (0.000) 
acm1 0.59 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.351 1.123 (0.000) (.) 0.999 (1.000) 1.000 (0.000) 
rce 3.75 1.48 0.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 -0.968 2.834 (0.000) (0.000) 0.978 (0.000) 0.981 (0.000) 
rcp 0.96 0.21 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -4.444 20.747 (.) (0.000) 0.977 (0.000) 1.000 (1.000) 
rci 0.70 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.862 1.743 (.) (0.000) 0.999 (0.575) 1.000 (1.000) 
rcci 0.72 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.956 1.914 (0.000) (0.000) 0.999 (0.357) 1.000 (0.000) 
rcs 0.67 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.712 1.506 (.) (.) 0.999 (0.891) 1.000 (0.000) 
rcm1 0.72 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.962 1.926 (0.000) (0.000) 0.999 (0.344) 1.000 (1.000) 
FUNCTIONS                
dcpe 0.54 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 0.512 2.321 (0.000) (0.000) 0.995 (0.000) 0.999 (0.657) 
bodm 8.71 3.38 0.00 6.00 9.00 11.00 44.00 1.793 16.150 (0.000) (0.000) 0.911 (0.000) 0.910 (0.000) 
bint 0.82 0.38 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -1.679 3.820 (0.000) (0.000) 0.997 (0.001) 1.000 (0.000) 
bint2 0.65 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.623 1.388 (.) (.) 0.999 (0.975) 1.000 (1.000) 
bint3 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.264 2.598 (0.000) (0.000) 0.997 (0.003) 1.000 (0.000) 
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Table 6 Continuation  
Variable Mean S.D. Min Q1 Med Q3 Max Skewness-Kurtosis Test Shapiro-Wilk Test Shapiro-Francia Test 
        Skewness Kurtosis P-value No adjust Wilk P-value Francia W P-value 
Financials                
wcta 0.10 0.26 -1.56 -0.03 0.08 0.21 1.35 
 
-0.009 
 
7.122 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
0.942 
 
(0.000) 
 
0.941 
 
(0.000) 
Prof 0.10 0.19 -3.16 0.07 0.12 0.17 0.61 -6.076 75.930 (0.000) (0.000) 0.607 (0.000) 0.605 (0.000) 
tlta 0.61 0.26 0.00 0.46 0.61 0.74 2.43 1.017 7.285 (.) (0.000) 0.949 (0.000) 0.948 (0.000) 
FIRMS                
logda 5.46 1.92 0.65 4.21 5.38 6.87 10.19 -0.067 2.538 (0.000) (0.000) 0.994 (0.000) 0.995 (0.000) 
fage 36.90 33.44 1.00 9.00 22.00 62.00 124.00 0.894 2.531 (0.000) (0.000) 0.862 (0.000) 0.865 (0.000) 
1748 Firm –Years Observations.  
Table 7: Composition of Sample Firms in Industry, Group and Year 
  INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 SUB-TOTAL   
STATUS NF F NF F NF F NF F NF F NF F NF F PERCENT 
YEAR END                               
2011 0 0 19 0 8 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 28 0        7.82  
2010 1 0 36 0 36 0 3 0 1 0 2 1 79 1      22.35  
2009 0 2 1 2 1 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 10        3.35  
2008 0 3 0 4 0 2 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 12        3.35  
2007 0 0 23 4 21 4 2 1 2 1 2 1 50 11      17.04  
2006 1 0 13 3 18 3 6 1 1 0 0 0 39 7      12.85  
2005 1 1 8 3 9 1 5 0 0 0 2 0 25 5        8.38  
2004 0 0 7 5 9 4 2 0 1 0 0 0 19 9        7.82  
2003 1 0 6 4 12 1 1 3 0 0 1 0 21 8        8.10  
2002 0 0 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 6        1.68  
2001 0 0 0 5 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9        2.51  
2000 0 0 0 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5        1.40  
1999 0 0 0 4 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 8        2.23  
1998 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4        1.12  
SUB-TOTAL 4 6 113 44 114 31 20 10 5 2 7 2 263 95    100.00  
TOTAL 10 157 145 30 7 9 358   
KEY:  Industry classification: 1=Healthcare, 2=Consumer, 3=Industrial, 4=Technology, 5=Telecommunication, 6=Basic Materials.  Status: NF-non-failed, F-failed  
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The section proceeds as follows. Subsection 7.1.1 presents the demographics of the 358 firms 
in the study. Subsections 7.1.2 and 7.1.3 deal with board composition and structure of the 
sample firms, respectively. Subsection 7.1.4 describes the board functions, whereas the 
financial position is the focus of subsection 7.1.5. Subsection 7.1.6 reports the normality 
tests.  
 
7.1.1 The Demographics of the Firms 
The defining features of the 358 sample firms from the London Stock Exchange are the 
heavy skew in the distributions of firm size and age. On average the sample firms record an 
assets size of £5.46 million with a range of £0.65 to £10.19 million. This is slightly above 
Figures reported by Neophytou and Molinero (2004), but not Clarke, Ferris, Jayaraman, and 
Lee (2006) in the UK and US, respectively.  
 
Firm age takes a value between 1 and 124, but has a cross-sectional average of 37 (median 
22.0). In addition, 25% (75%) of the sample firms are at least 9 (62) years old, implying that 
the sample firms are relatively stable. This compares favourably to the 40% reported by 
Thornhill and Amit (2003) using Canadian dataset.  
 
Table 7 contains the composition of the sample firms. It reports that the sample firms are 
mainly from six major fields of economic activities namely: Healthcare (10 firms), Consumer 
(157 firms), Industrial (145 firms), Technology (30 firms), Telecommunication (7 firms), and 
Basic Materials (9 firms). This suggests that majority (85%) of the companies in the sample 
are consumer (44%) and industrial (41%) firms.  
 
7.1.2 The Board Composition 
On average, the majority of directors (54%) on boards in the UK are non-employee directors, 
with three-quarters of 67%. This is slightly below the 58% and 69% reported in the US 
(Klein, 1998) and Australian (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003), respectively.    
 
Turning to board gender diversity, 35% of firms in the sample have at least a female on their 
board. This is consistent with recent Figures reported by Sealy and Vinnicombe (2012).  It 
also compares favourably to the 14%, 10% and 8% reported in the US by Hagendorff and 
Keasey (2012), Carter, Simkins, and Simpson (2003) and Adams and Ferreira (2009), 
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respectively. Lastly, more than 75% of UK firms have a board size variable equal to nine. 
The distributions, however, are skewed; the minimum is 2, whereas the extreme case is 20. 
However, this is consistent with prior findings (e.g. Kiel and Nicholson, 2003).  
 
7.1.3 The Board Structure 
On average, 75%, 95%, and 96% of UK firms have nomination, audit, and remuneration 
committees, respectively, during the sample period, 1999-2011. These Figures are slightly 
below Klein‘s (1998) record for nomination (77.10%), audit (99.60%) and compensation 
(97.90%) committees‘ presence in the US. Another significant feature of board nomination 
(67%), audit (29%) and remuneration (30%) committees‘ composition is the predominance of 
non-independent directors.  
 
On board standing committee meetings, on the average 39%, and 72% of the sample firms‘ 
nomination and remuneration committees, respectively, meet at least twice a year, relative to 
59% of board audit committees that meet three times a year. Table 6 reports that majority of 
the sample firms‘ nomination (53%) and remuneration (72%) committees are chaired by an 
independent NED. 
 
In addition, almost all boards have at least three independent NEDs serving on board standing 
committees. Specifically, table 6 shows an average of 63%, 59%, and 67% for nomination, 
audit and remuneration committees, respectively. Turning to board standing audit committee 
expertise, three-quarters of the sample firms have a financial and/or accounting expert 
serving on the board accountability committee.  Overall, three-quarters of UK firms have a 
nomination, audit and remuneration committees‘ effectiveness variable equal to five, 
suggesting effective corporate board structure in the UK.  
 
7.1.4 The Board Function 
Table 6 indicates that the majority (54%) of the sample firms evaluate the CEO‘s 
performance annually. The distribution, however, is heavily skewed, while the average is 
54%, the minimum, first-quarter and medium are all zero. The frequency of board meetings, 
also, is heavily skewed. For instance, firms on the average meet 8.71 times a year, but the 
range is 0 to 44 times, with a medium of 11 times.  
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Likewise, there is a heavy skew in the board government experience interlock. Put 
differently, the average is 0.23 but it ranges from zero to one, with a zero for minimum, first-
quarter, medium, and third-quarters. On NED board interlock, on average 82% of outside 
directors of sample firms serve on at least a corporate board. The inclusion of the CEO, 
however, indicates a sharp drop to 65%, implying that 35% of the CEOs of the sample firms 
had no corporate board affiliations.   
 
7.1.5 The Financials 
Overall, the descriptive statistics of the financial variables (i.e. liquidity, profitability and 
capital structure) compare favourably with Figures reported in Japan (e.g. Xu and Zhang, 
2009) and in the US (e.g. Shumway 2001). The liquidity ratio, however, is far below the 
figure reported by Shumway (2001).  
 
The mean and medium values of financial leverage are both 0.61, suggesting that the sample 
firms are highly geared. The mean (median) values of liquidity and profitability are 
respectively, 0.10 (0.08) and 0.10 (0.12), implying that the sample firms hold less amount of 
liquid assets and are also less profitable.  Table 6 depicts that the 25% (75%) of sample firms 
record -0.03 (0.21), 0.07 (0.17), and 0.46 (0.74) for liquidity, profitability and leverage, 
respectively, relative to the maximum of 1.35, 0.61 and 2.43. This indicates high skewness in 
the distribution of financial variables.  This has set the scene for normality testing in the next 
section. 
 
7.1.6 Normality Tests 
I employ Skewness-Kurtosis
8
 test, Shapiro-Wilk test
9
, and Shapiro-Francia
10
 test in STATA 
12 for normality testing (see Royston, 1991). Park (2008) defines Skewness as the third 
standardized moment that measures the extent of symmetry of probability distribution. Thus, 
if Skewness is more than zero, the distribution is skewed to the right, implying more 
observations on the left and vice versa. Similarly, Kurtosis measures the thinness of tails of 
                                                          
8
  Perhaps and more importantly, Skewness-Kurtosis test is conceptually similar to the Jarque-Bera test (Park 
2008), which is computed from Skewness and Kurtosis and asymptotically follows the chi-squared distribution 
with two degrees of freedom. By rule of thumb, normality is implied, when the Skewness and Kurtosis of a 
predictive variable are close to 0 and 3, respectively 
9
 By rule of thumb, normality is implied, when the Shapiro-Wilk statistics is close to one. Shapiro-Wilk test, 
however, is valid for sample sizes ranging from 7 to 2000 (Shapiro and Wilk, 1965 and Royston, 1992) 
10
 Stata (2005) recommends sample sizes 5 to 5000 for the Stata .sfrancia command. 
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probability distribution; it is based on the fourth central moment. Likewise, Shapiro and Wilk 
(1965) propose that Shapiro-Wilk W is the ratio of the best estimator of the variance to the 
usual corrected sum of squares estimator of the variance. Shapiro and Wilk (1972) and 
Royston (1983) develop the Shapiro-Francia W test, which is an approximation test that 
modifies the Shapiro-Wilk W.  Table 6 contains the numerical results of the normality test, 
whereas Appendix 6 (see page 298) shows the P-P plots generated in STATA 12.  
 
Largely, the numerical and graphical results show that the distribution of the observations of 
the operationalized variables differed from normal distribution. Precisely, the Shapiro-Wilk 
and Shapiro-Francia tests and both the Skewness-Kurtosis tests reject the null hypothesis that 
all the predictive variables are normally distributed at the 0.01 significance level. The 
graphical presentation in Appendix 6 supports the numerical findings but not firm size. In 
addition, the Shapiro-Wilk and Shapiro-Francia results are not consistent and thus, do not 
reject the null hypothesis of normality for some predictive variables (e.g. presence of female, 
nomination committees‘ size and meeting). 
 
In contrast, both the Skewness-Kurtosis (S-K) adjustment and no adjustment show consistent 
results. This suggests that both S-K and the graphical method provide sufficient evidence that 
all the predictive variables are not normally distributed except firm size. This implies that the 
data violates the normality assumption; hence the use of Multivariate Discriminant Analysis 
may produce unreliable results (see Ohlson, 1980). 
 
Lo (1986), however, shows that discriminant analysis and logit models produce similar 
results. Chava and Jarrow (2004), and Beaver, McNichol and Rhie (2005) seem to favour 
survival analysis over logit, but the cross sectional data is not suitable for the former 
(Sheppard, 1994). Consequently, the logit analysis is employed to test the hypotheses, as 
noted earlier in chapter 6. Thus, I invoke Lo‘s (1986) notion that logit analysis is more robust 
than discriminant analysis when dealing with samples which are not normally distributed. I 
turn next to the discussion of the multicollinearity tests. 
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7.2 MULTICOLLINEARITY TESTS 
This section examines the possible degree of multicollinearity among the independent 
variables. Table 8 shows results of the variance inflation factors (VIF). Additionally, table 9 
provides the Pearson and Spearman correlations between variables used in prediction of 
corporate failure, for the pooled data. (For the sake of brevity see Appendix 7 through to 11, 
pages 299-303, for the Spearman and Pearson correlation matrixes of the variables for sample 
firms for t – 1 through to t – 5). The discussion of the results of multicollinearity test is 
structured logically in three subheadings namely: board attributes, functions and corporate 
failure.   
 
Table 8: Collinearity Diagnostic Test 
Independent Variable VIF 1/VIF 
   Ace 4.18 0.24 
Rce 4.17 0.24 
Nce 3.68 0.27 
Logda 3.44 0.29 
Dcpe 2.61 0.38 
bint2 1.88 0.53 
Bint 1.79 0.56 
Bods 1.73 0.58 
Tlta 1.56 0.64 
Wcta 1.49 0.67 
Fmale 1.23 0.81 
Prof 1.16 0.86 
Bodm 1.12 0.89 
Fage 1.11 0.90 
bint3 1.07 0.93 
   Mean VIF 2.15 
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Table 9: Correlation Matrix: This table shows the unconditional correlations coefficients and significant levels between variables employed in the corporate failure 
prediction. Pearson correlation is shown below and to the left of the diagonal; above and left is Spearman correlation. The lower diagonal refers to Pearson 
correlations, while the upper diagonal refers to Spearman rank correlations. To conserve space the p-values are available on request. * denotes significance at 0.01 
levels. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. stat1 
 
-0.35* -0.14* -0.37* -0.47* -0.42* -0.14* -0.28* -0.44* -0.34* -0.53* -0.32* -0.34* -0.41* -0.39* -0.46* 
2. bodc -0.36* 
 
0.23* 0.25* 0.54* 0.41* 0.29* 0.37* 0.50* 0.33* 0.53* 0.26* 0.34* 0.50* 0.28* 0.44* 
3. fmale -0.14* 0.22* 
 
0.35* 0.32* 0.20* 0.18* 0.16* 0.24* 0.25* 0.35* 0.16* 0.22* 0.31* 0.22* 0.26* 
4. bods -0.36* 0.24* 0.34* 
 
0.50* 0.47* 0.19* 0.24* 0.42* 0.41* 0.57* 0.25* 0.34* 0.52* 0.34* 0.47* 
5. nce -0.48* 0.56* 0.31* 0.47* 
 
0.73* 0.65* 0.69* 0.78* 0.71* 0.73* 0.31* 0.51* 0.59* 0.43* 0.64* 
6. ncp -0.42* 0.44* 0.2* 0.44* 0.77* 
 
0.40* 0.49* 0.53* 0.45* 0.59* 0.37* 0.39* 0.48* 0.45* 0.50* 
7. nci -0.12* 0.29* 0.16* 0.16* 0.62* 0.39* 
 
0.42* 0.46* 0.26* 0.35* 0.15* 0.31* 0.28* 0.21* 0.25* 
8. ncci -0.28* 0.38* 0.16* 0.2* 0.69* 0.49* 0.41* 
 
0.49* 0.31* 0.42* 0.24* 0.39* 0.30* 0.28* 0.35* 
9 .ncs -0.44* 0.52* 0.24* 0.37* 0.79* 0.53* 0.45* 0.49* 
 
0.44* 0.64* 0.27* 0.46* 0.58* 0.34* 0.55* 
10. ncm1 -0.34* 0.34* 0.25* 0.38* 0.69* 0.45* 0.24* 0.31* 0.44* 
 
0.53* 0.17* 0.33* 0.43* 0.29* 0.50* 
11. ace -0.55* 0.56* 0.34* 0.51* 0.74* 0.63* 0.32* 0.45* 0.65* 0.51* 
 
0.38* 0.72* 0.80* 0.62* 0.80* 
12. acp -0.32* 0.33* 0.16* 0.23* 0.32* 0.37* 0.15* 0.24* 0.27* 0.17* 0.49* 
 
0.33* 0.22* 0.33* 0.27* 
13. aci -0.34* 0.37* 0.22* 0.29* 0.52* 0.39* 0.28* 0.39* 0.46* 0.33* 0.75* 0.33* 
 
0.51* 0.31* 0.42* 
14. acs -0.41* 0.50* 0.31* 0.47* 0.60* 0.48* 0.25* 0.30* 0.57* 0.42* 0.78* 0.22* 0.51* 
 
0.32* 0.52* 
15. acx -0.39* 0.31* 0.22* 0.32* 0.44* 0.45* 0.20* 0.28* 0.34* 0.29* 0.66* 0.33* 0.31* 0.32* 
 
0.39* 
16. acm1 -0.46* 0.46* 0.26* 0.43* 0.65* 0.50* 0.23* 0.35* 0.55* 0.50* 0.78* 0.27* 0.42* 0.52* 0.39* 
 17. rce -0.59* 0.55* 0.29* 0.45* 0.76* 0.64* 0.35* 0.51* 0.66* 0.50* 0.84* 0.50* 0.69* 0.65* 0.47* 0.62* 
18. rcp -0.31* 0.34* 0.15* 0.22* 0.31* 0.36* 0.15* 0.23* 0.25* 0.17* 0.47* 0.92* 0.31* 0.21* 0.31* 0.26* 
19. rci -0.34* 0.36* 0.18* 0.23* 0.52* 0.40* 0.30* 0.44* 0.46* 0.30* 0.63* 0.32* 0.78* 0.44* 0.28* 0.37* 
20.rcci -0.61* 0.34* 0.20* 0.30* 0.44* 0.42* 0.12* 0.23* 0.38* 0.35* 0.53* 0.32* 0.36* 0.39* 0.38* 0.41* 
21. rcs -0.40* 0.51* 0.27* 0.40* 0.68* 0.53* 0.36* 0.44* 0.66* 0.42* 0.71* 0.27* 0.55* 0.73* 0.34* 0.52* 
22. rcm1 -0.42* 0.4* 0.23* 0.41* 0.66* 0.55* 0.29* 0.42* 0.53* 0.48* 0.62* 0.32* 0.40* 0.46* 0.39* 0.58* 
23. dcpe -0.47* 0.45* 0.31* 0.45* 0.74* 0.51* 0.21* 0.32* 0.51* 0.53* 0.63* 0.21* 0.38* 0.53* 0.34* 0.63* 
24.bodm 0.00 0.08* 0.02 0.03 0.2* 0.17* 0.09* 0.15* 0.18* 0.15* 0.16* 0.07* 0.12* 0.08* 0.09* 0.18* 
25. bint -0.32* 0.40* 0.17* 0.22* 0.45* 0.45* 0.21* 0.35* 0.36* 0.27* 0.44* 0.29* 0.34* 0.28* 0.28* 0.38* 
26. bint2 -0.28* 0.50* 0.22* 0.28* 0.49* 0.41* 0.24* 0.34* 0.42* 0.30* 0.45* 0.21* 0.35* 0.33* 0.27* 0.40* 
27. bint3 -0.14* 0.07* 0.02 0.14* 0.14* 0.13* 0.16* 0.07* 0.14* 0.07* 0.11* 0.03 0.09* 0.09* 0.08* 0.07* 
28. wcta 0.01 -0.02 -0.12* -0.14* -0.10* -0.08* -0.06* -0.06 -0.06 -0.08* -0.08* 0.01 -0.06 -0.04 -0.09* -0.08* 
29. prof -0.38* 0.08* 0.09* 0.17* 0.21* 0.16* 0.05 0.17* 0.2* 0.15* 0.28* 0.19* 0.18* 0.21* 0.2* 0.21* 
30. tlta -0.05 0.11* 0.12* 0.18* 0.18* 0.15* 0.08* 0.10* 0.12* 0.12* 0.13* 0.02 0.05 0.09* 0.11* 0.15* 
31.logda -0.59* 0.53* 0.34* 0.61* 0.71* 0.60* 0.23* 0.37* 0.56* 0.56* 0.72* 0.33* 0.45* 0.59* 0.44* 0.66* 
32. fage -0.15* 0.02 -0.09* 0.09* 0.02 0.07* -0.08* -0.02 0.03 0.03 0.08* 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.09* 
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TABLE 9: CONTINUATION 
  17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
1. stat1 -0.57* -0.31* -0.34* -0.61* -0.40* -0.42* -0.48* -0.03 -0.32* -0.28* -0.14* 0.02 -0.38* -0.06 -0.58* -0.16* 
2. bodc 0.49* 0.26* 0.32* 0.32* 0.50* 0.38* 0.46* 0.09* 0.37* 0.49* 0.07* -0.06 0.04 0.15* 0.53* 0.04 
3. fmale 0.30* 0.15* 0.18* 0.20* 0.27* 0.23* 0.32* 0.00 0.17* 0.22* 0.02 -0.18* 0.05 0.15* 0.33* -0.07* 
4. bods 0.50* 0.24* 0.27* 0.34* 0.46* 0.43* 0.50* 0.06 0.25* 0.30* 0.17* -0.2* 0.15* 0.17* 0.63* 0.09* 
5. nce 0.75* 0.30* 0.51* 0.44* 0.67* 0.64* 0.75* 0.21* 0.43* 0.48* 0.14* -0.13* 0.19* 0.21* 0.71* 0.00 
6. ncp 0.61* 0.36* 0.40* 0.42* 0.53* 0.55* 0.53* 0.17* 0.45* 0.41* 0.13* -0.09* 0.16* 0.17* 0.61* 0.07* 
7. nci 0.37* 0.15* 0.33* 0.15* 0.36* 0.29* 0.24* 0.09* 0.22* 0.25* 0.15* -0.07* 0.08* 0.10* 0.25* -0.08* 
8. ncci 0.49* 0.23* 0.44* 0.23* 0.44* 0.42* 0.32* 0.18* 0.35* 0.34* 0.07* -0.06* 0.14* 0.12* 0.36* -0.04 
9. ncs 0.66* 0.25* 0.46* 0.38* 0.66* 0.53* 0.53* 0.19* 0.36* 0.42* 0.14* -0.07* 0.14* 0.15* 0.57* 0.03 
10. ncm1 0.53* 0.17* 0.30* 0.35* 0.42* 0.48* 0.54* 0.15* 0.27* 0.3* 0.07* -0.12* 0.15* 0.15* 0.57* 0.02 
11. ace 0.81* 0.36* 0.61* 0.51* 0.70* 0.62* 0.69* 0.15* 0.42* 0.45* 0.11* -0.14* 0.25* 0.19* 0.75* 0.07* 
12. acp 0.37* 0.92* 0.32* 0.32* 0.27* 0.32* 0.22* 0.06* 0.29* 0.21* 0.03 0.02 0.2* 0.03 0.30* 0.04 
13. aci 0.68* 0.31* 0.78* 0.36* 0.55* 0.40* 0.39* 0.12* 0.34* 0.35* 0.09* -0.08* 0.19* 0.08* 0.45* 0.01 
14. acs 0.68* 0.21* 0.44* 0.39* 0.73* 0.46* 0.55* 0.07* 0.28* 0.33* 0.09* -0.08* 0.20* 0.12* 0.61* 0.06 
15. acx 0.44* 0.32* 0.28* 0.38* 0.34* 0.39* 0.36* 0.08* 0.28* 0.27* 0.08* -0.11* 0.20* 0.13* 0.43* 0.06 
16. acm1 0.63* 0.26* 0.37* 0.41* 0.52* 0.58* 0.66* 0.18* 0.38* 0.4* 0.07* -0.11* 0.19* 0.19* 0.68* 0.10* 
17. rce 
 
0.37* 0.74* 0.69* 0.79* 0.73* 0.65* 0.21* 0.44* 0.48* 0.14* -0.09* 0.24* 0.15* 0.70* 0.03 
18. rcp 0.52* 
 
0.31* 0.34* 0.25* 0.34* 0.21* 0.10* 0.33* 0.22* 0.03 0.00 0.17* 0.03 0.30* 0.05 
19. rci 0.76* 0.31* 
 
0.36* 0.55* 0.39* 0.35* 0.16* 0.36* 0.37* 0.1* -0.08* 0.2* 0.11* 0.41* -0.03 
20. rcci 0.70* 0.34* 0.36* 
 
0.37* 0.40* 0.43* 0.03 0.33* 0.3* 0.11* -0.05 0.26* 0.09* 0.5* 0.09* 
21. rcs 0.79* 0.25* 0.55* 0.37* 
 
0.50* 0.54* 0.14* 0.38* 0.45* 0.12* -0.05 0.16* 0.08* 0.58* 0.05 
22. rcm1 0.75* 0.34* 0.39* 0.40* 0.50* 
 
0.57* 0.31* 0.34* 0.35* 0.11* -0.02 0.14* 0.14* 0.58* 0.03 
23. dcpe 0.59* 0.20* 0.34* 0.40* 0.52* 0.55* 
 
0.17* 0.32* 0.4* 0.08* -0.15* 0.2* 0.24* 0.74* 0.05 
24. bodm 0.20* 0.12* 0.16* 0.02 0.15* 0.28* 0.15* 
 
0.06* 0.09* 0.04 -0.10* -0.06 0.15* 0.16* -0.08* 
25. bint 0.48* 0.33* 0.36* 0.33* 0.38* 0.34* 0.31* 0.08* 
 
0.62* 0.17* -0.06 0.06* 0.12* 0.4* 0.01 
26. bint2 0.49* 0.22* 0.37* 0.30* 0.45* 0.35* 0.38* 0.08* 0.62* 
 
0.18* -0.08* 0.04 0.21* 0.44* 0.00 
27. bint3 0.14* 0.03 0.10* 0.11* 0.12* 0.11* 0.07* 0.02 0.17* 0.18* 
 
0.00 0.04 -0.02 0.08* 0.01 
28. wcta -0.04 0.00 -0.07* -0.04 -0.02 0.00 -0.09* -0.16* -0.06 -0.05 0.01 
 
0.00 -0.49* -0.21* 0.15* 
29.prof 0.27* 0.19* 0.20* 0.24* 0.18* 0.15* 0.17* -0.04 0.08* 0.06* -0.03 -0.03 
 
0.04 0.18* 0.05 
30. tlta 0.10* 0.02 0.08* 0.06* 0.05 0.11* 0.19* 0.19* 0.10* 0.18* -0.02 -0.56* 0.04 
 
0.24* -0.08* 
31. logda 0.68* 0.33* 0.42* 0.50* 0.56* 0.57* 0.69* 0.14* 0.39* 0.44* 0.08* -0.12* 0.31* 0.16* 
 
0.16* 
32. fage 0.06* 0.03 0.00 0.09* 0.06 0.04 0.04 -0.07* 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.10* 0.11* -0.09* 0.18* 
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7.2.1 Board Attributes           
Largely, the results suggest numerous issues of multicollinearity in the first instance. Simply 
put, most of the corporate governance variables are highly correlated, implying that these 
variables reflect the same governance information of an entity. For instance, there are 
significant positive correlations between nomination (nce), audit (ace) and remuneration (rce) 
committees‘ effectiveness: the Pearson (Spearman) rank correlations range from 0.74(0.73) to 
0.84(0.75). These variables measure board structure. The levels of tolerance from the VIF 
collinearity test, however, are all above 0.20, with the prevalent VIF of 4.18. This suggests 
that multicollinearity is not an issue (see Menard, 1995) as the first glance of the correlation 
matrix might seem.  
 
There are, also, no multicollinearity issues with board composition variables. The Pearson 
and Spearman correlations of the three variables namely: proportion of outside directors, 
presence of female directors, and size of board, are not highly correlated. The prevalent 
absolute value of the correlation is 0.34 (0.35), which occurs between board size and 
presence of female directors. As anticipated, board size has a significant and positive 
relationship to both presence of female directors and proportion of outside directors.  
 
Similarly, the results indicate significantly positive and high correlations between firm size 
and the main independent variables (i.e. proportion of outside directors, size of board, 
nomination, audit and remuneration committees‘ effectiveness) but not presence of female 
director. The dominant absolute value of the correlation is 0.72 (0.75), which occurs between 
firm size and audit committee effectiveness, suggesting the presence of multi-collinearity. 
The level of tolerance from the VIF collinearity test, however, suggests otherwise, at 0.29. 
Finally, as predicted, board attributes variables are statistically significant and positively 
correlated with firm‘s profitability and financial leverage but negatively correlated with 
firm‘s liquidity.  
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7.2.2 Board Functions        
The multi-collinearity test on board functions reveals four significant issues that merit 
attention. First, frequency of board meetings has marginally significant positive correlations 
with proportion of outside directors, board size, nomination, audit and remuneration 
committees‘ effectiveness, but not the presence of female directors. 
 
Second, the correlations between CEO‘s performance evaluation (dcpe) and nomination, 
audit and remuneration committees‘ effectiveness are quite high: the Pearson (Spearman) 
rank correlations are 0.74 (0.75), 0.63 (0.69) and 0.59 (0.65), respectively. This suggests the 
presence of multi-collinearity between CEO‘s performance evaluation and board monitoring 
committees. Therefore, I exclude the CEO‘s performance evaluation and, in this way, opt for 
frequency of board meetings and its interactions with board attributes in testing the 
interaction terms of corporate governance on corporate failure. 
 
Third, non-executive director interlock is positively and significantly associated with board 
interlock (i.e. CEO inclusive) but marginally significant with former government official. The 
Pearson (Spearman) rank correlations are 0.62 (0.62) and 0.17 (0.18).  These variables 
measure board resource function. Table 8 also, shows that the tolerance level (0.93) of former 
government official is quite high, relative to the 0.56 and 0.53 recorded by non-executive 
director and board interlocks, respectively. For this reason, I exclude the aforementioned 
interlocks and opt for the former government official measure in testing the intereaction 
effects of corporate governance on corporate failure. 
 
Fourth, table 9 indicates that there is limited multicollinearity issue between board 
monitoring and resource function variables. The Pearson and Spearman correlations of the 
two board monitoring variables (i.e. CEO‘s performance evaluation, frequency of board 
meetings) and the three board resource function measures (i.e. non-executive director 
interlock, board interlock and former government official), are not highly correlated. The 
highest value of the correlation is 0.38 (0.40), which occurs between board interlock and 
CEO‘s performance evaluation. Nonetheless, the three board resource variables have a 
statistically significant and positive relationship to both the board monitoring variables.   
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7.2.3 Corporate Failure 
For t - 1, t - 3, t - 4 and pooled firms‘ sample  (see Appendix 7, 9, 10 and table  9), corporate 
failure is significantly negative correlated with proportion of outside directors, presence of 
female directors, size of board, CEO‘s performance evaluation, board interlocks, profitability, 
financial leverage, firm size, firm age, nomination, audit and remuneration committees‘ 
effectiveness. Corporate failure, however, exhibits an insignificantly positive correlation with 
frequency of board meetings but negative correlation with firms‘ liquidity position, in t - 1. In 
contrast, corporate failure exhibits an insignificantly positive correlation with liquidity and 
frequency of board meetings, but negative correlation with firm‘s gearing position, in t - 3, t - 
4 and the pooled firms‘ sample.   
 
For t - 2 and t - 5 firms‘ sample (see Appendix 8 and 11, pages 300-303), corporate failure is 
significantly and negatively related to proportion of outside directors, presence of female 
directors, board size, CEO‘s performance evaluation, directors‘ interlock, profitability,  firm 
size, age, nomination, audit and remuneration committees‘ effectiveness, but not frequency of 
board meetings, liquidity and leverage. The result on frequency of board meetings, however, 
is at variance with predictions from theory. The prevalent absolute value of the correlation is 
0.01 (0.03), which occurs between frequency of board meeting and corporate failure in t - 1. 
This may suggest that corporate failure is not related to frequency of board meetings. I turn 
next to the univariate analysis.  
 
7.3 UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
This section examines the possible differences between the two mutually exclusive groups, 
failed and non-failed. The aim is twofold. First, univariate analysis provides a preliminary 
assessment of the hypotheses. Second, I assess the predictive power of each variable using 
univariate logistic regression analysis. Accordingly, the univariate analysis is organised under 
two sub-sections. Sub-section 7.3.1 presents the profile analysis, and sub-section 7.3.2 reports 
the univariate logit analysis. 
 
7.3.1 Profile Analysis of Failed and Non-failed Firms 
I calculate descriptive statistics (i.e. mean, standard deviations, minimum and maximum) of 
the two mutually exclusive groups of firms; failed and non-failed firms. The aim is to identify 
potential differences in the mean values among the two groups. Thus, I seek preliminary 
  
176 
 
evidence on how the composition and structure of corporate board relates to firm‘s failure. To 
achieve this aim I use t-test
11
 to compare the means of the failed and non-failed groups. Table 
10 reports the means, standard deviations and t -statistics for sample firms for years one (t – 
1), two (t – 2), three (t – 3), four (t – 4), and five (t – 5) prior failure as well as the pooled 
coss-sectional data. Figures 12 to 27 also display the trend of variables used in the study (see 
Appendix 12, pages 304-307), the analysis of which I turn. 
 
Table 10 shows several differences between failed and non-failed firms‘ corporate 
governance proxies and financial indicators. The boards of failed firms are significantly 
lower (6.08 directors versus 7.93), with less proportion of outsider directors (0.45 versus 
0.57) fewer female directors (0.23 versus 0.39), ineffective board structures, lesser board 
monitoring (0.09 versus 0.71) and fewer director interlocks (0.62 versus 0.89). Figures 11 to 
20 also depict that boards of failed firms reveal a decreasing trend in several variables (e.g. 
presence of female directors, liquidity and profitability) as far as three years prior to failure, 
whereas that of the non-failed counterparts increase (see Appendix 12, pages 304-307). 
Failed firms, for example, record a deteriorating profitability from years four to one prior to 
failure of 0.34, -0.01, -0.03, -0.10. These results are consistent with predictions of theory (i.e. 
agency, and resource dependency) and prior findings (e.g. Charitou, Neophytou and 
Charalambous, 2004; Platt and Platt, 2012). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 I compute standard t-test for the continuous variables, whereas the prtest (test of proportion) is computed for 
the binary variables, using STATA 12 
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Table 10: Profile Analysis of Sample Firms 
YEAR t - 1 t - 2 t - 3 t - 4 t - 5 POOLED DATA 
VARIABLES Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean 
Std 
Dev. Mean 
Std 
Dev. 
Mean Std Dev. 
Board Independence 0.585 0.140 0.577 0.140 0.570 0.147 0.574 0.144 0.559 0.150 0.573 0.144 
(0.456) (0.143) (0.453) (0.145) (0.442) (0.149) (0.436) (0.162) (0.440) (0.167) (0.445) (0.153) 
 7.59***  7.24***  7.21***  7.55***  6.29***  16.02***  
Gender  
Diversity 
0.438 0.497 0.415 0.494 0.377 0.486 0.361 0.481 0.355 0.480 0.390 0.488 
(0.194) (0.397) (0.237) (0.427) (0.274) (0.448) (0.231) (0.424) (0.233) (0.425) (0.234) (0.424) 
 4.19***  3.06***  1.81*  2.27**  2.13**  6.03***  
 Board Size 7.854 2.050 7.942 2.227 7.977 2.317 7.863 2.314 7.996 2.356 7.926 2.252 
 (5.634) (1.693) (5.935) (1.607) (6.263) (1.613) (6.176) (1.644) (6.411) (1.835) (6.082) (1.694) 
 9.36***  7.97***  6.64***  6.40***  5.79***  16.04***  
Nomination Committee 4.088 1.842 3.946 1.920 3.809 1.926 3.635 1.927 3.418 1.850 3.781 1.905 
 (1.484) (1.704) (1.430) (1.766) (1.453) (1.815) (1.484) (1.822) (1.422) (1.774) (1.455) (1.769) 
 11.93***  11.06***  10.35***  9.27***  8.90***  22.94***  
Audit Committee 4.219 1.183 4.171 1.194 4.086 1.186 4.051 1.204 3.969 1.198 4.100 1.194 
 (2.204) (1.395) (2.247) (1.412) (2.263) (1.482) (2.297) (1.410) (2.211) (1.285) (2.245) (1.394) 
 13.42***  12.67***  11.93***  11.39***  11.75***  27.36***  
 Remuneration Committee 4.358 1.036 4.341 1.059 4.276 1.096 4.235 1.126 4.156 1.154 4.274 1.095 
 (2.323) (1.483) (2.280) (1.462) (2.274) (1.498) (2.330) (1.469) (2.333) (1.402) (2.307) (1.458) 
 14.40***  14.46***  13.71***  12.74***  12.15***  30.16***  
CEO Evaluation 0.854 0.522 0.783 0.564 0.704 0.550 0.647 0.589 0.539 0.579 0.706 0.571 
 (0.086) (0.282) (0.097) (0.297) (0.095) (0.329) (0.110) (0.348) (0.078) (0.269) (0.093) (0.305) 
 13.50***  11.17***  10.14***  8.19***  7.28***  21.97***  
Board Meeting 8.704 2.829 8.817 3.172 8.790 2.837 8.745 2.754 8.539 2.994 8.719 2.918 
 (8.957) (4.147) (8.731) (4.399) (8.484) (3.640) (8.319) (3.645) (8.967) (6.005) (8.690) (4.429) 
 -0.65  0.20  0.83  1.16  -0.87  0.16  
 NED Interlock 0.904 0.295 0.907 0.291 0.903 0.297 0.878 0.327 0.879 0.327 0.894 0.308 
 (0.645) (0.481) (0.677) (0.470) (0.653) (0.479) (0.571) (0.498) (0.544) (0.501) (0.619) (0.486) 
 5.78***  5.26***  5.61***  6.26***  6.72***  13.25***  
KEY: Failed firms‘ descriptive statistics in parentheses. ***,** and *  denote t-statistics significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
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TABLE 10: -CONTINUATION 
YEAR t – 1 t - 2 t - 3 t - 4 t - 5 POOLED DATA 
VARIABLES Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean 
Std 
Dev. Mean 
Std 
Dev. 
Mean Std Dev. 
BOD Interlock 0.754 0.429 0.740 0.439 0.732 0.444 0.710 0.455 0.699 0.459 0.728 0.445 
 (0.441) (0.499) (0.462) (0.501) (0.453) (0.500) (0.407) (0.494) (0.378) (0.488) (0.429) (0.495) 
 5.69***  4.88***  4.89***  5.14***  5.39***  11.56***  
Former Gov't Official 0.277 0.448 0.279 0.449 0.268 0.444 0.267 0.443 0.246 0.432 0.267 0.443 
 (0.108) (0.311) (0.108) (0.311) (0.158) (0.367) (0.154) (0.363) (0.156) (0.365) (0.136) (0.344) 
 3.32***  3.35***  2.16***  2.17**  1.78*  5.72***  
Liquidity 0.101 0.210 0.106 0.214 0.092 0.223 0.096 0.205 0.096 0.223 0.098 0.215 
 (0.030) (0.404) (0.106) (0.316) (0.136) (0.312) (0.163) (0.292) (0.082) (0.405) (0.103) (0.350) 
 2.15**  0.02  -1.46  -2.38**  0.39  -0.37  
 Profitability 0.140 0.077 0.137 0.079 0.137 0.084 0.140 0.096 0.145 0.087 0.140 0.085 
 (-0.104) (0.352) (-0.028) (0.400) (-0.009) (0.244) (0.036) (0.207) (0.001) (0.301) (-0.021) (0.311) 
 10.54***  6.32***  8.39***  6.38***  6.92***  16.94***  
 Leverage 0.611 0.200 0.621 0.219 0.633 0.228 0.614 0.233 0.622 0.246 0.620 0.226 
 (0.684) (0.369) (0.590) (0.290) (0.543) (0.276) (0.530) (0.271) (0.616) (0.398) (0.593) (0.328) 
 -2.38**  1.06  3.07***  2.82***  0.18  1.98**  
 Firm Size 6.251 1.499 6.171 1.524 6.156 1.595 6.098 1.606 6.045 1.649 6.144 1.574 
 (3.457) (1.494) (3.649) (1.449) (3.576) (1.485) (3.642) (1.404) (3.523) (1.483) (3.569) (1.459) 
 15.44***  13.86***  13.77***  12.93***  12.81***  30.73***  
Firm Age 41.462 34.863 40.523 34.959 39.677 34.940 39.169 34.807 38.273 34.746 39.827 34.827 
 (30.280) (27.858) (29.559) (27.843) (28.158) (27.690) (28.154) (27.858) (27.611) (27.743) (28.760) (27.696) 
 2.79**  2.73***  2.89***  2.72***  2.63***  6.17***  
Observations  260  258  257  255  256 1286  
  (93)  (93)  (95)  (91)  (90) 462  
KEY: Failed firms‘ descriptive statistics in parentheses. ***,** and *  denote t-statistics significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
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The test of difference between the mean of liquidity ratio of failed and that of non-failed 
firms, however, suggests mixed results. First, there is no significant relationships between 
liquidity position of failed and non-failed firms for years two, three, five and the pooled 
sample. Thus, this study cannot reject the null hypothesis for years two, three and five. 
Second, failed firms exhibit statistically significantly higher liquidity position for year four 
prior failure (0.16 verses 0.10). Failed firms, however, exhibit statistically significantly lower 
liquidity position for year one prior failure (0.03 verses 0.10). This suggests that the liquidity 
position is crucial in the penultimate year of firm‘s failure. Overall, the failed firms record a 
deterioriating liquidity position from year four to one prior failure of 0.16, 0.14, 0.11 and 
0.03.  
 
The means of the CEO performance evaluation, nomination and remuneration committees‘ 
effectiveness as well as proportion of outside directors for the non-failed firms show an 
increasing trend from years four to one prior to failure, whereas that of their failed 
counterparts remain relatively stable (see Appendix 12, Figures 20-23). As expected non-
failed firms exhibit statistically significant higher assets size (6.14 verses 3.57) and firm age 
(39.8 verses 28.76) than failed firms. This verifies prior findings (e.g. Ohlson, 1980; Gales 
and Kesner, 1994; Thornhill and Amit 2003). 
 
The results show no significant differences between the frequency of board meeting of failed 
and non-failed firms. The means of the frequency of board meetings for the non-failed firms, 
however, show a decreasing trend from years four to one prior to failure, whereas those of 
their failed counterparts increase (see Appendix 12, Figure 23). Thus, this study cannot reject 
the null hypothesis. This indicates that boards of non-failed firms are relatively inactive, 
implying board meeting is used as a fire-fighting device (Jensen, 1993; Vafeas, 1999a). 
 
The test of difference between the mean of leverage position of failed and that of non-failed 
firms suggests mixed results. First, non-failed firms exhibit significant higher financial 
leverage ratio for years three, four and pooled sample data in relation to their non-failed 
counterparts. Second, and in contrast, failed firms exhibit statistically significant higher 
financial leverage ratio in the penultimate year to failure, relative to their non-failed 
counterparts (0.68 versus 0.61). Third, the results show no statistical significance between the 
means of financial leverage of failed and non-failed firms for years two and five prior failue. 
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Finally, the failed firms record an increasing financial leverage from years four to one prior 
failure of 0.53, 0.54, 0.59 and 0.68; whereas the non-failed counterparts‘ gearing position 
remains relatively stable at 0.61, 0.63, 0.62 and 0.61 (see also Appendix 12, Figure 24). This 
confirms prior empirical findings (e.g. Daily and Dalton, 1994a; Charitou, Neophytou and 
Charalambous, 2004), suggesting that financial leverage is positively related to the likelihood 
of corporate failure.  
 
Overall, the profile analysis indicates that failed firms are characterised by lower governance 
attributes with increasing financial leverage and weakening profitability and liquidity position 
compared to their non-failed counterparts. The findings, however, are constrained by 
limitations of the statistical analysis employed (i.e. t-test). First, t-test compares group means, 
assuming the predictive variable of interest follows a normal probability distribution (Park, 
2008). In this respect, the analysis reported in sub-section 7.1.6 indicates that the data violates 
the normality assumption, implying that the findings may not be reliable. Second, the t-test 
fails to answer the question of how each variable contributes to failure (Sheppard, 1995). For 
these reasons, I turn to the univariate logit analysis, in the next section.   
 
7.3.2 Univariate Logit Analysis 
Table 11 reports extract of the univariate logit results. Specifically, table 11 contains the  
marginal effects, t - statistics, McFadden‘s r–squared (hereafter, pseudo r-squared) and 
overall accuracy for t - 1, t – 2, t - 3, t – 4 and t - 5 sample periods, as well as the pooled data. 
Following Uysal (2011), I report the marginal effects of the univariate logit model due in part 
to difficulty of interpreting the coefficient of logit estimations.  
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Table 11: Univariate Analysis Results 
YEAR t - 1 t - 2 t - 3 t - 4 t - 5 Pooled 
 
Marginal 
effects 
Marginal 
effects 
Marginal 
effects 
Marginal 
effects 
Marginal 
effects 
Marginal 
effects 
 
T-Statistics T-Statistics T-Statistics T-Statistics T-Statistics T-Statistics 
 
Pseudo 
 r-squared  
Pseudo  
r-squared  
Pseudo  
r-squared  
Pseudo  
r-squared  
Pseudo 
 r-squared  
Pseudo 
 r-squared  
variables 
Overall 
accuracy 
Overall 
accuracy 
Overall 
accuracy 
Overall 
accuracy 
Overall 
accuracy 
Overall 
accuracy 
Independence -1.003*** -0.961*** -0.928*** -0.951*** -0.804*** -0.925*** 
 
-8.22 -7.83 -7.77 -8.14 -6.60 -17.11 
 
0.125 0.114 0.112 0.126 0.090 0.112 
 
76% 75% 75% 77% 76% 76% 
       Gender Diversity -0.218*** -0.157*** -0.093* -0.121** -0.113*** -0.141*** 
 
-4.33 -3.12 -1.83 -2.29 -2.15 -6.12 
 
0.046 0.024 0.008 0.014 0.012 0.019 
 
74% 74% 73% 74% 74% 74% 
       Board Size -0.101*** -0.088*** -0.076*** -0.075*** -0.068*** -0.082*** 
 
-11.43 -9.18 -7.31 -6.93 -6.18 -17.88 
 
0.214 0.162 0.114 0.111 0.093 0.135 
 
78% 76% 74% 74% 75% 76% 
       Nomination 
Committee -0.090*** -0.089*** -0.087*** -0.085*** -0.088*** -0.088*** 
 
-17.90 -15.39 -13.77 -11.40 -10.60 -29.94 
 
0.264 0.241 0.214 0.185 0.176 0.214 
 
80% 79% 78% 79% 79% 79% 
       Audit Committee -0.125*** -0.124*** -0.124*** -0.125*** -0.133*** -0.126*** 
 
-18.02 -16.44 -15.44 -14.39 -14.82 -35.26 
 
0.299 0.276 0.251 0.242 0.261 0.265 
 
80% 79% 78% 79% 78% 79% 
       Remuneration 
Committee -0.129*** -0.129*** -0.127*** -0.124*** -0.125*** -0.127*** 
 
-17.43 -17.82 -17.69 -16.27 -15.18 -37.96 
 
0.323 0.326 0.301 0.278 0.262 0.297 
 
81% 80% 80% 81% 80% 80% 
       CEO Evaluation -0.419*** -0.415*** -0.419*** -0.374*** -0.394*** -0.413*** 
 
-21.84 -13.67 -11.11 -8.37 -6.74 -23.31 
 
0.367 0.284 0.239 0.176 0.149 0.234 
 
82% 76% 73% 74% 74% 74% 
       Meeting 0.005 -0.001 0.006 -0.009 0.005 0.000 
 
0.65 -0.20 -0.83 -1.16 0.87 -0.16 
 
0.001 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.000 
 
74% 74% 73% 74% 74% 74% 
*, ** and *** stand for significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 11: Continuation 1 of 1 
YEAR t - 1 t- 2 t- 3 t- 4 t- 5 ALL 
 
Marginal 
effects 
Marginal 
effects 
Marginal 
effects 
Marginal 
effects 
Marginal 
effects 
Marginal 
effects 
 
T-Statistics T-Statistics T-Statistics T-Statistics T-Statistics T-Statistics 
 
Pseudo 
 r-squared  
Pseudo  
r-squared  
Pseudo  
r-squared  
Pseudo 
 r-squared  
Pseudo 
r-squared  
Pseudo 
 r-squared  
variables  
Overall 
accuracy 
Overall 
accuracy 
Overall 
accuracy 
Overall 
accuracy 
Overall 
accuracy 
Overall 
accuracy 
NED Interlock -0.289*** -0.275*** -0.287*** -0.290*** -0.302*** -0.289*** 
 
-6.47 -5.74 -6.26 -7.33 -8.13 -15.07 
 
0.073 0.061 0.069 0.089 0.103 0.078 
 
76% 74% 75% 76% 77% 76% 
       BOD Interlock -0.247*** -0.218*** -0.219*** -0.228*** -0.237*** -0.228*** 
 
-6.35 -5.34 -5.37 -5.70 -6.03 -12.84 
 
0.074 0.056 0.056 0.065 0.072 0.064 
 
74% 74% 73% 74% 74% 74% 
       Former Government 
Official -0.217*** -0.220*** -0.131** -0.133** -0.109* -0.160*** 
 
-3.30 -3.34 -2.17 -2.18 -1.78 -5.74 
 
0.030 0.031 0.012 0.013 0.008 0.018 
 
74% 74% 73% 74% 74% 74% 
       Liquidity -0.181** -0.002 -0.136 0.233** -0.032 0.015 
 
-2.16 -0.02 -1.47 2.40 -0.39 0.37 
 
0.011 0.000 0.005 0.014 0.000 0.000 
 
74% 74% 73% 73% 74% 74% 
       Profitability -1.746*** -1.437*** -1.305*** -1.034*** -1.153*** -1.322*** 
 
-8.46 -7.33 -6.98 -5.64 -6.17 -15.49 
 
0.306 0.162 0.156 0.093 0.127 0.162 
 
85% 80% 80% 77% 78% 80% 
       Leverage 0.208** -0.106 0.306*** -0.293*** -0.014 -0.083** 
 
2.38 -1.07 -3.13 -2.86 -0.18 -1.98 
 
0.013 0.003 0.024 0.021 0.000 0.002 
 
74% 74% 73% 74% 74% 74% 
       Firm Size -0.134*** -0.137*** -0.135*** -0.132*** -0.123*** -0.132*** 
 
-20.12 -17.81 -17.30 -16.76 -16.64 -39.72 
 
0.444 0.381 0.373 0.350 0.341 0.376 
 
89% 87% 85% 83% 83% 85% 
       Firm Age -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 
-2.80 -2.74 -2.91 -2.74 -2.64 -6.18 
 
0.020 0.019 0.021 0.020 0.018 0.020 
 
74% 74% 73% 74% 74% 74% 
*, ** and *** stand for significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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The results indicate that firm size consistently dominates all other variables in predicting 
failure. Explicitly, it records a predictive accuracy (pseudo r -squared), of 83% (34%) and 
89% (44%) for years five and one prior failure, respectively. This is consistent with the 
prediction of resource dependency theory, suggesting that firm size can enhance a firm‘s 
legitimacy to access critical resources (e.g. capital), thereby reducing the likelihood of firm‘s 
failure. As well, the result verifies prior studies (e.g. Moulton and Thomas 1993 and Sine, 
Mitsuhashi, and Kirsch 2006).  
 
Table 11 provides that board composition (i.e. independence, gender diversity and size), 
board structure (i.e. appointment, accountability and compensation committees), board 
monitoring (i.e. CEO performance evaluation and frequency of board meetings), board 
resource provision (i.e. NED interlock, board interlock, former government officials) 
variables are robust univariate predictors of corporate failure. The CEO performance 
evaluation, remuneration, audit and nomination committees register a predictive accuracy 
(pseudo r-squared) of 82% (37%) and 74% (10%) for years five and one prior failure, 
respectively, with a chi-square degrees of freedom at the 0.01 significance level. This is 
consistent with predictions from the agency and resource dependency theories. More 
importantly, these results provide preliminary evidence to support Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
and 6, which suggest that board attributes (i.e. composition and structure) and board functions 
(control and resources)  exhibit a significant  negative association with corporate failure.  
 
I also observe that firm age, financial leverage, profitability, and liquidity are robust 
univariate predictors of corporate failure (see table 11). This confirms prior studies (e.g. 
Daily and Dalton, 1994a; Charitou, Neophytou and Charalambous, 2004).  
 
The frequency of board meetings, however, is not statistically significant in all years, whereas 
financial leverage and liquidity are not statistically significant in both years two and five prior 
failure. Nevertheless, the frequency of board meetings, financial leverage and liquidity 
variables document a stable predictive accuracy of 73% to 74% over the five year period 
prior failure. This possibly implies that these variables may have potential explanatory power 
in a multivariate logit model, which is the focus of the next section. 
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7.4 MULTIVARIATE LOGIT ANALYSIS 
The previous section results are consistent with the research hypotheses. However, the 
univariate analysis considers one variable at a time, and thus, neglects the multi-dimensional 
nature of the process leading to a firm‘s failure. This section extends the analysis to a 
multivariate logit analysis. Simply put, I examine the relative contributions of diverse 
predictive variables to the corporate failure event simultaneously. 
 
Largely, the results from the logit analysis are consistent with the univariate tests but with 
few exceptions. Before I report these results, it is vital to make some critical explanations. 
First, I stratify the data into five cross-sectional sub-samples namely: t - 1, t - 2, t - 3, t - 4 and 
t - 5 prior to failure or otherwise (see chapter 6, sections 6.3 and 6.4, page 148). Following 
Sheppard (1994), I randomly stratify each year‘s data into two sub-samples for estimation 
and holdout test of the models. Thus, this study departs from the extant literature; however 
the motivation is to test the robustness of the models. From this point, I employ three phases 
of logit runs namely: estimation (panel A), holdout (panel B) and combined (panel C) tests. I 
use robust estimation and cluster by firm for estimations of the pooled and multi-period 
LOGIT models and, in this way, mitigate the effects of heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation. In contrast, the Jackknife procedure is used for the holdout test of the cross-
sectional models. The goal is to test the reliability of the predictions (see Altman, Haldeman 
and Narayanan, 1977).  
 
Second, the baseline model (hereafter model 1) includes only the control variables. The board 
composition model (hereafter model 2) considers all the three board composition measures 
and the control variables. The board structure models (models 3 to 5) consider the same 
control variables in model 1 and nomination, audit and remuneration committees‘ 
effectiveness in turn. In this respect, nomination, audit and remuneration committees‘ 
effectiveness are considered as important corporate governance attributes within the Anglo-
Saxon Literature and the empirical context, in particular. From this point, the goal for looking 
at each board structure variable is to assess the enhancement of goodness of fit (e.g. Wald 
chi-square, r-squared, ROC, and accuracy). For this reason, I replicate the analysis for models 
2 to 5, taking into account the interaction between board functions and attributes. In this 
regard, I estimate six different models (hereafter models 6 to 11) with only one board 
attribute and its interaction entering each of the six models due in part to the high degree of 
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multi-collinearity between the interaction terms12. I also estimate split models for the three 
composite measures (nomination, audit and remuneration committees‘ effectiveness) and 
present the results in models 12 to 14.  
 
In brief, I present the results (i.e. marginal effects and standard errors) from 14 estimated 
models from the pooled, cross sectional and multi-period data analysis. Thus, I perform 336 
LOGIT runs using STATA 12 to test six main and 24 auxiliary hypotheses using three 
different approaches namely: pooled cross-sectional (42), cross-sectional (210), and multi-
period (84) data analysis. I will discuss each in turn. 
 
7.4.1 Results of the Pooled Cross-Sectional LOGIT Model 
The pooled LOGIT Model uses multiple year data of firms and, in this way, allows for 
sufficient number of firms in the estimation and holdout samples (see EL Hennawy and 
Morris 1983, D‘Aveni 1989, and Sheppard 1994). Table 12 contains results of the LOGIT 
analysis performed for the combined sample (see Appendix 13, pages 306-309, for the 
estimation and holdout tests), the analysis of which I turn to. 
 
Table 12 illustrates that corporate failure is negatively and significantly related to profitability 
(β=-0.641, p<0.01), firm size (β=-0.110, p<0.01), proportion of outside directors (β=-0.200, 
p<0.10), board size (β=-0.012, p<0.01), audit committee effectiveness (β=0.022, p<0.10), and 
remuneration committee effectiveness (β=-0.042, p<0.01). In model 5 of the holdout test, for 
example, a 1 per cent decline in remuneration committee effectiveness, profitability and firm 
size results in the likelihood of corporate failure by 3.9, 69.0 and 7.4 per cent, respectively 
(see Appendix 14, page 310). Corporate failure, however, is not significantly related to the 
presence of female directors (β=0.026, p>0.10) and nomination committee effectiveness (β=-
0.003, p>0.10). 
                                                          
12 In unreported results, I examine the possible degree of multi-collinearity between the board attributes and 
functions as well as their interactions. The results suggest various issues of multicollinearity.  
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Table 12: Results of the Pooled Cross-sectional LOGIT Model 
COMBINED SAMPLE ( PANEL C) 
MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
MAIN VARIABLES Expected Sign            
Board composition             
H1A: BODC -  -0.200* 
(0.104) 
-0.186 
(0.114) 
-0.134 
(0.111) 
-0.061 
(0.113) 
-0.166 
(0.223) 
-0.185* 
(0.104) 
-0.189* 
(0.104) 
-0.163 
(0.116) 
-0.115 
(0.110) 
-0.032 
(0.113) 
H2A: FMALE -  0.026 
(0.035) 
0.028 
(0.035) 
0.037 
(0.035) 
0.043 
(0.035) 
0.028 
(0.035) 
-0.039 
(0.074) 
0.028 
(0.035) 
0.030 
(0.035) 
0.040 
(0.035) 
0.045 
(0.034) 
H3A: BODS -  -0.012* 
(0.007) 
-0.012* 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
-0.016 
(0.015) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
Board structure             
H4A: NCE -   -0.003 
(0.010) 
     -0.014 
(0.018) 
  
H5A: ACE -    -0.022* 
(0.012) 
     -0.049** 
(0.023) 
 
H6A: RCE -     -0.042*** 
(0.012) 
     -0.071*** 
(0.013) 
Board Functions             
BODM -      0.009 
(0.014) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.000 
(0.012) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.008) 
0.002 
(0.010) 
BINT3 -      -0.101 
(0.094) 
-0.070* 
(0.039) 
0.001 
(0.152) 
   
Interactions             
H1B i:  BODC*BODM -      -0.003 
(0.027) 
     
H1B ii: BODC*BINT3 -      0.045 
(0.177) 
     
H2B i: FMALE*BODM -       0.008 
(0.008) 
    
H2B ii: FMALE*BINT3 -       -0.029 
(0.078) 
    
H3B i: BODS*BODM -        0.001 
(0.001) 
   
H3B ii: BODS*BINT3 -        -0.011 
(0.020) 
   
H4B: NCE*BODM -         0.001 
(0.002) 
  
H5B: ACE*BODM -          0.003 
(0.002) 
 
H6B: RCE*BODM -           0.003 
(0.002) 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01 
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Table 12: Continuation 
COMBINED SAMPLE (PANEL C) 
MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
CONTROLVARIABLES Expected  
Sign 
           
Liquidity - -0.080 
(0.063) 
-0.071 
(0.063) 
-0.072 
(0.063) 
-0.075 
(0.062) 
-0.076 
(0.062) 
-0.060 
(0.061) 
-0.060 
(0.060) 
-0.066 
(0.061) 
-0.063 
(0.063) 
-0.067 
(0.062) 
-0.064 
(0.061) 
Profitability - -0.641*** 
(0.141) 
-0.650*** 
(0.142) 
-0.647*** 
(0.141) 
-0.609*** 
(0.140) 
-0.577*** 
(0.131) 
-0.601*** 
(0.140) 
-0.600*** 
(0.139) 
-0.606*** 
(0.140) 
-0.608*** 
(0.143) 
-0.564*** 
(0.139) 
-0.522*** 
(0.126) 
Leverage + 0.043 
(0.069) 
0.054 
(0.069) 
0.055 
(0.069) 
0.047 
(0.068) 
0.042 
(0.067) 
0.049 
(0.067) 
0.045 
(0.067) 
0.044 
(0.069) 
0.043 
(0.068) 
0.025 
(0.068) 
0.023 
(0.066) 
Firm Size - -0.110*** 
(0.008) 
-0.094*** 
(0.011) 
-0.091*** 
(0.013) 
-0.844*** 
(0.012) 
-0.074*** 
(0.011) 
-0.095*** 
(0.011) 
-0.096*** 
(0.011) 
-0.096*** 
(0.011) 
-0.093*** 
(0.013) 
-0.088*** 
(0.012) 
-0.077*** 
(0.011) 
Firm Age - -0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Industry Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Constant +/- 5.016*** 
(1.128) 
6.168*** 
(1.298) 
6.044*** 
(1.334) 
5.878*** 
(1.358) 
5.977*** 
(1.382) 
5.454*** 
(1.676) 
5.864*** 
(1.309) 
6.182*** 
(1.599) 
5.384*** 
(1.386) 
5.883*** 
(1.433) 
5.825*** 
(1.474) 
Parameters             
Observations  1748 1748 1748 1748 1748 1748 1748 1748 1748 1748 1748 
Wald chi2(9)/12/16  107.51*** 109.29*** 110.01*** 112.25*** 130.40*** 118.38*** 115.02*** 115.39*** 112.84*** 116.03*** 142.52*** 
Pseudo R2  0.456 0.466 0.466 0.471 0.486 0.481 0.483 0.482 0.473 0.480 0.499 
Log pseudo  -549.665 -538.942 -538.710 -534.104 -519.400 -524.210 -522.376 -523.393 -531.820 -524.677 -505.419 
Accuracy  % % % % % % % % % % % 
Failed  80.31 81.40 80.83 80.82 80.21 81.03 80.72 80.92 81.96 81.59 81.09 
Non-failed  88.59 89.20 88.99 89.24 88.96 89.25 89.11 89.37 89.41 89.46 89.90 
Overall  86.78 87.47 87.19 87.36 87.01 87.41 87.24 87.47 87.76 87.70 87.87 
Hosmer-Lemeshow (10)             
Chi2(8)  22.05 22.71 19.57 26.19 12.04 16.57 12.59 9.94 26.31 22.67 21.44 
Prob>chi2  0.005 0.004 0.012 0.001 0.150 0.035 0.127 0.270 0.001 0.004 0.006 
ROC  0.913 0.917 0.917 0.919 0.925 0.922 0.923 0.923 0.919 0.922 0.928 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01 
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Turning to the interaction effects, three observations merit attention. First, corporate failure is 
negatively and significantly related to former government official (β=-0.70, p<0.10) but 
positively and insignificantly associated to frequency of board meetings (β=0.009, p>0.10). 
Second, the interactions between frequency of board meetings and presence of female 
directors, nomination, audit and remuneration committees‘ effectiveness exhibit a positive 
and insignificant marginal effect in models 7, 9, 10 and 11. Third, the interactions between 
former government official and board composition proxies (i.e. board size and board gender 
diversity), exhibit a positive and insignificant marginal effect in models 6 and 7. I turn next to 
the assessment of the goodness of fit of the pooled model.  
 
The classification accuracy is quite high with an average 87.43, 88.16, and 87.45 per cent for 
estimation, holdout and combined samples, respectively. As well, the estimation, holdout and 
combined models record an average type I (II) errors of 18.16(11.04), 17.67 (10.13) and 
18.91 (10.72) per cent respectively, yielding an overall misclassification of 12.57, 11.84 and 
12.55 per cent at a cut-off of 0.5 prior probabilities. Nonetheless, classification accuracy as a 
measure of goodness fit is limited in part due to the absence of a measure of significance. For 
this reason, I turn to Hosmer-Lemeshow test. 
 
The Hosmer and Lemeshow's goodness-of-fit test
13
 proposes that the more closely the 
predicted and observed frequencies match, the better the model fit. Thus, it answers the 
crucial question, how well the model fits the data. By rule of thumb, a good fit as measured 
by Hosmer and Lemeshow's test yields a large p-value. Put differently, an insignificant chi-
square indicates that the model has adequate fit. The presence of continuous predictors in the 
model, however, result in many cells defined by the predictor variables, making a very large 
contingency table, which in turn yields significant results. For this reason, Hosmer and 
Lemeshow (2000) recommend combining the patterns formed by the predictor variables into 
10 groups and, in this way, form a contingency table of 2 by 10.  
 
The Hosmer and Lemeshow test for the holdout sample records a non-significant (p >0.1) for 
all models at eight degrees of freedom, implying that there is no statistically significant 
                                                          
13 Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit is computed as the Pearson chi-square from the contingency table of 
observed and expected frequencies 
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difference between the observed and predicted classifications. Thus, this study fails to reject 
the null hypothesis, which suggests that there is no difference between models predicted and 
observed values. This study also observes that, the Hosmer and Lemeshow test for the 
estimation sample records a non-significant (p >0.1) for almost all the models at eight 
degrees but not in models 1 and 2. In parallel, the combined samples‘ Hosmer and Lemeshow 
tests largely suggest statistical significance at the 0.05 level. Hence, this study rejects the null 
hypothesis. In short, Hosmer and Lemeshow tests for panel A and B suggest the pooled 
model has adequate fit, whereas panel C suggests otherwise. This implies that the overall 
LOGIT model fit is sensitive to sample size; therefore I turn to log likelihood chi-square to 
assess the validity of the overall logit model. 
 
The log likelihood chi-square is an omnibus test to assess the statistical significance of the 
estimated model. Log likelihood chi-square (-2LL) is calculated as 2 times the change 
between the log likelihood of the estimated model (LLm) and the log likelihood of the 
constant-only model (LLo). The pooled LOGIT models show a reduction of the log likelihood 
for iteration 0 is significant at the 0.000 level, with the minimum (maximum) chi-square of 
79.29 (142.52) with 9 (16) degrees of freedom and predicts corporate failure accurately at 
86.97 (87.87) per cent in model 7 (11) of the estimation (combined) test.  The general rule is 
that lesser values of -2LL suggest better model fit. Hair, Underson, Tatham and Black, 
(1998), however, suggest that there is no bench mark limit for this value. Hence, I turn to 
ROC
14
 and McFadden‘s r-squared15 (hereafter pseudo r-squared) to assess the validity of the 
pooled model. 
 
The pooled LOGIT model registers an average ROC of 0.92, 0.93 and 0.92 for the training, 
holdout and combined samples, respectively, implying the efficacy of the models is quite 
high.  As well, pseudo r-squared captures the proportion of change in terms of likelihood, 
implying that higher levels of pseudo r-squared indicate better fit. The pooled model 
produces a pseudo r-squared of 0.460 and 0.510 for the estimation and holdout tests.  This 
suggests that the pooled model accounts for approximately 49 per cent in the prediction of 
                                                          
14 Agarwal and Taffler (2008) document that the area under the ROC curve gives an indication of the model‘s 
quality. 
 
15 McFadden‘s  r-squared = 1 – (LLm   / LLo).  
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corporate failure in the UK, yielding a chi-square at the 0.0001 significance level. This 
implies that there is a less than 0.0001 chance that the classification accuracy, variance 
explained and ROC by the pooled LOGIT model and particularly, the findings outlined above 
happened by chance. 
 
The pooled LOGIT model, however, neglects changes in predictive variables. This is because 
this approach considers pooled data prior to failure and in this way, neglects the passage of 
time. The pooled model indicates the relationship between several corporate governance 
measures and corporate failure, but when these measures are considered important is beyond 
its scope. This is because the pooled model shows the entire signposts to failure and thus, 
assumes failure is a sudden event. Corporate failure, however, is considered as a ‗protracted 
downward spiral‘ (see Argenti 1976, Hambrick and D‘Aveni 1988, Amankwah-Amoah and 
Debrah, 2010). For this reason, I turn to the analysis of the cross-sectional LOGIT models in 
the next section. 
 
7.4.2 Results of the Cross-Sectional LOGIT Model 
Under this sub-section, I discuss the results of the logit analysis run for each sample year: t – 
1, t - 2, t – 3, t - 4 and t - 5. The goal is to uncover changes in regressors over time. Thus, I 
seek to overcome the limitations associated with pooling data across different years (see 
Moyer 1977; Mensah, 1984; Charitou, Neophytou, Charalambous, 2004) and the neglect of 
the time dimension of failure (see Dimitras, Slowinski, Susmaga, Zopounidis,1999; Balcaen 
and Ooghe 2006; Du Jardin  and  Séverin, 2011). As discussed in chapter three, the practice 
of pooling data across different years in the classical failure prediction models assume 
stationarity and data stability. Critics (e.g. Zmijewski 1984), however, suggest otherwise: 
implying that classical failure models suffer from stationarity problems (Mensah, 1984). 
Further, Balcaen and Ooghe (2006) and Jardin and Séverin (2011) contend that the use of 
pooled data or one annual account is based on the assumption that consecutive annual 
accounts are independent, repeated measurements. This suggests classical prediction models 
are limited due in part to year selection bias, neglect of time-series behaviour (D'Aveni, 1989; 
Dimitras, Slowinski, Susmaga, Zopounidis, 1999) and signal inconsistency problem (Luoma 
and Laitinen, 1991). Thus, classical models based on a fixed score output do not consider the 
corporate failure phenomenon as a process, and, in turn, contradicts general intuition 
(Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006).  
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Table 13: Results of the Cross-Sectional LOGIT Model: One Year (t-1) Prior Failure 
COMBINED SAMPLE ( PANEL C) 
MODEL t -1  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
MAIN VARIABLES Expected 
Sign 
           
Board composition             
H1A: BODC -  -0.046 
(0.102) 
-0.042 
(0.109) 
-0.023 
(0.109) 
0.027 
(0.108) 
-0.051 
(0.247) 
-0.059 
(0.098) 
-0.045 
(0.096) 
-0.036 
(0.109) 
-0.017 
(0.105) 
0.028 
(0.104) 
H2A: FMALE -  -0.029 
(0.034) 
-0.028 
(0.034) 
-0.025 
(0.035) 
-0.011 
(0.036) 
-0.027 
(0.036) 
-0.084 
(0.081) 
-0.032 
(0.035) 
-0.028 
(0.034) 
-0.023 
(0.036) 
-0.011 
(0.037) 
H3A: BODS -  -0.024*** 
(0.009) 
-0.024*** 
(0.008) 
-0.023*** 
(0.009) 
-0.021** 
(0.008) 
-0.019** 
(0.009) 
-0.020** 
(0.008) 
-0.048** 
(0.022) 
-0.021*** 
(0.008) 
-0.020** 
(0.008) 
-0.018** 
(0.008) 
Board structure             
H4A: NCE -   -0.001 
(0.009) 
   
 
  -0.018 
(-0.019) 
  
H5A: ACE -    -0.006 
(0.012) 
  
 
- 
 
  -0.041 
(0.027) 
 
H6A: RCE -     -0.026** 
(0.012) 
     -0.061** 
(0.031) 
Board Functions             
BODM -      0.007 
(0.013) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.009 
(0.016) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
BINT3 -      -0.006 
(0.143) 
-0.122 
(0.076) 
-0.320 
(0.223) 
   
Interactions             
H1B i:  BODC*BODM -      0.001 
(0.025) 
     
H1B ii: BODC*BINT3 -      -0.155 
(0.247) 
     
H2B i: FMALE*BODM -       0.004 
(0.009) 
    
H2B ii: FMALE*BINT3 -       0.097 
(0.102) 
    
H3B i: BODS*BODM -        0.003 
(0.002) 
   
H3B ii: BODS*BINT3 -        0.034 
(0.026) 
   
H4B: NCE*BODM -         0.001 
(0.002) 
  
H5B: ACE*BODM -          0.003 
(0.003) 
 
H6B: RCE*BODM -           0.003 
(0.003) 
Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis ,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01 
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Table 13: Continuation 
COMBINED SAMPLE ( PANEL C) 
MODEL t - 1  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
CONTROLVARIABLES Expected  
Sign 
           
Liquidity - -0.189*** 
(0.070) 
-0.190** 
(0.075) 
-0.191*** 
(0.074) 
-0.194*** 
(0.074) 
-0.187*** 
(0.072) 
-0.161** 
(0.069) 
-0.162** 
(0.071) 
-0.156** 
(0.070) 
-0.174** 
(0.070) 
-0.186*** 
(0.070) 
-0.162** 
(0.067) 
Profitability - -0.793*** 
(0.208) 
-0.789*** 
(0.192) 
-0.785*** 
(0.191) 
-0.771*** 
(0.196) 
-0.727*** 
(0.170) 
-
0.721*** 
(0.181) 
-0.735*** 
(0.176) 
-0.736*** 
(0.165) 
-0.730*** 
(0.182) 
-0.708*** 
(0.180) 
-
0.648*** 
(0.157) 
Leverage + 0.013 
(0.074) 
0.002 
(0.073) 
0.002 
(0.073) 
0.001 
(0.073) 
0.007 
(0.072) 
0.002 
(0.073) 
-0.006 
(0.071) 
0.028 
(0.077) 
-0.019 
(0.070) 
-0.032 
(0.071) 
-0.012 
(0.071) 
Firm Size - -0.094*** 
(0.010) 
-0.070*** 
(0.012) 
-0.069*** 
(0.014) 
-0.068*** 
(0.013) 
-0.058*** 
(0.011) 
-
0.069*** 
(0.012) 
-0.066*** 
(0.012) 
-0.070*** 
(0.012) 
-0.068*** 
(0.014) 
-0.069*** 
(0.013) 
-
0.058*** 
(0.011) 
Firm Age - -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Industry Effects  +/- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  7.420*** 
(1.588) 
9.190*** 
(2.046) 
9.120*** 
(2.083) 
9.027*** 
(2.129) 
8.919*** 
(2.034) 
8.395*** 
(2.379) 
8.818*** 
(1.900) 
11.110*** 
(2.792) 
8.451*** 
(2.060) 
9.675*** 
(2.217) 
9.398*** 
(2.286) 
Parameters             
Observations  353 353 353 353 353 353 353 353 353 353 353 
Wald chi2(9)/12/16  74.63*** 73.93*** 75.68*** 76.99*** 83.10*** 90.41*** 94.70*** 103.43*** 86.92*** 87.54*** 89.58*** 
Pseudo R2  0.593 0.614 0.614 0.614 0.623 0.634 0.638 0.642 0.626 0.629 0.641 
Log pseudo  -82.864 -78.605 -78.596 -78.489 -76.714 -74.442 -73.797 -72.819 -76.119 -75.460 -73.100 
Accuracy  % % % % % % % % % % % 
Failed  89.02 90.24 88.10 89.02 91.57 90.48 88.24 89.16 89.29 89.02 86.29 
Non-failed  92.62 92.99 92.94 92.62 93.70 93.68 93.28 92.96 93.31 92.62 93.31 
Overall  91.78 92.35 91.78 91.78 93.20 92.92 92.07 92.07 92.35 91.78 92.35 
Hosmer-Lemeshow (10)             
Chi2(8)  12.92 14.47 14.42 14.73 12.36 8.07 10.13 5.75 6.98 9.89 8.94 
Prob>chi2  0.115 0.070 0.072 0.065 0.136 0.427 0.256 0.267 0.539 0.273 0.347 
ROC  0.947 0.953 0.953 0.953 0.956 0.958 0.958 0.960 0.957 0.958 0.960 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01 
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Table 14: Results of the Cross-Sectional LOGIT Model: Two Years (t-2) Prior Failure  
COMBINED SAMPLE ( PANEL C) 
MODEL t - 2  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
MAIN VARIABLES Expected Sign            
Board composition             
H1A: BODC -  -0.245* 
(0.131) 
-0.227 
(0.141) 
-0.194 
(0.135) 
-0.118 
(0.137) 
0.061 
(0.267) 
-0.231* 
(0.130) 
-0.225* 
(0.130) 
-0.209 
(0.143) 
-0.179 
(0.136) 
-0.093 
(0.139) 
H2A: FMALE -  0.031 
(0.041) 
0.033 
(0.041) 
0.039 
(0.041) 
0.045 
(0.040) 
0.031 
(0.042) 
0.031 
(0.084) 
0.032 
(0.042) 
0.034 
(0.041) 
0.041 
(0.041) 
0.044 
(0.039) 
H3A: BODS -  -0.020** 
(0.009) 
-0.020** 
(0.009) 
-0.019* 
(0.009) 
-0.016* 
(0.009) 
-0.015* 
(0.009) 
-0.015* 
(0.009) 
-0.016 
(0.017) 
-0.017* 
(0.010) 
-0.017* 
(0.009) 
-0.013 
(0.009) 
Board structure             
H4A: NCE -   -0.005 
(0.011) 
     -0.013 
(0.019) 
  
H5A: ACE -    -0.018 
(0.014) 
     -0.029 
(0.022) 
 
H6A: RCE -     -0.041*** 
(0.013) 
     -0.060** 
(0.024) 
Board Functions             
BODM -      0.022 
(0.017) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.015) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.010) 
BINT3 -      -0.116 
(0.146) 
-0.158*** 
(0.061) 
-0.139 
(0.205) 
   
Interactions             
H1B i:  BODC*BODM -      -0.033 
(0.030) 
     
H1B ii: BODC*BINT3 -      0.011 
(0.269) 
     
H2B i: FMALE*BODM -       -0.002 
(0.007) 
    
H2B ii: FMALE*BINT3 -       0.109 
(0.093) 
    
H3B i: BODS*BODM -        0.000 
(0.002) 
   
H3B ii: BODS*BINT3 -        0.003 
(0.026) 
   
H4B: NCE*BODM -         0.001 
(0.002) 
  
H5B: ACE*BODM -          0.001 
(0.002) 
 
H6B: RCE*BODM -           0.001 
(0.003) 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01 
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Table 14: Continuation 1 of 1 
COMBINED SAMPLE (PANEL C) 
MODEL t - 2  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
CONTROLVARIABLES Expected  
Sign 
           
Liquidity - -0.105 
(0.073) 
-0.086 
(0.073) 
-0.087 
(0.073) 
-0.082 
(0.072) 
-0.098 
(0.070) 
-0.060 
(0.072) 
-0.055 
(0.072) 
-0.065 
(0.071) 
-0.081 
(0.072) 
-0.078 
(0.072) 
-0.088 
(0.069) 
Profitability - -0.623*** 
(0.172) 
-0.657*** 
(0.170) 
-0.642*** 
(0.168) 
-0.612*** 
(0.167) 
-0.552*** 
(0.147) 
-0.595*** 
(0.162) 
-0.613*** 
(0.162) 
-0.616*** 
(0.163) 
-0.608*** 
(0.167) 
-0.578*** 
(0.163) 
-0.506*** 
(0.140) 
Leverage + 0.048 
(0.082) 
0.062 
(0.082) 
0.063 
(0.082) 
0.062 
(0.082) 
0.048 
(0.078) 
0.072 
(0.085) 
0.066 
(0.085) 
0.068 
(0.086) 
0.047 
(0.082) 
0.043 
(0.082) 
0.028 
(0.075) 
Firm Size - -0.117*** 
(0.011) 
-0.093*** 
(0.013) 
-0.089*** 
(0.015) 
-0.083*** 
(0.014) 
-0.071*** 
(0.014) 
-0.091*** 
(0.014) 
-0.091*** 
(0.013) 
-0.092*** 
(-0.014) 
-0.091*** 
(0.015) 
-0.086*** 
(0.015) 
-0.074*** 
(-0.014) 
Firm Age - -0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Industry Effects   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant +/- 5.411*** 
(1.334) 
6.939*** 
(1.647) 
6.726*** 
(1.730) 
6.640*** 
(1.724) 
6.748*** 
(1.800) 
4.810*** 
(2.019) 
6.466*** 
(1.523) 
6.510*** 
(1.941) 
6.180*** 
(1.744) 
6.281*** 
(1.7275) 
6.455*** 
(1.816) 
Parameters             
Observations  351 351 351 351 351 351 351 351 351 351 351 
Wald chi2(9)/12/16  92.68*** 90.56*** 91.81*** 97.91*** 106.10*** 100.65*** 106.84*** 104.96*** 90.23*** 97.37*** 109.70*** 
Pseudo R2  0.464 0.482 0.483 0.486 0.501 0.507 0.508 0.504 0.489 0.493 0.513 
Log pseudo  -108.706 -105.119 -105.001 -104.341 -101.226 -100.016 -99.922 -100.602 -103.721 -102.874 -98.847 
Accuracy  % % % % % % % % % % % 
Failed  78.95 82.05 83.12 81.25 77.11 82.28 81.48 81.25 80.49 81.82 80.49 
Non-failed  88.00 89.38 89.42 89.67 89.18 89.71 90.00 89.67 89.96 89.05 89.96 
Overall  86.04 87.75 88..03 87.75 86.32 88.03 88.03 87.75 87.75 87.46 87.75 
Hosmer-Lemeshow (10)             
Chi2(8)  12.94 4.81 3.67 6.07 4.47 1.03 3.43 4.08 7.32 6.28 12.70 
Prob>chi2  0.114 0.777 0.885 0.640 0.812 0.998 0.905 0.850 0.503 0.616 0.123 
ROC  0.913 0.923 0.923 0.924 0.930 0.930 0.931 0.929 0.924 0.924 0.932 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01 
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Table 15: Results of the Cross-Sectional LOGIT Model: Three Years (t-3) Prior Failure  
COMBINED SAMPLE ( PANEL C) 
MODEL t - 3  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
MAIN VARIABLES Expected 
Sign 
           
Board composition             
H1A: BODC -  -0.242** 
(0.120) 
-0.230* 
(0.132) 
-0.193 
(0.134) 
-0.074 
(0.132) 
-0.071 
(0.342) 
-0.201* 
(0.121) 
-0.220* 
(0.121) 
-0.196 
(0.135) 
-0.167 
(0.132) 
-0.039 
(0.129) 
H2A: FMALE -  0.069* 
(0.042) 
0.070* 
(0.042) 
0.077* 
(0.043) 
0.084** 
(0.043) 
0.066 
(0.042) 
-0.048 
(0.098) 
0.069* 
(0.042) 
0.070* 
(0.043) 
0.080* 
(0.043) 
0.083** 
(0.042) 
H3A: BODS -  -0.009 
(0.009) 
-0.008 
(0.009) 
-0.007 
(0.009) 
-0.004 
(0.009) 
-0.006 
(0.009) 
-0.004 
(0.009) 
-0.023 
(0.020) 
-0.006 
(0.009) 
-0.004 
(0.009) 
-0.000 
(0.008) 
Board structure             
H4A: NCE -   -0.003 
(0.011) 
     -0.015 
(0.022) 
  
H5A: ACE -    -0.015 
(0.015) 
     -0.052* 
(0.027) 
 
H6A: RCE -     -0.046*** 
(0.015) 
     -0.072*** 
(0.026) 
Board Functions             
BODM -      0.017 
(0.021) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
-0.008 
(0.018) 
0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
0.005 
(0.010) 
BINT3 -      -0.086 
(0.140) 
-0.018 
(0.050) 
0.002 
(0.187) 
   
Interactions             
H1B i:  BODC*BODM -      -0.019 
(0.041) 
     
H1B ii: BODC*BINT3 -      0.071 
(0.260) 
     
H2B i: FMALE*BODM -       0.015* 
(0.009) 
    
H2B ii: FMALE*BINT3 -       -0.090 
(0.095) 
    
H3B i: BODS*BODM -        0.002 
(0.002) 
   
H3B ii: BODS*BINT3 -        -0.008 
(0.025) 
   
H4B: NCE*BODM -         0.001 
(0.002) 
  
H5B: ACE*BODM -          0.004 
(0.003) 
 
H6B: RCE*BODM -           0.002 
(0.003) 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01 
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Table 15: Continuation 1 of 1  
COMBINED SAMPLE (PANEL C) 
MODEL t - 3  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
CONTROLVARIABLES Expected  
Sign 
           
Liquidity - -0.047 
(0.082) 
-0.045 
(0.009) 
-0.046 
(0.085) 
-0.043 
(0.084) 
-0.058 
(0.085) 
-0.018 
(0.085) 
-0.040 
(0.083) 
-0.038 
(0.085) 
-0.036 
(0.085) 
-0.038 
(0.082) 
-0.054 
(0.082) 
Profitability - -0.660*** 
(0.209) 
-0.685*** 
(0.215) 
-0.682*** 
(0.214) 
-0.651*** 
(0.220) 
-0.585*** 
(0.208) 
-0.632*** 
(0.212) 
-0.626*** 
(0.221) 
-0.636*** 
(0.214) 
-0.634*** 
(0.214) 
-0.583*** 
(0.215) 
-0.527*** 
(0.190) 
Leverage + 0.021 
(0.087) 
0.016 
(0.085) 
0.016 
(0.085) 
0.009 
(0.086) 
-0.016 
(0.085) 
0.022 
(0.088) 
0.007 
(0.086) 
0.005 
(0.090) 
0.006 
(0.088) 
-0.019 
(0.089) 
-0.037 
(0.085) 
Firm Size - -0.110*** 
(-0.009) 
-0.098*** 
(0.012) 
-0.096*** 
(0.014) 
-0.091*** 
(0.013) 
-0.075*** 
(0.013) 
-0.100*** 
(0.014) 
-0.106*** 
(0.013) 
-0.104*** 
(0.013) 
-0.098*** 
(0.014) 
-0.096*** 
(0.014) 
-0.080*** 
(0.013) 
Firm Age - -0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
Industry Effects   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Constant +/- 4.738*** 
(1.601) 
6.108*** 
(1.970) 
6.008*** 
(2.006) 
5.915*** 
(2.030) 
5.928*** 
(1.997) 
4.449*** 
(2.540) 
5.923*** 
(2.047) 
6.686*** 
(2.479) 
5.167** 
(2.045) 
6.003 
(1.985) 
5.478*** 
(1.892) 
Parameters             
Observations             
Wald chi2(9)/12/16  352 352 352 352 352 352 352 352 352 352 352 
Pseudo R2  80.50*** 81.90*** 82.46*** 84.18*** 101.84*** 90.48*** 85.79*** 89.19*** 88.11*** 86.67*** 107.63*** 
Log pseudo  0.440 0.456 0.457 0.459 0.478 0.467 0.474 0.468 0.464 0.470 0.494 
Accuracy  -114.890 -111.583 -111.550 -111.147 -107.101 -109.359 -107.920 -109.110 -110.010 -108.822 -103.945 
Failed  % % % % % % % % % % % 
Non-failed  80.52 81.01 81.01 81.25 80.25 79.75 81.25 80.77 78.31 80.72 79.76 
Overall  88.00 88.64 88.64 88.97 88.93 88.28 88.97 88.32 88.85 89.59 89.55 
Hosmer-Lemeshow (10)  86.36 86.93 86.93 87.22 86.93 86.36 87.22 86.65 86.36 87.50 87.22 
Chi2(8)             
Prob>chi2  6.95 8.70 7.91 10.21 6.57 4.87 5.83 5.12 6.36 5.48 2.88 
Prob>chi2  0.543 0.368 0.443 0.251 0.583 0.771 0.666 0.744 0.607 0.705 0.942 
ROC  0.908 0.915 0.916 0.916 0.922 0.919 0.921 0.919 0.917 0.918 0.925 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01 
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Table 16: Results of the Cross-Sectional LOGIT Model: Four Years(t-4) Prior Failure  
COMBINED SAMPLE (PANEL C) 
MODEL t - 4  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
MAIN VARIABLES Expected 
Sign 
           
Board composition             
H1A: BODC -  -0.234* 
(0.120) 
-0.258* 
(0.133) 
-0.160 
(0.132) 
-0.076 
(0.125) 
-0.400 
(0.311) 
-0.205* 
(0.121) 
-0.214* 
(0.124) 
-0.221 
(0.139) 
-0.118 
(0.132) 
-0.012 
(0.128) 
H2A: FMALE -  0.041 
(0.047) 
0.040 
(0.047) 
0.058 
(0.049) 
0.059 
(0.047) 
0.044 
(0.047) 
-0.112 
(0.110) 
0.046 
(0.048) 
0.043 
(0.047) 
0.063 
(0.049) 
0.066 
(0.047) 
H3A: BODS -  -0.009 
(0.010) 
-0.010 
(0.010) 
-0.005 
(0.011) 
-0.004 
(0.010) 
-0.005 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.010) 
-0.004 
(0.023) 
-0.007 
(0.010) 
0.000 
(0.011) 
0.000 
(0.010) 
Board structure             
H4A: NCE -   0.006 
(0.012) 
     -0.004 
(0.025) 
  
H5A: ACE -    -0.026 
(0.017) 
     -0.074** 
(0.034) 
 
H6A: RCE -     -0.047 
(0.015) 
     -0.095*** 
(0.035) 
Board Functions             
BODM -      0.001 
(0.020) 
0.005 
(0.007) 
0.008 
(0.020) 
0.009 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.011) 
0.002 
(0.013) 
BINT3 -      -0.103 
(0.120) 
-0.042 
(0.050) 
0.171 
(0.238) 
   
Interactions             
H1B i:  BODC*BODM -      0.021 
(0.039) 
     
H1B ii: BODC*BINT3 -      0.068 
(0.234) 
     
H2B i: FMALE*BODM -       0.020* 
(0.010) 
    
H2B ii: FMALE*BINT3 -       -0.117 
(0.107) 
    
H3B i: BODS*BODM -        0.000 
(0.003) 
   
H3B ii: BODS*BINT3 -        -0.034 
(0.032) 
   
H4B: NCE*BODM -         0.001 
(0.002) 
  
H5B: ACE*BODM -          0.005 
(0.003) 
 
H6B: RCE*BODM -           0.005 
(0.004) 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01 
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Table 16: Continuation 1 of 1 
COMBINED SAMPLE ( PANEL C) 
MODEL t - 4  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
CONTROLVARIABLES Expected  
Sign 
           
Liquidity - -0.026 
(0.080) 
-0.024 
(0.078) 
-0.024 
(0.078) 
-0.035 
(0.078) 
-0.021 
(0.079) 
-0.011 
(0.081) 
-0.002 
(0.085) 
-0.031 
(0.083) 
-0.005 
(0.079) 
-0.006 
(0.079) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
Profitability - -0.468** 
(0.214) 
-0.471** 
(0.217) 
-0.474** 
(0.215) 
-0.432** 
(0.209) 
-0.425** 
(0.191) 
-0.431** 
(0.204) 
-0.428** 
(0.209) 
-0.438** 
(0.210) 
-0.453** 
(0.208) 
-0.385** 
(0.195) 
-0.396** 
(0.166) 
Leverage + 0.026 
(0.081) 
0.043 
(0.086) 
0.043 
(0.086) 
0.027 
(0.087) 
0.030 
(0.081) 
0.022 
(0.085) 
0.025 
(0.083) 
0.016 
(0.088) 
0.036 
(0.085) 
0.007 
(0.084) 
0.021 
(0.079) 
Firm Size - -0.118*** 
(0.010) 
-0.104*** 
(0.014) 
-0.108*** 
(0.016) 
-0.093*** 
(0.015) 
-0.080*** 
(0.014) 
-0.110*** 
(0.016) 
-0.112*** 
(0.015) 
-0.108*** 
(0.015) 
-0.111*** 
(0.018) 
-0.102*** 
(0.016) 
-0.087*** 
(-0.016) 
Firm Age - -0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Industry Effects +/- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  4.287*** 
(1.277) 
5.276*** 
(1.407) 
5.476*** 
(1.444) 
4.951*** 
(1.426) 
5.111*** 
(1.378) 
5.393*** 
(1.986) 
4.947*** 
(1.564) 
4.512*** 
(2.056) 
4.598*** 
(1.576) 
5.190*** 
(1.550) 
4.940*** 
(1.500) 
Parameters             
Observations  346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 
Wald chi2(9)/12/16  84.95*** 87.92*** 87.27*** 89.32*** 98.30*** 97.19*** 93.52*** 93.73*** 88.53*** 89.13*** 101.30*** 
Pseudo R2  0.399 0.410 0.411 0.415 0.433 0.426 0.435 0.428 0.419 0.430 0.456 
Log pseudo  -119.838 -117.625 -117.520 -116.558 -112.966 -114.460 -112.720 -113.947 -115.875 -113.553 -108.516 
Accuracy  % % % % % % % % % % % 
Failed  76.71 80.00 80.00 79.73 79.45 77.33 78.95 77.33 78.67 78.95 77.78 
Non-failed  87.18 87.32 87.32 88.24 87.91 87.82 88.52 87.82 88.19 88.52 89.43 
Overall  84.97 85.84 85.84 86.42 86.13 85.55 86.42 85.55 86.13 86.42 86.71 
Hosmer-Lemeshow (10)             
Chi2(8)  6.19 8.50 6.64 6.76 4.29 4.21 10.05 8.52 5.63 15.52 3.97 
Prob>chi2  0.626 0.387 0.577 0.563 0.831 0.838 0.262 0.384 0.689 0.050 0.860 
ROC  0.896 0.901 0.901 0.903 0.911 0.907 0.912 0.909 0.904 0.908 0.916 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01 
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Table 17: Results of the Cross-Sectional LOGIT Model: Five Years (t -5) Prior Failure  
COMBINED SAMPLE (PANEL C) 
MODEL  t - 5  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
MAIN VARIABLES Expected 
Sign 
           
Board composition             
H1A: BODC -  -0.154 
(0.110) 
-0.123 
(0.120) 
-0.023 
(0.112) 
-0.007 
(0.115) 
-0.276 
(0.250) 
-0.156 
(0.108) 
-0.153 
(0.109) 
-0.109 
(0.122) 
-0.012 
(0.113) 
0.012 
(0.115) 
H2A: FMALE -  0.020 
(0.048) 
0.023 
(0.048) 
0.043 
(0.047) 
0.038 
(0.047) 
0.019 
(0.049) 
-0.069 
(0.090) 
0.023 
(0.049) 
0.026 
(0.049) 
0.044 
(0.048) 
0.041 
(0.047) 
H3A: BODS -  -0.006 
(0.010) 
-0.005 
(0.010) 
0.002 
(0.010) 
-0.000 
(0.009) 
-0.004 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.010) 
-0.010 
(0.016) 
-0.005 
(0.010) 
0.003 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.009) 
Board structure             
H4A: NCE -   -0.008 
(0.015) 
     -0.014 
(0.022) 
  
H5A: ACE -    -0.051*** 
(0.015) 
     -0.076*** 
(0.029) 
 
H6A: RCE -     -0.046*** 
(0.014) 
     -0.077** 
(0.030) 
Board Functions             
BODM -      -0.003 
(0.015) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.008 
(0.015) 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.010) 
-0.005 
(0.012) 
BINT3 -      -0.129 
(0.104) 
-0.061 
(0.051) 
0.156 
(0.015) 
   
Interactions             
H1B i:  BODC*BODM -      0.013 
(0.029) 
     
H1B ii: BODC*BINT3 -      0.090 
(0.227) 
     
H2B i: FMALE*BODM -       0.013 
(0.009) 
    
H2B ii: FMALE*BINT3 -       -0.121 
(0.122) 
    
H3B i: BODS*BODM -        0.002 
(0.002) 
   
H3B ii: BODS*BINT3 -        -0.036 
(0.029) 
   
H4B: NCE*BODM -         0.001 
(0.001) 
  
H5B: ACE*BODM -          0.003 
(0.003) 
 
H6B: RCE*BODM -           0.003 
(0.003) 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01 
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Table 17: Continuation 1 of 1 
COMBINED SAMPLE ( PANEL C) 
MODEL t - 5  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
CONTROLVARIABLES Expected  
Sign 
           
Liquidity - -0.003 
(0.082) 
-0.006 
(0.082) 
-0.009 
(0.084) 
-0.035 
(0.083) 
-0.015 
(0.082) 
-0.028 
(0.089) 
-0.025 
(0.090) 
-0.050 
(0.095) 
-0.003 
(0.087) 
-0.028 
(0.087) 
-0.009 
(0.085) 
Profitability - -0.656*** 
(0.147) 
-0.670*** 
(0.147) 
-0.672*** 
(0.147) 
-0.649*** 
(0.143) 
-0.628*** 
(0.139) 
-0.649*** 
(0.152) 
-0.642*** 
(0.157) 
-0.656*** 
(0.157) 
-0.646*** 
(0.156) 
-0.621*** 
(0.154) 
-0.584*** 
(0.151) 
Leverage + 0.078 
(0.071) 
0.083 
(0.076) 
0.084 
(0.017) 
0.053 
(0.076) 
0.068 
(0.074) 
0.068 
(0.074) 
0.061 
(0.076) 
0.056 
(0.079) 
0.076 
(0.078) 
0.0.36 
(0.078) 
0.049 
(0.076) 
Firm Size - -0.107*** 
(0.009) 
-0.096*** 
(0.013) 
-0.091*** 
(0.017) 
-0.077*** 
(0.013) 
-0.077*** 
(0.013) 
-0.098*** 
(0.014) 
-0.097*** 
(0.013) 
-0.099*** 
(0.014) 
-0.091*** 
(0.017) 
-0.078*** 
(0.078) 
-0.078*** 
(0.014) 
Firm Age - 0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Industry Effects  +/- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  4.306*** 
(0.976) 
5.002*** 
(1.002) 
4.768*** 
(1.012) 
4.785*** 
(1.060) 
4.909*** 
(1.003) 
5.599*** 
(1.614) 
5.402*** 
(1.146) 
5.093*** 
(1.498) 
4.509*** 
(1.209) 
5.447*** 
(1.277) 
5.209*** 
(1.390) 
Parameters             
Observations  346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 
Wald chi2(9)/12/16  98.31*** 106.71*** 107.10*** 103.54*** 117.23*** 97.54*** 103.27*** 108.58*** 104.99*** 104.21*** 115.21*** 
Pseudo R2  0.426 0.432 0.433 0.455 0.455 0.443 0.449 0.448 0.434 0.458 0.461 
Log pseudo  -113.811 -112.702 -112.514 -108.130 -108.113 -110.417 -109.238 -109.510 -112.196 -107.515 -106.968 
Accuracy  % % % % % % % % % % % 
Failed  77.03 77.78 77.33 77.33 76.62 77.92 78.67 75.32 78.67 77.03 75.95 
Non-failed  87.87 87.59 88.19 88.19 88.48 88.85 88.56 88.10 88.56 87.87 88.76 
Overall  85.55 85.55 85.84 85.84 85.84 86.42 86.42 85.26 86.42 85.55 85.84 
Hosmer-Lemeshow (10)             
Chi2(8)  7.34 4.58 5.934 4.50 6.29 5.69 4.71 5.40 6.50 3.87 10.52 
Prob>chi2  0.500 0.802 0.655 0.810 0.614 0.682 0.788 0.714 0.591 0.869 0.230 
ROC  0.904 0.905 0.905 0.913 0.916 0.911 0.912 0.913 0.907 0.915 0.917 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
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Tables 13 through 17 contain results of the combined sample LOGIT analysis performed for  
t - 1, t - 2, t - 3, t - 4 and t - 5 sample years, (see Appendix 15 to 24, pages 310-328, for the 
estimation and holdout samples), the analysis of which I turn to. 
 
In almost all models and years, the results suggest that firm size, profitability and 
remuneration committee effectiveness are significantly related to corporate failure at the 0.01 
or 0.05 significance level. Profitability, however, is not statistically significant in sample year 
four, where proportion of outside directors (β=-0.367, p<0.05), remuneration committee 
effectiveness (β=-0.057, p<0.01), frequency of board meetings (β=0.061, p<0.10) and firm 
size (β=-0.106, p<0.01) are significant predictors of corporate failure. Particularly, model 2‘s 
estimation test suggests that a 5 (1) per cent decline in proportion of outside directors (firm 
size) results in the likelihood of corporate demise by 36.7 (10.6) per cent, as far as four years 
prior to potential failure.   
 
In addition to Remuneration committee effectiveness, firm size, and profitability, I observe 
that corporate failure is negatively and significantly related to both liquidity (β=-0.189, 
p<0.01) and board size (β=-0.024, p<0.01) but exhibit a positive and significant association 
with the presence of female directors (β=0.069, p<0.10), in years one and three, respectively. 
I also observe that corporate failure exhibits a negative and significant marginal effect 
association with audit committee effectiveness (β=-0.073, p<0.01), proportion of outside 
directors (β=-0.324, p<0.05) and both board size (β=-0.020, p<0.10) and former government 
official (β=-0.158, p<0.01), as far as five, three and two years prior to failure. This confirms 
Argenti (1976), Hambrick and D‘Aveni (1988) and Sheppard (1994) assertion that some 
variables take on superior significance as the firm approaches failure. From this point, I find 
that the effect of industry is more pronounced in the penultimate year of failure. There is no 
evidence that firm age determines the survival or failure of firms.  
 
Concerning the interaction effects, the results show that the interaction between presence of 
female directors and frequency of board meetings (β=0.030, p<0.10) is positively and 
significantly related to corporate failure in year four prior to failure. I turn next to the 
assessment of the goodness of fit measures of the cross-sectional models.  
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First, the p-values (0.0001) associated with the chi-square degrees of freedom ranging from 9 
to 15 indicate that the cross-sectional models are statistically significant. This suggests that 
there is a less than .0001 likelihood that the high level of average accuracies of 93, 88, 88, 87, 
and 86 per cent, improving over the five years prior to failure, might have happened by 
chance. Further, the cross-sectional models record an average type I (II) errors of 11 (6), 18 
(10), 18 (11), 20 (11) and 23 (11) per cent, yielding an overall misclassifications of 7, 12, 12, 
13, 14 per cent at a cut-off of 0.5 prior probabilities, declining over the five years prior to 
failure.   
 
Second, the Hosmer and Lemeshow test statistic is above 0.05 for almost all the cross-
sectional models. This implies that I fail to reject the null hypothesis, implying that the cross-
sectional LOGIT models fit the data at a satisfactory level.  Models 2, 4, 10 and 11 in panel B 
of t – 1 and model 10 of panel C of t – 4, however, are the few exceptions.  
 
Third, the cross-sectional models show a reduction of the log likelihood for iteration 0 is 
significant at the 0.0001 level, recording chi-squares of 56.45 (85.17), 50.18 (98.98), 47.85 
(88.98), 54.58 (91.92) and 68.22 (106.06) with 9 degrees of freedom respectively for 
estimation (combined) tests for year one through to five prior to failure. Finally, the cross-
sectional models record an average pseudo r-squared (ROC) of 0.65(0.96), 0.52(0.93), 
0.49(0.92), 0.44(0.91), and 0.47(0.92), improving over the five years prior to failure.  This 
implies that the cross-sectional models contribute an average of 44 to 65 per cent in the 
prediction of corporate failure in the UK as far as five years prior to failure, yielding a 
dominate chi-square at the 0.0001 significance level. Thus, there is a less than 0.0001 
probability that the classification accuracies of the cross-sectional models and in particular, 
the findings above occurred by chance. 
 
Critics (e.g. Sheppard 1994 and Shumway 2001), however, may argue that the present 
findings are sample specific but not a result of passage of time. Therefore, I follow Sheppard 
(1994), Darrat, Gray and Wu (2010), Wu, Gaunt and Gray (2010) and in turn, estimate a 
multi-period model. The rationale is to investigate changes in failing firms relative to their 
non-failed counterparts. This sets the scene for a discussion of the multi-period model in the 
next sub-section. 
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7.4.3 Results of the Multi-period LOGIT Model 
This sub-section discusses the results of the logit analysis run for multi-period sample: t – 1/2 
and t – 4/5. The goal is to observe changes in independent variables in both one to two (t-1/2) 
and four to five (4/5) years prior to failure (see Darrat, Gray and Wu (2010), Wu, Gaunt and 
Gray 2010; and Sheppard (1994). Thus, I concur with Sheppard‘s (1994) notion that this 
procedure allows two years to elapse for alteration to occur in the firms‘ governance and 
financial performance. Accordingly, I first examine changes four to five (4/5) year prior 
failure using a sample of 181 failed and 511 non-failed firm year observations. Finally, I 
observe the changes one to two (1/2) years prior failure, using a sub-sample of 186 failed and 
518 non-failed firm year observations. Tables 18 and 19 display results of the combined 
sample of the LOGIT analysis performed for 1/2 and 4/5 year periods prior to failure. (For 
the sake of brevity see Appendix 25 through 28, pages 332-346, for the results of panel A and 
B of the 1/2 and 4/5 years prior failure). I turn next to the discussion of the multi-period 
model. 
 
Consistent with the findings of the cross-sectional models, firm size, profitability, proportion 
of outside directors as well as both, audit and remuneration committees‘ effectiveness are 
significantly related to corporate failure at the 0.01 significance level. Proportion of outside 
directors, however, is not statistically significant in period one to two years prior to failure, 
where board size (β=-0.021, p<0.05), remuneration committee effectiveness (β=-0.035, 
p<0.01), former government official (β=-0.040, p<0.05), liquidity (β=-0.147, p<0.05), 
profitability (β=-0.168, p<0.01) and firm size (β=-0.107, p<0.01) are significantly related to 
corporate failure. Particularly, model 4‘s holdout test suggests that a 1 per cent decline in 
board size, audit committee effectiveness, liquidity, profitability and firm size results in the 
likelihood of corporate demise by 2.60, 0.05, 26.10, 74.40 and 7.00 per cent, respectively. 
 
Further, corporate failure is not related to presence of female directors (β=0.189, p>0.10), 
financial leverage (β=0.033, p<0.10), nomination committee effectiveness (β=-0.012, 
p>0.10), frequency of board meeting (β=-0.000, p>0.10) and firm age (β=-0.000, p>0.10). On 
the interaction effects, corporate failure is not related to either the interactions between board 
attributes and boards‘ monitoring or resource provision functions. I turn next to the 
assessment of the goodness of fit measures of the cross-sectional models.  
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Table 18: Results of the Four and Five Year Period LOGIT Model 
COMBINED SAMPLE (PANEL C) 
MODEL T-4/5  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
MAIN VARIABLES Expected 
Sign 
           
Board composition             
H1A: BODC -  -0.190* 
(0.109) 
-0.189 
(0.119) 
-0.088 
(0.115) 
-0.037 
(0.114) 
-0.319 
(0.262) 
-0.177 
(0.109) 
-0.176 
(0.110) 
-0.165 
(0.122) 
-0.067 
(0.115) 
-0.002 
(0.115) 
H2A: FMALE -  0.031 
(0.047) 
-0.031 
(0.047) 
0.051 
(0.047) 
0.049 
(0.046) 
0.032 
(0.047) 
-0.083 
(0.101) 
0.036 
(0.047) 
0.035 
(0.047) 
0.054 
(0.047) 
0.054 
(0.046) 
H3A: BODS -  -0.008 
(0.009) 
-0.007 
(0.009) 
-0.002 
(0.010) 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
-0.005 
(0.009) 
-0.004 
(0.009) 
-0.007 
(0.017) 
-0.006 
(0.009) 
0.000 
(0.010) 
0.000 
(0.009) 
Board structure             
H4A: NCE -   -0.000 
(0.013) 
     -0.007 
(0.002) 
  
H5A: ACE -    -0.037*** 
(0.014) 
     -0.073** 
(0.030) 
 
H6A: RCE -     -0.047*** 
(0.014) 
     -0.085*** 
(0.031) 
Board Functions             
BODM -      -0.000 
(0.016) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.015) 
0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.010) 
-0.001 
(0.012) 
BINT3 -      -0.124 
(0.104) 
-0.048 
(0.050) 
-0.161 
(0.212) 
   
Interactions             
H1B i:  BODC*BODM -      0.015 
(0.031) 
     
H1B ii: BODC*BINT3 -      0.101 
(0.211) 
     
H2B i: FMALE*BODM -       0.016 
(0.010) 
    
H2B ii: FMALE*BINT3 -       -0.112 
(0.107) 
    
H3B i: BODS*BODM -        0.001 
(0.002) 
   
H3B ii: BODS*BINT3 -        -0.034 
(0.029) 
   
H4B: NCE*BODM -         0.000 
(0.002) 
  
H5B: ACE*BODM -          0.004 
(0.003) 
 
H6B: RCE*BODM -           0.004 
(0.003) 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
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Table 18: Continuation 1 of 1 
COMBINED SAMPLE (PANEL C) 
t-4/5 MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
CONTROLVARIABLES Expected  
Sign 
           
Liquidity - -0.016 
(0.076) 
-0.156 
(0.075) 
-0.156 
(0.075) 
-0.034 
(0.076) 
-0.119 
(0.076) 
-0.017 
(0.079) 
-0.110 
(0.082) 
-0.040 
(0.083) 
-0.003 
(0.078) 
-0.016 
(0.078) 
0.001 
(0.077) 
Profitability - -0.565*** 
(0.158) 
-0.572*** 
(0.160) 
-0.572*** 
(0.160) 
-0.532*** 
(0.152) 
-0.522*** 
(0.148) 
-0.531*** 
(0.164) 
-0.530*** 
(0.169) 
-0.541*** 
(0.170) 
-0.541*** 
(0.169) 
-0.489*** 
(0.161) 
-0.470*** 
(0.152) 
Leverage + 0.056 
(0.070) 
0.065 
(0.074) 
0.065 
(0.074) 
0.046 
(0.074) 
-0.053 
(0.072) 
0.048 
(0.074) 
0.046 
(0.075) 
0.039 
(0.077) 
0.057 
(0.076) 
0.025 
(0.076) 
0.035 
(0.074) 
Firm Size - -0.112*** 
(0.009) 
-0.100*** 
(0.013) 
-0.100*** 
(0.016) 
-0.085*** 
(0.013) 
-0.078*** 
(0.013) 
-0.103*** 
(0.014) 
-0.103*** 
(0.014) 
-0.103*** 
(0.014) 
-0.101*** 
(0.017) 
-0.090*** 
(0.014) 
-0.082*** 
(0.014) 
Firm Age - -0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
Industry Effects  +/- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  4.256*** 
(1.056) 
5.087*** 
(1.129) 
5.079*** 
(1.140) 
4.745*** 
(1.168) 
4.948*** 
(1.142) 
5.334*** 
(1.698) 
5.086*** 
(1.273) 
4.963*** 
(1.573) 
4.494*** 
(1.300) 
5.028*** 
(1.366) 
4.982*** 
(1.399) 
 Parameters             
Observations  692 692 692 692 692 692 692 692 692 692 692 
Wald chi2(9)/12/16  97.81*** 101.36*** 102.05*** 101.80*** 114.18*** 102.81*** 104.13*** 107.83*** 101.16*** 101.37*** 116.38*** 
Pseudo R2  0.409 0.417 0.417 0.429 0.441 0.430 0.561 0.433 0.422 0.437 0.453 
Log pseudo  -234.857 -231.701 -231.700 -227.074 -222.483 -226.722 -178.480 -225.472 -229.894 -223.768 -217.374 
Accuracy  % % % % % % % % % % % 
Failed  76.92 77.24 77.24 78.77 77.85 77.63 79.73 77.33 78.77 77.03 78.21 
Non-failed  87.07 87.39 87.39 87.91 88.03 88.33 88.42 88.01 87.91 87.68 88.99 
Overall  84.97 85.26 85.26 85.98 85.84 85.98 86.56 85.69 85.98 85.40 86.56 
Hosmer-Lemeshow (10)             
Chi2(8)  11.384 9.80 10.17 10.99 7.42 7.11 4.97 6.55 13.78 7.26 12.90 
Prob>chi2  0.181 0.279 0.253 0.202 0.492 0.525 0.761 0.586 0.088 0.509 0.115 
ROC  0.900 0.903 0.903 0.907 0.912 0.909 0.911 0.912 0.905 0.910 0.916 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
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Table 19: Results of the One and Two Year Period LOGIT Model 
COMBINED SAMPLE (PANEL C) 
t- 1/2 MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
MAIN VARIABLES Expected 
Sign 
           
Board composition             
H1A: BODC -  -0.157 
(0.117) 
-0.146 
(0.125) 
-0.121 
(0.119) 
-0.054 
(0.123) 
-0.019 
(0.232) 
-0.155 
(0.114) 
-0.149 
(0.115) 
-0.132 
(0.127) 
-0.109 
(0.119) 
-0.038 
(0.122) 
H2A: FMALE -  0.003 
(0.035) 
0.004 
(0.035) 
0.009 
(0.036) 
0.021 
(0.035) 
0.005 
(0.035) 
-0.021 
(0.071) 
0.004 
(0.035) 
0.005 
(0.035) 
0.011 
(0.035) 
0.021 
(0.035) 
H3A: BODS -  -0.021** 
(0.008) 
-0.020** 
(0.008) 
-0.019** 
(0.009) 
-0.017** 
(0.008) 
-0.016** 
(0.008) 
-0.016* 
(0.008) 
-0.027 
(0.017) 
-0.018** 
(0.008) 
-0.017** 
(0.008) 
-0.014* 
(0.008) 
Board structure             
H4A: NCE -   -0.003 
(0.009) 
     -0.016 
(0.017) 
  
H5A: ACE -    -0.012 
(0.012) 
     -0.032 
(0.021) 
 
H6A: RCE -     -0.035*** 
(0.012) 
     -0.060*** 
(0.023) 
Board Functions             
BODM -      0.014 
(0.014) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.013) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
BINT3 -      -0.057 
(0.129) 
-0.140** 
(0.058) 
-0.196 
(0.186) 
   
Interactions             
H1B i:  BODC*BODM -      -0.014 
(0.026) 
     
H1B ii: BODC*BINT3 -      -0.082 
(0.229) 
     
H2B i: FMALE*BODM -       -0.001 
(0.007) 
    
H2B ii: FMALE*BINT3 -       0.100 
(0.084) 
    
H3B i: BODS*BODM -        0.001 
(0.002) 
   
H3B ii: BODS*BINT3 -        0.014 
(0.024) 
   
H4B: NCE*BODM -         0.001 
(0.002) 
  
H5B: ACE*BODM -          0.002 
(0.002) 
 
H6B: RCE*BODM -           0.002 
(0.003) 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
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Table 19: Continuation 1 of 1 
COMBINED SAMPLE (PANEL C) 
t-1/2 MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
CONTROLVARIABLES Expected  
Sign 
           
Liquidity - -0.147** 
(0.065) 
-0.135** 
(0.067) 
-0.136** 
(0.067) 
-0.137** 
(0.066) 
-0.138** 
(0.065) 
-0.112* 
(0.065) 
-0.110* 
(0.065) 
-0.110* 
(0.065) 
-0.127* 
(0.065) 
-0.130** 
(0.065) 
-0.123** 
(0.062) 
Profitability - -0.681*** 
(0.164) 
-0.697*** 
(0.165) 
-0.687*** 
(0.163) 
-0.664*** 
(0.167) 
-0.611*** 
(0.144) 
-0.639*** 
(0.161) 
-0.654*** 
(0.159) 
-0.645*** 
(0.155) 
-0.642*** 
(0.160) 
-0.617*** 
(0.160) 
-0.551*** 
(0.135) 
Leverage + 0.033 
(0.073) 
0.035 
(0.074) 
0.035 
(0.074) 
0.035 
(0.074) 
-0.030 
(0.071) 
0.038 
(0.074) 
0.034 
(0.074) 
0.046 
(0.077) 
0.016 
(0.072) 
0.009 
(0.072) 
0.010 
(0.068) 
Firm Size - -0.107*** 
(0.009) 
-0.083*** 
(0.012) 
-0.081*** 
(0.014) 
-0.078*** 
(0.013) 
-0.066*** 
(0.009) 
-0.082*** 
(0.012) 
-0.082*** 
(0.012) 
-0.084*** 
(0.012) 
-0.082*** 
(0.014) 
-0.081*** 
(0.010) 
-0.068*** 
(0.002) 
Firm Age - -0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
Industry Effects  +/- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  6.141*** 
(1.291) 
7.696*** 
(1.650) 
7.545*** 
(1.724) 
7.455*** 
(1.724) 
7.463*** 
(1.718) 
11.780*** 
(1.974) 
7.242*** 
(1.519) 
7.994*** 
(1.553) 
6.972*** 
(1.730) 
7.428*** 
(1.732) 
7.483*** 
(1.824) 
Parameters             
Observations  704 704 704 704 704 704 704 704 704 704 704 
Wald chi2(9)/12/16  102.18*** 98.89*** 100.54*** 105.74*** 119.57*** 115.10*** 117.08*** 126.19*** 102.33*** 111.30*** 125.05*** 
Pseudo R2  0.521 0.537 0.537 0.539 0.552 0.559 0.561 0.559 0.546 0.549 0.566 
Log pseudo  -194.729 -188.172 -188.066 -187.455 -182.249 -179.384 -178.480 -179.151 -184.56 -183.461 -176.424 
Accuracy  % % % % % % % % % % % 
Failed  84.18 84.57 83.54 84.05 83.95 85.28 86.90 85.19 85.80 86.08 83.83 
Non-failed  90.29 90.96 90.93 90.94 90.77 91.31 92.88 91.14 91.33 90.84 91.43 
Overall  88.92 89.49 89.20 89.35 89.20 89.91 91.45 89.77 90.06 89.77 89.63 
Hosmer-Lemeshow (10)             
Chi2(8)  20.14 17.65 13.88 8.46 8.63 6.35 8.23 7.30 11.09 5.79 8.23 
Prob>chi2  0.010 0.024 0.085 0.390 0.375 0.608 0.412 0.505 0.197 0.671 0.411 
ROC  0.929 0.936 0.936 0.936 0.941 0.941 0.942 0.941 0.938 0.939 0.944 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01
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First, the p-values (0.0001) associated with the chi-square degrees of freedom of 15 indicate 
that the multi-period LOGIT models are significant. This implies that there is a less 
than .0001 likelihood that the high level of average accuracies in the estimation (88.98%), 
holdout (91.01%) and combined (89.76) samples of the one to two years period prior failure, 
might have occurred by chance. It also records an average type I (II) errors of 21.42 (11.59) 
per cent, yielding an overall misclassifications of 13.74 per cent at a cut-off of 0.5 prior 
probabilities for the period four to five years prior failure.   
 
Second, the Hosmer and Lemeshow test statistic is above 0.05 in models 1 to 11 of the 
estimation, holdout and combined samples at 8 degrees of freedom, implying that I cannot 
reject the null hypothesis. In contrast, the Hosmer and Lemeshow test statistic is significant at 
the 0.05 significance level in models 1 and 2 of the combined sample for the period one to 
two years prior failure, suggesting that I reject the null hypothesis. Nonetheless, I have 
enough evidence from the estimation, holdout and combined samples of both periods (1/2 and 
4/5) to conclude that the multi-period models fit the data quite well.  
 
Third, the multi-period models show a reduction of the log likelihood for constant- only 
model is significant at the 0.0001 level, recording average chi-square of 99.38(89.85) with 9 
degrees of freedom for the period one to two (four to five) years prior failure.. Fourth, the 
multi-period models record an average pseudo r-squared of 0.50, 0.54 and 0.51 for the 
estimation, holdout and combined samples, respectively. Thus, the multi-period model 
accounts for an average of 50 to 54 per cent in the prediction of corporate failure in the UK 
from the 4/5 year period period failure. This yields a chi-square at the 0.0001 significance 
level and ROC of 0.92, 0.94 and 0.93 for the estimation, holdout and combined samples, 
respectively. Accordingly, I conclude that there is a less than 0.0001 likelihood that the 
classification accuracies of the multi-period models happened by chance. The next section 
presents the results in line with the hypotheses developed in chapter five. 
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Table 20: Summary of Results of the Hypotheses tested 
HYPOTHESES RESULTS 
Model Pooled  Cross-
Sectional   
Multi-period  
BOARD COMPOSITION    
Board Independence    
1a  Proportion of outside directors Supported 
(-) 
Supported 
(-) 
Supported 
(-) 
1b(i)  Proportion of outside directors* 
frequency of board meeting 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
1b(ii)  Proportion of outside directors* 
Former Government Official 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported  
Board Gender Diversity    
2a Presence of female director Not 
supported  
Not 
supported  
Not 
supported  
2b(i) Presence of female director* 
frequency of board meeting 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported  
2b(ii) Presence of female director* 
Former Government Official 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported  
Board Size    
3a Board size  Supported 
(-) 
Supported  
(-) 
Supported 
(-) 
3b(i) Board Size* 
frequency of board meetings 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported  
3b(ii) Board Size* 
Former Government Official 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported  
BOARD STRUCTURE    
Nomination Committee    
4a Nomination committee effectiveness Not 
supported 
 
Partially 
supported 
(-) 
Not 
supported 
 
4b.  Nomination committee effectiveness* 
frequency of board meeting 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported  
4c. Nomination committee presence Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
Not 
Supported 
4d. Nomination committee independence Not 
supported  
Not 
supported  
Not 
supported  
4e. Nomination committee chairman independence Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
4f. Nomination committee size Supported 
(-) 
Supported 
(-) 
Supported 
(-) 
4g. Nomination committee meeting Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
Audit Committee    
5a  Audit committee effectiveness Supported 
(-) 
Supported 
(-) 
Supported 
(-) 
5b.  Audit committee effectiveness* 
frequency of board meeting 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported  
5c. Audit committee presence Not 
Supported 
Supported 
(-) 
Supported 
(-) 
5d. Audit committee independence Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
5e. Audit committee expertise Supported 
(-) 
Supported 
(-) 
Supported 
(-) 
5f. Audit committee size Not 
supported 
Supported 
(-) 
Not 
Supported 
5g. Audit committee meeting Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
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Table 20:  Continuation 1 of 1 
 RESULTS 
HYPOTHESES Pooled  Cross-
sectional 
Multi-periodl 
Remuneration Committee    
6a Remuneration committee effectiveness Supported 
(-) 
Supported 
(-) 
Supported 
(-) 
6b.  Remuneration committee effectiveness* 
frequency of board meetings 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported  
6c. Remuneration committee presence Not 
supported 
Supported 
(-) 
Not 
supported 
6d. Remuneration committee independence Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
6e. Remuneration committee chair independence Supported 
(-) 
Supported 
(-) 
Supported 
(-) 
6f. Remuneration committee size Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
6g. Remuneration committee meeting Not 
supported 
Not 
supported  
Not 
supported 
Board Functions Supported 
(-) 
Supported 
(-) 
Supported 
(-) 
 Frequency of board meetings Not 
supported 
Not 
supported  
Not 
supported 
 Former Government Official Not 
Supported 
Supported  
(-) 
Supported 
(-) 
CONTROLS    
 Liquidity Not 
Supported 
Supported 
(-) 
Supported 
(-) 
 Profitability Supported 
(-) 
Supported 
(-) 
Supported 
(-) 
 Leverage Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
Not 
Supported 
 Firm Size Supported 
(-) 
Supported 
(-) 
Supported 
(-) 
 Firm Age Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
Note: supported means there is a significant association between the variable and corporate failure, whereas 
partially supported denotes a significant association in one of the samples namely: estimation, holdout and 
combined.  
 
7.5 RESULTS OF THE HYPOTHESES TESTS 
The conclusions are based on a variable‘s significance in at least two of the three samples 
namely: estimation, holdout and combined. Appendix 29 through 31 reports the results of the 
split models (see pages 338-342), whereas table 20 contains the summary results of the 
hypotheses based on: the pooled, cross-sectional and multi-period LOGIT models.  
 
Model 1 contains only the control variables. It compares favourably with re-estimated 
Taffler‘s (1983) model16 (see Appendix 32, page 344). Further, table 20 contains four 
                                                          
16 In this respect, Taffler‘s model is ―well-established and widely used UK based Z-score‖ (Agarwal and Taffler 
(2007; p.286). Taffler‘s (1983) model includes four ratios: (a) profit before interest and tax to current 
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observations worth mentioning. First, model 1 indicates that three of the control variables 
namely: liquidity (β =-0.189, p<0.01), profitability (β=-0.793, p<0.01) and firm size (β=-
0.094, p<0.01) have a significant marginal effect relationship with the probability of 
corporate failure. I also observe that industry effects (i.e. technology, consumer, industrial 
and healthcare) determine the likelihood of firm‘s failure. Conversely, I fail to find evidence 
that both firm age (β=0.000, p>0.10) and financial leverage (β=0.013, p>0.10) reduce the 
probability of corporate failure. Model 1 records an average pseudo r-squared of 0.474 and 
predicts 87.36 in all cases. The Hosmer and Lemeshow test statistic is also insignificant in 
most cases, whereas the chi-squares are significant at the 0.01 level, implying that model 1 is 
adequate, with average ROC value of 0.915.   
 
Second, on the main variables, the results indicate that five measures: proportion of outside 
directors, board size, audit committee effectiveness and remuneration committee 
effectiveness and. former government official play a major role in the prediction of corporate 
failure. Third, the presence and size of nomination committee, audit committee‘s presence, 
expertise and size as well as the independence of remuneration committee chairman also play 
a significant role in discriminating between failed and non-failed firms. Fourth, on the 
interaction effects, this result indicates that all the LOGIT models fail to record a robust result 
for either the interactions between frequency of board meetings and board attributes or the 
interactions between former government official and board attributes. I turn next to the 
presentation of these findings in line with the hypotheses.  
 
H1: Board Independence and Corporate Failure Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 1a proposes that ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between 
proportion of outside directors and corporate failure. As Hypothesis 1a predicts, proportion of 
outside directors has a negative and significant marginal effect in the pooled, and cross-
sectional LOGIT models as well as period four to five LOGIT model. In model 2, a 10 per 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
liabilities, a profitability indicator; (b) working capital  to total assets, a proxy for working capital position; (c) 
current liabilities to total assets, a proxy for financial risk; (d) (quick assets – current liabilities)/daily operating 
expenses. Daily operating expenses = (sales – profit before interest and tax – depreciation)/365. I use logit 
analysis in the re-estimation of Taffler‘s (1983) model, instead of the linear discriminant analysis used by 
Taffler (1983). The aim is to overcome the demanding assumptions of the linear discriminant analysis (see 
chapter 3, table 1, page 49). 
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cent decrease in proportion of outside directors results in the likelihood of corporate failure 
by 20 per cent (see table 12, page 184). 
 
Hypothesis 1b (i) states that ceteris paribus, the lower the level of monitoring, the stronger is 
the negative association between proportion of outside directors and corporate failure. I find 
no evidence to support hypothesis 1b. The few exceptions, however, are t – 3 and t – 4 cross-
sectional LOGIT models, which support the interaction between proportion of outside 
directors and frequency of board/corporate failure association at the 0.05 and 0.10 
significance levels, in panel A. Model 6 of panel B of t – 4, in contrast, reports that the 
interaction between proportion of outside directors and frequency of board meetings 
(β=0.132, p<0.01) exhibits a positive and significant marginal effect with corporate failure. 
Explanations for the findings of hypothesis 1b (i) are limitless but are reviewed in the 
discussion chapter.   
 
There is also no evidence to support hypothesis 1b (ii), which proposes that ceteris paribus, 
the lower the level of resources, the stronger is the negative association between proportion 
of outside directors and corporate failure. The addition of hypotheses 1b (i) and (ii) (see 
model 6) to model 2 considerably improves the likelihood ratio chi-square. The notable 
enhancement in chi-square (average accuracy) of 173.66 (87.65) to 193.68 (88.28) with 16 
degrees of freedom) occurs in 1/2 year period, yielding p-values at the 0.0001 significance 
level. The chi-square (from 106.71 to 97.54), however, shrinks in t – 5. The pseudo r-squared 
(ROC) also record a slight improvement, with the outstanding occurring at 0.07 (0.03). This 
suggests that proportion of outside directors, frequency of board meeting, former government 
official and their interactions account for 0.07 per cent of why entities fail in the UK.  
 
Overall, model 6 registers an average pseudo r-squared (ROC) of 0.514 (0.929), and 
misclassifies an average of 11.72 per cent in all cases. As well, model 6 reports an 
insignificant Hosmer and Lemeshow test statistic in all estimations save panel C of the 
pooled LOGIT model, suggesting that I cannot reject the null hypothesis. In short, I have 
enough evidence from the goodness of fit measures to assume the validity of model 6. 
Hypotheses 1b (i) and (ii) therefore obtain no support.  
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H2: Board Gender Diversity and Corporate Failure Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 2a states that ceteris paribus, board gender diversity is negatively associated with 
corporate failure. On the contrary, there is a significant positive association between the 
presence of female directors and corporate failure in panels B and C of the t - 3 LOGIT 
models at the 0.10 significance levels. Likely reasons for this specific presence of female 
directors/corporate failure are reviewed in the discussion chapter.  
 
Hypothesis 2b: The LOGIT models fail to provide evidence to support H2b, which states that 
ceteris paribus, the lower the level of (i) monitoring and (ii) resources, the stronger is the 
negative association between presence of female directors and corporate failure. There is, 
however, a significant positive association between corporate failure and the interaction 
between presence of female directors and frequency of board meetings in both the t – 4 and t 
– 4/5 LOGIT models at the 0.10 and 0.05 significance levels. 
 
In addition, I find a significant positive association between corporate failure and the 
interaction between presence of female directors and former government official in the t – 3 
LOGIT models. Corporate failure, conversely, exhibits a significant negative association 
between the interaction between presence of female directors and former government official 
in panel B of t – 4, 4/5 period LOGIT models and panel A of t – 5 LOGIT models. Reasons 
for the findings of hypotheses H2b (i) and (ii) are several but are listed in the discussion 
chapter.     
 
Model 7 shows that the addition of hypotheses 2b (i) and (ii) to model 2 significantly 
improves the likelihood ratio chi-square, with the dominant occurring in t -1 (chi-square of 
73.93 to 97.7 at 16df with p<0.0001). In the year five prior failure, however, the chi-square 
declines (from 70.52 to 66.54). Model 7 also reports slight improvement in r-squared, with 
the outstanding occurring at 0.09 in t - 2. This indicates that presence of female directors, 
frequency of board meetings, former government official and their interactions contribute 
0.09 per cent in corporate failure prediction in the UK.  
 
On the average, model 7 records pseudo r-squared of 0.523, and predicts 88.08 per cent in all 
cases. Thus, model 7 contributes 52.3 per cent in explaining the corporate failure syndrome in 
the UK, yielding an overall misclassification of 11.20 per cent. More importantly, model 7 
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records an insignificant Hosmer and Lemeshow test statistic in all estimations, suggesting 
that I fail to reject the null hypothesis. In short, model 7 fits the data quite well, with average 
ROC of 0.932. Hypotheses 2b (i) and (ii) consequently receive no support.  
 
H3: Board Size and Corporate Failure Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 3a proposes that ceteris paribus, the size of the board is negatively related to 
corporate failure. This hypothesis is supported in the pooled, t -1, t – 2 and 1/2 year period 
modelsl. In the penultimate year to failure, model 2 reports that, 1 per cent decrease in board 
size results in the likelihood of corporate failure by 2.40 per cent (see table 13, page 189).  
 
The addition of hypotheses 1 - 3 (see model 2) to model 1 significantly enhances the 
likelihood ratio chi-square. The prevalent improvement in goodness fit (from a chi-square 
(accuracy) of 170.60 (86.04) to 180.53 (87.75) with 12 degrees of freedom) occurs in 4/5 (t - 
2) year period, yielding p-values at the 0.0001 significance level. In contrast, the goodness of 
fit shrinks in 1/2 (from a chi-square of 102.18 to 98.89 with 12 degrees of freedom). In 
addition, the r-squareds‘ (ROC) improvements are negligible, with the outstanding occurring 
at 0.03 (0.012), implying that the three board composition variables explain 0.3 per cent of 
corporate failure.  
 
On the average, model 2 records a pseudo r-squared of 0.488, and predicts an average of 
87.64 per cent in all cases. Finally, model 2 registers an insignificant Hosmer and Lemeshow 
test statistic in almost all the logit models, suggesting that I cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
In a sharp contrast, the Hosmer and Lemeshow test statistic is significant at the 0.05 
significance level in panel C of the pooled and 4/5 year period LOGIT models as well as 
panel B of the t - 1, implying that I reject the null hypothesis. Nevertheless, I have sufficient 
evidence from the classification accuracy, Hosmer-Lemeshow statistics, log likelihood chi-
square, and McFadden‘s r-squared to conclude that the model 2, with average ROC of 0.923, 
fits the data quite well. Hypotheses 1a and 3a thus receive full support but not hypothesis 2a. 
 
Hypothesis 3b states that ceteris paribus, the lower the level of (i) monitoring and (ii) 
resources, the stronger is the negative association between board size and corporate failure. 
There is almost no evidence from the logit models to support hypothesis H3b.                          
Corporate failure, however, exhibits a significant positive association between the 
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interactions between board size and both frequency of board meetings (β=0.003, p<0.10) and 
former government official (β=0.069, p<0.05) in panel A of t -1 LOGIT models, respectively. 
Probabe reasons for these findings are outlined in the discussion chapter of this thesis.  
 
Largely, the chi-squares for model 8 estimations are all significant at the 0.0001 level, with 
the highest occurring in t – 1 (chi-square of 73.93 to 103.43 at 16df). Model 8 also registers 
an average pseudo r-squared of 0.513, and misclassifies 11.67 per cent in all cases. This 
implies that the interaction between board size and frequency of board meetings as well as 
the interaction between board size and former government officials contribute 2.4 per cent in 
corporate failure prediction in the UK. 
 
Further, model 8 contributes 51.3 per cent in explaining the corporate failure phenomena in 
the UK. It also registers an insignificant Hosmer and Lemeshow test statistic in all 
estimations but not panel A of the pooled LOGIT models, implying that I cannot reject the 
null hypothesis. Thus, Model 8 fits the data adequately, with average ROC of 0.930. Hence, 
hypotheses 3b (i) and (ii) receive no support. 
 
H4: Nomination Committee Effectiveness and Corporate Failure Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 4a posits that ceteris paribus, nomination committee effectiveness is negatively 
related to corporate failure. There is no support for this hypothesis using the direct effects. 
The only significant exception is panel B of t – 5, which reports a significant negative 
association between the firm‘s nomination committee effectiveness (β=-0.049, p<0.05) and 
corporate failure (see model 3, Appendix 24, page 328). Nomination committee effectiveness 
exhibits a negative and insignificant association with corporate failure in almost all 
estimations, implying that the signs of the parameter estimates are in line with agency theory. 
 
Using the interaction effects, nomination committee effectiveness (β=-0.063, p<0.05) is 
negatively related to corporate failure as far as two years prior to the event (see model 9, 
Appendix 17, page 314). Possible explanations for this specific nomination committee 
effectiveness/ corporate failure relationship are discussed in the next chapter of this thesis.  
 
Chi-squared for all model 3 (9) estimations are significant at 0.0001, with an increase in 
pseudo r-squared of 0.01 (0.02) to 0.494 (0.504) and misclassify 12.16 (11.64) per cent in all 
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cases. As well, the Hosmer and Lemeshow test statistic is insignificant in all estimations but 
not panel C in the pooled LOGIT model. In sum, models 3 and 9 fit the data acceptably, with 
average ROC values of 0.924 and 0.928. For this reason, hypothesis 4a receives partial 
support.  
 
Hypothesis 4b: There is no support for H4b, which suggests that ceteris paribus, the lower 
the level of monitoring the stronger is the negative association between nomination 
committee effectiveness and corporate failure. Model 9, however, reports that corporate 
failure is positively and insignificantly associated with the interaction between nomination 
committee effectiveness and frequency of board meetings.  
 
Model 9 records a slight increase in pseudo r-squared of 0.01 (from model 3‘s 0.494 to 0.504) 
and misclassifies 11.63 per cent compared to 12.16 per cent of model 3. Chi-squares are 
incremental and also significant at the 0.01 level. Finally, the Hosmer and Lemeshow test 
statistic is not significant in all but three cases, suggesting that model 9 fits the data quiet 
well. From this point, hypothesis 4b obtains no support.  
 
Hypotheses 4c, 4e and 4g: There is also no evidence to support hypotheses 4c, 4e and 4g on 
nomination committees‘ presence, chair independence and meetings, all predicted to have a 
negative association with corporate failure, ceteris paribus. The only significant exception is 
panel A of model 12, which reports that nomination committee meeting has a positive 
significant marginal effect association with corporate failure in the five years prior failure at 
the 0.10 significance level (see model 12, Appendix 29, page 338).  
 
Hypothesis 4d states that ceteris paribus, nomination committee independence is negatively 
related to corporate failure. There is no evidence to support this hypothesis. In contrast, there 
is a significant positive association between the firm‘s nomination committee independence 
and corporate failure in the pooled and cross-sectional LOGIT models. Model 12 illustrates 
that, 1 per cent increase in nomination committee independence results in the likelihood of 
corporate failure by 11 per cent. Possible causes for this specific nomination committee 
independence/corporate failure association are listed in the discussion chapter.  
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Hypothesis 4f posits that ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between nomination 
committee size and corporate failure. As hypothesis 4f predicts, nomination committee size 
has a negative and significant marginal effect (p<0.01) in the pooled and two of the cross-
sectional LOGIT models. The results also show that a 1 per cent decline in nomination 
committee size increases the likelihood of corporate failure by 15.2% in the penultimate year 
to failure.  
 
The addition of hypotheses 4c, 4d, 4e, 4f and 4g (see model 12) to model  1 significantly 
improves the goodness of fit, with the prevalent occurring in the pooled model (from a chi-
square of 107.68 to 129.87 with 9df). The goodness of fit, however, shrinks in t - 5 (from a 
chi-square of 61.02 to 54.97 with 9 degrees of freedom). This notwithstanding, model 12 
records a pseudo r-squared increment of 2.9 per cent (from 0.474 to 0.504), yielding an 
average classification accuracy of 88.46 per cent. In addition, the Hosmer-Lemeshow chi-
square statistic indicates non-significance for the cross-sectional LOGIT models but not 
panels A and C of the pooled LOGIT model. This implies that the model 12‘s validity may be 
questionable.  
 
However, model 12 records satisfactory results for the other measures of goodness of fit (a 
chi-square of 87.52, pseudo r-squared of 0.456, type I (II) errors of 15 (11) per cent) at the 
0.0001 significance level. Specifically, the change LOGIT model records satisfactory results 
for other measures of goodness fit {an average chi-square, pseudo r-squared, ROC and type I 
(II) errors of 37.79, 0.089, 0.695, and 33.14 (22.69) per cent, respectively} at the 0.0001 
significance level. Hence, I have enough grounds to assume the adequacy of model 12. 
Hypothesis 4f therefore receives full support but not hypotheses 4c, 4d, 4e, and 4g. 
 
H5: Audit Committee Effectiveness and Corporate Failure Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 5a states that ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between audit 
committee effectiveness and corporate failure. This hypothesis is supported in the pooled and 
t - 5 cross-sectional LOGIT models. In model 4, for example, 1 per cent deterioration in audit 
committee effectiveness results in the probability of corporate failure by 7.3 per cent as far as 
five years prior failure (see Appendix 24, page 328). The t – 5 LOGIT model also records 
chi-square of 71.11 (103.54) and pseudo r-squared of 0.517 (0.455) at the 0.0001 significance 
levels for the estimation (combined) sample. 
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The Hosmer and Lemeshow chi-square (6.16 with 8df) is not significant, yielding an ROC of 
0.926. On average, the addition of hypothesis 5a results in a slight increase in pseudo r-
squared by 0.01 (from model 2‘s 0.489 to 0.498) and predicts 87.95 compared to 87.65 per 
cent of model 2, suggesting that model 5 fits the data quite well. Hypothesis 5a consequently 
receives full support.  
 
Hypothesis 5b: There is no support for H5b, which suggests that ceteris paribus, the lower 
the level of monitoring the stronger is the negative association between audit committee 
effectiveness and corporate failure. Model 10 records an ROC and chi-square of 0.668 and 
33.33 (with 15df) at the 0.0001 significance level. The pseudo r-squared and predictive 
accuracy are also 0.064 and and 74.89%, implying that model 10 accounts for 6% in 
answering the question of why firms fail in the UK. The Hosmer and Lemeshow chi-square 
of 5.73 is not significant (p>0.05) for panel A of the change LOGIT models. Further, the chi-
square, case classification, ROC and pseudo r-squared suggest that model 10 is adequate. 
From this point, I assume the validity of model 10, and, in this way, conclude that hypothesis 
5b receives no support. 
 
Hypothesis 5c states that ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between audit 
committee presence and corporate failure. As hypothesis 5c predicts, audit committee 
presence exhibits significant negative marginal effect association (p<0.10) with corporate 
failure in the t - 5 LOGIT models.  
 
There is no support for hypotheses 5d and 5g on audit committee independence and meeting, 
both predicted to have a negative association with corporate failure. Specifically, I find that 
both exhibit a negative and insignificant marginal effect (p>0.10) relationship with corporate 
failure.  
 
Hypothesis 5e posits that ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between audit 
committee expertise and corporate failure. As hypothesis 5e predicts, audit committee 
expertise has a negative and significant marginal effect in the pooled and t – 5 LOGIT 
models. In particular, model 13 reports that, 1 per cent drop in audit committee expertise 
results in the likelihood of corporate failure by 16.9%, as far as five years prior failure. 
  
219 
 
 
Hypothesis 5f states that ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between audit 
committee size and corporate failure. This hypothesis is supported in t – 5 at the 0.05 
significance level. Model 10 again reports that, 1 per cent drop in audit committee size results 
in the likelihood of corporate failure by 9.4%. 
 
The addition of hypotheses 5c, 5d, 5e, 5f and 5g (see model 13) to model 1 significantly 
improves the goodness of fit, with the prevalent occurring in the t - 5 model (from an ROC of 
0.908 to 0.949). The t – 5 also registers chi-square of 96.97(13df) and pseudo r-squared of 
0.467 at the 0.0001 significance levels in the combined sample. The Hosmer and Lemeshow 
chi-square (10.61 with 8df) also is not significant, yielding an overall classification accuracy 
of 87.86 per cent, implying that the overall fit of model 13 is good.  Hypotheses 5c, 5e and 5f 
therefore receive full support, whereas hypotheses 5d and 5g receive no support. The 
discussion chapter provides possible reasons for this specific corporate failure/audit 
committee effectiveness measures association in the relevant subsection. 
 
H6: Remuneration Committee Effectiveness and Corporate Failure Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 6a states that ceteris paribus, remuneration committee effectiveness is negatively 
related to corporate failure. As hypothesis 6a predicts, remuneration committee effectiveness 
has a negative and significant marginal effect association with corporate failure in the pooled, 
change, and cross-sectional LOGIT models. Specifically, this hypothesis is supported in the 
pooled and t – 3, t – 4, t - 5 cross-sectional LOGIT models at the 0.01 significance level in 
model 5.  
 
The addition of hypothesis 6a (see model 5) to model 2 considerably increases the model fit, 
with the prevalent occurring in the pooled LOGIT model‘s estimation test (from a chi-square 
of 83.78 to 108.063 with 13df). There is also a slight improvement in pseudo r-squared (from 
an average of 0.489 to 0.510), resulting in a decline (increase) in the average 
misclassification rate (ROC) from 12.35 (92.30) to 11.96 (93.00) per cent. Accordingly, I 
assume the adequacy of model 5, and, thus, conclude that hypothesis 6a receives full support.    
 
Hypothesis 6b: There is no support for H6b, which suggests that ceteris paribus, the lower 
the level of monitoring the stronger is the negative association between remuneration 
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committee effectiveness and corporate failure. Model 11 registers chi-square of 35.82 with 15 
degrees of freedom at the 0.0001 significance level, and predicts corporate failure accurately 
at 75.77% of the combined sample. The pseudo r-squared and ROC values are also 0.070 and 
0.676. As well, the Hosmer and Lemeshow chi-square of 7.330 with 8df is not significant 
(p>0.10), implying that model 11 is appropriate and contributes to 7% in answering the 
question of why firms collapse in the UK. For this reason, I assume the validity of model 11, 
and, in turn, conclude that hypothesis 6b gets no support. 
 
Hypothesis 6c states that ceteris paribus, remuneration committee presence is negatively 
related to corporate failure. This hypothesis is supported in t – 2 cross-sectional LOGIT 
model at the 0.01 significance level.  
  
Hypotheses 6d and 6f, respectively, predict a negative relationship between corporate failure 
and remuneration committee‘s independence and size. The logit results fail to provide robust 
significant evidence, ceteris paribus, to support the association between corporate failure and 
remuneration committee‘s independence and size. The few significant exceptions are a 
negative association between remuneration committee size (independence) and corporate 
failure in panel A (B) of t – 1 (t – 5) and t - 2 cross-sectional LOGIT models as well as the 
1/2 (4/5) year period logit model.                        
 
Hypothesis 6e proposes that ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between 
remuneration committee chairman‘s independence and corporate failure. As hypothesis 6e 
predicts, remuneration committee chairman‘s independence exhibits a significant negative 
marginal effect with corporate failure in model 14 in all estimations at the 0.01 significance 
level. Thus, a 1 per cent shrink in remuneration committee chairman‘s independence 
increases the likelihood of corporate failure by 16.7, 17.1, 19.0, 22.10 and 20.3 per cent 
respectively for t - 1 through to t - 5.  
 
There is no support for hypothesis 6g on remuneration committee meeting, which predicts a 
negative association with corporate failure. The only significant exception is panel B of t – 2, 
where corporate failure exhibits a negative and significant relationship with remuneration 
committee effectiveness at the 0.01 significance level. There is also a significant positive 
marginal effect association between corporate failure and remuneration committee meeting in 
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panel A of t – 2 cross-sectional LOGIT model. In panel A (B) of model 14, a 1 (5) per cent 
increase in  remuneration committee meeting as far as two years prior failure results in the 
likelihood of corporate failure by 13.2 (12.2) per cent.  
 
The addition of hypotheses 6c, 6d, 6e, 6f and 6g (see model 14) to model 1 significantly 
enhances the goodness of fit, with the prevalent occurring in the t - 2 model (from an ROC of 
0.899 to 0.945). Model 14 in t - 2 registers chi-square of 1021.53 with 13 degrees of freedom 
at the 0.0001 significance level, and predicts corporate failure accurately in 90.34% (90.86%) 
in the training (combined) test. The Hosmer-Lemeshow chi-square (9.23 with 8df) is also 
insignificant, generating a pseudo r-squared of 0.565 (0.642). This implies that model 14 fits 
the data well, with an average ROC of 0.945, and contributes to 57%-64% in solving the 
query of why entities fail in the UK. Overall, hypotheses 6c, 6e receive full support but not 
6d, 6f and 6g. 
 
7.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter is dedicated to answer the two sub-questions of the study. First, I test whether 
the composition and structure of corporate boards relate to firm‘s failure. Second, I examine 
how the interactions between attributes and functions of corporate board relate to firm‘s 
failure. Accordingly, I test a number of LOGIT models, due in part to the binary nature of the 
dependent variable.  
 
Consistent with literature, I employ the univariate analysis for a preliminary assessment of 
the hypotheses. As expected, the profile analysis portrays that corporate governance attributes 
and financial indicators of failed firms are not only weaker compared to non-failed firms, 
they also declined significantly as a firm approached failure. The univariate logit analysis 
similarly suggests that all but one (i.e. frequency of board meetings) of predictive variables 
exhibit a significant marginal effect relationship with corporate failure at the 0.0001 
significance level as far as five years preceding failure. Financial leverage likewise appears to 
be positive and significant (p<0.05) as far as five years, whereas the frequency of board 
meetings is positive but not significant. Another significant observation of the univariate logit 
worth mentioning is that firm size dominated all in the prediction of corporate failure, 
yielding an average pseudo r-squared of 0.39 and predicts an average of 85 per cent in all 
cases.   
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Turning to the main independent variables, the preliminary analysis suggests that proportion 
of outside directors, presence of female directors, board size, remuneration, audit and 
nomination committees‘ effectiveness contribute 8, 15, 15, 22, 27, and 30 per cent, 
respectively, in explaining the corporate failure the 0.0001 significance level, predicting an 
average of 76, 74, 76, 79, 79 and 81 per cent in all cases as far as five years. On board 
function variables, the results suggest that CEO‘s performance evaluation, frequency of board 
meetings, non-executive directors interlock, board interlock, and former government official 
account for 26, 0, 8, 7, and 2 per cent in explaining the corporate failure occurrences at the 
0.0001 significance level.  
 
In addition to firm size, the control variables‘ results suggest that liquidity (p<0.05), 
profitability (p<0.01), leverage (p<0.05) and firm age (p<0.01) contribute an average of 0, 19, 
0, and 0 per cent, respectively, in answering the question why entities fail in the UK. Firm‘s 
age, leverage, liquidity, former government officials, frequency of board meetings, however, 
predict an average of 74% in all cases as far as five years preceding failure, therein lays their 
justification in the multivariate logit analysis.  
 
Turning to the multivariate logit analysis, I perform numerous tests through three main data 
analysis namely: pooled cross-sectional, cross-sectional and change. Accordingly, the 
conclusions drawn with respect to the hypotheses are based on the pooled, cross-sectional and 
change logit analyses. I evaluate the overall fit of the models with five main measures 
namely: 1) classification accuracy, (2) Hosmer-Lemeshow test, (3) log likelihood chi-square, 
(4) McFadden‘s r-squared and (5) ROC. Generally, the five measures indicate that the logit 
models fit the data quite well.  
 
On board composition measures, I find that corporate failure exhibits a significant negative 
marginal effect association with both proportion of outside directors and board size but shows 
a significant positive association with the presence of female directors. On board structure 
measures, corporate failure exhibits a significant negative marginal effect relationship with 
the presence and size of nomination committee, audit committee‘s effectiveness, presence, 
expertise and size, as well as remuneration committee‘s presence, effectiveness and its 
chairman‘s independence. Nomination committee effectiveness, however, shows a negative 
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and significant association with corporate failure through the interaction effects but not the 
direct effects.  I also observe that corporate failure exhibits a significant positive relationship 
with nomination committee independence as well as remuneration committee‘s meeting.  
 
Turning to the interaction effects, corporate failure shows a significant positive relationship 
with the interactions between frequency of board meetings and presence of female directors. 
On board functions, corporate failure exhibits a significant negative marginal effect 
association with former government officials but not frequency of board meetings. 
Concerning the control variables, corporate failure exhibits a negative and significant 
marginal effect association with liquidity, profitability, firm size, industry effects. There is 
however, no evidence to support the notion that firm age and financial leverage reduced the 
probability of corporate failure. 
 
In summary, hypotheses 1a, 3a, 4f, 5a, 5c, 5e, 5f, 6a and 6e receive full support, whereas, 
hypotheses 4a and 6c obtain partial support. Hypotheses 1b (i), 1b (ii), 2a,  2b (ii), 3b(i), 
3b(ii), 4c, 4b, 4e, 4g, 5b, 5d, 5g, 6d  and 6f are not supported but the signs are in line with 
expectations. Hypotheses 2b (i), 4d, 6b and 6g are also not supported. Possible reasons for 
these findings are numerous. The next chapter is dedicated to these reasons.    
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
8.0 INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in chapter one, this study examines whether corporate governance is related to 
corporate failure? Chapter Four discussed the corporate failure from the perspectives of two main 
theoretical lenses namely: agency, and resource dependency. Chapter Five presented six main 
hypotheses developed from a multi-theoretical approach. Chapter Six highlighted the UK as the 
empirical setting for the analysis. Thus, I concur with Taffler‘s (1984) notion that the UK is a major 
global economic market, and, in this way, ideal for an effective development of corporate failure 
prediction model. This notwithstanding, to the best of my knowledge, no attempt has been made in 
the UK to develop a theoretical model to assess the financial health of UK companies. This study 
attempts to fill this gap among others. Chapter Seven reported the results of the study. The aim of 
this chapter is threefold. First, I discuss the results from the perspective of their theoretical and 
practical implications. Second, I highlight limitations of the study. Finally, I recommend potentially 
fruitful lines of further research from this study. 
 
The present chapter proceeds as follows. Sections 8.1 and 8.2 review the findings from the direct 
and interaction effects. Section 8.3 contains the contribution of this research to theory, practice and 
policy. The limitations of the research are considered in Section 8.4. Section 8.5 concludes with 
recommendations for future research. 
 
8.1 DISCUSSION OF KEY FINDINGS ON THE DIRECT EFFECTS 
The basic objective is to explore, whether corporate governance can explain corporate failure. For 
this reason, the study explores two sub questions: (1) whether board attributes are related to 
corporate failure; and (2) whether the interactions between board attributes and functions are related 
to corporate failure. This section is dedicated to an in-depth discussion of the findings of the first 
sub-question in relation to the extant literature.   
 
The results indicate three distinct patterns. The first relates to the proportion of outside directors, 
board size, audit committee effectiveness and remuneration committee effectiveness.  The second 
and third patterns relate to the presence of female directors on boards and nomination committee 
effectiveness, respectively. The first of the three patterns exhibits a direct association with corporate 
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failure. The second and third patterns, however, exhibit certain features which need to be discussed. 
I turn next to the discussion of these patterns.   
 
8.1.1 Proportion of Outsider Directors  
The results suggest that firms with higher proportions of outside directors are less likely to fail.  
This probably confirms agency theory‘s proposition that outside dominated boards are more likely 
to meticulously monitor and evaluate the CEO, and ultimately, fire non-performing CEOs and, thus, 
reduce likelihood of firm‘s failure (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). Put differently, 
outside directors, due to their presumed independence and reputation (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Field 
and Keys, 2003), may reduce the likelihood of a firm‘s failure by motivating managers to pursue 
shareholder value enhancing strategies (see Fich, 2005; Fich and Slezak, 2008). This implies that 
outside dominated boards are less likely to collude with the CEO to expropriate shareholders‘ fund 
(Fama, 1980: Mizruchi and Strearns, 1988; Carter, Simkins and Simpson 2003), thereby reducing 
the probability of a firm‘s failure17. This interpretation is in line with Rosenstein and Wyatt‘s (1990) 
finding, suggesting that an additional outside director on the board increases shareholder value. 
 
I can speculate that financial distress may trigger severe inside and outside directors‘ conflict over 
how the firm should be managed. For example, inside directors, due to the risk of losing their jobs 
and source of perquisites, may have a greater incentive to rescue the firm (Fich and Slezak, 2008). 
As well, Fama and Jensen (1983) contend that experienced inside directors are more effective in 
performing the service tasks. Inside directors, however, are indebted to the CEO for their livelihood 
and, in this mode, may be reluctant to evaluate the CEO‘s performance (Patton and Baker, 1987) 
and protect shareholders‘ interest (Mace, 1971). For this reason, outside directors may depart to 
save their reputational capital and career in the board network
18
. This is in line with Hermalin and 
Weisbach‘s (1988) finding, suggesting that poor performance is followed by more director 
departures. It is also argued that the failing firm may lack the growth prospects and resources 
required to retain prestigious outside directors
19
. This may lead to insufficient representation of 
outside directors on board, which in turn, explains the board‘s inability to discharge their 
                                                          
17 Fich and Slezak (2008) provide reasons on why inside directors may not be effective monitors of CEO to avoid 
corporate failure. 
18 Gilson‘s (1990) findings suggest that directors of failed firms, due to the stigma of bankruptcy, are less likely to be 
appointed within the board network. Fich and Shivdasani‘s (2006) study also suggests that busy outside directors are 
more likely to exit boards during performance decline.  
19 D‘Aveni (1989b) report that a failing firm lacks the financial resources required to change competitive strategies to 
reverse deteriorating performance trend and thus, cannot retain prestigious outside directors.    
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monitoring role. In turn, this allows the CEO to pursue self-serving policy, thereby increasing the 
probability of corporate failure. 
 
The results report that a 1 per cent decrease in proportion of outside directors increases the 
likelihood of a firm‘s failure by 20 per cent. Thus, outside director‘s departure reduces the firm‘s 
dependability (D‘Aveni, 1989a: b; Beasley, 1996), due in part to a firm‘s reputational capital loss. 
This may prompt negative stock price reaction and finally, firm‘s failure20. This also confirms 
resource dependency theory‘s (Burt, 1983; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) notion that greater 
proportion of outside directors reduces the likelihood of a firm‘s failure (Zahra and Pearce, 1989) 
by improving firm‘s access to resources (Bazerman and Schoorman, 1983; Peng, 2004) and 
legitimacy (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Surviving firms may increase the proportion of outside 
directors on board as a competitive strategy to control probable environment uncertainty (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978; Hillman, Cannella, and Paetzold, 2000) and thus, avoid corporate failure. This 
is also consistent with the legalistic view, suggesting that boards require greater proportion of 
outside directors to discharge their service tasks
21
 effectively (Carpenter, 1988; Zahra and Pearce 
1989; Zhang, 2010). 
 
Another possible reason that explain why higher proportion of outside directors reduce the 
likelihood of a firm‘s failure is that outside directors, due to their assumed independence, are more 
likely to discharge their legal duties (see Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002; Higgs, 2003). Therefore, 
outside dominated boards safeguard shareholders‘ interest by contributing to the firm‘s strategy 
formulation and evaluation (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001) to avoid firm‘s failure. This verifies 
board reformers‘ view (e.g. Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Daily and Dalton, 1994a; Higgs, 2003), 
suggesting that firms with lower proportion of independent directors, due to the presumed board 
ineffectiveness, are more likely to fail.  
 
Finally, the result supports Gales and Kesner (1994) and Fich and Slezak (2008) findings in the US, 
confirming that failing firms‘ outside directors reduce prior to failure. The result, however, disputes 
Daily and Dalton (1994a: 1995), and Platt and Platt‘s (2012) findings, who find that board 
independence is not significantly related to corporate failure. The present study, however, differs 
                                                          
20 For example, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) find that the appointment of outside director is linked to positive stock 
price reaction. 
21
 Carpenter (1988) and Zahra and Pearce (1989) document that the boards service tasks include legal duties (e.g. 
providing counsel to CEO, enhancing firm‘s legitimacy and reducing firms interdependency with its environment).  
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slightly from Daily and Dalton (1994a: 1995) and Platt and Platt (2012). This is probably because 
Daily and Dalton (1994a) use the independent/interdependent director distinction, matched on the 
basis of size, industry and year, but the present study considers number of outside directors divided 
by the board size (see Chancharat, Krishnamurti and Tian, 2012). 
 
The above analysis probably lends support to the suitability of agency and resource dependency 
theories as analytical lenses through which to study the efficacy of outside directors, as a board 
monitoring, resource and strategy device, in the corporate failure context. 
 
8.1.2 Presence of Female Directors  
The results indicate that there is a significant positive association between the presence of female 
directors and corporate failure. The possible explanations are as follows. First, female directors are 
largely not part of the ―old boys‖ network and hence, may provide tougher monitoring of the CEO‘s 
actions (van der Walt and Ingley 2003; Kang, Cheng and Grey, 2007). This may thwart CEO‘s 
creativity and ultimately, reduce firm‘s flexibility, value and survival chances. This interpretation is 
in line with Almazan and Suarez (2003) and Adams and Ferreira‘s (2007) notion that female 
directors may reduce shareholder value. 
 
Second, heterogeneity may produce additional conflict in the decision making process (Carter, 
Simkins and Simpson, 2003). Female directors, for example, offer variety of perspectives to enrich 
the board decision process. This variety of perspectives, in turn, may cause the board to evaluate 
more alternatives and explore the consequences. This evaluation requires mutual collaboration 
between the executives and non-executives. Top management, however, may consider female 
directors, due to their tougher monitoring, as ―unfriendly‖ and, in this manner, may be circumspect 
to share information to facilitate effective collaboration (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). This means 
that there is potential limitations in the decision making process. Specifically, female directors are 
limited in their advisory role, implying that corporate board strategy may not benefit from their 
wide base of acumen (Carver, 2002) ranging from creativity to innovation associated with board 
gender diversity (Cox and Blake, 1991; Robinson and Dechant, 1997 and Carter, Simkins and 
Simpson, 2003). In sum, board gender diversity may not impact on board strategy role resulting in 
ineffective board process and firm‘s failure, itself.  
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Third, homogeneity in the board is associated with a narrow perspective, implying that diversity 
(including gender) improves the effectiveness of the board and its committees (Cox and Blake, 
1991; Robinson and Dechant, 1997 and Carter, Simkins and Simpson, 2003). For this reason, 
entrenched CEOs may use board gender diversity as a window dressing mechanism to appease 
critical stakeholders to obtain legitimacy (Brammer, Millington and Pavelin, 2007) and continual 
support from the investment community (Fondas, 2000). Thus, board gender diverisity, despite their 
perceived competitive advantage (Bernardi, Bean, and Weippert, 2002), may not be motivated by 
shareholder value enhancing objective but compliance
22
.   
   
Finally, the result lends support to Rose‘s (2007) notion suggesting that directors belonging to the 
―old boy‘s club‖ may supress any unique feature from female directors. Thus, female directors‘ 
contribution may not be considered in board decisions (Westphal and Milton, 2000). Further,  
female directors, despite their independence, may own insignificant equity stake (Eisenberg, 
Sundgren and Wells, 1998) and thus, lack the incentive to be effective board monitors (see Jensen, 
1993). The important implication is that female directors may adapt to the passive board behaviour 
of the traditional ―old boy‘s‖ network to retain their seats. For this reason, female directors may 
avoid excessive CEO monitoring but rather serve as a ―rubber stamp‖ for CEO‘s agenda (see Pearce 
and Zahra, 1991; Adams and Ferreira, 2009), which in turn, may be detrimental to the firm‘s 
performance and long term success. In short, I invoke Rose‘s (2007) notion that the potential 
benefits of female directors are never realised by firms and its owners, so far as the CEO continues 
to have informal influence on board appointments.  
 
Nonetheless, this result contradicts expectations of the agency theory, suggesting that ‗more diverse 
boards‘ (Carter, D‘Souza, Simkins and Simpson, 2010), due to their presumed independence, have a 
greater incentive to evaluate the CEO‘s performance, thereby reducing the likelihood of firm‘s 
failure. This result probably disputes resource dependency‘s proposition, suggesting that board 
gender diversity reduces the likelihood of a firm‘s failure by yielding different perspectives of 
looking at board strategy. The result contradicts board reformers‘ view (Davies, 2011), suggesting 
that board gender diversity leads to better board process and thus reduces the probability of a firm‘s 
failure. In sum, the result supports Jensen‘s (1993) notion that the composition and characteristics 
                                                          
22
 Daily and Dalton (2003), for example, suggest that board gender diversity is considered as an investment criterion by 
investors.  
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of corporate board should be designed to maximize shareholder value but not to appease 
stakeholders.  
 
In comparison with related studies, the finding confirms Ahern and Dittmar‘s (2012) findings from 
Norwegian firms
23
. It however, contradicts Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader (2003) and Campbell and 
Minquez-Vera‘s (2008) findings24. The study‘s design and empirical settings, however, differ 
sharply from Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader (2003) and Campbell and Minquez-Vera (2008). 
Campbell and Minquez-Vera (2008), for example, use a dataset from Spain, a civil law country, 
dominated by concentrated and largely family ownership. 
    
The above arguments may raise questions about the suitability of agency and resource dependency 
theories as analytical lenses through which to study the efficacy of board gender diversity, as a 
board monitoring, resource and strategic device, in the performance context.  
 
8.1.3 Board Size 
The results suggest that a firm with a smaller board size is more likely to fail. This probably 
confirms Dowell, Shackell and Stuart (2011) and Cole, Daniel and Naveen‘s (2008) finding that 
firms benefit immeasurably from greater monitoring effort by having larger boards. This also 
confirms agency theory‘s notion, suggesting that larger boards yield an effective board control role, 
and thus, enhance firm‘s performance (Dalton, Daily, Johnson and Ellstrand, 1999) to diminish the 
likelihood of failure. It is argued that smaller boards are more susceptible to CEO domination, 
implying that an entrenched CEO may overturn board decisions in furtherance of his interest and 
thereby, increasing the likelihood of a firm‘s failure (Miller, 1990).  
 
This result also confirms resource dependency theory‘s proposition, implying that large boards, due 
in part to their effective linkage (Pfeffer, 1972) and diversity (Goodstein, Gautam and Boeker, 
1994), reduce the likelihood of firm‘s failure by improving firm‘s ability to co-opt the turbulent 
environment (Hambrick and D‘Aveni, 1988). Put simply, smaller boards, due to insufficient 
linkage, may lack the legitimacy required to secure critical resources for firm‘s survival.  
 
                                                          
23
 Ahern and Dittmar (2012) find that the female quota caused a negative share price reaction. 
24
 Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader (2003) and Campbell and Minquez-Vera (2008) document a positive and significant 
association between board gender diversity and various measures of firm performance. 
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Another possible explanation of the efficacy of large boards to enhance firm‘s survival is rooted in 
its ability to discharge the strategic function effectively, compared to smaller boards. The strategic 
function is crucial during prolonged firm value decline or critical periods of financial distress 
(Mintzberg, 1983). In distress, smaller boards, due in part to limited diversity, may cause firm‘s 
failure by increasing the uncertainty surrounding strategic development (Pearce and Zahra, 1991). 
Thus, smaller boards are less diverse, and in this light, may be ineffective in taking crucial strategic 
decisions to adjust to environmental changes (Mintzberg, 1983; Goodstein, Gautam, Boeker, 1994). 
This in turn, may increase uncertainty and ultimately, reduce the probability of a firm‘s failure.  
 
The deteriorating board size also suggests that directors of failed firms may depart to save their 
reputational capital. Alternatively, failed firms may lack the resources necessary to retain highly 
competent board members. Put differently, failed firms may prefer smaller boards
25
, due to reduced 
coordination and free-rider problems associated with larger boards (Yermack, 1996). Larger 
boards, however, may be better for firms, due in part to inability of smaller boards to discharge 
their monitoring, resources and strategy functions effectively.  
 
Finally, the result confirms Gales and Kesner (1994) and Platt and Platt‘s (2012) findings in the US 
context but not Fich and Slezak (2008). The dependent variable is, however, different from Fich and 
Slezak (2008). Fich and Slezak‗s (2008) hazard analysis, the dependent variable is the time between 
a firm‘s distress and Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing.   
 
The present finding probably lends support for the continual use of the agency and resource 
dependency theories as analytical lenses through which to study the efficacy of board size, as a 
monitoring and strategic device, in the corporate performance and failure context.  
 
8.1.4 Nomination Committee Effectiveness  
From the interaction effects, nomination committee effectiveness is negatively related to corporate 
failure as far as two years prior failure. In contrast, the direct effects‘ result suggests that 
nomination committee effectiveness is not significantly related to corporate failure. Therefore, I 
find partial support in advancing the argument that nomination committee effectiveness is 
negatively related to corporate failure. The likely reasons are as follows. 
                                                          
25
 Jensen (1993) suggests that boards exceeding eight directors are easily dominated by CEO and thus may be 
ineffective.  
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First, decisions by the nomination committee are subject to ratification by the entire board. Thus, 
entrenched CEOs may lobby and in most cases overturn nomination committees‘ decisions in 
furtherance of their interests, which may be detrimental to shareholders. This interpretation is in line 
with evidence (see Golden and Zajac, 2001, Ees and Postma, 2004) suggesting that powerful CEOs, 
rather than shareholders, often select directors. 
 
Second, the CEO may influence the succession planning process by dismissing viable successor 
candidates (Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003). The implication is that CEO influence in the board 
recruitment process is a more important factor in assessing the efficacy of the nomination 
committee in the corporate failure context. This in part may account for the partial support findings.  
 
Third, directors who may serve on the nomination committee may own allegiance to the CEO, due 
to the timing of their appointment. Affiliated directors, for example, may be less likely to challenge 
the CEO‘s proposals (Wade, O'Reilly, and Chandratat, 1990). Thus, it is argued that the power 
relationship between nomination committee members and the CEO depends in part to the timing of 
directors‘ appointment.  
 
Turning to the split NCE model results, I observe three distinct patterns. The first visible pattern 
relates to nomination committee‘s presence and size; the second relates to nomination committee‘s 
independence; the final pattern relates to nomination committee‘s chairman independence and 
meeting. The first of the three patterns exhibits a direct association with corporate failure. The 
second and third patterns, however, display some intriguing features which need to be discussed, 
the analysis of which I turn to. 
 
(a) Nomination Committee Presence 
The results suggest that the presence of nomination committee has an insignificant negative 
association with corporate failure. This is at variance with propositions of Cadbury (1992), 
suggesting that the nomination committee enhances effective monitoring and advising of the board, 
a situation that could avoid corporate failure. This finding also contradicts the agency theory notion 
that NCs enhance directors‘ independence, board effectiveness and corporate survival by reducing 
the CEO‘s power (Westphal and Zajac, 1995; Westphal, 1998).  
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Finally, the finding disputes resource dependence theory‘s (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978) assertion that NCs reduce the likelihood of failure by adjusting board composition to the 
demands posed by a firm‘s external environment (Ruigrok, Peck, Tacheva, Greve and Hu, 2006). 
The present results suggest that the mere presence of nomination committee is not related to the 
likelihood of firm‘s failure.  
 
(b) Nomination Committee Size 
The results suggest that the size of the nomination committee has a negative significant marginal 
effect on corporate failure.This means that nomination committees with a minimum three 
independent NEDs are more likely to evaluate the board diversity prior to new appointments. This 
in turn, may reduce the agency conflicts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Jensen, 1993), thereby diminishing the probability of firm‘s failure.  This interpretation is consistent 
with the argument that nomination committees enhance firm‘s survival chances by strengthening 
the board selection process. 
 
This result, however, disputes Platt and Platt‘s (2012) findings. Platt and Platt define nomination 
committee size as the absolute number of nomination committee members. In this study, 
nomination committee size takes a value of ―1‖ if it has at least three independent NEDs, ―0‖ 
otherwise. 
 
(c)  Nomination Committee Independence  
The result indicates that the independence of the nomination committee has a significant positive 
association with corporate failure, which is at variance with agency theory. This leads to the 
question: how is it possible that the firm with independent nomination committee would fail? The 
possible explanations are several. 
 
First, I can speculate that a nomination committee consisting exclusively non-executive directors 
may have lower incentive, due in part to their negligible equity holding, to design the board 
composition to maximise shareholder value. Second, the nomination committee consisting 
exclusively of non-executive directors may have to rely on CEO‘s input to discharge their duties. 
Thus, such a committee is limited by their inferior information compared to the CEO (Jensen, 
1993), implying that the CEO may dominate the board selection process. This in turn, may reduce 
board effectiveness thereby increasing the probability of a firm‘s failure.  
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Third, the board appointment may be influenced by other factors such as substantial equity stake but 
not independence of the nomination committee. Thus, I could speculate that nomination committee 
independence may be a cosmetic device to enhance firm‘s legitimacy but not a firm value 
enhancing strategy. As failure approaches, firms conform to the accepted norms of their population 
(Judge and Zeithami, 1992; Sheppard, 1994), which include enhancing the independence of 
nomination committee. Failing firms, in turn, obtain some degree of legitimacy, due to presumed 
board effectiveness, to access critical resources from their environment (D‘Aveni, 1989b) and to 
safeguard their going concern. In contrast, the evidence suggests that such attempts may not be 
successful as the agency and resource dependency theories may suggest. 
  
This finding differs from contemporary studies in the US (e.g. Platt and Platt, 2012). Platt and Platt, 
however, use the percentage of independent directors on the nomination committee as a proxy of 
independence. This study‘s nomination committee independence takes a value of ―1‖, if members 
are exclusively independent NEDs, otherwise ―0‖.  
 
(d) Nomination Committee chair’s independence  
Contrary to the expectations, the independence of the nomination committee chairperson is not 
significantly related to corporate failure. This suggests that the independence of the chairperson of 
the nomination committee is irrelevant to the corporate failure. This finding contradicts proposals of 
board reformers and agency theory, suggesting that an independent director serving as chairman of 
the nomination committee reduces the possibility of a firm‘s failure by promoting quality 
monitoring.  
 
The likely reasons are twofold. First, other variables in the nomination committee model may be 
more important than the independence of the committee‘s chair. Large nomination committee size, 
for instance, may influence the chair‘s influence, implying that the chair may serve as a mere 
ceremonial head during annual general meetings and/or steer committee‘s meeting. Second, the 
measure of nomination committee chair‘s independence may not be appropriate in the corporate 
failure context. Nomination committee chair independence takes a value of ―1‖ if its chair is 
independent NED (board chair inclusive), ―0‖ otherwise. 
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 (e) Nomination Committee Meeting 
The results indicate that the number of nomination committee meetings has a significant positive 
association with corporate failure, which is at variance with agency theory. This suggests that 
frequent meetings of nomination committee increase its fees paid to directors for meeting 
attendance, travelling and lodging expenses as well as the opportunity cost of time executive 
directors‘ use in organizing, preparing and attending meetings (Vafeas, 1999a). Further, the 
nomination is approved by the entire board. This implies an increase of the operating costs of both 
the entire board and the nomination committee. These operating costs may diminish shareholders‘ 
value and ultimately, increase the likelihood of a firm‘s failure.  
 
An alternative reason is that failing firms begin to comply with expected norms, and in the light of 
these meetings, look like their non-failed counterparts. Nomination committee meeting takes a 
value of ―1‖, if the committee meets at least twice in the year, otherwise ―0‖. The assumption is that 
by meeting twice or more the nomination committee of a firm is likely to effectively prepare a 
description of the role and capabilities required for a particular appointment. This, in turn, enables 
the firm to recruit and select prestigious board members who are more connected to the board 
interlock, and, thus, enhances the firms‘ access to vital resource (D‘Aveni, 1989b) to safeguard its 
survival. The evidence, however, suggests that such attempts may be unfruitful, contrary to 
propositions of the agency and resource dependency theories. 
 
The above arguments may raise questions about the suitability of the agency theory as analytical 
lenses through which to study the efficacy of nomination committees, as a board monitoring device, 
in the corporate failure context.  
 
8.1.5 Audit Committee Effectiveness  
Consistent with agency theory, audit committee effectiveness has a negative marginal effect on 
corporate failure. This suggests that an effective audit committee exercises professional care to 
ensure higher integrity of the firm‘s internal controls, higher level of audit quality (Carcello and 
Neal, 2003) and good financial reporting. These, in turn, improve market transparency, reduce 
agency costs and restore investors‘ confidence and ultimately, reduce the probability of the firm‘s 
failure. This interpretation is in line with the argument that audit committees enhance firm‘s 
survival chances by strengthening the financial reporting and audit process. 
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Turning to the split ACE models‘ result, I observe two key distinct patterns. The first discernible 
pattern relates to audit committee‘s presence, expertise and size; the second relates to audit 
committee‘s independence and meeting. The first of the two patterns exhibits a direct relationship 
with corporate failure. The second pattern, however, shows specific features which need to be 
discussed in the subsequent paragraphs. 
 
(a) Audit  Committee Presence  
The results suggest that the presence of audit committee has a significant negative association with 
corporate failure. This confirms propositions of agency theory, suggesting that the mere presence of 
audit committee contributes towards reducing the predominant agency costs (Mendez and Garcia, 
2007) and thus, enhances firm‘s survival chances. In this respect, audit committee presence is 
linked to better governance quality and reduced information asymmetries. 
  
The result, however, contradicts related studies‘ findings, that suggest that the presence of the audit 
committee is not related to the likelihood of financial statement fraud (Beasley, 1996), earnings 
management (Peasnell, Pope and Young, 2005), and, thus, does not enhance the quality of financial 
reporting (Menon and Deahl Williams, 1994).  
 
(b) Audit  Committee Expertise  
Audit committee expertise has a significant negative association with corporate failure. This means 
that compliance with section 3.16 of Smith (2003) reduces the likelihood of firm‘s failure by 
enhancing its risk management and external auditor‘s independence. Section 3.16 provides that a 
member of the audit committee should have relevant financial expertise. 
 
Consistent with Anglo-Saxon related research, the present result suggests that audit committee 
expertise enhances corporate survival by reducing financial statement fraud (Beasley, Carcello, 
Hermanson, Lapides, 2000). I can speculate that financial expertise members, due in part to their 
reputational capital, have greater incentive to be effective monitors of external auditors‘ 
independence (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Peasnell, Pope and Young, 2005).  
 
(c) Audit Committee Size  
I find that a firm with a large audit committee is less likely to fail. This implies that at least three 
independent NEDs audit committee members (Smith 2003; Zaman, Hudaib and Hanifa, 2011) are 
  
236 
 
required to enhance audit committee‘s status and resources to fulfil its monitoring role (Pincus, 
Rusbarsky and Wong, 1989; Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993).  
 
I can also speculate that large audit committees may demand higher external auditors‘ 
independence by encouraging suspicious auditor switches (Archambeault and DeZoort, 2001). This 
result confirms agency theory propositions as well as findings from contemporary studies (e.g. Platt 
and Platt, 2012).   
 
(d) Audit Committee Independence  
Audit committee independence may not enhance a firm‘s survival. This submits that audit 
committee independence is not relevant to corporate failure prediction
26
. This contradicts Platt and 
Platt‘s (2012) findings. Platt and Platt, however, use percentage of independent directors compared 
to a more stringent definition in this study that uses a binary measure of ―1‖ if all members of audit 
committee are independent NEDs and ―0‖ otherwise. This finding is also at variance with  related 
studies, suggesting that audit committee independence enhances the financial reporting process by 
reducing financial statement fraud (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, Lapides, 2000) and/or receiving 
going-concern opinion (Carcello and Neal, 2000).  Possible reasons for this finding are as follows.  
 
First, I can argue that the measure of size subsumes the audit committee independence measure. 
Second, it is also possible that the measure of audit committee independence adopted from Smith 
(2003) and Zaman, Hudaib and Hanifa (2011) may not be suitable in the corporate failure context. 
Third, critics may argue that the binary measure of ―1‖ if all members of audit committee are 
independent NEDs does not correctly measure audit committee independence. Fourth, I can also 
argue that shareholders may use other mechanisms (example: reputable external audit firm) to 
monitor the financial reporting and audit processes. Finally, the audit committee performs a 
specialised function and, hence its impact may be dependent on audit committee expertise and/or 
size and not independence, as agency theory may suggest.  
 
(e) Audit Committee Meeting  
Frequency of audit committee meetings is not related to corporate failure. This implies that 
compliance with the minimum three meetings suggested by Smith (2003) is not an assurance to 
                                                          
26
 In this regard, in an unreported model, I test the audit committee independence measure together with the control 
variables only but with no difference in results. 
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rescue a failing company. The finding contradicts expectations from research that draws on agency 
theory, suggesting that regular audit committee meetings may signal due diligence (Menon and 
Williams, 2001), reduce fraud (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, Lapides, 2000) and, in this manner, 
improve the financial reporting process. Likely reasons for this finding are as follows.  
 
First, I may argue that our measure of size subsumes the audit committee frequency measure. 
Second, it is likely that our measure of audit committee meeting adopted from Smith (2003) and 
Zaman, Hudaib and Hanifa (2011) may not be appropriate in the corporate failure context. Third, it 
is also possible that the binary measure of ―1‖ if the audit committee meets at least three times does 
not accurately measure audit committee meeting. Lastly, as discussed earlier, the audit committee 
executes an expert function and, hence its impact may be dependent on background of members and 
not frequency of its meetings.  
 
The present findings probably lend support for the suitability of the agency theory as an analytical 
lens through which to study the efficacy of audit committee, as a board monitoring device, in the 
corporate failure context.  
 
8.1.6 Remuneration Committee Effectiveness  
Consistent with agency theory, firms with weak remuneration committee effectiveness are more 
likely to fail. This may imply that an effective remuneration committee safeguards the firm‘s going 
concern by stretching on the performance-related elements of top executives‘ remuneration. Thus, 
transparent procedure for fixing firm‘s executive remuneration policy is designed exclusively to 
minimise the executives and shareholder conflict (Main, Jackson, Pymm, and Wright, 2008), and 
thus, promotes the long term success of the entity. From this point, it is argued that a weak 
remuneration committee might be associated with overly generous pay awards to the executives 
(Ezzamel and Watson, 2005), implying that the going concern of the firm is threatened. An 
effective remuneration committee, however, may be related to competitive remuneration packages 
to encourage prestigious directors to run the company successfully. This interpretation is consistent 
with the argument that remuneration committees enhance firm‘s survival chances by aligning the 
agent and principal interests. 
 
Concerning the split RCE model results, I spot three distinctive patterns. The first distinct pattern 
relates to remuneration committee chair‘s independence; the second relates to remuneration 
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committee presence; finally, the third pattern relates to remuneration committee‘s independence, 
size and meeting. The first of the three patterns shows a direct relationship with corporate failure. 
The second and third patterns, however, display unique features. The subsequent paragraphs discuss 
these patterns in detail.  
 
(a) Remuneration  Committee Presence  
The evidence to the hypothesis on RC presence is mixed. First, consistent with agency theory, the 
annual logit models‘ result provides partial support that the presence of remuneration committee 
enhances corporate survival. This may suggest that the mere presence of remuneration committees 
affects the level of executives‘ remuneration (Conyon and Peck, 1998), implying that the prevalent 
agency problem is minimal. 
 
Second, and in contrast, the pooled logit model‘s result also contains partial support that 
remuneration committee presence is positively related to corporate failure. If this tells a story, I 
concur with O‘Reilly, Main and Crystal‘s (1988) notion that CEOs have a significant and informal 
influence in selecting board members, and, in this way, the selection process itself can raise CEO 
compensation to the detriment of the firm‘s long term survival. 
 
I, however, discuss the results of the cross sectional models due in part to the numerous limitations 
of the pooled logit (see, chapter 7). The possible explanations are twofold. First, remuneration 
committee may increase firms‘ survival through long term incentive plan and stock options for 
firm‘s top management.  Second, consistent with agency theory, remuneration committee is 
designed to monitor and evaluate the top executives and thus, restores the investment community‘s 
confidence for continual support.   
 
 (b) Remuneration Committee Chair’s Independence  
Consistent with agency theory, firms with an independent remuneration committee chair are less 
likely to fail. This may indicate that greater independence of remuneration committee chair 
safeguards firm‘s survival by preventing excessive CEO pay packages (Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand 
and Dalton, 1998; Main, Jackson, Pymm, and Wright, 2008).  
 
This finding complements Main, Jackson, Pymm, and Wright‘s (2008) findings, that the nomination 
committee chair requires greater independence to discharge his onerous role of shaping the 
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remuneration committee proposals, in the light of severe shareholder management conflict. Thus, 
independent remuneration committee chair may preserve the firms‘ assets by negotiating fairly and 
objectively with various stakeholders of the firm.  
 
(c) Remuneration Committee Independence  
Contrary to agency theory, the results show that lower remuneration committee independence is not 
related to corporate failure. This sharply contradicts expectation of Anglo-Saxon reformers, who 
provide guidance for greater independence in the compensation committee (Daily, Johnson, 
Ellstrand and Dalton, 1998). As well, this finding is at variance with Platt and Platt (2012) and 
related studies‘ (Mangel and Singh, 1993) findings. Possible reasons for no evidence for the 
hypothesis on RC independence are several. 
 
First, I can speculate that the measure of firm size subsumes the remuneration committee 
independence measure. Second, it is plausible that the measure of remuneration committee 
independence adopted from the Greenbury (1995) may not be appropriate in the corporate failure 
context. Third, it is also probable that the binary measure of ―1‖ if all members of remuneration 
committee are independent NEDs does not correctly measure remuneration committee 
independence. Fourth, I also contend other governance measures such as higher proportion of 
outside directors are more relevant to evaluate the CEO‘s performance in the corporate failure 
context. Lastly, the remuneration committee‘s impact may be dependent on remuneration 
committee chair‘s independence and not the independence of its entire members. 
 
(d.) Remuneration Committee Size  
Contrary to expectations, remuneration committee size is not related to corporate failure. This 
suggests that the remuneration committee size is irrelevant to the corporate failure prediction. Our 
finding contradicts Platt and Platt‘s (2012) findings and propositions of agency theory. The likely 
reasons are as follows.  
 
First, it is possible that the binary measure of ―1‖ when RC includes at least three independent 
NED (board chair exclusive), ―0‖ otherwise, does not correctly measure remuneration committee 
size. In this respect, Platt and Platt (2012) use the absolute number of remuneration committee size. 
Second, other variables (example: remuneration committee chair‘s independence, firm size) in the 
remuneration committee model may be more important than the size variable. Third, it is also 
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possible that shareholders may employ other governance mechanisms to monitor executive 
compensation.  
 
 (e) Remuneration Committee Meeting  
The frequency of remuneration committee meetings is not related to corporate failure, contrary to 
expectations. This suggests that compliance to the minimum two meetings suggested by ICSA 
(2010) is not an assurance to salvage a failing company. This contradicts propositions from agency 
theory and related research findings, which suggest that frequent remuneration committee meetings 
enhance firm‘s survival and CEO monitoring by reducing the executive pay fiasco (Daily, Johnson, 
Ellstrand and Dalton, 1998). Possible reasons are as follows. 
  
First, I argue that the measure of firm size subsumes the frequency of remuneration committee 
measure. Second, it is possible that the measure of remuneration committee meeting adopted from 
ICSA (2010) may not be suitable in the corporate failure context. Third, it is also likely that the 
binary measure of ―1‖ if the remuneration committee meets at least twice does not accurately 
measure remuneration committee meeting. Finally, the remuneration committee‘s impact may be 
dependent on the independence of its chair and not meetings.  
 
The current finding probably provides support for the appropriateness of the agency theory as 
analytical lens through which to study the efficacy of remuneration committee, as a board 
monitoring device, in the corporate failure context. This paves the way for the discussion of the 
interaction effects in the next section. 
 
8.2 DISCUSSION OF KEY FINDINGS ON INTERACTION EFFECTS 
This section discusses the findings on the interaction effects of corporate governance on corporate 
failure. Former government official, frequency of board meetings and the interactions between 
board attributes and functions are discussed accordingly in the relevant sub-sections.  
 
8.2.1 Former Government Official  
Consistent with resource dependency theory, a firm with a former government official is less likely 
to fail. It is argued that governments are considered as critical sources of dependency (Schuler, 
Rehbein and Cramer, 2002; Hillman, 2005). In this respect, former government officials on the 
board provide information required to secure government contracts (Hillman, Cannella and 
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Paetzold, 2000). Further, former government officials are ―resources rich directors‖ (Boyd, 1990) 
and thus serve as channels to form strategic alliance with existing government officials to access 
privileged resources concerning proposed firm‘s policy environment changes (Schuler, Rehbein and 
Cramer, 2002). Put simply, former government officials on board provide access to privilege 
information and legitimacy. This, in turn, reduces uncertainty (Pfeffer, 1972), thereby enhancing 
firm‘s performance (Hillman, 2005), value (Hillman, Zardkoohi and Bierman, 1999) and survival 
(Schuler, Rehbein and Cramer, 2002).  
 
This interpretation is consistent with resource dependency‘s notion, suggesting that boards create 
linkages between the firm and critical coalition‘s partners who create uncertainties (Pfeffer, 1972; 
Hillman, 2005). The present finding probably provides support for the appropriateness of the 
resource dependency theory as an analytical lens through which to study former government 
official, as board resource device, in the corporate failure context.  
 
8.2.2 Frequency of Board Meetings  
Contrary to expectations, the number of board meetings has a positive and significant association 
with corporate failure. This refutes proposition from agency theory, which suggests that higher 
frequency of board meetings reduces the likelihood of corporate failure by enhancing board 
monitoring (Vafeas, 1999a). As well, the finding refutes Vafeas‘s (1999a) findings that firm 
performance (i.e. excess stock return) enhances following years of higher frequency of board 
meeting. The likely reasons are as follows. 
 
First, more board meetings increase cost (e.g. directors‘ meeting fees, managerial time), thereby 
reducing shareholder value, and in this way, increase the probability of a firm‘s failure. Jensen 
(1993) concurs, emphasising that healthy firms‘ boards are reasonably inactive. This interpretation 
is in line with Vafeas‘s (1999a) study, suggesting that high frequency of board meetings are 
followed by negative stock price reaction and poor performance.  
 
Second, frequency of board meetings does not correctly measure board monitoring. Put differently, 
board meetings are used mainly for ―legal compliance activities‖ and ―information dissemination‖ 
rather than control of CEO (Machold and Farquhar, 2013). This means that fruitful deliberations are 
not possible at board meetings (Jensen, 1993), due in part to boards‘ passivity (Machold and 
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Farquhar, 2013) and unproductive routine task which absorbs most of the limited meeting time  
(Vafeas, 1999a).  
 
Third, other board function measures (example: former government official) in our interaction 
terms models may be more significant than the board monitoring measure variable. Fourth, other 
governance mechanisms (e.g. board committees) may be more important as board monitoring 
mechanisms but not frequency of board meeting. Lastly, the measure of board monitoring may be 
inappropriate in the corporate failure context.  
 
The present finding probably lends support to the argument that firms employ board meetings as a 
fire-fighting device (Jensen, 1993). The finding, however, raises questions about the 
appropriateness of the agency theory as analytical lens through which to study the efficacy of board 
meetings, as a board monitoring device, in the corporate failure context. 
 
8.2.3 Interactions between Board Attributes and Functions 
On the interactions, I observe three distinct patterns. The first relates to the frequency of board 
meetings interactions with proportion of outside directors and board size as well as the interaction 
between former government officials and presence of female directors. The second relates to 
frequency of board meetings interactions with presence of female directors, audit and remuneration 
committees‘ effectiveness. Finally, the third pattern relates to the interaction between outside 
directors and former government officials as well as the interaction between outside directors and 
the frequency of board meetings. The first of three patterns shows contradicting relationship with 
corporate failure. The second and third patterns, however, display positive and no relationship with 
corporate failure, respectively. I turn next to the discussion of these patterns. 
 
First, the interaction between proportion of outside directors and the frequency of board meetings 
shows no significance in almost all estimations. The interaction between proportion of outside 
directors and the frequency of board meetings, however, is significantly negative in panel A of t - 3 
and t – 4,  but significantly positive in panel B of t - 4 logit model. The interaction between 
presence of female directors and former government officials exhibit significantly negative in panel 
B (A) of t – 4 (t – 5), but significantly positive in panel B of t - 3 logit model.  There is no evidence 
for the interaction between board size and the frequency of board meetings. There is also no 
evidence for the interaction between board size and former government officials except a significant 
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and positive association in panel A of the t – 1 logit model. These could suggest that the results are 
sensitive to model specifications. 
 
Second, the interaction between presence of female directors and the frequency of board meetings 
is significantly positive in model 7. This may suggest that the relationship between presence of 
female directors and corporate failure is stronger in firms with higher frequency of board 
meetings. Thus, I could argue that the female‘s director service task may require more board 
meetings to establish an intimate relationship with the CEO. The important implication is that the 
female director may be more sympathetic with the CEO and thus, protect his interest rather that 
the principal. This in part may account for why the interaction between presence of female 
directors and the frequency of board meetings is positively associated with corporate failure. This 
interpretation is in line with class managerial hegemony‘s notion suggesting that directors protect 
the interest of the ruling party (see Pettigrew, 1992; Hung, 1998; Mills, 2000).  
 
The interaction between audit committee effectiveness and the frequency of board meetings is 
significantly positive in model 10. The interaction between remuneration committee effectiveness 
and the frequency of board meetings is significantly positive in model 11. These contradict the 
expectations of agency and resource dependency theories as well as reformers in the Anglo-Saxon 
environment. It could suggest that failing firms adopt these acceptable governance mechanisms as 
strategies to restore investment community‘s confidence but to no avail. Pfeffer and Davis-Blake 
(1986) suggest that effective turnarounds are associated with installation of a new board, is 
germane here. 
 
Third, the interaction between proportion of outside directors and former government officials is 
not significant in all specifications. The possible reason is that not all outside directors are 
independent of management. Further, the former government official measure includes both 
executive and non-executive. The important implication is that this interaction ignores 
independence, which is essential factor for board monitoring. The interaction between 
nomination committee effectiveness and the frequency of board meetings exhibits no significance 
in all specifications. The likely reason is that nomination committee‘s decision is subject to board 
ratification. Further, frequency of board meeting may not be a suitable proxy for board 
monitoring. The implication is that nomination committee and board meetings may be a window 
dressing device to appease critical exchange partners. In short, critics (e.g. Kang and Shivdasini, 
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1995) may argue that the model lacks power, due in part to inappropriateness of the board 
monitoring measures.  
 
The present findings add to the interaction effects literature of corporate governance and 
performance in two fold. First, it extends the extant literature on corporate governance and 
corporate failure by looking at the interplay of board attributes and functions. Second, the findings, 
however, raise questions about the appropriateness of the integration of the agency and resource 
dependency theories as analytical lenses through which to study the efficacy of the interaction of 
board attributes and functions, in the corporate failure context. In short, the present findings 
contradict propositions from agency and resource dependency theories, implying that proportion of 
outside directors, presence of female directors and nomination committee effectiveness interactions 
with board monitoring and resources provision does not influence corporate survival. This paves the 
way for a summary of the key findings in the next section 
 
 8.3 CONTRIBUTION OF THE RESEARCH 
This section presents the study‘s contribution to knowledge, practice and policy. Subsection 8.3.1 
describes the contribution to theoretical development. Subsection 8.3.2 deals with the contribution 
to advocates of board reforms. Subsection 8.3.3 considers the contribution to firm‘s governance 
policy. 
 
8.3.1 Contribution to Theoretical Development  
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) document that boards perform two main functions: control and resource 
provision, which in turn, are vital to prevent corporate failure. Empirical evidence, however, is 
distinctively lacking. The primary contribution of this research is to fill this gap. Thus, the study 
seeks to answer the question of whether board attributes and functions are related to a firm‘s 
likelihood of failure? In this respect, the study contributes to corporate governance and corporate 
failure literature in several ways.  
 
First, this study is one of the first to test empirically an integrative model of the two corporate 
governance theories: agency and resource dependency theories, in the corporate failure context. 
Thus, I answer the call that the corporate failure context is one of the opportunities for linking the 
aforementioned theories (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Accordingly, I discuss important insights 
connected to corporate failure prediction from the two main theoretical approaches. Thus, the 
  
245 
 
theoretical basis of the study contains the fusion of the two theories to explain the corporate failure 
syndrome. 
   
Second, this study extends prior corporate governance and corporate failure research by proposing 
and testing an integrative framework that embraces both the direct and interaction associations 
between corporate governance and corporate failure. Although contemporary researchers (Zahra 
and Pearce, 1989; Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004; Amankwah-Amoah and Debrah, 2010) 
acknowledge the significance of the interaction effects of corporate governance on corporate 
performance and failure, in particular, empirical evidence is distinctively lacking. This study 
attempts to fill this gap. Our integrative framework considers board attributes and functions as well 
as their interactions. Thus, I seek to gain insights on how firms fail and in this way, contribute to the 
literature on what corporate governance mechanisms are required for a firm to survive. In sum, the 
proposed integrative framework departs from prior studies, and in this light, may improve our 
understanding of corporate failure.  
 
Third, this study is one of the first to mirror the recommendations of Cadbury (1992), Greenbury 
(1995), Higgs (2003), and Smith (2003) relating to the board and its committees effectiveness in the 
UK.  Fourth, this study is the first attempt to develop and test a theoretical model to assess the 
financial health of UK companies. Thus, prior prediction models in the UK are mainly based on ad 
hoc selection of variables approach.  
 
Fifth, this study is the first to explore the association between corporate failure and board gender 
diversity, frequency of board meetings, former government official as well as nomination, audit and 
remuneration committees‘ effectiveness. The board former government official measure captures 
the chairman, senior NED and CEO‘s government experience. The inclusion of the CEO‘s 
government experience overcomes a major gap in the interlocking research. Thus, this study 
considers both inside and outside directors‘ government experience unlike prior studies that 
consider only the latter (sees Rivas, 2012). To date, nomination, audit and remuneration 
committees‘ effectiveness variables have been used in isolation. This study applies agency 
analytical lens to examine the effect of nomination, audit and remuneration committees‘ 
effectiveness variables based on a composite measure of five constructs. In this regard, I recognise 
the multi-dimensional nature of corporate failure by controlling for board composition, financial 
indicators and firm specific characteristics.  
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Sixth, in contrast to propositions from the agency and resource dependency theories, our results 
provide support to the argument that board gender diversity can possibly be a drawback in terms of 
performance (Adams and Ferreira, 2009) because it‘s not a value enhancing strategy. As Terjesen, 
Sealy and Singh (2009) note, women are invited to serve on boards to reflect the present generation 
of stakeholders. Our evidence refutes resource dependency‘s assertion that women reduce the 
likelihood of failure by bringing different values and perspectives to enrich the boardroom 
dynamics (Ruigrok, Peck, Tacheva, Greve and Hu, 2006). As well, this study does not lend support 
to Pearce and Zahra‘s (1991) assertion that boards with at least a woman director would be less 
likely to rubber-stamp, due in part to their broader experiences and different ―voices‖ (Fondas and 
Sassalos, 2000).  
 
Seventh, the use of agency and resource dependency theories in this study has shown that the 
proportion of outside directors and board size are significant signposts to the failure event. For this 
reason, the findings lend support to the notion that outside dominated boards exhibit a positive 
association with effective board control (Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand, 1996) and resource provision 
function (Pfeffer, 1972; Pearce and Zahra, 1991; Fich, 2005) and, thus, enhance a firm‘s survival 
chances. This contradicts Gales and Kesner‘s (1994) findings, implying board composition (i.e. 
absolute number of outside directors) is not related to corporate failure, using the resource 
dependency analytical lens. The findings also provide support that board size is a device to access 
resource, implying that large board is valuable for the breath of its ‗services‘ (Chaganti, Mahajan, 
and Sharma, 1985; Dalton, Daily, Johnson, and Ellstrand, 1999) as well as an indicator of board 
control over the CEO (Pearce and Zahra, 1991). This supports Gales and Kesner‘s (1994) findings, 
suggesting that prior to bankruptcy declaration, declining firms experienced loss of outside directors 
and thus, shrink in overall board size. 
 
Eighth, the use of agency theory in this study has shown that nomination committee size, 
remuneration committee effectiveness and its chair‘s independence as well as audit committee‘s 
effectiveness, size, presence and expertise are important governance mechanisms that contribute 
towards understanding of the failure syndrome. The findings lend support to the notion that well run 
board nomination, audit and remuneration committees prevent corporate failure by allowing the 
board to monitor managerial performance (Pincus, Rusbarsky and Wong 1989; Zahra and Pearce, 
1989).  
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Ninth, the use of resource dependency theory in this study has shown that board government 
experience is a significant governance mechanism that contributes towards our understanding of the 
failure syndrome. Our findings lend support to the assertion that government experience enhances 
firm‘s survival by increasing the firm‘s ability to co-opt resources to decrease environmental 
uncertainty (Rivas, 2012; Hillman, 2005). The findings suggest that the impact of former 
government official becomes profound in two years prior to failure, suggesting that failing firms 
lack the managerial talent to pursue a turnaround strategy.  
 
8.3.2 Contribution to Government Policy  
The study also provides suggestions that could strengthen the unitary board system in four thematic 
areas namely: composition, effectiveness, accountability and remuneration. I will discuss each in 
turn.  
 
On board composition, the Higgs Report (2003) recommends that at least half of the board should 
be independent NEDs, excluding the chairman. The findings suggest that this must be preserved to 
enhance boards‘ ability in discharging its monitoring and resource roles.  The findings lend support 
to the notion that greater proportion of NEDs on the unitary board promotes board effectiveness by 
allowing NEDs to constructively challenge the CEO‘s proposals. Here prior empirical evidence on 
corporate governance and outside directors, in particular, are based solely on Cadbury. In contrast, 
this study reflects on both Cadbury (1992) and Higgs (2003) regarding outside directors in the UK. 
 
Turning to board effectiveness, the Cadbury (1992) and Higgs (2003) recommend that nomination 
committee should consist of a majority NEDs and chaired by independent NED. The findings 
suggest a minimum of three independent NEDs nomination committee membership is required to 
enhance its status and power in discharging its duties. This is a wake-up call to the Financial 
Reporting Council and advocates of boards worldwide to be more prescriptive on the membership 
of the nomination committee. The findings also endorse the Code‘s (2003) supporting principle on 
board size, suggesting that sufficient board size is required to facilitate board and its committees‘ 
effectiveness. The declining board size of failing firms may hasten the failure process by disrupting 
management turnaround strategies through weakening the board‘s composition and structure. In this 
vein, the Financial Reporting Council should introduce measures aimed at encouraging boards of 
failing firms to demonstrate commitment to the board turnaround strategies to help rescue the firm. 
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On board accountability, the findings suggest that Smith‘s (2003) requirement on presence, size, 
and expertise of audit committees must be maintained to ensure long term success of firms in the 
UK. There is also the need for reforms worldwide to embrace the prescriptive nature of Smith‘s 
(2003) requirements to ensure rigorous board accountability through the audit committees.  
 
Finally, on board remuneration, the findings suggest a more prescriptive requirement to 
complement Greenbury (1995) and Higgs‘ (2003) guidance. Specifically, the findings endorse 
Greenbury and Higgs recommendation for the establishment of board compensation committee with 
membership exclusively NEDs. In addition, the findings suggest that remuneration committee 
should include at least three NEDs, chaired by independent NED, and should meet at least twice a 
year.  In this vein, the Financial Reporting Council should introduce measures aimed at encouraging 
boards to adopt a more prescriptive model to ensure an effective remuneration committee to 
minimise the conflict between executive pay and shareholder wealth maximisation. This finding 
also serves as a wake-up call for reforms worldwide to embrace a more prescriptive framework to 
ensure competitive remuneration is pay to maintain and motivate prestigious board members to run 
their entities successfully.   
 
8.3.2 Contribution to Firm’s Corporate Governance Strategies.  
The study‘s findings also provide several implications for firm‘s corporate governance strategies.  
First by pursuing board gender diversity schemes, the resource dependency scholars may argue that 
new female directors will impact on the board advisory role (Burak, Malmender and Tate, 2008). 
From the agency perspective, female directors enhance board monitoring role by reducing the 
CEO‘s influence over the board (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012). The findings, however, suggest that 
board gender diversity strategy may be a window-dressing exercise to appease the investment 
community for continual support. This window dressing strategy may result in substantial costs to 
shareholders (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012). Thus, female directors, due to their presumed long-term 
orientation (Masta and Miller, 2011), may lack the experience required to reverse the downward 
trend of a failing firm. I concur with Jensen‘s (1993) notion that the board should not be moulded 
after the democratic political model that represents other constituencies.  Investors should be aware 
that board gender diversity may not be motivated by safeguarding firm‘s survival but rather a 
scheme to mislead firm‘s stakeholder for continual support. 
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Second, the expectation in the Anglo-Saxon literature is that outside directors enhance their board 
monitoring role by demanding more board meetings. This view is strengthened by the agency 
theory, emphasising that more board meetings enhance a firm‘s likelihood of survival by allowing 
outside directors to pursue shareholders‘ interests (Vafeas, 1999a). The academic and financial 
press also attribute ineffective monitoring to busy directors who are not able to attend meetings 
frequently (NACD, 1996). The findings, however, suggest that frequent board meetings may be a 
fire-fighting device to pacify investors in the presence of problems (Jensen, 1993). Drawing from 
the class managerial hegemony perspective, these meetings may be too artificial, due to the 
presumed limited time of meetings and lack of genuine independence among outside directors 
(Vafeas, 1999a), to safeguard failing firms from the downward spiral. Further, effective board 
monitoring through frequent board meetings may not be possible so far as the CEOs set the agenda 
(Jensen, 1993) and most of the limited time for board meetings is consumed by routine task 
(Machold and Farquhar, 2013). Accordingly, investors should be aware that board meetings are not 
a proactive measure to improve performance (Vafeas, 1999a) and/or reduce the likelihood of firms‘ 
failure. 
 
Third, by following strategies to enhance nomination committee‘s independence, agency scholars 
may argue that the CEO‘s influence in the board selection process is reduced and, in this way, NCs 
increase the board‘s effectiveness (Vafeas, 1999b) by raising directors‘ qualifications. The findings, 
however, propose that nomination committee independence is purely cosmetic in the presence of 
crisis to conform to best industry practice. Although the CEO is not a member of the nomination 
committee but attends every committee meeting at the invitation of the committee‘s chair. 
Therefore, investors should be aware that the selection process may potentially hasten the failure 
process due in part to the CEO informal influence on new board appointments.    
 
Finally, the findings suggest that failing firms should pursue strategies aimed at recruiting, retaining 
and motivating competent outside directors to be committed to turnaround strategies. These outside 
directors, due to their managerial talent and prestige, would be more effective in board monitoring 
and the resource provision role. Further, they may impact on board monitoring by serving on the 
remuneration and audit committees. This in turn, may enhance the effectiveness of the board 
remuneration and audit committees and, thus, enhance the firm‘s legitimacy to access critical 
resources to reduce the likelihood of failure.  
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8.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The study‘s approach has six main limitations. These are: (1) arbitrary definition of corporate 
failure, (2) neglect of small and medium private unquoted firms, (3) arbitrary sample period, (4) 
neglect of a more regulated corporate governance environment, (5) neglect of the phenomenological 
approach, and (6) neglect of the macroeconomic indicators. I will discuss each in turn. 
 
8.4.1 Arbitrary Definition of Corporate Failure  
I define corporate failure as firms that have filed for insolvency under the UK Insolvency Act of 
1986. Thus, the failed firms‘ sample may be contaminated with firms that may have filed for 
insolvency for other reasons but not financial. In contrast, this study seeks to develop an economic 
model but not an insolvency model. This is consistent with the vast literature (Shumway, 2001; 
Hillegeist, Keating, Cram and Lundstedt, 2004).  
 
The findings, however, cannot be generalised beyond the UK due to fundamental national 
differences in insolvency laws. Consequently, future research should consider extending the scope 
of failure‘s definition to encapsulate the Morris‘s (1997) spectrum of potential indicators of 
corporate financial distress. 
 
8.4.2 Neglect of Small and Medium Private Unquoted Firms  
The non-failed firms are relatively large and within the top 500 publicly quoted firms on the 
London Stock Exchange Market. The failed firms also include formerly public quoted and unquoted 
firms. The major limitation is that I neglect small and medium-sized firms that are not listed where, 
arguably, failure is intense.  
 
The conclusions, therefore, cannot be generalised to private and/or entities listed under the 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM), due in part to the major differences between publicly and 
privately owned firms in terms of corporate governance mechanisms. To deal with this limitation, 
future research should seek to replicate this study in the AIM. 
 
8.4.3 Arbitrary Sample Period  
The sample period is 1
st
 January, 1999 to 31
st
 December, 2011. The aim for this arbitrary sample 
period is to collect data 5 years after the introduction of the Cadbury‘s (1992) Report. In addition to 
Cadbury (1992), the study mirrors Greenbury (1995), Higgs (2003), Smith (2003), and the Code‘s 
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(2010) guidance on boards and its committees. The main limitation is that the failed firms have 
different failing years within the sample period. Hence, critics (e.g. Ooghe, Joos, and DE 
Bourdeaudhuij, 1995) may argue that the findings are valid for sample specific data within the 
chosen time period. To overcome this limitation I collect data from the non-failed firms in line with 
the failing firms‘ year datasets. As well to mitigate data stationarity and stability related issues, I 
randomly split the data into two sub-samples: estimation and holdout. This notwithstanding, I 
cannot assume causality, due to the statistical approached used
27
.  
 
8.4.4 Neglect of a more Regulated Corporate Governance EnvironmentS  
I limit the empirical settings to the UK, a ‗comply or explain‘ corporate governance environment. 
Further, I omit foreign firms in the UK due in part to the effects of exchange rate fluctuations.   
 
Consequently, the results may not be applicable in: (1) a more regulated corporate governance 
environment (e.g. US), (2) foreign firms in the UK and finally, (3) jurisdictions with dual boards 
(e.g. Germany). Therefore, future research should consider replicating the study in a mandatory 
corporate governance environment, foreign firms in the UK and/or countries with dual boards.  
 
8.4.5 Neglect of the Phenomenological Approach 
The study adopts the positivism approach due in part to the difficulties of obtaining data through 
interviews from boards of failed firms. Accordingly, a significant feature of this study is that, the 
annual reports are meticulously analysed to extract corporate governance attributes for 
incorporation in the models. The aim of this is to make the model not only relevant to the 
population studied, but to firms that will appear in the future.  
 
Critics, however, may argue that choosing between interpretive and positivism approaches is not 
straightforward. Thus, the models‘ validity may be enhanced if data is gathered through 
triangulation. As a result, future research should replicate this study by collecting data from annual 
reports, through questionnaires from insolvency practitioners and interviews of board members of 
selected failed firms.  
 
                                                          
27
 The statistical approach used in the study, however, is well established in the literature (see Chapter 6, section 6.6 and 
6.7). 
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8.4.6 Neglect of the Macroeconomic Indicators 
Finally, I limit the antecedents of corporate failure to selected corporate governance attributes, 
financial and firm specific indicators. The implication is that other factors (e.g. macroeconomic and 
natural disasters) that may precipitate failure in the real world are not captured in the models. 
Further, the corporate governance attributes employed in the study are not exhaustive. This paves 
the way for recommendations of future research in the next section.  
 
8.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
This study answers two key questions. First, to what extent are the composition and structure of 
corporate board related to corporate failure? Second, to what extent is corporate failure related to 
the interactions between board attributes and functions. Other governance measures and variables 
operationalization, however, are recommended for future research. 
 
On board composition, a proxy for board independence, I use a measure of proportion of outside 
directors. This measure may not mirror independence, since all outside directors may not 
necessarily be independent of management. In this regard, Dalton, Daily, Johnson, and Ellstrand, 
1999) define independence as the boards‘ ability to provide guidance that does not reflect the 
CEO‘s will. For this reason, future research should consider dependent and independent directors as 
well as CEO dominance, as proxies for board independence.  
 
Turning to board gender diversity, I use a dummy of ―1‖ if there is a female director on the board, 
―0‖ otherwise. Critics may argue that this measure is basic and, thus, does not mirror board gender 
diversity. Future research, therefore, should consider background, skills, experience, age, 
qualifications and affiliations of female directors as well as gender diversity on board committees. 
The implication is that these wider set of variables may deepen the understanding on the impact of 
board gender diversity on corporate failure. 
 
On board effectiveness, I use two measures: board size and nomination committee effectiveness. 
Further research, however, may extend this to include board diversity. Pearce and Zahra‘s (1991) 
finding suggests that large and more diverse boards enhance firm‘s performance by reducing 
uncertainties associated with strategy development. Goodstein, Gautam and Boeker (1994), 
however, suggest that board diversity may be a significant constraint on strategic change. These 
contradicting findings suggest that board diversity remains an empirical question to date. For this 
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reason, I argue that the board diversity may provide insightful findings in the context of corporate 
failure.  
  
On board accountability, I use audit committee effectiveness, a composite measure of five main 
constructs: audit committee‘s presence, independence, size, expertise and meeting. From the agency 
perspective (DeAngelo, 1981), due to the presumed conflicts of interest, audit function is seen as an 
effective monitoring device. The audit function‘s credibility, however, is challenged in the wake of 
the unprecedented financial scandals and its associated corporate failures. Arnett and Danos‘s 
(1979) findings suggest that audit firm size is not related to audit quality. In contrast, DeAngelo 
(1981) finds otherwise. In this vein, I argue that the corporate failure context may provide insightful 
findings on surrogates for the audit functions quality. For this reason, further research, may consider 
external auditor tenure, size and reputation in the corporate failure context. 
 
On board remuneration, I use remuneration committee effectiveness, a composite measure of five 
main constructs: remuneration committee‘s presence, independence, size, chair‘s independence and 
meeting.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose that execution stock option contracts reduce the 
prime moral hazard problem by aligning agents and shareholders‘ interest, and, in this manner, 
enhance firm performance. Contemporary researchers (e.g. Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002) confirm 
this notion, implying that stock options enhance shareholder value.  
 
Critics (e.g. Hanlon, Rajgopal and Shevlin 2003), however, have labelled executive stock options as 
‗rent extraction‘. Carpenter and Remmers (2001), for example, find that top executives exploit 
stock option to the detriment of shareholder value. In sum, empirical evidence on stock options is 
mixed. There is also no evidence in relation to the link between executive stock option and 
corporate failure. Thus, I argue that an examination of stock options in the corporate failure context 
may provide insight to clear the present ambiguity in the top executive contract literature. More 
importantly, corporate failure literature would benefit greatly if future research is directed to capture 
executive stock options. 
 
On the board monitoring role, I opt for frequency of board meetings instead of CEO‘s performance 
evaluation due to multicollinearity issues. This measure may not mirror board monitoring. I find 
that frequency of board meetings is positively related to corporate failure. This finding suggests 
future investigations are required on surrogates for quality of board meetings. Thus, to answer the 
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question: which factors of board meetings contribute to corporate failure. In this vein, future 
research should consider meeting‘s agenda, duration and minutes. Vafeas (1999a), for example, 
recognizes proxies for board meeting quality as follows: (1) outside directors‘ ability to direct 
meeting‘s agenda, (2) freedom to challenge and exchange ideas at board meeting, and (3) meeting 
duration less time allocated for unproductive routine task.    
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Summary of Corrporate Governance Framework in ther UK  
INDICATOR  PRINCIPLE OR GUIDANCE 
INTRODUCTION  
Corporate governance view Agency paradigm 
Trademark ‗comply or explain‘ 
LEADERSHIP  
Board structure Unitary board-(executive and independent non-executive) 
CEO duality Allowed but not permitted 
Non-executive directors Independent 
EFFECTIVENESS  
Board & Committees -Balance of skills 
-experience 
-independence 
-knowledge of the company 
Appointment  to board  -formal, rigorous and transparent 
-re-election at regular intervals 
Directors Commitment -Sufficient time  
Directors Learning &Growth -induction 
-Continuous Professional Development 
Board Information needs  -reliable and relevant  
ACCOUNTABILITY  
Company‘s position and prospects -balanced and understandable assessment 
Risk Management -maintain sound risk management and internal control system 
-established formal and transparent arrangements in relation to: 
corporate reporting and risk management and company‘s auditor 
REMUNERATION  
Levels of Remuneration -sufficient to attract, retain and motivate directors of the quality required to run the 
company successfully 
-performance related pay 
- formal and transparent policy on remuneration 
-no director should be involved in deciding his own pay. 
RELATIONS WITH SHAREHOLDERS  
Dialogue -An active Dialogue with mutual understanding  
-AGM 
Voting rights One share one vote 
OTHERS  
Disclosure  -mandatory- (FSA DTR chapters 7.1 and 7.2) 
- comply or explain- 
(FSA Listing Rules 9.8.6 R, 9.8.7 R, and 9.8.7)& The UK Corporate Governance 
Code (2010)  
Additional Guidance 
 
-Internal Controls-(The Turnbull Guidance) 
-Audit Committees-(FRC Guidance).  
 
Source of documents FRC website at: 
http://www.frc.org.uk/corporate/ukcgcode.cfm 
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Appendix 2: Comparison of Insolvency Procedures in the UK 
Procedure liquidation 
 
Reorganization 
Options Compulsory 
liquidation* 
Voluntary  
liquidation** 
Administration Administration 
receivership 
Company 
Voluntary 
Arrangement 
Corporate 
voluntary  
moratorium 
Control rights Creditors Creditors Creditors Creditors Creditors Debtor 
Owner of the 
right to run the 
firm during the 
procedure 
Official Receiver 
becomes 
liquidator unless 
the court thinks 
otherwise. 
Insolvency 
practitioner  
Administrator Administrative 
Receiver 
Administrator Directors 
Solvency 
Requirement 
Default of a  
debt covenant   
Solvent or insolvent 
company as per 
directors‘ or 
creditors‘ 
orientation, 
respectively. 
Default of a  
debt covenant 
Default of a debt 
covenant 
Default of a debt 
covenant 
Default of a 
debt covenant 
Automatic 
Stay against 
creditor claims 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
Main objectives Allow the 
company to 
compromise its 
liabilities  to 
creditors 
Allow the company 
to wound-up 
Act in the interest of 
all creditors and in turn 
rescue a company as a 
going concern 
Repayment of the 
floating charge holder 
and secured creditors‘ 
claims 
Rescue a company 
as a going concern 
Allow an 
eligible 
company 
28days 
moratorium  
Owner of the 
right to initiate 
the procedure 
Creditors, 
Company itself, 
company‘s 
directors, the 
Secretary of State 
Business 
innovation and 
skills, 
The Financial 
Services 
Authority, 
The official 
Receiver 
Creditors or  
Directors.  
The Court, Floating 
charge holder and the 
company and its 
directors 
Floating charge holder  Administrator, or 
liquidator or 
directors 
Company itself, 
company‘s 
directors, 
Liquidation 
versus 
reorganization  
The court Special resolution 
at general meeting 
The court Administrative 
Receiver 
The court The court 
Provision to ease 
new financing 
No, new financing 
is junior to 
existing claims 
No, new financing 
is junior to existing 
claims 
No, new financing is 
junior to existing 
claims 
No, new financing is 
junior to existing 
claims 
No, new financing 
is junior to 
existing claims 
No, new 
financing is 
junior to 
existing claims 
Preservation of 
residual Claims 
of Equity 
Holders 
Equity unlikely to 
have claim in 
compulsory 
liquidation 
Equity likely to 
have claim in 
members voluntary 
liquidation but not 
creditors voluntary 
liquidation 
Equity likely to have 
claim in administration 
due in part to the role 
of administrator, to act 
in the interest of all 
creditors 
Equity unlikely to 
have claim in 
receivership, since the 
receiver acts in the 
interest of his floating 
charge holder 
Equity unlikely to 
have claim in 
company 
voluntary 
arrangement 
Equity likely to 
have claim in 
company 
voluntary 
arrangement 
Adopted from Franks et al (1996) and Pochet (2002)  
*Compulsory liquidation of a company is when the company is ordered by the court to be wound up. 
** There are two types of Voluntary liquidation namely: members‘ voluntary liquidation (MVL) and creditors‘ 
voluntary liquidation (CVL)   
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Appendix 3: A Comparison of the Four Perspectives of Corporate Boards 
 PERSPECTIVES 
Dimension Legalistic Managerial 
Hegemony 
Agency Theory Resource 
Dependency 
Theoretical Origin -Corporate law -Marxist sociology -Economics 
-Finance 
-Organisational 
theory 
- Sociology 
Board Roles -Control 
-Service 
-Control 
-Service 
-Control 
-Service 
-Strategy 
-Control 
-Service 
-Strategy 
-Resources 
Board Attributes -Composition 
-Characteristics 
-Process 
-Structure 
-Composition 
-Characteristics 
-Process 
-Composition 
-Characteristics 
-Process 
-Structure 
-Composition 
-Characteristics  
Contingencies -Ownership 
concentration 
-Company Size 
 
-Ownership 
concentration 
-CEO Style 
-Ruling Capitalist 
Values 
-Ownership 
concentration 
-Company Size 
- board's equity 
compensation 
-External 
environment 
-Company life 
cycle 
-Types of business 
-board capital 
breath 
Company 
performance criteria 
-Survival 
-Growth 
-Profitability 
-Oligopolistic 
market power 
-Profitability 
-Survival 
-Low operating cost 
-Profitability 
-Growth in 
resources 
-Goal 
achievements 
-Relative Market 
Position 
Model Compliance  ‗Rubber Stamp‘ Compliance Co-optation 
Representative 
studies 
Williamson (1964) 
Berle and Means 
(1968) 
Mace (1971) 
Bainbrige (1993) 
Miller (1992) 
Cieri, Sullivan, 
Lennox (1994) 
Mills ( 1956) 
 
Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) 
Fama and Jensen 
(1983) 
Pfeffer (1972) 
Hayes and Hillman 
(2010) 
Drees and 
Heugens (2013) 
Adopted from Zahra and Pearce (1989), Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996), Daily, Dalton 
and Cannella (2003), Cornforth, 2004; Ricart, Rodriguez and Sanchez, 2005) 
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Appendix 4: Profile of Failed and Non-Failed Firms used in the Study 
  ENITITY      INSOLVENCY HISTROY 
 
SIZE DATA 
LEAD 
TIME 
No Name Petition Windup Status SIC03 Assets(£ m) Used DAYS 
1 1st Dental Laboratories PLC 24/09/10 pending R 8072  8.07  2005 - 09 298 
2 Actif Group plc 21/12/06 22/02/07 D 2339 8.62  2001 - 05  509 
3 Actionleisure plc 11/10/01 21/04/10 R 919 49.75  1996 - 00 284 
4 Adam& Harvey Group PLC 12/07/02 12/07/02 D 5051  15.14  1997 - 01 193  
5 Adval Group plc 31/08/06 11/06/07 D 7372 1.68  2001 - 05 518  
6 Advanced Technology PLC 14/09/10 14/09/10 D 3669 6.45  2000 - 03 2,449  
7 Airflow Streamlines PLC 19/01/04 11/01/05 L 2931 37.94  1999 - 03 19  
8 Alizyme plc  06/08/09 15/06/10 L 2834 5.30  2004 - 08 218  
9 Alldays plc 28/10/02 28/04/06 D 5411 175.80  1997 - 01 365  
10 Aquilo plc 01/10/07 27/01/10 D 6411 5.12  2004 - 06 274  
11 Arcolectric Holdings PLC 26/11/03 10/03/04 D 7415 16.25  1997 - 01 695  
12 Argonaut Games PLC 23/02/05 12/05/06 D 3537 12.69  1999 - 03 573  
13 Arthur Wood & Son PLC 03/10/03 05/10/04 D 7372 2.36  1998 - 02 276  
14 ASW Holdings plc 10/07/02 12/08/04 D 3312 164.30  1997 - 01 191  
15 AT Communications Group plc 03/08/09 31/01/11 L 4899 76.85  2004 - 08 215  
16 Availeon PLC 13/12/01 26/11/02 D 5812 1.94  1996 - 00 622  
17 AX Realisation Plc 12/07/10 22/12/10 L 5142 95.14  2005 - 09 527  
18 Bakabo plc 10/09/10 10/09/10 L 7371 3.86  2005 - 09 528  
19 Baldwin Industries Services plc 28/10/02 26/02/03 L 7353 142.18  1998 - 02 211  
20 Bearing Power International PLC 08/08/06 08/08/06 D 5085 7.51  1996 - 00 2,046 
21 Beauford PLC 07/09/07 07/09/07 L 3299 2.37  2001 - 04 980  
22 Beaufort International  Group PLC 10/12/04 20/07/06 D 8742 2.28  1999 - 03 345  
23 BEDE PLC 31/03/08 23/07/10 D 3844 13.09  2002 - 06 456  
24 Bertam Holding PLC 07/05/08 07/05/08 D 2076 46.70  2000 - 04 1,223  
25 Bioglan Pharma PLC 21/02/02 31/01/03 L 2834 257.05  1997 - 01 386 
26 Blagden PLC 21/08/00 21/08/00 D 7415 151.30  1994 - 98 599  
27 Blockeys PLC 03/08/10 03/08/10 D 7499 24.26  1995 - 99 3,868 
28 BNB Recruitment Solutions PLC 29/06/09 25/01/10 L 8742 52.27  2003 - 07 546  
29 BV Group PLC 10/09/03 06/10/04 D 7440 3.03  1997 - 01 618  
30 Cakebread Robey PLC 09/10/09 13/07/10 D 5211 10.28  1996 - 00 3,204  
31 Calluna PLC 17/04/03 23/09/05 D 3572 13.97  1997 - 99 1,203 
32 Canterbury Foods Group PLC 03/01/06 04/01/07 D 7361 38.94  2000 - 04 368  
33 Carbo PLC 29/03/05 28/03/06 D 3291 35.80  2000 - 04 423  
34 Celebrated Group PLC (THE) 27/08/99 26/06/00 D 7011 11.99  1994 - 98 516  
35 Chesterton International Limited 07/03/05 09/07/08 L 7031 18.09  2000 - 04 66  
36 ChoicesUK PLC 22/08/07 14/08/08 L 5212 45.51  2002 - 06 445  
37 Compact Power Holding PLC 31/01/11 31/01/11 L 4953 3.36  2002 - 06 1,767  
38 Connaught PLC 08/09/10 pending R 4525 470.90  2005 - 09 373 
39 Courts PLC 30/11/04 02/12/07 D 5712 619.70  2000 - 04 244  
40 Customvis PLC 12/08/10 15/07/11 L 3845 4.07  2005 - 09 408  
41 Designrealm Holding PLC 06/11/03 07/08/08 D 3661 20.23  1998 - 02 494 
42 Dream Direct Group PLC 31/05/07 28/01/10 L 5961 2.07  2003 - 06 426  
43 Ennstone PLC 09/03/09 10/03/10 L 7415 448.48  2003 - 07 434  
44 Erinaceous Group plc 14/04/08 14/04/08 R 7349 439.80  2002 - 06 470  
45 European Home Retail plc 13/10/06 21/02/07 L 5961 58.11  2001 - 05 531  
46 Faupel Limited 12/05/09 16/11/10 L 5023 8.62  2003 - 07 498  
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Appendix 4: Continuation 2 of 8 
  ENITITY      INSOLVENCY HISTROY  SIZE DATA 
LEAD 
TIME 
No Name Petition Windup Status SIC03 Assets(£ m) Used DAYS 
47 
Ferguson International Holdings 
PLC 21/01/00 13/04/06 D 2754 32.23  1995 - 99 327  
48 FII Group plc 24/06/04 21/06/05 D 3149 7.05  1998 - 02 755  
49 Fortress Holdings PLC 30/11/04 30/11/04 L 3646 16.76  1999 - 03 
         
335  
50 French PLC 08/04/02 08/04/02 L 2591 9.37  1997 - 01 190  
51 Gaskell plc 18/03/05 09/03/06 D 2591 17.27  1999 - 03 443  
52 Glow Communications PLC 15/11/04 05/04/06 D 4899 3.69  1999 - 03 351  
53 Hawtal Whiting Holdings PLC 20/10/00 29/03/01 L 8711 24.77  1995 - 99 294  
54 
Highbury House Communications 
PLC 20/01/06 05/09/08 D 2721 98.85  2000 - 04 385  
55 Intimas Group PLC 15/07/09 27/05/10 L 2341 17.29  2003 - 07 562  
56 Inveresk PLC 08/10/10 pending R 2621 19.83  2003 - 07 1,012 
57 Jarvis PLC 26/03/10 23/09/11 R 4789 101.30  2005 - 09 360 
58 Jessops PLC 21/01/10 25/04/11 D 5946 93.10  2004 - 08 478  
59 John Tams Group PLC 16/02/00 08/11/00 D 3263 16.52  1995 - 99 322  
60 Lambert Howarth Group plc 03/10/07 28/03/09 D 5139 49.89  2001 - 05 641  
61 Lamont Holding PLC 06/02/03 06/02/03 R 2221 29.98  1997 - 01 402  
62 Litho Supplies PLC 22/12/09 14/07/10 D 5085 23.42  2004 - 08 356  
63 Maypole Group PLC 27/10/10 pending R 7011 11.20  2005 - 09 300  
64 Meldex International PLC 23/08/10 26/08/11 L 2834 24.34  2004 - 08 600  
65 Minorplanet Systems PLC 09/11/10 pending R 5135 10.90  2005 - 09 435  
66 Newport Networks Group PLC 17/08/09 17/08/09 L 2725 7.75  2005 - 07 595  
67 Oakdene Homes PLC 23/01/09 21/01/11 L 1522 144.49  2003 - 07 389  
68 Old Monk Company PLC 09/10/02 08/05/08 D 5812 30.23  1997 - 01 529  
69 Pan Pacific Aggregate PLC 07/06/11 07/06/11 R 1411 7.08  2006 - 10 158  
70 Partridge Fine Art Ltd 20/07/09 17/06/11 L 5250 16.39  2003 - 07 628  
71 Plasmon plc 06/10/08 23/09/09 D 3572 46.72  2004 - 08 189  
72 Po Na Na Group PLC 01/05/03 26/07/06 D 5813 31.64  1998 - 02 396  
73 Provalis PLC 15/09/06 15/09/06 L 2834 16.00  2001 - 05 467  
74 Radamec Group PLC 28/07/05 15/09/06 D 3625 8.60  2000 - 04 209  
75 Raymarine PLC 14/05/10 13/08/10 L 7415 121.79  2005 - 09 134  
76 Regent Inns PLC 20/10/09 20/10/09 R 5813 152.15  2004 - 08 479  
77 Rok PLC 08/11/10 08/11/10 R 7415 375.20  2005 - 09 312  
78 Scipher PLC 27/09/04 24/07/08 D 6794 28.02  1999 - 03 546  
79 Scotia Holding PLC 29/01/01 29/01/01 R 2834 45.29  1995 - 99 395  
80 Shalibane PLC 30/03/01 17/12/04 D 3714 14.09  1995 - 99 455 
81 Superscape Group Limited 22/12/10 22/12/10 L 3269 10.52  2004 - 08 721  
82 The Mayflower Corporation PLC 31/03/04 28/12/06 L 3713 523.20  1998 - 02 456  
83 Thomas Walker plc 24/04/09 22/10/09 L 3542 8.66  2004 - 08 298  
84 Total Office Group PLC 08/10/99 17/07/00 D 2521 24.64  1994 - 98 312  
85 UNO PLC 15/03/00 08/02/10 R 270759 6.43  1996 - 00 326  
86 Vanco plc 25/05/08 13/05/11 D 7373 203.43  2003 - 07 480  
87 Victory Corporation Limited 28/09/09 16/09/10 L 5122 24.10  2002 - 06 1,277 
88 Vivomedica PLC 14/09/10 14/09/10 L 3841 6.23  2004 - 08 622  
89 Wagon plc 08/12/08 pending R 3465 648.60  2004 - 08  252 
90 Waterdorm plc 28/02/00 06/09/11 D 3640 64.32  1995 - 99 334 
91 Wembley plc 18/08/05 31/08/05 L 7997 201.75  2000 - 04 230 
92 Whitehead Mann Group plc 18/05/10 18/05/10 D 7361 27.71  2003 - 07 1,144 
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  ENITITY      INSOLVENCY HISTROY  SIZE DATA 
LEAD 
TIME 
No Name Petition Windup Status SIC03 Assets(£ m) Used DAYS 
         
93 Widney plc 12/03/09 14/10/09 L 2591 11.95  2003 - 07 529  
94 Woolworths Group plc 27/01/09 11/02/10 L 5311 1,320.60  2004 - 08 360  
95 World Telecom PLC 23/12/99 03/11/10 D 3661 18.11  1996 - 98 357  
96 4imprint Group PLC n.a n.a A 5248 43.91  2001 - 05 n.a   
97 A.G. Barr P.L.C. n.a n.a A 1598 102.39  2001 - 05 n.a   
98 Acal PLC n.a n.a A 5190 169.50  2002 - 06  n.a   
99 Aegis Group PLC n.a n.a A 7440 4,409.00  2006 - 10  n.a   
100 AGA Rangemaster Group PLC n.a n.a A 2972 557.30  2002 - 06  n.a   
101 Aggreko PLC n.a n.a A 7132 1,393.00  2006 - 10  n.a   
102 Air Partner PLC n.a n.a A 6220 37.55  2002 - 06  n.a   
103 API Group PLC n.a n.a A 2872 120.73  1999 - 03  n.a   
104 Arm Holdings PLC n.a n.a A 3210 623.71  2003 - 07  n.a   
105 Assetco PLC n.a n.a A 7415 190.27  2006 - 10  n.a   
106 Associated British Foods PLC n.a n.a A 1589 9,108.00  2006 - 10  n.a   
107 Autologic Holdings PLC n.a n.a A 6024 263.70  2000 - 04  n.a   
108 Aveva Group PLC n.a n.a A 7260 72.62  2001 - 05  n.a   
109 Avon Rubber P.L.C. n.a n.a A 2513 175.62  2000 - 04  n.a   
110 Babcock International Group PLC n.a n.a A 6323 3,179.00  2007 - 11  n.a   
111 BAE Systems PLC n.a n.a A 3530 22,870.00  2007 - 11  n.a   
112 Balfour Beatty PLC n.a n.a A 4521 5,216.00  2006 - 10  n.a   
113 Barratt Developments P L C n.a n.a A 4521 2,203.30  2006 - 10  n.a   
114 BBA Aviation PLC n.a n.a A 6323 1,367.70  2006 - 10  n.a   
115 Bellway P L C n.a n.a A 4521 1,628.80  2003 - 07  n.a   
116 Berendsen PLC n.a n.a A 9301 1,408.00  2006 - 10  n.a   
117 Blacks Leisure Group PLC n.a n.a A 5242 140.60  2001 - 05  n.a   
118 Bloomsbury Publishing PLC n.a n.a A 2211 84.95  1999 - 03  n.a   
119 Bodycote PLC n.a n.a A 2851 970.20  2003 - 07  n.a   
120 Booker Group PLC n.a n.a A 5139 851.50  2007 - 11  n.a   
121 Bovis Homes Group PLC n.a n.a A 4521 941.02  2002 - 06  n.a   
122 Brammer PLC n.a n.a A 5186 233.72  2003 - 07  n.a   
123 British American Tobacco P.L.C. n.a n.a A 1600 18,466.00  2006 - 07  n.a   
124 British Polythene Industries PLC n.a n.a A 2522 212.50  2003 - 07  n.a   
125 
British SKY Broadcasting Group 
PLC n.a n.a A 9220 4,804.00  2006 - 10  n.a   
126 Britvic PLC n.a n.a A 3530 1,039.90  2006 - 10  n.a   
127 BT Group PLC n.a n.a A 6420 23,079.00  2006 - 10  n.a   
128 BTG PLC n.a n.a A 7310 98.40  1999 - 03  n.a   
129 Bunzl PLC n.a n.a A 5190 2,652.50  2006 - 10  n.a   
130 Burberry Group PLC n.a n.a A 1822 1,294.00  2007 - 11  n.a   
131 Caffyns PLC n.a n.a A 5010 65.75  2001 - 05  n.a   
132 Carclo PLC n.a n.a A 2524 129.81  1999 - 03  n.a   
133 Carillion PLC n.a n.a A 4521 3,049.60  2006 - 10  n.a   
134 Carpetright PLC n.a n.a A 5248 267.20  2003 - 07  n.a   
135 Castings PLC n.a n.a A 2751 75.44  1999 - 03  n.a   
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  ENITITY INSOLVENCY HISTROY  SIZE DATA 
LEAD 
TIME 
No Name Petition Windup Status SIC03 Assets(£ m) Used DAYS 
136 Chemring Group PLC n.a n.a A 2461 355.40  2003 - 07  n.a   
137 Chime Communications PLC n.a n.a A 7440 117.40  2002 - 06  n.a   
138 Clarkson PLC n.a n.a A 6340 123.80  2001 - 05  n.a   
139 Clinton Cards PLC n.a n.a A 5248 245.07  2003 - 07  n.a   
140 Cobham PLC n.a n.a A 3530 2,559.50  2006 - 10  n.a   
141 Communisis PLC n.a n.a A 2222 285.97  2001 - 05  n.a   
142 Compass Group PLC n.a n.a A 5552 7,958.00  2006 - 10  n.a   
143 Computacenter PLC n.a n.a A 7222 964.18  2006 - 10  n.a   
144 Cookson Group PLC n.a n.a A 3663 2,603.80  2006 - 10  n.a   
145 Cosalt PLC n.a n.a A 2922 82.34  1999 - 03  n.a   
146 Costain Group PLC n.a n.a A 4521 375.40  2006 - 10  n.a   
147 Cranswick PLC n.a n.a A 1513 291.43  2003 - 07  n.a   
148 Croda International PLC n.a n.a A 2466 913.10  2006 - 10  n.a   
149 Daily Mail And General Trust P LC n.a n.a A 2212 2,049.70  2006 - 210  n.a   
150 Dairy Crest Group PLC n.a n.a A 1551 1,182.50  2007 - 11  n.a   
151 Daisy Group PLC n.a n.a A 6420 148.69  2001 - 04  n.a   
152 Dart Group PLC n.a n.a A 6024 241.50  2003 - 07  n.a   
153 Dawson Holdings PLC n.a n.a A 5147 85.70  1999 - 03  n.a   
154 De LA Rue PLC n.a n.a A 2222 519.70  2003 - 07  n.a   
155 Debenhams PLC n.a n.a A 5212 1,995.30  2006 - 10  n.a   
156 Dechra Pharmaceuticals PLC n.a n.a A 2441  90.16  2002 - 06  n.a   
157 Devro PLC n.a n.a A 1589 160.15  2002 - 06  n.a   
158 Diageo PLC n.a n.a A 1591 18,925.00  2006 - 10  n.a   
159 Dialight PLC n.a n.a A 3210 74.46  1999 - 03  n.a   
160 Dixons Retail PLC n.a n.a A 5245 3,414.00  2007 - 11  n.a   
161 Domino Printing Sciences PLC n.a n.a A 2956 175.88  2002 - 06  n.a   
162 DS Smith PLC n.a n.a A 2121 1,452.80  2006 - 10  n.a   
163 Easyjet PLC n.a n.a A 6210 4,002.50  2006 - 10  n.a   
164 Electrocomponents PLC n.a n.a A 5186 712.10  2006 - 10  n.a   
165 Elementis PLC n.a n.a A 2466 355.10  2003 - 07  n.a   
166 Empresaria Group PLC n.a n.a A 745 25.96  2002 - 06  n.a   
167 Enterprise Inns PLC n.a n.a A 5540 6,356.00  2003 - 07  n.a   
168 Euromoney Institutional Investor PLC n.a n.a A 2213 216.17  2002 - 06  n.a   
169 Fenner PLC n.a n.a A 2513 340.30  2003 - 07  n.a   
170 Fidessa Group PLC n.a n.a A 7222 81.92  2002 - 06  n.a   
171 Findel P.L.C. n.a n.a A 5261 577.48  2003 - 07  n.a   
172 Firstgroup PLC n.a n.a A 6021 5,236.10  2007 - 11  n.a   
173 French Connection Group PLC n.a n.a A 1548 179.80  2001 - 05  n.a   
174 Fuller Smith & Turner PLC n.a n.a A 1596 371.29  2002 - 06  n.a   
175 G4S PLC n.a n.a A 7460 5,212.00  2006 - 10  n.a   
176 Galliford Try PLC n.a n.a A 1542 1,110.40  2006 - 10  n.a   
177 Games Workshop Group PLC n.a n.a A 3650 61.35  2000 - 04  n.a   
178 Genus PLC n.a n.a A 142 104.83  2001 - 05  n.a   
179 GKN PLC n.a n.a A 3430 4,250.00  2006 - 10  n.a   
180 Goodwin PLC n.a n.a A 2852 20.24  1999 - 03  n.a   
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 ENITITY      INSOLVENCY HISTROY  SIZE DATA 
LEAD 
TIME 
No Name Petition Windup Status SIC03 Assets(£ m) Used DAYS 
181 Greene King PLC n.a n.a A 5540 2,867.20  2006 - 10  n.a   
182 Greggs PLC n.a n.a A 1581 238.21  2003 - 07  n.a   
183 H.R.Owen PLC n.a n.a A 5010 169.95  2000 - 04  n.a   
184 Halfords Group PLC n.a n.a A 5030 641.90  2007 - 11  n.a   
185 Halma PLC n.a n.a A 3320 337.27  2003 - 07  n.a   
186 Hampson Industries P.L.C. n.a n.a A 3530 92.13  2001 - 05  n.a   
187 Harvey Nash Group PLC n.a n.a A 7450 80.71  2003 - 07  n.a   
188 Havelock Europa PLC n.a n.a A 3612 42.06  1999 - 03  n.a   
189 Hays PLC n.a n.a A 7450 753.40  2006 - 10  n.a   
190 Headlam Group PLC n.a n.a A 5147 324.43  2003 - 07  n.a   
191 Henry Boot PLC n.a n.a A 4521 199.80  2000 - 04  n.a   
192 Hill & Smith Holdings PLC n.a n.a A 2811 238.37  2002 - 06  n.a   
193 Hilton Food Group PLC n.a n.a A 5222 191.47  2008 - 10  n.a   
194 HMV Group PLC n.a n.a A 5248 675.30  2006 - 10  n.a   
195 Holidaybreak Plc n.a n.a A 5522 440.80  2007 - 07  n.a   
196 Holidaybreak Plc. n.a n.a A 5522 204.50  2003 - 06  n.a   
197 Home Retail Group PLC n.a n.a A 5244 4,098.40  2007 - 11  n.a   
198 Homeserve PLC n.a n.a A 6720 454.37  2003 - 07  n.a   
199 Howden Joinery Group PLC n.a n.a A 3614 366.20  2003 - 07  n.a   
200 Huntsworth PLC n.a n.a A 7440 257.91  2001 - 05  n.a   
201 Hyder Consulting PLC n.a n.a A 7420 101.87  2002 - 06  n.a   
202 
Imagination Technologies Group 
PLC n.a n.a A 3230 20.31  1999 - 03  n.a   
203 IMI PLC n.a n.a A 2924 1,566.70  2006 - 10  n.a   
204 Imperial Tobacco Group PLC n.a n.a A 1600 8,956.00  2006 - 07  n.a   
205 Inchcape PLC n.a n.a A 5010 3,070.50  2006 - 10  n.a   
206 Intercontinental Hotels Group PLC n.a n.a A 5510 1,726.08  2006 - 10  n.a   
207 Interior Services Group PLC n.a n.a A 4521 377.87  2006 - 10  n.a   
208 International Greetings PLC n.a n.a A 2125 83.11  2001 - 05  n.a   
209 Interserve PLC n.a n.a A 4521 972.40  2006 - 10  n.a   
210 Intertek Group PLC n.a n.a A 7430 1,130.80  2006 - 10  n.a   
211 Invensys PLC n.a n.a A 3162 1,994.00  2007 - 11  n.a   
212 ITE Group PLC n.a n.a A 7487 93.69  2000 - 04  n.a   
213 ITV PLC n.a n.a A 9220 3,038.00  2006 - 10  n.a   
214 J D Wetherspoon PLC n.a n.a A 5813 893.13  2006 - 10  n.a   
215 J Sainsbury PLC n.a n.a A 5211 11,399.00  2007 - 11  n.a   
216 Jacques Vert PLC n.a n.a A 5242 77.35  2000 - 04  n.a   
217 James Fisher And Sons PLC n.a n.a A 6110 218.81  2002 - 06  n.a   
218 James Halstead PLC n.a n.a A 4543 94.79  2001 - 05  n.a   
219 James Latham PLC n.a n.a A 5153 50.85  2000 - 04  n.a   
220 JD Sports Fashion PLC n.a n.a A 5242 367.67  2007 - 11  n.a   
221 John Menzies PLC n.a n.a A 5147 477.80  2006 - 10  n.a   
222 Johnson Matthey PLC n.a n.a A 2466 2,832.80  2006 - 10  n.a   
223 Johnson Service Group PLC n.a n.a A 7140 393.70  2002 - 06  n.a   
224 Johnston Press PLC n.a n.a A 2212 1,874.17  2002 - 06  n.a   
225 Kcom Group PLC n.a n.a A 6420 452.65  2002 - 06  n.a 
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Appendix 4: contination 6 of 8 
  ENITITY   INSOLVENCY HISTROY  SIZE DATA 
LEAD 
TIME 
No Name Petition Windup Status SIC03 Assets(£ m) Used DAYS 
226 Keller Group PLC n.a n.a A 4521 813.00  2006 - 10  n.a   
227 Kesa Electricals PLC n.a n.a A 5245 1,721.30  2006 - 10  n.a   
228 Kier Group PLC n.a n.a A 4521 1,093.70  2006 - 10  n.a   
229 Kingfisher PLC n.a n.a A 5246 9,576.00  2007 - 11  n.a   
230 Kofax PLC n.a n.a A 7222 152.38  2006 - 06  n.a   
231 Ladbrokes PLC n.a n.a A 9271 977.60  2006 - 10  n.a   
232 Laird PLC n.a n.a A 3210 790.20  2003 - 07  n.a   
233 Laura Ashley Holdings PLC n.a n.a A 1822 112.30  2002 - 06  n.a   
234 Lavendon Group PLC n.a n.a A 7132 267.75  2002 - 06  n.a   
235 Logica PLC n.a n.a A 3002 3,620.70  2006 - 10  n.a   
236 London Security Plc. n.a n.a A 2924 81.74  1999 - 03  n.a   
237 Lookers PLC n.a n.a A 5010 683.70  2006 - 10  n.a   
238 LOW & Bonar PLC n.a n.a A 1717 265.20  2002 - 06  n.a   
239 Lupus Capital PLC n.a n.a A 2523 118.30  2002 - 06  n.a   
240 Macfarlane Group PLC n.a n.a A 2522 80.44  2000 - 04  n.a   
241 Majestic Wine PLC n.a n.a A 5134 81.94  2002 - 06  n.a   
242 
Management Consulting Group 
PLC n.a n.a A 7414 221.92  2002 - 06  n.a   
243 Marks And Spencer Group P.L.C. n.a n.a A 5212 7,344.10  2007 - 11  n.a   
244 Marshalls PLC n.a n.a A 2661 358.18  2005 - 06  n.a   
245 Marston's PLC n.a n.a A 5540 2,324.70  2003 - 07  n.a   
246 Mcbride PLC n.a n.a A 2452 404.20  2003 - 07  n.a   
247 Mears Group PLC n.a n.a A 4521 143.75  2003 - 07  n.a   
248 Meggitt PLC n.a n.a A 1598 3,079.70  2005 - 09  n.a   
249 Melrose PLC n.a n.a A 2852 2,110.80  2006 - 10  n.a   
250 Michael Page International PLC n.a n.a A 7450 308.89  2006 - 10  n.a   
251 
Millennium & Copthorne Hotels 
PLC n.a n.a A 5510 2,414.20  2003 - 07  n.a   
252 Misys PLC n.a n.a A 7221 542.70  2003 - 07  n.a   
253 Mitchells & Butlers PLC n.a n.a A 5540  4,464.00  2006 - 10  n.a   
254 Mitie Group PLC n.a n.a A 7487 1,074.80  2007 - 11  n.a   
255 Molins PLC n.a n.a A 2953 151.60  1999 - 03  n.a   
256 
Morgan Crucible Company 
Plc(The) n.a n.a A 2466 1,004.00  2005 - 09  n.a   
257 Morgan Sindall Group PLC n.a n.a A 4521 1,018.60  2006 - 10  n.a   
258 Moss Bros Group PLC n.a n.a A 5242 66.13  2000 - 04  n.a   
259 Mothercare Plc. n.a n.a A 5248 226.80  2003 - 07  n.a   
260 N Brown Group PLC n.a n.a A 5261 553.90  2003 - 07  n.a   
261 National Express Group PLC n.a n.a A 6021 2,420.80  2006 - 10  n.a   
262 Next PLC n.a n.a A 5242 1,792.30  2007 - 11  n.a   
263 Nichols PLC n.a n.a A 1598 59.21  1999 - 03  n.a   
264 North Midland Construction PLC n.a n.a A 4521 40.57  2000 - 04  n.a   
265 Northamber PLC n.a n.a A 5184 60.78  2000 - 04  n.a   
266 Northgate PLC n.a n.a A 7110 1,272.59  2003 - 07  n.a   
267 NWF Group PLC n.a n.a A 5131 81.84  2002 - 06  n.a   
268 Oxford Instruments PLC n.a n.a A 3320 136.80  2001 - 05  n.a   
269 Pace PLC n.a n.a A 3230 967.30  2006 - 10  n.a   
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Appendix 4: Continuation 7 of 8 
 ENITITY INSOLVENCY HISTROY  SIZE DATA 
LEAD 
TIME 
No Name Petition Windup Status SIC03 Assets(£ m) Used DAYS 
270 Parity Group PLC n.a n.a A 7222 56.55  1999 - 03  n.a   
271 Pearson PLC n.a n.a A 2211 10,392.00  2006 - 10  n.a   
272 Pendragon PLC n.a n.a A 5010 1,402.00  2006 - 10  n.a   
273 Penna Consulting PLC n.a n.a A 7414 42.07  1999 - 03  n.a   
274 Persimmon PLC n.a n.a A 4521 2,686.00  2006 - 10  n.a   
275 Phoenix IT Group PLC n.a n.a A 7222 107.87  2002 - 06  n.a   
276 Premier Farnell PLC n.a n.a A 5186 511.70  2007 - 11  n.a   
277 Premier Foods PLC n.a n.a A 1589 3,499.50  2006 - 10  n.a   
278 Psion PLC n.a n.a A 3002 237.11  2001 - 05  n.a   
279 Punch Taverns PLC n.a n.a A 5540 5,850.10  2006 - 10  n.a   
280 PZ Cussons PLC n.a n.a A 2451 540.80  2003 - 07  n.a   
281 Qinetiq Group PLC n.a n.a A 7430 1,449.50  2007 - 11  n.a   
282 Quadnetics Group PLC n.a n.a A 3162 11.25  1999 - 03  n.a   
283 Reckitt Benckiser Group PLC n.a n.a A 2451 13,201.00  2008 - 10  n.a   
284 Redhall Group PLC n.a n.a A 2875 15.07  2000 - 04  n.a   
285 Redrow PLC n.a n.a A 4521 927.40  2002 - 06  n.a   
286 Reed Elsevier PLC n.a n.a A 2211 11,103.00  2006 - 10  n.a   
287 Renew Holdings Plc. n.a n.a A 4521 131.46  2002 - 06  n.a   
288 Renishaw P L C n.a n.a A 3320 161.59  2001 - 05  n.a   
289 Renold PLC n.a n.a A 2914 179.80  2001 - 05  n.a   
290 Rentokil Initial PLC n.a n.a A 7470 1,791.20  2006 - 10  n.a   
291 Rexam PLC n.a n.a A 2872 5,815.00  2006 - 10  n.a   
292 Ricardo PLC n.a n.a A 7420 121.03  2000 - 04  n.a   
293 RM PLC n.a n.a A 7222 141.64  2002 - 06  n.a   
294 Robert Walters PLC n.a n.a A 7450 107.69  2003 - 07  n.a   
295 Robert Wiseman Dairies PLC n.a n.a A 1551 337.02  2007 - 11  n.a   
296 Rotork P.L.C. n.a n.a A 5186 139.77  2002 - 06  n.a   
297 RPC Group PLC n.a n.a A 2522 848.30  2007 - 11  n.a   
298 Savills PLC n.a n.a A 7031 524.70  2003 - 07  n.a   
299 Scapa Group PLC n.a n.a A 2462 154.10  2001 - 05  n.a   
300 SDL PLC n.a n.a A 7222 92.65  2001 - 05  n.a   
301 Senior PLC n.a n.a A 3530 393.00  2003 - 07  n.a   
302 Serco Group PLC n.a n.a A 7414 2,478.90  2006 - 10  n.a   
303 Severfield-Rowen PLC n.a n.a A 2811 140.41  2002 - 06  n.a   
304 Shanks Group PLC n.a n.a A 9001 720.60  2003 - 07  n.a   
305 SIG PLC n.a n.a A 5154 1,535.60  2006 - 10  n.a   
306 Smiths Group PLC n.a n.a A 3310 3,264.10  2006 - 10  n.a   
307 Smiths News PLC n.a n.a A 5147 179.60  2006 - 10  n.a   
308 
Southern Cross Healthcare Group 
PLC n.a n.a A 8514 411.20  2006 - 10  n.a   
309 Spectris PLC n.a n.a A 3320 954.80  2006 - 10  n.a   
310 Speedy Hire PLC n.a n.a A 7134 350.00  2002 - 06  n.a   
311 Spirax-Sarco Engineering PLC n.a n.a A 2912 353.75  2003 - 07  n.a   
312 Spirent Communications PLC n.a n.a A 6420 287.80  2002 - 06  n.a   
313 Sportingbet PLC n.a n.a A 9271 163.20  2006 - 10  n.a   
314 Sports Direct International PLC n.a n.a A 5242 902.75  2007 - 11  n.a   
315 Stagecoach Group PLC n.a n.a A 6021 1,620.60  2006 - 10  n.a   
316 Sthree PLC n.a n.a A 7450 175.04  2003 - 07  n.a   
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 ENITITY      INSOLVENCY HISTROY  SIZE DATA 
LEAD 
TIME 
No Name Petition Windup Status SIC03 Assets(£ m) Used DAYS 
317 STV Group PLC n.a n.a A 9220 440.30  2001 - 03  n.a   
318 T Clarke PLC n.a n.a A 4531 67.27  2001 - 05  n.a   
319 Tate & Lyle PLC n.a n.a A 1583 2,977.00  2007 - 11  n.a   
320 Taylor Wimpey PLC n.a n.a A 4521 3,952.80  2006 - 10  n.a   
321 Ted Baker PLC n.a n.a A 5242 58.94 2001 - 05  n.a   
322 Telecom Plus PLC n.a n.a A 6420 64.84  2003 - 07  n.a   
323 Tesco PLC n.a n.a A 5211 24,775.00  2007 - 07  n.a   
324 The Alumasc Group PLC n.a n.a A 2875 69.62  1999 - 03  n.a   
325 The Berkeley Group Holdings PLC n.a n.a A 4521 1,249.71  2005 - 07  n.a   
326 The Capita Group PLC n.a n.a A 7414 2,760.30  2006 - 10  n.a   
327 The Character Group PLC n.a n.a A 5147 33.37  1999 - 03  n.a   
328 The Game Group PLC n.a n.a A 5248 668.69  2007 - 11  n.a   
329 The Go-Ahead Group PLC n.a n.a A 6021 983.70  2006 - 10  n.a   
330 The Innovation Group PLC n.a n.a A 7260 61.79  2000 - 04  n.a   
331 The Rank Group PLC n.a n.a A 9271 596.50  2003 - 07  n.a   
332 The Restaurant Group PLC n.a n.a A 5530 280.59  2003 - 07  n.a   
333 The Sage Group Plc. n.a n.a A 7222 2,711.00  2006 - 10  n.a   
334 The Vitec Group Plc. n.a n.a A 3230 161.30  2002 - 06  n.a   
335 Thorntons PLC n.a n.a A 1584 111.97  2001 - 05  n.a   
336 Tottenham Hotspur PLC n.a n.a A 9261 93.30  2000 - 04  n.a   
337 Travis Perkins PLC n.a n.a A 5153 4,061.80  2006 - 10  n.a   
338 Tribal Group PLC n.a n.a A 7414 305.52  2001 - 05  n.a   
339 Trifast PLC n.a n.a A 2874 73.53  1999 - 03  n.a   
340 Trinity Mirror PLC n.a n.a A 2212 1,966.20  2003 - 07  n.a   
341 TT Electronics PLC n.a n.a A 3210 375.30  2003 - 07  n.a   
342 Ultra Electronics Holdings PLC n.a n.a A 3162 357.55  2003 - 07  n.a   
343 Umeco PLC n.a n.a A 3530 211.40  2001 - 05  n.a   
344 Uniq PLC n.a n.a A 1513 433.70  2002 - 06  n.a   
345 Victrex PLC n.a n.a A 2416 121.80  2001 - 05  n.a   
346 Volex Group P.L.C. n.a n.a A 3162 109.43  2002 - 06  n.a   
347 VP PLC n.a n.a A 7134 81.85  2000 - 04  n.a   
348 Weir Group Plc(The) n.a n.a A 2912 2,005.60  2006 - 10  n.a   
349 WH Smith PLC n.a n.a A 5247 503.00  2006 - 10  n.a   
350 Whitbread PLC n.a n.a A 5510 2,787.70  2007 - 11  n.a   
351 William Hill PLC n.a n.a A 9271 1,811.10  2006 - 10  n.a   
352 Wincanton PLC n.a n.a A 6024 848.80  2007 - 11  n.a   
35
3 WM Morrison Supermarkets P LC n.a n.a A 5211 9,149.00  2007 - 11  n.a   
354 WS Atkins PLC n.a n.a A 7420 904.70  2007 - 11  n.a   
355 WSP Group PLC n.a n.a A 7420 457.20  2003 - 07  n.a   
356 Yell Group PLC n.a n.a A 7440 5,628.00  2007 - 11  n.a   
357 Young & Co's Brewery PLC n.a n.a A 1596 222.46  2000 - 04  n.a   
358 Yule Catto & CO PLC n.a n.a A 2413 574.92  2003 - 07  n.a   
KEY: 
Status: R –Receivership, D-Dissolved, L-In Liquidation, A-Active. 
Lead Time: is the difference between firm’s Insolvency petition data and the date of the last annual 
account used in the present study.  
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Appendix 5: Variables of The Study: Label, Measurement, Expected Sign 
Variable Label Measurement Expected 
sign 
Dependent    
Failure STAT1 Dummy value (1=failed firm, 0 otherwise) n/a 
Independent-H1    
Board Independence 
 
BODC Number of outsider directors/board Size - 
 
Independent-H2    
Board gender diversity FMALE Dummy value (1 if at least a woman is on firm‘s board, 0 
otherwise) 
- 
Independent-H3    
Board Size BODS Number of board members during the year  - 
Independent-H4    
Presence of NC NCP Dummy value (1 =NCP; 0 = otherwise) - 
Independence of NC NCI Dummy value (1 if the NC is exclusively independent 
28
NED, 0 otherwise) 
- 
NC Chair independence  NCCI Dummy value (1 if the NC is chaired by  independent NED 
,board chair inclusive save recruiting chairs successor, 0 
otherwise) 
- 
Size of NC NCS Dummy value (1 if the NC has at least three  independent 
NED, 0 otherwise) 
- 
Frequency of meeting 
of NC 
NCM1 Dummy value (1 if the NC holds at least two meetings, 0 
otherwise) 
- 
Nomination committee 
effectiveness 
NCE Composite measure (aggregate of NCP, NCI, NCCI,NCS,  
and NCM1) 
- 
Independent-H5    
Presence of AC ACP Dummy value (1 =ACP; 0 = otherwise) - 
Independence of AC ACI Dummy value (1 if the AC is exclusively independent 
NED, 0 otherwise) 
- 
Expertise of AC ACX Dummy value (1 if the AC has at least one member with 
relevant financial expertise, 0 otherwise) 
- 
Size of AC ACS Dummy value (1 if the AC has at least three  independent 
NED, 0 otherwise) 
- 
Frequency of meeting 
of AC 
ACM1 Dummy value (1 if the AC holds at least three meetings, 0 
otherwise) 
- 
Audit  committee 
effectiveness 
ACE Composite measure (aggregate of ACP, ACI, ACX, ACS,  
and ACM1) 
- 
Independent-H6    
Presence of RC RCP Dummy value (1 =RCP; 0 = otherwise) - 
Independence of RC RCI Dummy value (1 if the RC is exclusively independent 
NED, 0 otherwise) 
- 
Independence of RCC RCCI Dummy value (1 if the RC is chaired by  independent NED, 
0 otherwise) 
- 
Size of RC RCS Dummy value (1 if the RC has at least three  independent 
NED, 0 otherwise) 
- 
Frequency of meeting 
of RC 
RCM1 Dummy value (1 if the RC holds at least two meetings, 0 
otherwise) 
- 
Remuneration 
committee 
effectiveness 
RCE Composite measure (aggregate of RCP, RCI, RCCI,RCS,  
and RCM1) 
- 
 
 
                                                          
28
 Independent NED is based on the definition in the Higgs Report (2003), Refer to chapter two of the thesis.  
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Appendix 5:  Continuation 1 of 1 
Variable Label Measurement Expected 
Sign 
Interaction Effects    
Control Function BCON   
A: CEO Performance 
Evaluation 
Or 
DCPE Coded as ―0‖, ―1‖, ―2‖, if the annual report indicates that the 
CEO‘s performance was evaluated informally, formally, and 
externally, respectively.  
- 
B: Frequency of Board 
Meeting 
BODM Number of board meetings.  - 
Resource Function  BRES   
A: Board Interlock 
Or 
BINT Dummy value of 1, if both the entity‘s chairman, senior 
NED serve on at least one board, zero otherwise.  
- 
B: Board Interlock 
 
Or 
BINT2 Dummy value of 1, if all the entity‘s lead directors 
(measured by the trinity-i.e. Chairman, CEO, and senior 
NED) serve on at least one board, zero otherwise 
- 
C: Board Interlock BINT3 Dummy value of 1, if at least an entity‘s lead director 
(measured by the trinity-i.e. Chairman, CEO, and senior 
NED) has Government experience, zero otherwise 
- 
Controls    
Liquidity WCTA Working Capital/Total Assets - 
Profitability PROF Earnings before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and 
Amortisation/Total Assets 
- 
Leverage TLTA Total Liabilities/Total Assets + 
Firm Size LOGDA logarithm of book value of year-end total assets divided by 
Consumer Price Index-deflator 
- 
Firm Age FAGE Balance sheet date minus date of incorporation +/- 
Industry Indicators INDY   
Technology  TECHN Dummy variable equals 1 if company is in the Technology 
and 0 if in any other SIC classification.  
+/- 
 Consumer  CONSU Dummy variable equals 1 if company is in the Consumer 
and 0 if in any other SIC classification. 
+/- 
Healthcare  HEALT Dummy variable equals 1 if company is in the Healthcare 
and 0 if in any other SIC classification. 
+/- 
 Telecommunication  TELEC Dummy variable equals 1 if company is in the 
Telecommunication and 0 if in any other SIC classification. 
+/- 
 Basic Materials BMATS Dummy variable equals 1 if company is in the Basic 
Materials and 0 if in any other SIC classification. 
+/- 
 Industrial 
 
INDUS Dummy variable equals 1 if company is in the Industrial and 
0 if in any other SIC classification. 
+/- 
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Appendix 6: P-P Plots of Normally and Non-Normally Distributed of Predictive Variables 
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Appendix 7:  Correlation Matrix for One Year (t - 1) Prior Failure 
t - 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1. Status 
 
-0.38 -0.22 -0.45 -0.54 -0.58 -0.61 -0.58 0.03 -0.31 -0.30 -0.18 -0.11 -0.49 0.13 -0.64 -0.15 
2. Independence -0.38* 
 
0.27 0.29 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.45 0.08 0.40 0.48 0.10 0.06 0.16 0.02 0.55 0.02 
3. Gender Div. -0.22* 0.28* 
 
0.36 0.34 0.34 0.31 0.37 -0.01 0.22 0.25 0.06 -0.06 0.11 0.05 0.37 -0.08 
4. Board Size -0.46* 0.30* 0.36* 
 
0.50 0.53 0.47 0.52 0.01 0.26 0.31 0.15 -0.08 0.25 0.03 0.64 0.05 
5. Nomination -0.52* 0.55* 0.34* 0.53* 
 
0.77 0.78 0.76 0.18 0.46 0.44 0.18 -0.04 0.29 0.04 0.72 0.02 
6. Audit Com -0.57* 0.54* 0.35* 0.59* 0.75* 
 
0.85 0.66 0.15 0.44 0.44 0.16 0.02 0.37 -0.02 0.72 0.06 
7. Remuneration -0.60* 0.51* 0.31* 0.53* 0.78* 0.82* 
 
0.64 0.19 0.50 0.49 0.19 0.07 0.34 -0.05 0.68 0.05 
8. Evaluation -0.61* 0.45* 0.37* 0.55* 0.76* 0.71* 0.69* 
 
0.10 0.35 0.39 0.13 -0.02 0.29 0.03 0.72 0.07 
9. Meeting 0.01 0.09 -0.03 0.06 0.16* 0.14* 0.17* 0.14* 
 
0.11 0.11 0.03 -0.07 -0.02 0.14 0.11 -0.03 
10. NED Interlock -0.31* 0.37* 0.22* 0.28* 0.43* 0.41* 0.44* 0.37* 0.10** 
 
0.62 0.23 -0.01 0.10 0.03 0.39 0.00 
11. BOD Interlock -0.30* 0.48* 0.25* 0.32* 0.42* 0.43* 0.47* 0.40* 0.13** 0.62* 
 
0.21 0.00 0.09 0.06 0.42 0.02 
12. Gov‘t Official -0.18* 0.09* 0.06 0.18* 0.18* 0.17* 0.19* 0.15* 0.05 0.23* 0.21* 
 
0.05 -0.03 -0.06 0.10 0.04 
13. Liquidity -0.07 -0.02 
-
0.14** -0.20* -0.10* -0.10* -0.03 -0.09* -0.08 -0.04 -0.05 0.06 
 
0.04 -0.59 -0.05 0.12 
14. Profitability -0.55* 0.14* 0.07 0.28* 0.33* 0.38* 0.35* 0.38* -0.08 0.12* 0.12* 0.07 0.03 
 
-0.16 0.43 0.15 
15. Leverage 0.10** 0.08 0.10** 0.08 0.10** 0.07** 0.02 0.08 0.12* 0.06 0.09* -0.05 -0.54* -0.11* 
 
0.03 -0.11 
16. Firm Size -0.61* 0.56* 0.37* 0.66* 0.72* 0.76* 0.69* 0.76* 0.13* 0.39* 0.42* 0.10* -0.17* 0.33* 0.13* 
 
0.16 
17. Firm Age -0.16* 0.04 
-
0.09** 0.04 -0.01 0.06 0.03 0.09 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.19* 0.05 
-
0.11* 0.14* 
 Notes: Pearson correlation is shown above and to the right of the diagonal; below and left is Spearman correlation. 
Observations: Total=353; Failed Firms…93, Non-Failed Firms 260  
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Appendix 8: Correlation Matrix for Two Years (t - 2) Prior Failure 
t - 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1. Status 
 
-0.36 -0.16 -0.39 -0.51 -0.56 -0.61 -0.51 -0.01 -0.28 -0.26 -0.18 0.00 -0.32 -0.06 -0.60 -0.14 
2. Independence -0.36* 
 
0.24 0.25 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.45 0.07 0.39 0.49 0.08 -0.02 0.05 0.16 0.53 0.00 
3. Gender Div. -0.16* 0.23 
 
0.38 0.32 0.34 0.30 0.31 0.03 0.19 0.24 0.04 -0.13 0.12 0.12 0.33 -0.08 
4. Board Size -0.41* 0.26 0.39 
 
0.48 0.51 0.47 0.43 0.04 0.22 0.25 0.17 -0.17 0.14 0.19 0.62 0.08 
5. Nomination -0.50* 0.52 0.32 0.51 
 
0.75 0.77 0.75 0.17 0.42 0.42 0.20 -0.09 0.21 0.19 0.71 0.01 
6. Audit Com -0.55* 0.52 0.33 0.57 0.73 
 
0.84 0.64 0.16 0.41 0.37 0.14 -0.06 0.23 0.14 0.72 0.05 
7. Remuneration -0.60* 0.49 0.30 0.52 0.77 0.80 
 
0.62 0.21 0.47 0.44 0.16 -0.04 0.24 0.11 0.69 0.05 
8. Evaluation -0.53* 0.46 0.32 0.49 0.76 0.71 0.68 
 
0.15 0.27 0.35 0.11 -0.10 0.15 0.22 0.69 0.06 
9. Meeting -0.03 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.20 0.17 0.22 0.19 
 
0.12 0.08 0.00 -0.15 -0.04 0.16 0.16 -0.10 
10. NED Interlock -0.28* 0.35 0.19 0.25 0.40 0.38 0.43 0.29 0.11 
 
0.59 0.22 -0.10 0.03 0.13 0.38 0.01 
11. BOD Interlock -0.26* 0.47 0.24 0.26 0.40 0.36 0.44 0.37 0.09 0.59 
 
0.22 -0.08 -0.01 0.22 0.38 0.03 
12. Gov't Official -0.18* 0.07 0.04 0.19 0.20 0.14 0.17 0.11 0.07 0.22 0.22 
 
0.03 -0.09 -0.01 0.09 0.01 
13. Liquidity -0.03 -0.04 -0.19 -0.22 -0.08 -0.09 -0.05 -0.11 -0.13 -0.06 -0.09 0.02 
 
-0.05 -0.52 -0.15 0.08 
14. Profitability -0.41* 0.05 0.09 0.16 0.26 0.31 0.31 0.29 -0.07 0.08 0.00 -0.01 0.03 
 
0.00 0.26 0.10 
15. Leverage -0.05 0.19 0.15 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.15 0.25 0.17 0.13 0.24 0.00 -0.47 -0.01 
 
0.22 -0.04 
16. Firm Size -0.58* 0.53 0.33 0.65 0.71 0.75 0.70 0.74 0.18 0.38 0.38 0.09 -0.19 0.20 0.27 
 
0.17 
17. Firm Age -0.16* 0.03 -0.07 0.08 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.07 -0.08 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.15 0.07 -0.04 0.15 
 Notes: Pearson correlation is shown above and to the right of the diagonal; below and left is Spearman correlation. 
Observations: Total=351; Failed Firms…93, Non-Failed Firms 258  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
299 
 
Appendix 9: Correlation Matrix for Three Years (t - 3) Prior Failure 
t- 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1. Status 
 
-0.36 -0.10 -0.33 -0.48 -0.54 -0.59 -0.48 -0.04 -0.30 -0.26 -0.12 0.08 -0.41 -0.16 -0.59 -0.15 
2. Independence -0.36 
 
0.19 0.24 0.56 0.58 0.54 0.44 0.12 0.38 0.51 0.09 0.00 0.12 0.14 0.53 0.04 
3. Gender Div. -0.10 0.19 
 
0.31 0.29 0.33 0.29 0.26 0.04 0.10 0.17 -0.03 -0.15 0.12 0.16 0.30 -0.10 
4. Board Size -0.34 0.24 0.33 
 
0.46 0.48 0.45 0.44 0.03 0.22 0.27 0.10 -0.20 0.17 0.25 0.60 0.10 
5. Nomination -0.47 0.52 0.29 0.50 
 
0.75 0.76 0.74 0.26 0.44 0.50 0.12 -0.10 0.26 0.25 0.70 0.01 
6. Audit Com -0.52 0.54 0.35 0.54 0.73 
 
0.84 0.65 0.19 0.45 0.46 0.08 -0.07 0.34 0.19 0.73 0.08 
7. Remuneration -0.57 0.48 0.30 0.50 0.76 0.81 
 
0.61 0.23 0.49 0.49 0.11 -0.05 0.32 0.15 0.69 0.07 
8. Evaluation -0.50 0.44 0.28 0.50 0.75 0.71 0.69 
 
0.20 0.29 0.36 0.07 -0.10 0.21 0.26 0.71 0.02 
9. Meeting -0.05 0.10 0.01 0.07 0.25 0.17 0.21 0.20 
 
0.13 0.11 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.12 0.19 -0.09 
10. NED Interlock -0.30 0.35 0.10 0.25 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.29 0.12 
 
0.61 0.18 -0.08 0.07 0.13 0.40 0.00 
11. BOD Interlock -0.26 0.51 0.17 0.28 0.49 0.47 0.48 0.37 0.11 0.61 
 
0.22 -0.07 0.07 0.23 0.44 0.04 
12. Gov't Official -0.12 0.09 -0.03 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.18 0.22 
 
0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.07 0.06 
13. Liquidity 0.04 -0.02 -0.19 -0.19 -0.11 -0.11 -0.08 -0.15 -0.08 -0.06 -0.08 -0.02 
 
-0.16 -0.52 -0.14 0.08 
14. Profitability -0.35 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.18 0.22 0.21 0.18 -0.06 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.00 
 
0.24 0.32 0.12 
15. Leverage -0.15 0.16 0.19 0.23 0.28 0.26 0.21 0.31 0.15 0.15 0.25 -0.02 -0.48 0.07 
 
0.26 -0.07 
16. Firm Size -0.58 0.51 0.31 0.63 0.70 0.76 0.71 0.75 0.19 0.39 0.44 0.08 -0.22 0.13 0.33 
 
0.18 
17. Firm Age -0.17 0.08 -0.07 0.10 0.00 0.08 0.03 0.04 -0.10 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.15 0.06 -0.09 0.17 
 Notes: Pearson correlation is shown above and to the right of the diagonal; below and left is Spearman correlation. 
Observations: Total=352; Failed Firms 95, Non-failed firms 257 
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Appendix 10: Correlation Matrix for Four Years (t - 4) Prior Failure 
t - 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1. Status 
 
-0.38 -0.12 -0.33 -0.45 -0.52 -0.57 -0.40 -0.06 -0.34 -0.28 -0.12 0.13 -0.33 -0.15 -0.57 -0.15 
2. Independence -0.36 
 
0.20 0.23 0.57 0.57 0.55 0.44 0.10 0.40 0.51 0.05 -0.13 0.10 0.17 0.53 0.03 
3. Gender Div. -0.12 0.22 
 
0.33 0.29 0.37 0.30 0.27 0.04 0.17 0.23 0.02 -0.14 0.08 0.16 0.33 -0.08 
4. Board Size -0.34 0.23 0.33 
 
0.47 0.53 0.44 0.47 0.02 0.23 0.32 0.16 -0.16 0.17 0.22 0.61 0.11 
5. Nomination -0.44 0.54 0.30 0.52 
 
0.72 0.74 0.72 0.26 0.45 0.55 0.13 -0.16 0.21 0.22 0.71 0.03 
6. Audit Com -0.50 0.52 0.38 0.59 0.72 
 
0.83 0.60 0.19 0.45 0.50 0.10 -0.22 0.28 0.20 0.72 0.08 
7. Remuneration -0.55 0.49 0.31 0.50 0.73 0.80 
 
0.56 0.27 0.46 0.51 0.13 -0.14 0.24 0.18 0.68 0.07 
8. Evaluation -0.42 0.47 0.29 0.51 0.74 0.67 0.61 
 
0.21 0.30 0.44 0.04 -0.16 0.13 0.23 0.70 0.04 
9. Meeting -0.07 0.11 0.02 0.05 0.24 0.17 0.25 0.20 
 
0.05 0.12 0.02 -0.15 0.06 0.10 0.22 -0.06 
10. NED Interlock -0.34 0.38 0.17 0.26 0.44 0.44 0.42 0.31 0.03 
 
0.64 0.15 -0.11 0.10 0.14 0.38 0.01 
11. BOD Interlock -0.28 0.51 0.23 0.34 0.54 0.51 0.49 0.45 0.10 0.64 
 
0.16 -0.09 0.09 0.25 0.47 0.03 
12. Gov't official -0.12 0.06 0.02 0.19 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.05 0.03 0.15 0.16 
 
0.00 0.04 -0.03 0.08 0.04 
13. Liquidity 0.09 -0.11 -0.18 -0.20 -0.17 -0.22 -0.14 -0.19 -0.12 -0.08 -0.08 -0.04 
 
-0.22 -0.49 -0.20 0.09 
14. Profitability -0.30 0.02 0.03 0.14 0.15 0.22 0.17 0.12 -0.01 0.06 0.03 0.07 -0.07 
 
0.33 0.24 0.08 
15. Leverage -0.13 0.20 0.15 0.19 0.24 0.21 0.20 0.26 0.12 0.13 0.25 -0.02 -0.44 0.17 
 
0.21 -0.09 
16. Firm Size -0.57 0.53 0.33 0.63 0.72 0.75 0.70 0.74 0.20 0.39 0.47 0.08 -0.26 0.12 0.26 
 
0.18 
17. Firm Age -0.16 0.04 -0.05 0.11 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.05 -0.09 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.13 0.06 -0.06 0.18  
Notes: Pearson correlation is shown above and to the right of the diagonal; below and left is Spearman correlation. 
Observations: Total=346; Failed Firms…91, Non-Failed Firms 255  
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Appendix 11:  Correlation Matrix for Five Years (t - 5) Prior Failure 
t - 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1. Status 
 
-0.32 -0.11 -0.30 -0.43 -0.54 -0.55 -0.37 0.05 -0.36 -0.29 -0.10 -0.02 -0.35 -0.01 -0.57 -0.14 
2. Independence -0.31 
 
0.20 0.22 0.57 0.55 0.54 0.44 0.03 0.40 0.49 0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.07 0.51 0.01 
3. Gender Div. -0.11 0.22 
 
0.33 0.32 0.31 0.27 0.34 0.01 0.17 0.19 0.00 -0.14 0.05 0.10 0.34 -0.11 
4. Board Size -0.31 0.23 0.33 
 
0.45 0.51 0.41 0.44 0.04 0.20 0.28 0.12 -0.12 0.12 0.20 0.59 0.12 
5. Nomination -0.43 0.55 0.32 0.49 
 
0.71 0.72 0.69 0.18 0.47 0.53 0.09 -0.12 0.10 0.19 0.70 0.01 
6. Audit Com -0.52 0.52 0.31 0.57 0.71 
 
0.83 0.57 0.10 0.46 0.49 0.07 -0.11 0.20 0.14 0.71 0.10 
7. Remuneration -0.53 0.50 0.28 0.48 0.71 0.82 
 
0.50 0.14 0.49 0.50 0.10 -0.05 0.21 0.10 0.66 0.07 
8. Evaluation -0.38 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.70 0.63 0.56 
 
0.10 0.30 0.37 0.01 -0.11 0.11 0.21 0.68 0.01 
9. Meeting -0.03 0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.18 0.10 0.17 0.12 
 
0.01 0.02 0.05 -0.31 -0.13 0.37 0.05 -0.08 
10. NED Interlock -0.36 0.38 0.17 0.23 0.46 0.44 0.46 0.31 -0.03 
 
0.63 0.09 0.00 0.11 0.09 0.41 0.01 
11. BOD Interlock -0.29 0.49 0.19 0.30 0.52 0.50 0.49 0.38 0.03 0.63 
 
0.11 -0.03 0.13 0.15 0.47 0.00 
12. Gov't Official -0.10 0.04 0.00 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.11 
 
-0.06 -0.02 0.04 0.07 0.01 
13. Liquidity 0.06 -0.09 -0.19 -0.16 -0.17 -0.17 -0.13 -0.18 -0.12 -0.04 -0.08 -0.06 
 
0.13 -0.63 -0.07 0.13 
14. Profitability -0.31 -0.03 -0.02 0.12 0.08 0.16 0.17 0.07 -0.07 0.03 0.09 0.04 0.01 
 
-0.03 0.29 0.10 
15. Leverage -0.06 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.23 0.20 0.16 0.29 0.17 0.11 0.19 0.03 -0.48 0.12 
 
0.11 -0.14 
16. Firm Size -0.56 0.52 0.34 0.59 0.71 0.74 0.69 0.71 0.10 0.42 0.48 0.07 -0.20 0.13 0.23 
 
0.19 
17. Firm Age -0.15 0.01 -0.09 0.12 -0.01 0.08 0.04 0.00 -0.11 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.16 0.03 -0.13 0.18 
 Notes: Pearson correlation is shown above and to the right of the diagonal; below and left is Spearman correlation. 
 Observations: Total=346; Failed Firms…90, Non-Failed Firms 256  
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Appendix 12: The Trend of Variables used in the Study 
 
Figure 12: Board Gender Diversity of Failed and Non-failed Firms 
 
 
Figure 13: Ned Interlock of Failed and Non-failed Firms 
 
 
Figure 14: Board Interlock of Failed and Non-failed Firms 
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Appendix 12: Continuation 1 of 5 
 
Figure 15: Former Government Official of Failed and Non-failed Firms 
 
 
Figure 16: Firm Size of Failed and Non-failed Firms 
 
 
Figure 17: Audit Committee Effectiveness of Failed and Non-failed Firms 
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Appendix 12: Continuation 2 of 5 
 
Figure 18: Profitability of Failed and Non-failed Firms 
 
 
Figure 19: Liquidity of Failed and Non-failed Firms 
 
 
Figure 20: Board Size of Failed and Non-failed Firms 
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Appendix 12: continuation 3 of 5 
 
Figure 21: CEO Performance Evaluation of Failed and Non-failed Firms 
 
 
Figure 22: Nomination Committee Effectiveness of Failed and Non-failed Firms 
 
 
Figure 23: Remuneration Copmmittee Effectiveness of Failed and Non-failed Firms 
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Appendix 12: Continuation 4 of 5  
 
Figure 24: Proportion of Outside Directors of Failed and Non-failed Firms 
 
 
Figure 25: Frequency of Board Meetings of Failed and Non-failed Firms 
 
 
Figure 26: Financial Leverage of Failed and Non-failed Firms 
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Appendix 12: Continuation 5 of 5  
 
Figure 27: Firm Age of Failed and Non-failed Firms 
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Appendix 13:  Results of the Pooled Cross-Sectional Logit Model 
ESTIMATION SAMPLE ( PANEL A) 
POOLED MODEL   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
MAIN VARIABLES Expected 
Sign 
           
Board composition             
H1A: BODC -  -0.261** 
(0.108) 
-0.254** 
(0.123) 
-0.177 
(0.121) 
-0.127 
(0.123) 
-0.073 
(0.276) 
-0.241** 
(0.108) 
-0.244** 
(0.110) 
-0.218* 
(0.125) 
-0.146 
(0.120) 
-0.089 
(0.125) 
H2A: FMALE -  0.014 
(0.039) 
0.015 
(0.039) 
0.029 
(0.040) 
0.034 
(0.040) 
0.018 
(0.039) 
-0.093 
(0.084) 
0.018 
(0.039) 
0.022 
(0.039) 
0.036 
(0.040) 
0.040 
(0.039) 
H3A: BODS -  -0.012 
(0.008) 
-0.012 
(0.008) 
-0.009 
(0.008) 
-0.008 
(0.008) 
-0.010 
(0.008) 
-0.009 
(0.008) 
-0.004 
(0.015) 
-0.011 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
Board structure             
H4A: NCE -   -0.002 
(0.011) 
     -0.016 
(0.020) 
  
H5A: ACE -    -0.027** 
(0.013) 
     -0.057** 
(0.025) 
 
H6A: RCE -     -0.044*** 
(0.013) 
     -0.085*** 
(0.024) 
Board Functions             
BODM -      0.022 
(0.016) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.014 
(0.013) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.009) 
0.001 
(0.010) 
BINT3 -      -0.126 
(0.098) 
-0.070 
(0.045) 
0.019 
(0.179) 
   
Interactions             
H1B i:  BODC*BODM -      -0.023 
(0.030) 
     
H1B ii: BODC*BINT3 -      0.114 
(0.189) 
     
H2B i: FMALE*BODM -       0.013 
(0.008) 
    
H2B ii: FMALE*BINT3 -       -0.009 
(0.083) 
    
H3B i: BODS*BODM -        -0.001 
(0.001) 
   
H3B ii: BODS*BINT3 -        -0.012 
(0.024) 
   
H4B: NCE*BODM -         0.001 
(0.002) 
  
H5B: ACE*BODM -          0.003 
(0.002) 
 
H6B: RCE*BODM -           0.004 
(0.003) 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01 
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APPENDIX 13: Continuation 1 of 1 
ESTIMATION SAMPLE ( PANEL A) 
POOLED MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
CONTROLVARIABLES Expected  
Sign 
           
Liquidity - 0.007 
(0.070) 
0.020 
(0.068) 
0.019 
(0.068) 
0.012 
(0.066) 
0.009 
(0.067) 
0.030 
(0.065) 
0.025 
(0.062) 
0.021 
(0.066) 
0.028 
(0.066) 
0.017 
(0.064) 
0.012 
(0.063) 
Profitability - -0.567*** 
(0.167) 
-0.585*** 
(0.171) 
-0.584*** 
(0.170) 
-0.544*** 
(0.165) 
-0.516*** 
(0.154) 
-0.507*** 
(0.167) 
-0.502*** 
(0.166) 
-0.508*** 
(0.170) 
-0.515*** 
(0.173) 
-0.474*** 
(0.162) 
-0.434*** 
(0.143) 
Leverage + 0.077 
(0.071) 
0.099 
(0.069) 
0.099 
(0.069) 
0.092 
(0.070) 
0.084 
(0.068) 
0.088 
(0.067) 
0.075 
(0.067) 
0.080 
(0.069) 
0.083 
(0.069) 
0.065 
(0.069) 
0.058 
(0.065) 
Firm Size - -0.110*** 
(0.010) 
-0.092*** 
(0.012) 
-0.091*** 
(0.014) 
-0.080*** 
(0.013) 
-0.070*** 
(0.013) 
-0.094*** 
(0.012) 
-0.095*** 
(0.012) 
-0.094*** 
(0.012) 
-0.092*** 
(0.014) 
-0.085*** 
(0.013) 
-0.073*** 
(0.013) 
Firm Age - -0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
Industry Effects +/- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  4.159*** 
(1.195) 
5.376*** 
(1.358) 
5.306*** 
(1.388) 
4.939*** 
(1.442) 
5.126*** 
(1.416) 
3.646*** 
(1.916) 
4.945*** 
(1.335) 
4.209*** 
(1.611) 
4.475*** 
(1.466) 
4.825*** 
(1.494) 
5.249*** 
(1.540) 
Parameters             
Observations  875 875 875 875 875 875 875 875 875 875 875 
Wald chi2(9/15)  79.29*** 83.78*** 84.75*** 93.10*** 108.06*** 100.34*** 97.50*** 98.92*** 99.52*** 106.24*** 120.04*** 
Pseudo R2  0.435 0.449 0.449 0.457 0.471 0.469 0.471 0.468 0.462 0.473 0.494 
Log pseudo  -285.255 -278.194 -278.161 -274.330 -267.286 -268.297 -267.128 -268.540 -271.510 -265.947 -255.739 
Accuracy  % % % % % % % % % % % 
Failed  81.62 82.80 82.26 81.48 81.28 80.30 82.54 80.63 81.91 82.56 81.63 
Non-failed  88.41 88.82 88.68 88.78 88.52 89.36 89.07 88.74 88.79 89.71 89.54 
Overall  86.97 87.54 87.31 87.20 86.97 87.31 87.66 86.97 87.31 88.11 87.77 
Hosmer-Lemeshow (10)             
Chi2(8)  21.81 14.62 14.42 13.40 8.10 6.69 8.51 15.98 11.81 12.81 11.62 
Prob>chi2  0.005 0.067 0.072 0.099 0.424 0.570 0.385 0.043 0.160 0.119 0.169 
ROC  0.906 0.913 0.913 0.915 0.920 0.920 0.921 0.920 0.917 0.920 0.925 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01 
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Appendix 14: Results of the Pooled Cross-Sectional Logit Model 
HOLDOUT SAMPLE (PANEL B) 
POOLED MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
MAIN VARIABLES Expected 
Sign 
           
Board composition             
H1A: BODC -  -0.140 
(0.124) 
-0.114 
(0.132) 
-0.096 
(0.128) 
-0.004 
(0.129) 
-0.239 
(0.240) 
-0.128 
(0.124) 
-0.135 
(0.119) 
-0.103 
(0.133) 
-0.088 
(0.126) 
0.012 
(0.127) 
H2A: FMALE -  0.034 
(0.039) 
0.036 
(0.039) 
0.041 
(0.038) 
0.049 
(0.038) 
0.038 
(0.039) 
0.022 
(0.082) 
0.036 
(0.038) 
0.035 
(0.039) 
0.042 
(0.038) 
0.046 
(0.038) 
H3A: BODS -  -0.014* 
(0.008) 
-0.013* 
(0.008) 
-0.012 
(0.008) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.011 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.029* 
(0.016) 
-0.012 
(0.008) 
-0.010 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
Board structure             
H4A: NCE -   -0.007 
(0.011) 
     -0.013 
(0.020) 
  
H5A: ACE -    -0.015 
(0.013) 
     -0.036 
(0.024) 
 
H6A: RCE -     -0.039*** 
(0.009) 
     -0.057** 
(0.026) 
Board Functions             
BODM -      -0.004 
(0.016) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.014 
(0.014) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
0.001 
(0.011) 
BINT3 -      -0.077 
(0.106) 
-0.065 
(0.044) 
-0.029 
(0.160) 
   
Interactions             
H1B i:  BODC*BODM -      0.013 
(0.028) 
     
H1B ii: BODC*BINT3 -      -0.036 
(0.206) 
     
H2B i: FMALE*BODM -       0.003 
(0.008) 
    
H2B ii: FMALE*BINT3 -       -0.072 
(0.087) 
    
H3B i: BODS*BODM -        0.003 
(0.002) 
   
H3B ii: BODS*BINT3 -        -0.009 
(0.021) 
   
H4B: NCE*BODM -         0.001 
(0.002) 
  
H5B: ACE*BODM -          0.002 
(0.002) 
 
H6B: RCE*BODM -           0.002 
(0.003) 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level,,  * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix 14: Continuation 1 of 1 
HOLDOUT SAMPLE (PANEL B) 
POOLED MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
CONTROLVARIABLES Expected  
Sign 
           
Liquidity - -0.176** 
(0.071) 
-0.180** 
(0.072) 
-0.184*** 
(0.072) 
-0.182** 
(0.071) 
-0.183** 
(0.072) 
-0.174** 
(0.072) 
-0.176** 
(0.070) 
-0.170** 
(0.070) 
-0.177** 
(0.072) 
-0.176** 
(0.072) 
-0.167** 
(0.073) 
Profitability - -0.754*** 
(0.152) 
-0.758*** 
(0.152) 
-0.750*** 
(0.150) 
-0.724*** 
(0.155) 
-0.690*** 
(0.143) 
-0.742*** 
(0.157) 
-0.734*** 
(0.154) 
-0.734*** 
(0.154) 
-0.734*** 
(0.153) 
-0.698*** 
(0.157) 
-0.659*** 
(0.143) 
Leverage + -0.007 
(0.078) 
-0.006 
(0.081) 
-0.007 
(0.081) 
-0.013 
(0.080) 
-0.017 
(0.078) 
-0.012 
(0.080) 
-0.009 
(0.079) 
-0.003 
(0.083) 
-0.015 
(0.081) 
-0.028 
(0.079) 
-0.029 
(0.078) 
Firm Size - -0.107*** 
(0.009) 
-0.092*** 
(0.013) 
-0.087*** 
(0.015) 
-0.085*** 
(0.014) 
-0.074*** 
(0.013) 
-0.093*** 
(0.014) 
-0.094*** 
(0.013) 
-0.094*** 
(0.014) 
-0.089*** 
(0.015) 
-0.088*** 
(0.015) 
-0.077*** 
(0.013) 
Firm Age - -0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
Industry Effects +/- Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  6.155*** 
(1.272) 
7.401*** 
(1.462) 
7.188*** 
(1.153) 
7.249*** 
(1.499) 
7.305*** 
(1.522) 
8.051*** 
(1.954) 
7.509*** 
(1.525) 
8.855*** 
(1.853) 
6.837*** 
(1.610) 
7.458*** 
(1.611) 
7.107*** 
(1.722) 
Parameters             
Observations  873 873 873 873 873 873 873 873 873 873 873 
Wald chi2 (9/12/16)  107.68*** 108.47*** 109.75*** 111.08*** 122.27*** 115.66*** 107.54*** 106.88*** 110.25*** 114.70*** 132.04*** 
Pseudo R2  0.491 0.501 0.501 0.503 0.518 0.514 0.516 0.516 0.503 0.506 0.523 
Log pseudo  -256.589 -251.957 -251.528 -250.814 -243.402 -254.070 -244.355 -243.945 -250.535 -249.178 -240.568 
Accuracy  % % % % % % % % % % % 
Failed  79.40 82.65 82.05 82.14 80.10 83.42 83.67 83.00 82.23 82.99 80.79 
Non-failed  89.17 89.81 89.53 89.66 89.58 90.36 90.10 90.34 89.79 89.69 90.00 
Overall  86.94 88.20 87.86 87.97 87.40 88.77 88.66 88.66 88.09 88.20 87.86 
Hosmer-Lemeshow (10)             
Chi2(8)  9.01 4.63 6.65 3.59 2.58 7.90 3.45 4.58 5.59 9.45 2.50 
Prob>chi2  0.342 0.797 0.575 0.827 0.958 0.443 0.903 0.801 0.693 0.306 0.962 
ROC  0.925 0.929 0.929 0.930 0.934 0.932 0.933 0.933 0.930 0.931 0.935 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix 15: Results of the Cross-Sectional Logit Model; One Year (t – 1) Prior Failure 
ESTIMATION SAMPLE (PANEL A)  
 t – 1 MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
MAIN VARIABLES Expected Sign            
Board composition             
H1A: BODC -  -0.010 
(0.145) 
0.018 
(0.146) 
0.084 
(0.173) 
0.164 
(0.049) 
0.420 
(0.412) 
0.003 
(0.140) 
0.021 
(0.134) 
0.059 
(0.152) 
0.121 
(0.168) 
0.174 
(0.178) 
H2A: FMALE -  -0.026 
(0.048) 
-0.021 
(0.049) 
-0.016 
(0.050) 
-0.008 
(0.049) 
-0.030 
(0.050) 
-0.164 
(0.134) 
-0.017 
(0.052) 
-0.019 
(0.053) 
-0.016 
(0.056) 
-0.008 
(0.056) 
H3A: BODS -  -0.026 
(0.017) 
-0.024 
(0.016) 
-0.024 
(0.017) 
-0.019 
(0.015) 
-0.026* 
(0.014) 
-0.024* 
(0.013) 
-0.088** 
(0.038) 
-0.025* 
(0.013) 
-0.026* 
(0.014) 
-0.019 
(0.012) 
Board structure             
H4A: NCE -   -0.009 
(0.012) 
     -0.017 
(0.034) 
  
H5A: ACE -    -0.021 
(0.019) 
     -0.067* 
(0.036) 
 
H6A: RCE -     -0.044** 
(0.017) 
     -0.075 
(0.047) 
Board Functions             
BODM -      0.031 
(0.022) 
0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.019 
(0.022) 
0.012 
(0.010) 
-0.002 
(0.011) 
-0.0014 
(0.016) 
BINT3 -      -0.022 
(0.123) 
-0.154** 
(0.071) 
-0.517*** 
(0.195) 
   
Interactions             
H1B i:  BODC*BODM -      -0.042 
(0.039) 
     
H1B ii: BODC*BINT3 -      -0.024 
(0.283) 
     
H2B i: FMALE*BODM -       0.012 
(0.013) 
    
H2B ii: FMALE*BINT3 -       0.196 
(0.159) 
    
H3B i: BODS*BODM -        0.005 
(0.003) 
   
H3B ii: BODS*BINT3 -        0.069** 
(0.027) 
   
H4B: NCE*BODM -         -0.000 
(0.003) 
  
H5B: ACE*BODM -          0.004 
(0.003) 
 
H6B: RCE*BODM -           0.003 
(0.005) 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01 
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Appendix 15: Continuation 1 of 1 
ESTIMATION SAMPLE (PANEL A) 
 t -1 MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
CONTROLVARIABLES Expected  
Sign 
           
Liquidity - -0.054 
(0.083) 
-0.071 
(0.091) 
-0.071 
(0.090) 
-0.078 
(0.092) 
-0.090 
(0.100) 
-0.049 
(0.068) 
-0.064 
(0.066) 
-0.062 
(0.064) 
-0.062 
(0.069) 
-0.071 
(0.066) 
-0.085 
(0.079) 
Profitability - -1.141** 
(0.540) 
-1.224** 
(0.495) 
-1.226** 
(0.513) 
-1.212*** 
(0.468) 
-1.265** 
(0.527) 
-1.045*** 
(0.402) 
-1.047*** 
(0.397) 
-1.156*** 
(0.388) 
-1.041** 
(0.488) 
-1.078** 
(0.440) 
-1.123** 
(0.490) 
Leverage + 0.085 
(0.108) 
0.079 
(0.109) 
0.083 
(0.107) 
0.088 
(0.116) 
0.063 
(0.111) 
0.046 
(0.089) 
0.012 
(0.094) 
0.086 
(0.101) 
0.048 
(0.090) 
0.047 
(0.094) 
0.028 
(0.099) 
Firm Size - -0.088*** 
(0.013) 
-0.072*** 
(0.016) 
-0.065*** 
(0.019) 
-0.066*** 
(0.015) 
-0.062*** 
(0.015) 
-0.068*** 
(0.014) 
-0.067*** 
(0.016) 
-0.073*** 
(0.015) 
-
0.059*** 
(0.018) 
-0.062*** 
(0.014) 
-0.060*** 
(0.015) 
Firm Age - -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Industry Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant +/- 4.359*** 
1.214) 
5.984*** 
(1.874) 
5.306*** 
(1.971) 
5.348*** 
(2.030) 
5.984*** 
(3.19) 
1.610*** 
(3.281) 
5.715*** 
(1.996) 
10.324** 
(4.218) 
3.305 
(2.141) 
6.006 
(2.390) 
6.574** 
(3.012) 
Parameters             
Observations  177 177 177 177 177 177 177 177 177 177 177 
Wald chi2(9)/12/16  59.72*** 56.58*** 54.12*** 52.25*** 54.86*** 59.83*** 62.09*** 56.97*** 57.05*** 50.93*** 56.55*** 
Pseudo R2  0.599 0.617 0.619 0.621 0.636 0.639 0.646 0.658 0.639 0.645 0.655 
Log pseudo  -41.132 -39.274 -39.056 -38.792 -37.256 -37.008 -36.301 -35.065 -36.949 -36.360 -35.378 
Accuracy  % % % % % % % % % % % 
Failed  84.09 90.24 90.24 92.50 86.05 88.10 84.44 90.48 84.44 86.36 85.71 
Non-failed  92.48 92.65 92.65 92.70 92.54 92.59 93.18 93.33 93.18 93.23 91.85 
Overall  90.40 92.09 92.09 92.66 90.96 91.53 90.96 92.66 90.96 91.53 90.40 
Hosmer-Lemeshow (10)             
Chi2(8)  4.73       3.77 8.02 4.33 7.03 9.06 3.04 6.61 8.32 10.18 3.71 
Prob>chi2  0.786 0.877 0.432 0.826 0.534 0.337 0.932 0.580 0.403 0.252 0.883 
ROC  0.948 0.950 0.950 0.952 0.956 0.957 0.960 0.963 0.958 0.959 0.963 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses ,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01 
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Appendix 16: Results of the Cross-Sectional Logit Model; One Year (t-1) Prior Failure 
HOLDOUT SAMPLE (PANEL B) 
 t - 1 MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
MAIN VARIABLES Expected Sign            
Board composition             
H1A: BODC -  -0.062 
(0.195) 
-0.024 
(0.195) 
-0.043 
(0.202) 
-0.003 
(0.192) 
-0.507 
(0.447) 
-0.107 
(0.183) 
-0.068 
(0.188) 
-0.028 
(0.185) 
-0.044 
(0.187) 
0.002 
(0.173) 
H2A: FMALE -  -0.039 
(0.085) 
-0.033 
(0.085) 
-0.035 
(0.086) 
-0.024 
(0.087) 
-0.031 
(0.100) 
0.050 
(0.252) 
-0.048 
(0.096) 
-0.031 
(0.088) 
-0.038 
(0.099) 
-0.029 
(0.100) 
H3A: BODS -  -0.023* 
(0.012) 
-0.021* 
(0.012) 
-0.021* 
(0.013) 
-0.019 
(0.013) 
-0.019 
(0.017) 
-0.020 
(0.016) 
-0.040 
(0.047) 
-0.020 
(0.013) 
-0.017 
(0.015) 
-0.014 
(0.017) 
Board structure             
H4A: NCE -   -0.010 
(0.023) 
     -0.058 
(0.048) 
  
H5A: ACE -    -0.007 
(0.021) 
     -0.049 
(0.046) 
 
H6A: RCE -     -0.026 
(0.223) 
     -0.063 
(0.057) 
Board Functions             
BODM -      -0.025 
(0.027) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
-0.010 
(0.034) 
-0.008 
(0.010) 
-0.009 
(0.011) 
-0.007 
(0.016) 
BINT3 -      -0.099 
(0.389) 
-0.089 
(0.118) 
-0.328 
(0.440) 
   
Interactions             
H1B i:  BODC*BODM -      0.051 
(0.052) 
     
H1B ii: BODC*BINT3 -      -0.048 
(0.555) 
     
H2B i: FMALE*BODM -       -0.009 
(0.025) 
    
H2B ii: FMALE*BINT3 -       -0.675 
(0.511) 
    
H3B i: BODS*BODM -        0.002 
(0.005) 
   
H3B ii: BODS*BINT3 -        0.032 
(0.049) 
   
H4B: NCE*BODM -         0.005 
(0.004) 
  
H5B: ACE*BODM -          0.004 
(0.005) 
 
H6B: RCE*BODM -           0.004 
(0.006) 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, Jackknife standard errors in parentheses ,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix 16: continuation 1 of 1 
HOLDOUT SAMPLE (PANEL B) 
 t - 1 MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
CONTROLVARIABLES Expected  
Sign 
           
Liquidity - -0.261* 
(0.134) 
-0.268 
(0.171) 
-0.271* 
(0.162) 
-0.271 
(0.173) 
-0.237 
(0.152) 
-0.262* 
(0.147) 
-0.252 
(0.167) 
-0.249 
(0.184) 
-0.273* 
(0.147) 
-0.279 
(0.177) 
-0.205 
(0.158) 
Profitability - -0.740** 
(0.332) 
-0.670** 
(0.298) 
-0.672** 
(0.291) 
-0.657** 
(0.301) 
-0.610** 
(0.260) 
-0.687** 
(0.341) 
-0.657* 
(0.383) 
-0.673* 
(0.360) 
-0.689** 
(0.285) 
-0.641** 
(0.271) 
-0.555** 
(0.260) 
Leverage + -0.056 
(0.112) 
-0.101 
(0.129) 
-0.107 
(0.144) 
-0.105 
(0.124) 
-0.088 
(0.118) 
-0.128 
(0.124) 
-0.091 
(0.140) 
-0.084 
(0.150) 
-0.151 
(0.154) 
-0.143 
(0.126) 
-0.092 
(0.129) 
Firm Size - -0.089*** 
(0.016) 
-0.059** 
(0.025) 
-0.051** 
(0.033) 
-0.056** 
(0.026) 
-0.042* 
(0.023) 
-0.050* 
(0.029) 
-0.049* 
(0.029) 
-0.051* 
(0.030) 
-0.049 
(0.034) 
-0.060** 
(0.027) 
-0.044* 
(0.024) 
Firm Age - 0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Industry Effects  +/- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  10.268** 
(4.042) 
12.311** 
(6.044) 
12.084* 
(6.522) 
12.167* 
(6.252) 
11.679** 
(5.783) 
17.517** 
(8.502) 
12.059* 
(6.543) 
14.829* 
(7.920) 
14.673* 
(8.217) 
14.317* 
(7.294) 
12.834** 
(7.111) 
             
             
Parameters             
Observations  176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 
Wald chi2(9)/12/16  2.08** 1.36 1.30 1.19 1.15 0.63 1.08 0.83 0.79 0.88 0.80 
Pseudo R2  0.648 0.673 0.676 0.674 0.685 0.702 0.697 0.649 0.683 0.683 0.695 
Log pseudo  -35.589 -33.066 -32.790 -32.974 -31.894 -30.116 -30.681 -30.461 -31.379 -32.054 -30.858 
Accuracy  % % % % % % % % % % % 
Failed  93.02 89.13 91.11 89.13 93.33 91.30 90.91 88.89 93.02 93.18 93.33 
Non-failed  95.49 96.15 96.18 96.15 96.95 96.92 95.45 95.42 95.49 96.21 96.95 
Overall  94.89 94.32 94.89 94.32 96.02 95.45 94.32 93.75 94.89 95.45 96.02 
Hosmer-Lemeshow (10)             
Chi2(8)  9.90 24.35 11.76 23.181 14.14 7.33 14.05 3.89 14.50 18.08 31.58 
Prob>chi2  0.272 0.002 0.162 0.003 0.078 0.501 0.080 0.867 0.070 0.021 0.000 
ROC  0.960 0.966 0.968 0.965 0.966 0.973 0.967 0.971 0.973 0.969 0.968 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, Jackknife standard errors in parentheses ,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix 17: Results of the Cross-Sectional Logit Model; Two Years (t – 2) Prior Failure 
ESTIMATION SAMPLE ( PANEL A) 
t -2 MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
MAIN VARIABLES Expected 
Sign 
           
Board composition             
H1A: BODC -  -0.319* 
(0.163) 
-0.267 
(0.196) 
-0.273 
(0.170) 
-0.241 
(0.174) 
-0.449 
(0.396) 
-0.286* 
(0.169) 
-0.320* 
(0.167) 
-0.172 
(0.199) 
-0.199 
(0.174) 
-0.159 
(0.175) 
H2A: FMALE -  0.009 
(0.059) 
0.010 
(0.061) 
0.019 
(0.060) 
0.016 
(0.058) 
0.015 
(0.059) 
-0.238* 
(0.145) 
0.015 
(0.057) 
0.030 
(0.060) 
0.046 
(0.057) 
0.042 
(0.055) 
H3A: BODS -  -0.020 
(0.014) 
-0.019 
(0.013) 
-0.019 
(0.013) 
-0.016 
(0.013) 
-0.013 
(0.013) 
-0.009 
(0.013) 
-0.029 
(0.025) 
-0.014 
(0.015) 
-0.015 
(0.015) 
-0.012 
(0.012) 
Board structure             
H4A: NCE -   --0.011 
(0.017) 
    - 
 
-0.063** 
(0.030) 
  
H5A: ACE -    -0.018 
(0.019) 
     -0.076** 
(0.034) 
 
H6A: RCE -     -0.029 
(0.019) 
     -0.086** 
(-0.086) 
Board Functions             
BODM -      0.011 
(0.027) 
0.015** 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.025) 
0.012 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.010) 
0.006 
(0.014) 
BINT3 -      -0.170 
(0.213) 
-0.170** 
(0.073) 
0.300 
(0.376) 
   
Interactions             
H1B i:  BODC*BODM -      0.018 
(0.051) 
     
H1B ii: BODC*BINT3 -      0.049 
(0.368) 
     
H2B i: FMALE*BODM -       0.029 
(0.019) 
    
H2B ii: FMALE*BINT3 -       0.015 
(0.157) 
    
H3B i: BODS*BODM -        0.003 
(0.004) 
   
H3B ii: BODS*BINT3 -        -0.065 
(0.050) 
   
H4B: NCE*BODM -         0.005 
(0.003) 
  
H5B: ACE*BODM -          0.005* 
(0.003) 
 
H6B: RCE*BODM -           0.005 
(0.004) 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses ,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01 
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Appendix 17: Continuation 1 of 1 
ESTIMATION SAMPLE ( PANEL A) 
t-2 MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
CONTROLVARIABLES Expected  
Sign 
           
Liquidity - 0.022 
(0.098) 
0.071 
(0.097) 
0.071 
(0.097) 
0.063 
(0.095) 
0.059 
(0.092) 
0.094 
(0.084) 
0.106 
(0.089) 
0.077 
(0.081) 
0.078 
(0.087) 
0.056 
(0.089) 
0.066 
(0.086) 
Profitability - -0.484** 
(0.190) 
-0.503*** 
(0.192) 
-0.471** 
(0194) 
-0.483** 
(0.192) 
-0.445** 
(0.190) 
-0.377** 
(0.169) 
-0.340** 
(0.159) 
-0.367** 
(0.187) 
-0.327* 
(0.176) 
-0.378** 
(0.176) 
-0.297* 
(0.165) 
Leverage + 0.025 
(0.119) 
0.068 
(0.121) 
0.066 
(0.121) 
0.062 
(0.121) 
0.042 
(0.116) 
0.051 
(0.122) 
0.048 
(0.122) 
0.008 
(0.133) 
0.016 
(0.210) 
0.0013 
(0.114) 
-0.002 
(0.106) 
Firm Size - -0.122*** 
(0.013) 
-0.093*** 
(0.018) 
-0.084*** 
(0.022) 
-0.084*** 
(0.020) 
-0.075*** 
(0.021) 
-0.094*** 
(0.018) 
-0.101*** 
(0.017) 
-0.093*** 
(0.015) 
-0.089*** 
(0.022) 
-0.093*** 
(0.020) 
-0.074*** 
(0.021) 
Firm Age - 0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Industry Effects  +/- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  4.772*** 
(1.583) 
6.041*** 
(1.879) 
5.457*** 
(2.015) 
5.732*** 
(1.936) 
5.957*** 
(1.928) 
5.399*** 
(2.888) 
5.489*** 
(1.949) 
6.147** 
(2.923) 
4.619** 
(2.155) 
6.204*** 
(2.048) 
6.017*** 
(1.979) 
Parameters             
Observations  176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 
Wald chi2(9)/12/16  40.39*** 41.70*** 45.46*** 46.00*** 49.68*** 60.96*** 52.76*** 55.93*** 50.25*** 49.01*** 59.89*** 
Pseudo R2  0.430 0.450 0.452 0.453 0.458 0.524 0.538 0.534 0.510 0.510 0.521 
Log pseudo  -58.181 -56.228 -56.004 -55.867 -55.367 -48.576 -47.153 -47.556 -50.041 -50.059 -48.877 
Accuracy  % % % % % % % % % % % 
Failed  81.58 80.49 80.00 81.58 80.95 85.00 82.93 80.95 87.50 85.00 83.33 
Non-failed  88.41 89.63 88.97 88.41 90.30 90.44 90.37 90.30 91.18 90.44 91.04 
Overall  86.93 87.50 86.93 86.93 88.07 89.20 88.64 88.07 90.34 89.20 89.20 
Hosmer-Lemeshow (10)             
Chi2(8)  8.51 9.10 4.94 10.64 7.51 6.30 3.86 2.44 5.68 14.74 8.40 
Prob>chi2  0.386 0.334 0.764 0.223 0.483 0.613 0.870 0.965 0.683 0.064 0.396 
ROC  0.899 0.911 0.913 0.910 0.911 0.937 0.942 0.942 0.932 0.931 0.930 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
318 
 
Appendix 18: Results of the Cross-Sectional Logit Model; Two Years (t – 2) Prior Failure 
HOLDOUT SAMPLE ( PANEL B) 
t – 2 MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
MAIN VARIABLES Expected 
Sign 
           
Board composition             
H1A: BODC -  -0.231 
(0.256) 
-0.230 
(0.266) 
-0.248 
(0.264) 
-0.003 
(0.282) 
0.243 
(0.672) 
-0.203 
(0.234) 
-0.163 
(0.229) 
-0.223 
(0.274) 
-0.233 
(0.263) 
0.005 
(0.286) 
H2A: FMALE -  0.061 
(0.059) 
0.062 
(0.058) 
0.060 
(0.059) 
0.087 
(0.066) 
0.073 
(0.058) 
0.153 
(0.164) 
0.073 
(0.059) 
0.066 
(0.058) 
0.062 
(0.058) 
0.097 
(0.067) 
H3A: BODS -  -0.028* 
(0.016) 
-0.028 
(0.017) 
-0.028* 
(0.016) 
-0.021 
(0.014) 
-0.029* 
(0.016) 
-0.028* 
(0.017) 
-0.028 
(0.034) 
-0.030* 
(0.018) 
-0.031* 
(0.017) 
-0.023 
(0.015) 
Board structure             
H4A: NCE -   -0.000 
(0.017) 
     0.010 
(0.038) 
  
H5A: ACE -    0.005 
(0.023) 
     0.023 
(0.043) 
 
H6A: RCE -     -0.058** 
(0.026) 
     -0.067 
(0.059) 
Board Functions             
BODM -      0.012 
(0.049) 
-0.004 
(0.011) 
-0.004 
(0.030) 
-0.006 
(0.016) 
-0.002 
(0.021) 
-0.011 
(0.007) 
BINT3 -      0.176 
(0.364) 
-0.191 
(0.209) 
-0.546** 
(0.268) 
   
Interactions             
H1B i:  BODC*BODM -      -0.040 
(0.091) 
     
H1B ii: BODC*BINT3 -      -0.528 
(0.826) 
     
H2B i: FMALE*BODM -       -0.010 
(0.016) 
    
H2B ii: FMALE*BINT3 -       0.104 
(0.257) 
    
H3B i: BODS*BODM -        -0.001 
(0.004) 
   
H3B ii: BODS*BINT3 -        0.056 
(0.036) 
   
H4B: NCE*BODM -         -0.001 
(0.004) 
  
H5B: ACE*BODM -          -0.002 
(0.005) 
 
H6B: RCE*BODM -           0.001 
(0.007) 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, Jackknife standard errors in parentheses ,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix 18: continuation 1 of 1 
HOLDOUT SAMPLE ( PANEL B) 
t – 2 MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
CONTROLVARIABLES Expected  
Sign 
           
Liquidity - -0.184 
(0.127) 
-0.224* 
(0.132) 
-0.224* 
(0.133) 
-0.226* 
(0.137) 
-0.250* 
(0.131) 
-0.224 
(0.154) 
-0.246 
(0.152) 
-0.257 
(0.161) 
-0.241* 
(0.140) 
-0.242* 
(0.142) 
-0.278* 
(0.146) 
Profitability - -0.934*** 
(0.296) 
-1.005*** 
(0.307) 
-1.003*** 
(0.308) 
-1.034*** 
(0.346) 
-0.740*** 
(0.234) 
-0.904*** 
(0.323) 
-1.020*** 
(0.327) 
-0.983*** 
(0.319) 
-0.981*** 
(0.310) 
-1.022*** 
(0.351) 
-0.719*** 
(0.256) 
Leverage + 0.079 
(0.141) 
0.070 
(0.141) 
0.070 
(0.144) 
0.071 
(0.140) 
0.049 
(0.142) 
0.075 
(0.168) 
0.054 
(0.177) 
0.068 
(0.164) 
0.088 
(0.156) 
0.093 
(0.150) 
0.058 
(0.154) 
Firm Size - -0.097*** 
(0.016) 
-0.071*** 
(0.020) 
-0.071*** 
(0.024) 
-0.074*** 
(0.024) 
-0.051*** 
(0.020) 
-0.064** 
(0.025) 
-0.061*** 
(0.023) 
-0.061*** 
(0.024) 
-0.068*** 
(0.026) 
-0.070*** 
(0.026) 
-0.049** 
(0.024) 
Firm Age - -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
Industry Effects   Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Constant +/- 5.690** 
(2.715) 
8.768** 
(3.534) 
8.761** 
(3.700) 
8.871** 
(3.633) 
8.768** 
(4.450) 
8.324 
(7.103) 
10.729*** 
(4.001) 
11.374** 
(4.882) 
9.796** 
(4.293) 
9.445** 
(4.271) 
10.499 
(5.231) 
 Parameters             
Observations  175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 
Wald chi2(9)/12/16  4.30*** 2.97*** 2.70** 2.66** 2.19 1.61 1.72** 1.80** 2.28* 2.26*** 2.04** 
Pseudo R2  0.543 0.576 0.576 0.576 0.609 0.607 0.602 0.609 0.583 0.584 0.616 
Log pseudo  -46.061 -42.790 -42.790 -42.767 -39.434 -39.633 -40.115 -39.462 -41.996 -41.896 -38.700 
Accuracy  % % % % % % % % % % % 
Failed  82.50 79.07 79.07 79.07 80.95 85.00 85.37 85.00 82.50 82.50 82.50 
Non-failed  90.37 90.91 90.91 90.91 90.98 91.11 91.79 91.11 90.37 90.37 90.37 
Overall  88.57 88.00 88.00 88.00 88.57 89.71 90.29 89.71 88.57 88.57 88.57 
Hosmer-Lemeshow (10)             
Chi2(8)  3.97 4.02 4.03 3.89 3.79 4.20 3.68 4.23 5.43 5.24 6.84 
Prob>chi2  0.860 0.855 0.854 0.867 0.876 0.839 0.885 0.836 0.711 0.732 0.554 
ROC  0.940 0.950 0.950 0.950 0.958 0.959 0.956 0.960 0.953 0.953 0.960 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, Jackknife standard errors in parentheses ,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix 19: Results of the Cross-Sectional Logit Model; Three Years (t – 3) Prior Failure 
ESTIMATION SAMPLE ( PANEL A) 
 t – 3 MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
MAIN VARIABLES Expected Sign            
Board composition             
H1A: BODC -  -0.324** 
(0.166) 
-0.287 
(0.181) 
-0.198 
(0.196) 
-0.114 
(0.173) 
0.521 
(0.478) 
-0.314* 
(0.168) 
-0.309* 
(0.177) 
-0.268 
(0.181) 
-0.175 
(0.192) 
-0.069 
(0.177) 
H2A: FMALE -  0.002 
(0.064) 
0.006 
(0.065) 
0.017 
(0.065) 
0.015 
(0.063) 
0.003 
(0.060) 
0.096 
(0.198) 
0.002 
(0.064) 
0.009 
(0.067) 
0.016 
(0.066) 
0.027 
(0.062) 
H3A: BODS -  -0.010 
(0.015) 
-0.008 
(0.015) 
-0.003 
(0.016) 
-0.005 
(0.015) 
-0.006 
(0.016) 
-0.010 
(0.017) 
0.015 
(0.037) 
-0.007 
(0.015) 
-0.000 
(0.016) 
0.010 
(0.014) 
Board structure             
H4A: NCE -   -0.009 
(0.015) 
     0.000 
(0.034) 
  
H5A: ACE -    -0.035 
(0.022) 
     0.020 
(0.054) 
 
H6A: RCE -     -0.068*** 
(0.018) 
     -0.038 
(0.039) 
Board Functions             
BODM -      0.058** 
(0.028) 
0.006 
(0.010) 
0.023 
(0.032) 
0.011 
(0.012) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.60) 
BINT3 -      -0.251 
(0.221) 
-0.000 
(0.076) 
0.004 
(0.354) 
   
Interactions             
H1B i:  BODC*BODM -      -0.111** 
(0.055) 
     
H1B ii: BODC*BINT3 -      0.425 
(0.386) 
     
H2B i: FMALE*BODM -       -0.008 
(0.022) 
    
H2B ii: FMALE*BINT3 -       -0.130 
(0.167) 
    
H3B i: BODS*BODM -        -0.003 
(0.047) 
   
H3B ii: BODS*BINT3 -        -0.004 
(0.047) 
   
H4B: NCE*BODM -         -0.001 
(0.004) 
  
H5B: ACE*BODM -          -0.007 
(0.006) 
 
H6B: RCE*BODM -           -0.005 
(0.005) 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01 
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Appendix 19: continuation 1 of 1 
ESTIMATION SAMPLE (PANEL A) 
t – 3 MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
CONTROLVARIABLES Expected  
Sign 
           
Liquidity - -0.073 
(0.116) 
-0.047 
(0.117) 
-0.049 
(0.117) 
-0.059 
(0.115) 
-0.118 
(0.114) 
-0.030 
(0.108) 
-0.040 
(0.125) 
-0.033 
(0.121) 
-0.040 
(0.118) 
-0.058 
(0.117) 
-0.117 
(0.114) 
Profitability - -0.426 
(0.295) 
-0.047 
(0.117) 
-0.436 
(0.313) 
-0.356 
(0.291) 
-0.295 
(0.233) 
-0.437 
(0.295) 
-0.464 
(0.328) 
-0.422 
(0.302) 
-0.408 
(0.310) 
-0.317 
(0.285) 
-0.248 
(0.212) 
Leverage + -0.030 
(0.122) 
-0.013 
(0.117) 
-0.008 
(0.116) 
-0.030 
(0.118) 
-0.063 
(0.110) 
-0.004 
(0.110) 
-0.003 
(0.123) 
-0.002 
(0.124) 
-0.004 
(0.115) 
-0.026 
(0.112) 
-0.062 
(0.106) 
Firm Size - -0.119*** 
(0.014) 
-0.100*** 
(0.017) 
-0.094*** 
(0.019) 
-0.084*** 
(0.019) 
-0.067*** 
(0.019) 
-0.102*** 
(0.017) 
-0.102*** 
(0.017) 
-0.100*** 
(0.018) 
-0.096*** 
(0.019) 
-0.187*** 
(0.019) 
-0.072*** 
(0.020) 
Firm Age - -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.006 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
Industry Effects   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant +/- 4.380** 
(1.926) 
5.629** 
(2.418) 
5.340** 
(2.531) 
5.020** 
(2.455) 
5.284*** 
(1.962) 
1.371 
(2.966) 
5.287** 
(2.562) 
3.640*** 
(3.382) 
4.559* 
(2.541) 
3.140 
(2.451) 
3.008 
(2.057) 
 Parameters             
Observations  176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 
Wald chi2(9)/12/16  37.20*** 43.43*** 44.85*** 48.82*** 54.10*** 45.29*** 46.86*** 46.97*** 49.45*** 52.10*** 57.33*** 
Pseudo R2  0.403 0.420 0.421 0.430 0.467 0.441 0.426 0.424 0.425 0.441 0.481 
Log pseudo  -60.965 -59.283 -59.093 -58.171 -54.416 -57.070 -58.651 -58.832 -58.707 -57.117 -53.061 
Accuracy  % % % % % % % % % % % 
Failed  82.05 76.32 75.61 80.95 80.95 82.05 80.00 77.50 78.05 78.00 83.33 
Non-failed  89.05 86.96 88.15 90.30 90.30 89.05 88.97 88.24 88.89 88.89 87.86 
Overall  87.50 84.66 85.23 88.07 88.07 87.50 86.93 85.80 86.36 86.36 86.93 
Hosmer-Lemeshow (10)             
Chi2(8)  5.30 7.23 7.09 10.37 3.66 11.57 8.25 6.79 6.93 8.81 5.33 
Prob>chi2  0.725 0.512 0.528 0.240 0.887 0.172 0.409 0.559 0.544 0.358 0.722 
ROC  0.893 0.904 0.906 0.903 0.918 0.911 0.906 0.902 0.904 0.907 0.920 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses ,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01 
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Appendix 20: Results of the Cross-Sectional Logit Model; Three Years (t – 3) Prior Failure 
HOLDOUT SAMPLE (PANEL B) 
t – 3 MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
MAIN VARIABLES Expected Sign            
Board composition             
H1A: BODC -  -0.170 
(0.071) 
-0.196 
(0.274) 
-0.191 
(0.262) 
-0.08 
(0.269) 
-0.515 
(0.721) 
-0.075 
(0.211) 
-0.130 
(0.225) 
-0.176 
(0.288) 
-0.172 
(0.250) 
-0.013 
(0.252) 
H2A: FMALE -  0.120* 
(0.071) 
0.120* 
(0.071) 
0.118* 
(0.070) 
0.134* 
(0.076) 
0.146** 
(0.074) 
-0.193 
(0.182) 
0.132 
(0.081) 
0.120* 
(0.072) 
0.135* 
(0.075) 
0.132* 
(0.075) 
H3A: BODS -  -0.010 
(0.013) 
-0.011 
(0.014) 
0.010 
(0.014) 
-0.007 
(0.014) 
-0.005 
(0.017) 
0.005 
(0.015) 
-0.049 
(0.041) 
-0.006 
(0.015) 
-0.002 
(0.014) 
0.000 
(0.014) 
Board structure             
H4A: NCE -   0.005 
(0.023) 
     -0.027 
(0.041) 
  
H5A: ACE -    0.006 
(0.027) 
     -0.100* 
(0.060) 
 
H6A: RCE -     -0.034 
(0.031) 
     -0.096 
(0.062) 
Board Functions             
BODM -      -0.016 
(0.034) 
-0.007 
(0.014) 
-0.035 
(0.037) 
-0.000 
(0.012) 
-0.022 
(0.016) 
-0.011 
(0.022) 
BINT3 -      0.111 
(0.283) 
-0.067 
(0.109) 
0.101 
(0.327) 
   
Interactions             
H1B i:  BODC*BODM -      0.052 
(0.068) 
     
H1B ii: BODC*BINT3 -      -0.441 
(0.591) 
     
H2B i: FMALE*BODM -       0.035** 
(0.017) 
    
H2B ii: FMALE*BINT3 -       -0.086 
(0.187) 
    
H3B i: BODS*BODM -        0.006 
(0.005) 
   
H3B ii: BODS*BINT3 -        -0.027 
(0.044) 
   
H4B: NCE*BODM -         0.003 
(0.004) 
  
H5B: ACE*BODM -          0.011** 
(0.005) 
 
H6B: RCE*BODM -           0.008 
(0.006) 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, Jackknife standard errors in parentheses ,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix 20: continuation 1 of 1 
HOLDOUT SAMPLE (PANEL B) 
t – 3 MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
CONTROLVARIABLES Expected  
Sign 
           
Liquidity - -0.057 
(0.131) 
-0.084 
(0.147) 
-0.084 
(0.149) 
-0.087 
(0.148) 
-0.091 
(0.148) 
-0.087 
(0.155) 
-0.072 
(0.157) 
-0.124 
(0.148) 
-0.089 
(0.155) 
-0.080 
(0.153) 
-0.091 
(0.165) 
Profitability - -1.004*** 
(0.258) 
-0.954*** 
(0.263) 
-0.952*** 
(0.263) 
-0.963*** 
(0.278) 
-0.920*** 
(0.275) 
-0.914*** 
(0.317) 
-0.906** 
(0.397) 
-0.871*** 
(0.336) 
-0879*** 
(0.322) 
-0.804** 
(0.336) 
-0.871** 
(0.367) 
Leverage + 0.045 
(0.148) 
0.024 
(0.160) 
0.028 
(0.160) 
0.028 
(0.028) 
-0.014 
(0.157) 
-0.037 
(0.191) 
-0.078 
(0.171) 
-0.010 
(0.195) 
-0.027 
(0.164) 
-0.098 
(0.160) 
-0.090 
(0.158) 
Firm Size - -0.095*** 
(0.015) 
-0.090*** 
(0.025) 
-0.094*** 
(0.027) 
-0.093*** 
(0.025) 
-0.077*** 
(0.026) 
-0.109*** 
(0.034) 
-0.077*** 
(0.028) 
-0.106*** 
(0.032) 
-0.100*** 
(0.028) 
-0.103*** 
(0.027) 
-0.191*** 
(0.028) 
Firm Age - 0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Industry Effects  +/- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Constant  6.101 
(3.933) 
8.314* 
(4.791) 
8.607 
(5.172) 
8.412* 
(4.914) 
8.314* 
(4.949) 
11.326 
(7.687) 
10.025* 
(5.463) 
12.946* 
(6.850) 
9.012* 
(5.264) 
12.170** 
(5.258) 
10.387* 
(6.137) 
Parameters             
Observations  176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 
Wald chi2(9)/12/16  4.76*** 2.73*** 2.33*** 2.44*** 2.73*** 1.46 1.62* 1.47 1.74** 1.48 1.59* 
Pseudo R2  0.519 0.523 0.545 0.545 0..557 0.577 0.602 0.585 0.555 0.583 0.584 
Log pseudo  -49.590 -49.224 -46.878 -46.887 -45.738 -43.624 -41.004 -42.834 -45.910 -43.050 -42.878 
Accuracy  % % % % % % % % % % % 
Failed  80.95 83.33 85.00 83.33 82.93 92.11 86.67 85.71 85.37 86.67 83.72 
Non-failed  89.55 90.30 89.71 90.30 89.63 90.58 86.67 91.04 90.37 93.13 90.98 
Overall  87.50 88.64 88.64 88.64 88.07 90.91 91.48 89.77 89.20 91.48 89.20 
Hosmer-Lemeshow (10)             
Chi2(8)  6.31 7.13 4.59 5.67 9.01 2.981 3.97 7.37 8.82 6.26 5.17 
Prob>chi2  0.613 0.523 0.801 0.684 0.341 0.936 0.860 0.497 0.358 0.618 0.740 
ROC  0.932 0.940 0.939 0.939 0.943 0.945 0.953 0.947 0.940 0.948 0.950 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line,  Jackknife standard errors in parentheses,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix 21: Results of the Cross-Sectional Logit Model; Four Years (t – 4) Prior Failure 
ESTIMATION SAMPLE (PANEL A) 
t – 4 MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
MAIN VARIABLES Expected 
Sign 
           
Board composition             
H1A: BODC -  -0.367** 
(0.155) 
-0.357** 
(0.170) 
-0.337** 
(0.167) 
-0.217 
(0.160) 
0.555 
(0.489) 
-0.345** 
(0.146) 
-0.359** 
(0.158) 
-0.341** 
(0.172) 
-0.315* 
(0.166) 
-0.177 
(0.163) 
H2A: FMALE -  0.068 
(0.064) 
0.068 
(0.064) 
0.075 
(0.064) 
0.101 
(0.070) 
0.076 
(0.063) 
-0.243 
(0.187) 
0.070 
(0.064) 
0.072 
(0.063) 
0.067 
(0.062) 
0.086 
(0.063) 
H3A: BODS -  -0.006 
(0.013) 
-0.006 
(0.013) 
-0.005 
(0.013) 
-0.005 
(0.012) 
-0.006 
(0.012) 
0.005 
(0.012) 
-0.003 
(0.031) 
-0.006 
(0.012) 
0.000 
(0.013) 
-0.000 
(0.011) 
Board structure             
H4A: NCE -   -0.002 
(0.015) 
     0.016 
(0.042) 
  
H5A: ACE -    -0.012 
(0.021) 
     -0.052 
(0.055) 
 
H6A: RCE -     -0.057*** 
(0.021) 
     -0.114** 
(0.051) 
Board Functions             
BODM -      0.061* 
(0.031) 
-0.005 
(0.012) 
0.003 
(0.027) 
0.012 
(0.014) 
-0.008 
(0.021) 
-0.007 
(0.017) 
BINT3 -      -0.081 
(0.178) 
-0.058 
(0.073) 
0.264 
(0.354) 
   
Interactions             
H1B i:  BODC*BODM -      -0.113* 
(0.061) 
     
H1B ii: BODC*BINT3 -      0.089 
(0.329) 
     
H2B i: FMALE*BODM -       0.030* 
(0.016) 
    
H2B ii: FMALE*BINT3 -       0.043 
(0.120) 
    
H3B i: BODS*BODM -        0.000 
(0.004) 
   
H3B ii: BODS*BINT3 -        -0.041 
(0.048) 
   
H4B: NCE*BODM -         -0.002 
(0.004) 
  
H5B: ACE*BODM -          0.004 
(0.005) 
 
H6B: RCE*BODM -           0.006 
(0.005) 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01 
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Appendix 21: Continuation 1 of 1 
ESTIMATION SAMPLE (PANEL A) 
t – 4 MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
CONTROLVARIABLES Expected  
Sign 
           
Liquidity - 0.070 
(0.117) 
0.048 
(0.116) 
0.047 
(0.116) 
0.041 
(0.021) 
0.038 
(0.112) 
0.060 
(0.121) 
0.076 
(0.121) 
0.028 
(0.126) 
0.060 
(0.120) 
0.046 
(0.116) 
0.062 
(0.121) 
Profitability - -0.503 
(0.360) 
-0.469 
(0.364) 
-0.469 
(0.364) 
-0.456 
(0.356) 
-0.424 
(0.295) 
-0.469 
(0.376) 
-0.379 
(0.336) 
-0.450* 
(0.390) 
-0.461 
(0.355) 
-0.417 
(0.341) 
-0.391 
(0.255) 
Leverage + 0.040 
(0.114) 
0.020 
(0.128) 
0.019 
(0.127) 
0.012 
(0.128) 
0.014 
(0.114) 
0.032 
(0.127) 
-0.032 
(0.120) 
0.017 
(0.137) 
0.026 
(0.116) 
0.024 
(0.117) 
0.005 
(0.107) 
Firm Size - -0.106*** 
(0.015) 
-0.097*** 
(0.020) 
-0.095*** 
(0.023) 
-0.093*** 
(0.022) 
-0.064*** 
(0.020) 
-0.097*** 
(0.023) 
-0.097*** 
(0.023) 
-0.102*** 
(0.023) 
-0.100*** 
(0.025) 
-0.099*** 
(0.025) 
-0.071*** 
(0.021) 
Firm Age - -0.001 
(0.015) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Industry Effects  +/- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  4.521*** 
(1.516) 
6.614*** 
(1.732) 
6.546*** 
(1.750) 
6.602*** 
(1.744) 
6.791*** 
(1.746) 
1.292*** 
(3.108) 
6.917*** 
(2.190) 
6.258*** 
(2.833) 
5.462** 
(2.206) 
7.303 
(2.806) 
7.362*** 
(2.577) 
Model Parameters             
Observations  173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 
Wald chi2(9)/12/16  44.24*** 47.85*** 48.74*** 47.80*** 54.07*** 60.93*** 61.26*** 58.22*** 60.32*** 56.57*** 60.33*** 
Pseudo R2  0.402 0.428 0.428 0.429 0.463 0.445 0.448 0.436 0.432 0.435 0.476 
Log pseudo  -59.262 -56.715 -56.705 -56.593 -53.263 -55.030 -54.697 -55.917 -56.295 -56.030 -51.945 
Accuracy  % % % % % % % % % % % 
Failed  80.00 81.08 81.08 75.68 82.50 78.95 86.11 82.05 81.08 76.92 80.00 
Non-failed  87.68 88.97 88.97 87.50 90.98 88.89 89.11 90.30 88.97 88.81 90.23 
Overall  86.13 87.28 87.28 84.97 89.02 86.71 89.02 88.44 87.28 86.13 87.86 
Hosmer-Lemeshow (10)             
Chi2(8)  4.68 7.80 8.05 4.98 9.72 2.77 5.66 9.30 4.25 3.71 9.28 
Prob>chi2  0.791 0.453 0.429 0.759 0.285 0.948 0.685 0.317 0.834 0.882 0.320 
ROC  0.900 0.905 0.906 0.907 0.918 0.912 0.912 0.909 0.907 0.908 0.923 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parenthesis ,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01 
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Appendix 22: Results of the Cross-Sectional Logit Model; Four Years (t – 4) Prior Failure 
HOLDOUT SAMPLE (PANEL B) 
t – 4 MODEL   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
MAIN VARIABLES Expected 
Sign 
           
Board composition             
H1A: BODC -  -0.014 
(0.198) 
-0.072 
(0.233) 
0.080 
(0.205) 
0.095 
(0.201) 
-1.147** 
(0.477) 
-0.015 
(0.238) 
-0.023 
(0.234) 
-0.022 
(0.263) 
-1.077** 
(-2.26) 
0.185 
(0.241) 
H2A: FMALE -  -0.013 
(0.074) 
-0.018 
(0.077) 
0.013 
(0.083) 
-0.004 
(0.073) 
0.009 
(0.080) 
0.002 
(0.194) 
0.004 
(0.082) 
0.002 
(0.081) 
0.043 
(0.086) 
0.018 
(0.076) 
H3A: BODS -  -0.026 
(0.017) 
-0.028 
(0.018) 
-0.019 
(0.019) 
-0.018 
(0.019) 
-0.023 
(0.019) 
-0.013 
(0.019) 
-0.013 
(0.045) 
-0.021 
(0.040) 
-0.010 
(0.019) 
-0.011 
(0.019) 
Board structure             
H4A: NCE -   0.014 
(0.025) 
     -0.021 
(0.040) 
  
H5A: ACE -    -0.036 
(0.032) 
     0.008 
(0.005) 
 
H6A: RCE -     -0.032 
(0.026) 
     -0.093 
(0.063) 
Board Functions             
BODM -      -0.046* 
(0.027) 
0.012 
(0.009) 
0.009 
(0.037) 
0.008 
(0.013) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.025) 
BINT3 -      -0.480* 
(0.267) 
-0.019 
(0.087) 
0.247 
(0.599) 
   
Interactions             
H1B i:  BODC*BODM -      0.132*** 
(0.050) 
     
H1B ii: BODC*BINT3 -      0.770 
(0.497) 
     
H2B i: FMALE*BODM -       0.007 
(0.025) 
    
H2B ii: FMALE*BINT3 -       -1.562*** 
(0.370) 
    
H3B i: BODS*BODM -        0.001 
(0.005) 
   
H3B ii: BODS*BINT3 -        -0.053 
(0.083) 
   
H4B: NCE*BODM -         0.004 
(0.004) 
  
H5B: ACE*BODM -          0.008 
(0.005) 
 
H6B: RCE*BODM -           0.007 
(0.007) 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first, Jackknife standard errors in parentheses ,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix 22: Continuation 1 of 1 
HOLDOUT SAMPLE (PANEL B) 
 t – 4 MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
CONTROLVARIABLES Expected  
Sign 
           
Liquidity - -0.095 
(0.134) 
-0.126 
(0.141) 
-0.134 
(0.136) 
-0.125 
(0.146) 
-0.115 
(0.145) 
-0.142 
(0.164) 
-0.108 
(0.144) 
-0.120 
(0.152) 
-0.122 
(0.137) 
-0.069 
(0.126) 
-0.079 
(0.129) 
Profitability - -0.432 
(0.323) 
-0.399 
(0.346) 
-0.395 
(0.349) 
-0.336 
(0.341) 
-0.387 
(0.344) 
-0.340 
(0.337) 
-0.417 
(0.315) 
-0.413 
(0.302) 
-0.383 
(0.319) 
-0.289 
(0.294) 
-0.378 
(0.278) 
Leverage + 0.056 
(0.145) 
0.053 
(0.160) 
0.041 
(0.160) 
0.039 
(0.153) 
0.050 
(0.155) 
0.029 
(0.161) 
0.086 
(0.156) 
0.059 
(0.163) 
0.027 
(0.163) 
0.044 
(0.154) 
0.040 
(0.154) 
Firm Size - -0.129*** 
(0.017) 
-0.113*** 
(0.025) 
-0.122*** 
(0.032) 
-0.097*** 
(0.026) 
-0.100*** 
(0.028) 
-0.130*** 
(0.028) 
-0.127*** 
(0.027) 
-0.123*** 
(0.028) 
-0.131*** 
(0.034) 
-0.110*** 
(0.032) 
-0.116*** 
(0.032) 
Firm Age - 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Industry Effects  +/- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  4.229* 
(2.493) 
5.413* 
(2.923) 
6.067** 
(3.022) 
4.629* 
(2.867) 
4.995* 
(2.853) 
11.371*** 
(4.369) 
4.642* 
(3.529) 
4.370 
(4.394) 
5.548* 
(3.281) 
4.5807* 
(2.896) 
5.094 
(3.176) 
 Parameters             
Observations  173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 
Wald chi2(9)/12/16  3.83*** 2.44*** 3.32** 2.35*** 2.35*** 2.14*** 3.13*** 1.49 1.63* 1.74** 1.75** 
Pseudo R2  0.423 0.435 0.423 0.445 0.445 0.508 0.497 0.473 0.460 0.480 0.484 
Log pseudo  -57.864 -56.586 -56.275 -55.580 -55.593 -49.284 -50.420 -52.791 -54.082 -52.075 -51.681 
Accuracy  % % % % % % % % % % % 
Failed  73.68 77.14 82.86 78.95 76.32 76.19 80.95 82.50 86.49 80.95 79.07 
Non-failed  86.67 86.23 87.68 88.15 87.41 89.31 90.84 90.23 89.71 90.84 90.77 
Overall  83.82 84.39 86.71 86.13 84.97 86.13 88.44 88.44 89.02 88.44 87.86 
Hosmer-Lemeshow (10)             
Chi2(8)  6.08 3.22 3.58 9.37 9.73 10.07 7.81 14.84 4.05 2.36 4.56 
Prob>chi2  0.638 0.920 0.893 0.312 0.285 0.260 0.452 0.062 0.853 0.968 0.804 
ROC  0.902 0.909 0.909 0.911 0.914 0.930 0.921 0.922 0.919 0.924 0.923 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, Jackknife standard errors in parentheses ,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix 23: Results of the Cross-Sectional Logit Model; Five Years (t – 5) Prior Failure 
ESTIMATION SAMPLE (PANEL A) 
 t – 5 MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
MAIN VARIABLES Expected 
Sign 
           
Board composition             
H1A: BODC -  -0.237 
(0.153) 
-0.356** 
(0.170) 
-0.018 
(0.156) 
-0.054 
(0.167) 
-0.571* 
(0.344) 
-0.214 
(0.158) 
-0.241 
(0.168) 
-0.311* 
(0.170) 
-0.021 
(0.161) 
-0.009 
(0.167) 
H2A: FMALE -  0.001 
(0.060) 
-0.017 
(0.057) 
0.035 
(0.057) 
0.023 
(0.058) 
0.013 
(0.065) 
-0.166 
(0.146) 
0.018 
(0.066) 
0.000 
(0.061) 
0.041 
(0.062) 
0.042 
(0.062) 
H3A: BODS -  -0.020 
(0.013) 
-0.024* 
(0.013) 
-0.007 
(0.012) 
-0.012 
(0.012) 
-0.019 
(0.014) 
-0.019 
(0.015) 
-0.001 
(0.021) 
-0.025* 
(0.013) 
-0.007 
(0.012) 
-0.012 
(0.012) 
Board structure             
H4A: NCE -   0.031 
(0.013) 
     0.016 
(0.032) 
  
H5A: ACE -    -0.073*** 
(0.018) 
     -0.116*** 
(0.039) 
 
H6A: RCE -     -0.053*** 
(0.089) 
     -0.107*** 
(0.038) 
Board Functions             
BODM -      -0.014 
(0.019) 
0.004 
(0.009) 
0.018 
(0.017) 
0.003 
(0.012) 
-0.009 
(0.013) 
0.005 
(0.013) 
BINT3 -      -0.042 
(0.153) 
-0.048 
(0.074) 
0.155 
(0.242) 
   
Interactions             
H1B i:  BODC*BODM -      0.045 
(0.036) 
     
H1B ii: BODC*BINT3 -      -0.049 
(0.349) 
     
H2B i: FMALE*BODM -       0.025 
(0.015) 
    
H2B ii: FMALE*BINT3 -       -0.579** 
(0.270) 
    
H3B i: BODS*BODM -        -0.001 
(0.002) 
   
H3B ii: BODS*BINT3 -        -0.035 
(0.031) 
   
H4B: NCE*BODM -         0.001 
(0.003) 
  
H5B: ACE*BODM -          0.005 
(0.003) 
 
H6B: RCE*BODM -           0.006* 
(0.003) 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses ,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01 
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Appendix 23: Continuation 1 of 1 
ESTIMATION SAMPLE (PANEL A) 
 t – 5 MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
CONTROLVARIABLES Expected  
Sign 
           
Liquidity - 0.099 
(0.090) 
0.090 
(0.091) 
0.094 
(0.085) 
0.071 
(0.084) 
0.108 
(0.089) 
0.064 
(0.104) 
0.072 
(0.102) 
0.045 
(0.103) 
0.105 
(0.091) 
0.079 
(0.087) 
0.112 
(0.090) 
Profitability - -0.497*** 
(0.168) 
-0.549*** 
(0.013) 
-0.533*** 
(0.022) 
-0.474*** 
(0.150) 
-0.461*** 
(0.158) 
-0.525*** 
(0.184) 
-0.505*** 
(0.179) 
-0.535*** 
(0.103) 
-0.494*** 
(0.184) 
-0.426*** 
(0.161) 
-0.354** 
(0.167) 
Leverage + 0.225*** 
(0.078) 
0.240*** 
(0.085) 
0.226*** 
(0.084) 
0.234*** 
(0.077) 
0.246*** 
(0.079) 
0.202** 
(0.088) 
0.204*** 
(0.083) 
0.228*** 
(0.086) 
0.216** 
(0.088) 
0.203** 
(0.083) 
0.202** 
(0.084) 
Firm Size - -0.114*** 
(0.014) 
-0.189*** 
(0.019) 
-0.109*** 
(0.027) 
-0.060*** 
(0.018) 
-0.065*** 
(0.018) 
-0.092*** 
(0.019) 
-0.088*** 
(0.019) 
-0.095*** 
(0.020) 
-0.109*** 
(0.028) 
-0.062*** 
(0.019) 
-0.066*** 
(0.018) 
Firm Age - 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.027) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Industry Effects  +/- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  4.075*** 
(1.236) 
5.252*** 
(1.295) 
6.690*** 
(1.626) 
3.644*** 
(1.255) 
4.265*** 
(1.236) 
6.792*** 
(2.223) 
5.248*** 
(1.364) 
4.007*** 
(1.728) 
6.480*** 
(1.702) 
4.422*** 
(1.486) 
5.136*** 
(1.621) 
Parameters             
Observations  173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 
Wald chi2(9)/12/16  61.02*** 70.52*** 71.11*** 71.11*** 72.80*** 66.05*** 66.54*** 77.71*** 72.68*** 70.13*** 50.76*** 
Pseudo R2  0.441 0.460 0.517 0.517 0.491 0.478 0.487 0.479 0.481 0.526 0.507 
Log pseudo  -55.399 -53.555 -47.896 -47.896 -50.463 -51.799 -50.851 -51.633 -51.515 -47.052 -48.887 
Accuracy  % % % % % % % % % % % 
Failed  78.38 74.36 77.78 76.19 78.95 76.92 76.92 81.82 78.95 78.05 78.95 
Non-failed  88.24 88.06 87.59 90.08 88.89 88.81 88.81 93.02 88.89 90.15 88.89 
Overall  86.13 84.97 85..55 86.71 86.71 86.13 86.13 90.17 86.71 87.28 86.71 
Hosmer-Lemeshow (10)             
Chi2(8)  5.70 4.63 6.21 6.16 6.09 7.77 4.78 5.92 3.96 7.57 6.87 
Prob>chi2  0.681 0.796 0.624 0.629 0.637 0.456 0.781 0.656 0.860 0.477 0.551 
ROC  0.908 0.915 0.921 0.935 0.928 0.920 0.926 0.923 0.922 0932 0.932 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses ,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01 
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Appendix 24: Results of the Cross-Sectional Logit Model; Five Years (t -5) Prior Failure 
HOLDOUT SAMPLE ( PANEL B) 
 t – 5 MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
MAIN VARIABLES Expected 
Sign 
           
Board composition             
H1A: BODC -  -0.137 
(0.193) 
0.045 
(0.195) 
-0.049 
(0.193) 
0.023 
(0.199) 
0.099 
(0.558) 
-0160 
(0.202) 
-0.155 
(0.197) 
0.078 
(0.209) 
-0.057 
(0.199) 
0.028 
(0.212) 
H2A: FMALE -  0.055 
(0.077) 
0.051 
(0.075) 
0.073 
(0.078) 
0.075 
(0.074) 
0.060 
(0.080) 
0.066 
(0.177) 
0.068 
(0.084) 
0.047 
(0.078) 
0.074 
(0.079) 
0.073 
(0.075) 
H3A: BODS -  0.014 
(0.016) 
0.021 
(0.018) 
0.021 
(0.018) 
0.020 
(0.016) 
0.014 
(0.016) 
0.015 
(0.015) 
-0.021 
(0.031) 
0.020 
(0.018) 
0.023 
(0.018) 
0.021 
(0.016) 
Board structure             
H4A: NCE -   -0.049** 
(0.022) 
     -0.022 
(0.059) 
  
H5A: ACE -    -0.042 
(0.028) 
     -0.062 
(0.064) 
 
H6A: RCE -     -0.052** 
(0.026) 
     -0.065 
(0.061) 
Board Functions             
BODM -      0.012 
(0.034) 
-0.002 
(0.012) 
-0.038 
(0.032) 
0.010 
(0.013) 
0.007 
(0.021) 
-0.001 
(-0.233) 
BINT3 -      -0.128 
(0.197) 
-0.020 
(0.087) 
0.156 
(0.625) 
   
Interactions             
H1B i:  BODC*BODM -      -0.031 
(0.071) 
     
H1B ii: BODC*BINT3 -      0.148 
(0.429) 
     
H2B i: FMALE*BODM -       0.003 
(0.021) 
    
H2B ii: FMALE*BINT3 -       -0.148 
(0.134) 
    
H3B i: BODS*BODM -        0.005 
(0.004) 
   
H3B ii: BODS*BINT3 -        -0.033 
(0.089) 
   
H4B: NCE*BODM -         -0.004 
(0.006) 
  
H5B: ACE*BODM -          0.002 
(0.007) 
 
H6B: RCE*BODM -           0.002 
(0.007) 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, Jackknife standard errors in parentheses ,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix 24: Continuation 1 of 1 
HOLDOUT SAMPLE ( PANEL B) 
 t – 5 MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
CONTROLVARIABLES Expected  
Sign 
           
Liquidity - -0.200 
(0.153) 
-0.218 
(0.165) 
-0.269 
(0.194) 
-0.272 
(0.177) 
-0.287* 
(0.170) 
-0.204 
(0.167) 
-0.237 
(0.170) 
-0.263 
(0.191) 
-0.242 
(0.191) 
-0.291 
(0.188) 
-0.288 
(0.179) 
Profitability - -0.953*** 
(0.328) 
-0.967*** 
(0.354) 
-0.938*** 
(0.364) 
-0.961*** 
(0.354) 
-0.982*** 
(0.347) 
-0.899** 
(0.354) 
-0.931*** 
(0.396) 
-0.977*** 
(0.376) 
-0.886** 
(0.386) 
-0.979** 
(0.388) 
-0.983** 
(0.386) 
Leverage + -0.164 
(0.146) 
-0.195 
(0.138) 
-0.234 
(0.150) 
-0.248* 
(0.150) 
-0.221* 
(0.129) 
-0.183 
(0.138) 
-0.209 
(0.146) 
-0.212 
(0.158) 
-0.220 
(0.150) 
-0.261 
(0.156) 
-0.227* 
(0.135) 
Firm Size - -0.103*** 
(0.145) 
-0.111*** 
(0.026) 
-0.087*** 
(0.029) 
-0.097*** 
(0.026) 
-0.094*** 
(0.026) 
-0.108*** 
(0.026) 
-0.113*** 
(0.027) 
-0.115*** 
(0.031) 
-0.089*** 
(0.031) 
-0.098*** 
(0.028) 
-0.096*** 
(0.029) 
Firm Age - 0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Industry Effects +/- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  6.530*** 
(2.108) 
6.989*** 
(2.379) 
6.119*** 
(2.499) 
7.580*** 
(2.719) 
7.762*** 
(2.555) 
6.073*** 
(3.906) 
7.676** 
(3.029) 
10.708** 
(4.487) 
4.790 
(3.130) 
8.379 
(3.672) 
7.868*** 
(3.602) 
Parameters             
Observations  173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 
F(9-16,-172)  4.36*** 2.93*** 2.08** 2.59*** 2.93*** 1.88** 1.95** 1.74** 1.74** 2.04** 1.81** 
Pseudo R2  0.457 0.471 0.508 0.484 0.498 0.480 0.483 0.491 0.512 0.485 0.499 
Log pseudo  -53.855 -52.423 -48.831 -51.132 -49.818 -51.548 -51.299 -50.438 -48.413 -51.040 -49.717 
Accuracy             
Failed  77.50% 73.17% 76.92% 76.92% 80.00% 74.36% 74.36% 76.92% 78.95% 77.50% 77.50% 
Non-failed  89.47% 88.64% 88.81% 88.81% 90.23% 88.06% 88.06% 88.81% 88.89% 89.47% 89.47% 
Overall  86.71% 84.97% 86.13% 86.13% 87.86% 84.97% 84.97% 86.13% 86.71% 86.71% 86.71% 
Hosmer-Lemeshow (10)             
Chi2(8)  3.48 1.76 7.24 4.65 3.42 3.17 1.93 3.32 11.68 3.23 1.34 
Prob>chi2  0.901 0.988 0.511 0.795 0.905 0.923 0.983 0.912 0.166 0.919 0.995 
ROC  0.916 0.922 0.934 0.924 0.926 0.926 0.926 0.926 0.934 0.925 0.927 
First line shows the marginal effects of each variable line, Jackknife standard errors in parentheses ,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
332 
 
Appendix 25: Results of the Four and Five Year (t – 4/5) Period Logit Model 
ESTIMATION SAMPLE (PANEL A) 
t - 4/5 MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
MAIN VARIABLES Expected 
Sign 
           
Board composition             
H1A: BODC -  -0.298** 
(0.121) 
-0.352*** 
(0.132) 
-0.186 
(0.133) 
-0.132 
(0.130) 
-0.185 
(0.325) 
-0.276** 
(0.122) 
-0.281** 
(0.127) 
-0.330** 
(0.134) 
-0.153 
(0.136) 
-0.090 
(0.134) 
H2A: FMALE -  0.039 
(0.054) 
0.033 
(0.052) 
0.058 
(0.054) 
0.062 
(0.055) 
0.043 
(0.055) 
-0.160 
(0.133) 
0.045 
(0.054) 
0.039 
(0.052) 
0.058 
(0.054) 
0.062 
(0.054) 
H3A: BODS -  -0.012 
(0.009) 
-0.013 
(0.009) 
-0.010 
(0.010) 
-0.008 
(0.009) 
-0.010 
(0.010) 
-0.007 
(0.010) 
-0.004 
(0.016) 
-0.013 
(0.009) 
-0.003 
(0.010) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
Board structure             
H4A: NCE -   -0.013 
(0.015) 
     -0.011 
(0.026) 
  
H5A: ACE -    -0.039** 
(0.017) 
     -0.073* 
(0.039) 
 
H6A: RCE -     -0.054*** 
(0.017) 
     -0.112*** 
(0.035) 
Board Functions             
BODM -      0.013 
(0.019) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
0.009 
(0.014) 
0.007 
(0.011) 
-0.004 
(0.014) 
-0.010 
(0.012) 
BINT3 -      -0.029 
(0.127) 
-0.044 
(0.064) 
0.168 
(0.253) 
   
Interactions             
H1B i:  BODC*BODM -      -0.011 
(0.036) 
     
H1B ii: BODC*BINT3 -      -0.040 
(0.268) 
     
H2B i: FMALE*BODM -       0.023* 
(0.012) 
    
H2B ii: FMALE*BINT3 -       -0.041 
(0.111) 
    
H3B i: BODS*BODM -        -0.000 
(0.002) 
   
H3B ii: BODS*BINT3 -        -0.031 
(0.033) 
   
H4B: NCE*BODM -         -0.000 
(0.003) 
  
H5B: ACE*BODM -          0.004 
(0.004) 
 
H6B: RCE*BODM -           0.006* 
(0.003) 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix 25: Continuation 1 of 1 
ESTIMATION SAMPLE (PANEL A) 
t – 4/5 MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
CONTROLVARIABLES Expected  
Sign 
           
Liquidity - 0.063 
(0.083) 
0.053 
(0.083) 
0.056 
(0.081) 
0.038 
(0.080) 
0.059 
(0.081) 
0.052 
(0.088) 
0.059 
(0.088) 
0.025 
(0.093) 
0.065 
(0.084) 
0.051 
(0.084) 
0.078 
(0.085) 
Profitability - -0.532*** 
(0.181) 
-0.545*** 
(0.185) 
-0.540*** 
(0.184) 
-0.504*** 
(0.171) 
-0.479*** 
(0.167) 
-0.503** 
(0.208) 
-0.497** 
(0.202) 
-0.516** 
(0.211) 
-0.514*** 
(0.199) 
-0.453** 
(0.189) 
-0.405** 
(0.175) 
Leverage + 0.128* 
(0.074) 
0.143* 
(0.077) 
0.143* 
(0.077) 
0.129* 
(0.077) 
-0.138* 
(0.074) 
0.132* 
(0.079) 
0.113 
(0.077) 
0.117 
(0.080) 
0.138* 
(0.078) 
0.105 
(0.078) 
0.110 
(0.076) 
Firm Size - -0.108*** 
(0.012) 
-0.092*** 
(0.015) 
-0.100*** 
(0.020) 
-0.077*** 
(0.016) 
-0.064*** 
(0.015) 
-0.095*** 
(0.017) 
-0.093*** 
(0.017) 
-0.096*** 
(0.017) 
-0.102*** 
(0.021) 
-0.081*** 
(0.018) 
-0.067*** 
(0.015) 
Firm Age - -0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Industry Effects  +/- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  4.149*** 
(1.075) 
5.583*** 
(1.189) 
6.044*** 
(1.267) 
5.158*** 
(1.262) 
5.296*** 
(1.147) 
4.619*** 
(2.052) 
5.527*** 
(1.380) 
4.846*** 
(1.518) 
5.479*** 
(1.528) 
5.415*** 
(1.716) 
6.107*** 
(1.866) 
Parameters             
Observations  346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 
Wald chi2(9)/12/16  66.06*** 67.94*** 67.68*** 76.57*** 85.22*** 76.24*** 75.58*** 78.53*** 71.04*** 78.76*** 88.41*** 
Pseudo R2  0.413 0.431 0.434 0.446 0.463 0.439 0.448 0.442 0.437 0.454 0.480 
Log  pseudo  -116.355 -112.894 -112.334 -109.959 -106.475 -111.277 -109.492 -110.625 -111.582 -108.338 -103.181 
Accuracy  % % % % % % % % % % % 
Failed  80.28 80.00 80.28 78.67 80.26 78.67 80.82 85.19 81.43 78.95 80.77 
Non-failed  88.00 87.68 88.00 88.56 89.26 88.56 88.64 91.14 88.04 88.89 89.93 
Overall  86.42 86.13 86.42 86.42 87.28 86.42 86.99 89.77 86.71 86.71 87.86 
Hosmer-Lemeshow (10)             
Chi2(8)  5.06 3.55 4.67 5.80 8.63 2.87 4.43 4.43 5.56 2.82 6.36 
Prob>chi2  0.751 0.895 0.792 0.670 0.093 0.943 0.816 0.816 0.696 0.945 0.607 
ROC  0.903 0.907 0.909 0.915 0.919 0.910 0.914 0.913 0.910 0.917 0.923 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix 26: Results of the Four and Five Year (t – 4/5) Period Logit Model 
HOLDOUT VALIDATION TEST (PANEL B) 
t-4/5 MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
MAIN VARIABLES Expected 
Sign 
           
Board composition             
H1A: BODC -  -0.079 
(0.140) 
-0.020 
(0.149) 
-0.006 
(0.145) 
0.059 
(0.146) 
-0.434 
(0.315) 
-0.079 
(0.147) 
-0.086 
(0.139) 
0.005 
(0.153) 
0.016 
(0.144) 
0.091 
(0.149) 
H2A: FMALE -  0.019 
(0.060) 
0.021 
(0.060) 
0.039 
(0.060) 
0.031 
(0.057) 
0.022 
(0.058) 
0.069 
(0.116) 
0.026 
(0.060) 
0.022 
(0.058) 
0.042 
(0.059) 
0.034 
(0.055) 
H3A: BODS -  -0.004 
(0.013) 
-0.003 
(0.013) 
0.002 
(0.012) 
0.003 
(0.012) 
-0.001 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.011) 
-0.014 
(0.023) 
-0.000 
(0.012) 
0.005 
(0.012) 
0.006 
(0.012) 
Board structure             
H4A: NCE -   -0.015 
(0.016) 
     -0.020 
(0.027) 
  
H5A: ACE -    -0.034* 
(0.018) 
     -0.062* 
(0.036) 
 
H6A: RCE -     -0.041** 
(0.018) 
     -0.069* 
(0.035) 
Board Functions             
BODM -      -0.010 
(0.019) 
0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.023) 
0.010 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
0.005 
(0.015) 
BINT3 -      -0.256** 
(0.127) 
-0.031 
(0.059) 
0.168 
(0.293) 
   
Interactions             
H1B i:  BODC*BODM -      0.037 
(0.038) 
     
H1B ii: BODC*BINT3 -      0.337 
(0.253) 
     
H2B i: FMALE*BODM -       -0.001 
(0.014) 
    
H2B ii: FMALE*BINT3 -       -0.246* 
(0.139) 
    
H3B i: BODS*BODM -        0.003 
(0.003) 
   
H3B ii: BODS*BINT3 -        -0.038 
(0.039) 
   
H4B: NCE*BODM -         0.000 
(0.003) 
  
H5B: ACE*BODM -          0.003 
(0.004) 
 
H6B: RCE*BODM -           0.003 
(0.004) 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix 26: Continuation 1 of 1 
HOLDOUT SAMPLE (PANEL B) 
MODEL T-4/5  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
CONTROLVARIABLES Expected  
Sign 
           
Liquidity - -0.130 
(0.099) 
-0.123 
(0.099) 
-0.124 
(0.102) 
-0.141 
(0.099) 
-0.137 
(0.098) 
-0.109 
(0.101) 
-0.124 
(0.100) 
-0.132 
(0.102) 
-0.107 
(0.102) 
-0.121 
(0.100) 
-0.115 
(0.095) 
Profitability - -0.612*** 
(0.228) 
-0.609*** 
(0.226) 
-0.602*** 
(0.224) 
-0.566*** 
(0.221) 
-0.589*** 
(0.211) 
-0.557*** 
(0.207) 
-0.569*** 
(0.017) 
-0.588*** 
(0.203) 
-0.584*** 
(0.210) 
-0.553** 
(0.207) 
-0.580*** 
(0.188) 
Leverage + -0.070 
(0.097) 
-0.066 
(0.101) 
-0.064 
(0.099) 
-0.088 
(0.096) 
-0.076 
(0.092) 
-0.077 
(0.098) 
-0.075 
(0.095) 
-0.082 
(0.100) 
-0.072 
(0.100) 
-0.100 
(0.097) 
-0.089 
(0.092) 
Firm Size - -0.114*** 
(0.012) 
-0.107*** 
(0.017) 
-0.099*** 
(0.019) 
-0.094*** 
(0.017) 
-0.091*** 
(0.018) 
-0.112*** 
(0.018) 
-0.114*** 
(0.017) 
-0.113*** 
(0.017) 
-0.100*** 
(0.020) 
-0.098*** 
(0.018) 
-0.097*** 
(0.018) 
Firm Age - -0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
Industry Effects +/- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  5.041*** 
(1.417) 
5.395*** 
(1.525) 
4.933*** 
(1.507) 
5.117*** 
(1.517) 
5.337*** 
(1.513) 
6.764*** 
(2.178) 
5.119*** 
(1.691) 
6.142*** 
(2.413) 
3.982*** 
(1.701) 
5.018*** 
(1.674) 
4.921*** 
(1.637) 
Parameters             
Observations  346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 
Wald chi2(9-16)  74.37*** 76.51*** 77.17*** 77.86*** 80.02*** 85.00*** 78.48*** 80.86*** 76.08*** 77.66*** 81.17*** 
Pseudo R2  0.426 0.428 0.431 0.437 0.444 0.449 0.455 0.450 0.439 0.445 0.457 
Log pseudo  -114.444 -114.107 -113.460 -112.318 -110.850 -109.822 -108.555 -109.615 -111.948 -110.615 -108.216 
Accuracy  % % % % % % % % % % % 
Failed  74.68 76.32 77.92 75.95 72.73 77.03 86.90 76.62 78.38 77.22 75.61 
Non-failed  88.01 87.78 88.48 88.39 86.99 87.50 92.88 88.10 87.87 88.76 89.02 
Overall  84.97 85.26 86.13 85.55 83.82 85.26 91.45 85.55 85.84 86.13 85.84 
Hosmer-Lemeshow (10)             
Chi2(8)  5.96 8.63 4.24 2.72 18.37 7.20 13.48 6.98 7.45 5.03 6.05 
Prob>chi2  0.652 0.374 0.835 0.951 0.019 0.515 0.096 0.539 0.489 0.755 0.642 
ROC  0.904 0.906 0.906 0.909 0.911 0.916 0.917 0.910 0.907 0.914 0.916 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
336 
 
Appendix 27: Results of the One and Two Year (t – 1/2) Period Logit Model 
ESTIMATION SAMPLE (PANEL A) 
t-1/2 MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
MAIN VARIABLES Expected 
Sign 
           
Board composition             
H1A: BODC -  -0.168 
(0.143) 
-0.131 
(0.162) 
-0.113 
(0.146) 
-0.084 
(0.160) 
-0.201 
(0.358) 
-0.156 
(0.146) 
-0.171 
(0.148) 
-0.083 
(0.164) 
-0.071 
(0.142) 
-0.045 
(0.160) 
H2A: FMALE -  -0.005 
(0.045) 
-0.001 
(0.045) 
0.006 
(0.046) 
0.010 
(0.045) 
0.005 
(0.042) 
-0.142 
(0.101) 
0.005 
(0.043) 
0.010 
(0.045) 
0.022 
(0.044) 
0.025 
(0.043) 
H3A: BODS -  -0.017 
(0.013) 
-0.016 
(0.012) 
-0.015 
(0.012) 
-0.013 
(0.011) 
-0.013 
(0.011) 
-0.012 
(0.011) 
-0.025 
(0.027) 
-0.015 
(0.011) 
-0.015 
(0.012) 
-0.013 
(0.010) 
Board structure             
H4A: NCE -   -0.009 
(0.012) 
     -0.042* 
(0.022) 
  
H5A: ACE -    -0.018*** 
(0.016) 
     -0.068** 
(0.028) 
 
H6A: RCE -     -0.029** 
(0.014) 
     -0.073** 
(0.032) 
Board Functions             
BODM -      0.014 
(0.021) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.021) 
0.112 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.013) 
BINT3 -      -0.131 
(0.151) 
-0.144** 
(0.062) 
-0.067 
(0.247) 
   
Interactions             
H1B i:  BODC*BODM -      0.003 
(0.040) 
     
H1B ii: BODC*BINT3 -      0.053 
(0.268) 
     
H2B i: FMALE*BODM -       0.014 
(0.011) 
    
H2B ii: FMALE*BINT3 -       0.077 
(0.111) 
    
H3B i: BODS*BODM -        0.001 
(0.003) 
   
H3B ii: BODS*BINT3 -        -0.005 
(0.033) 
   
H4B: NCE*BODM -         0.003 
(0.002) 
  
H5B: ACE*BODM -          0.005* 
(0.003) 
 
H6B: RCE*BODM -           0.004 
(0.004) 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered at firm level,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix 27: Continuation 1 of 1 
ESTIMATION SAMPLE (PANEL A) 
t-1/2 MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
CONTROLVARIABLES Expected  
Sign 
           
Liquidity - -0.024 
(0.084) 
-0.004 
(0.083) 
-0.004 
(0.083) 
-0.011 
(0.081) 
-0.017 
(0.082) 
-0.016 
(0.062) 
0.013 
(0.064) 
0.012 
(0.063) 
0.001 
(0.066) 
-0.016 
(0.066) 
-0.020 
(0.065) 
Profitability - -0.685*** 
(0.216) 
-0.701*** 
(0.224) 
-0.679*** 
(0.220) 
-0.673*** 
(0.217) 
-0.648*** 
(0.203) 
-0.552*** 
(0.180) 
-0.552*** 
(0.183) 
-0.556*** 
(0.180) 
-0.534*** 
(0.185) 
-0.556*** 
(0.066) 
-0.516*** 
(0.161) 
Leverage + 0.058 
(0.102) 
0.085 
(0.104) 
0.087 
(0.103) 
0.087 
(0.105) 
0.073 
(0.101) 
0.059 
(0.088) 
0.037 
(0.090) 
0.053 
(0.096) 
0.034 
(0.088) 
0.024 
(0.091) 
0.021 
(0.086) 
Firm Size - -0.108*** 
(0.012) 
-0.088*** 
(0.016) 
-0.081*** 
(0.018) 
-0.081*** 
(0.016) 
-0.075*** 
(0.016) 
-0.088*** 
(0.014) 
-0.088*** 
(0.014) 
-0.088*** 
(0.014) 
-0.079*** 
(0.016) 
-0.083*** 
(0.015) 
-0.074*** 
(0.015) 
Firm Age - -0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
Industry Effects   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant +/- 4.615*** 
(1.486) 
5.698*** 
(1.704) 
5.175*** 
(1.820) 
5.315*** 
(1.780) 
5.622*** 
(1.768) 
4.771* 
(2.515) 
5.370*** 
(1.574) 
5.577** 
(2.434) 
4.054** 
(1.759) 
5.752*** 
(1.724) 
5.905*** 
(1.927) 
Parameters             
Observations  353 353 353 353 353 353 353 353 353 353 353 
Wald chi2(9)/12/16  69.10*** 68.20*** 72.72*** 76.13*** 81.79*** 86.46*** 85.71*** 92.53*** 78.84*** 87.04*** 95.68*** 
Pseudo R2  0.491 0.503 0.505 0.506 0.512 0.547 0.555 0.548 0.542 0.546 0.552 
Log pseudo  -104.136 -101.726 -101.350 -101.018 -99.871 -92.668 -91.049 -92.553 -93.649 -92.901 -91.563 
Accuracy  % % % % % % % % % % % 
Failed  80.77 83.33 82.28 85.53 82.28 87.01 87.18 88.16 87.01 87.34 85.19 
Non-failed  88.73 89.45 89.42 89.53 89.42 90.22 90.55 90.25 90.22 90.88 90.81 
Overall  86.97 88.10 87.82 88.67 87.82 89.52 89.80 89.80 89.52 90.08 89.52 
Hosmer-Lemeshow (10)             
Chi2(8)  10.15 8.66 7.59 6.36 4.78 8.31 3.41 7.44 4.05 3.77 3.89 
Prob>chi2  0.254 0.372 0.474 0.607 0.781 0.404 0.906 0.490 0.853 0.877 0.867 
ROC  0.919 0.925 0.926 0.925 0.927 0.941 0.944 0.941 0.939 0.938 0.939 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix 28: Results of the One and Two Year (t – 1/2) Period Logit Model 
HOLDOUT SAMPLE (PANEL B) 
t – 1/2 MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
MAIN VARIABLES Expected 
Sign 
           
Board composition             
H1A: BODC -  -0.146 
(0.145) 
-0.137 
(0.145) 
-0.131 
(0.144) 
-0.035 
(0.144) 
-0.098 
(0.234) 
-0.144 
(0.127) 
-0.106 
(0.134) 
-0.137 
(0.142) 
-0.132 
(0.143) 
-0.037 
(0.141) 
H2A: FMALE -  0.025 
(0.035) 
0.027 
(0.034) 
0.028 
(0.035) 
0.046 
(0.036) 
0.034 
(0.035) 
0.100 
(0.093) 
0.027 
(0.035) 
0.029 
(0.035) 
0.030 
(0.035) 
0.045 
(0.036) 
H3A: BODS -  -0.027*** 
(0.009) 
-0.027*** 
(0.010) 
-0.026*** 
(0.009) 
-0.023** 
(0.009) 
-0.026*** 
(0.010) 
-0.027*** 
(0.010) 
-0.037* 
(0.022) 
-0.028*** 
(0.010) 
-0.028*** 
(0.010) 
-0.023*** 
(0.009) 
Board structure             
H4A: NCE -   -0.003 
(0.010) 
     -0.015 
(0.020) 
  
H5A: ACE -    -0.005*** 
(0.014) 
     -0.009 
(0.024) 
 
H6A: RCE -     -0.038** 
(0.015) 
     -0.054** 
(0.025) 
Board Functions             
BODM -      -0.004 
(0.015) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.008 
(0.016) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
-0.004 
(0.009) 
-0.007 
(0.010) 
BINT3 -      0.049 
(0.159) 
-0.151** 
(0.064) 
-0.407** 
(0.181) 
   
Interactions             
H1B i:  BODC*BODM -      0.001 
(0.026) 
     
H1B ii: BODC*BINT3 -      -0.329 
(0.294) 
     
H2B i: FMALE*BODM -       -0.009 
(0.009) 
    
H2B ii: FMALE*BINT3 -       0.063 
(0.087) 
    
H3B i: BODS*BODM -        0.001 
(0.002) 
   
H3B ii: BODS*BINT3 -        0.040 
(0.022) 
   
H4B: NCE*BODM -         0.001 
(0.002) 
  
H5B: ACE*BODM -          0.000 
(0.002) 
 
H6B: RCE*BODM -           0.002 
(0.003) 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix 28: Continuation 1 of 1 
HOLDOUT SAMPLE (PANEL B) 
t – 1 / 2 MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
CONTROLVARIABLES Expected  
Sign 
           
Liquidity - -0.246*** 
(0.080) 
-0.262*** 
(0.080) 
-0.264*** 
(0.078) 
-0.261*** 
(0.080) 
-0.256*** 
(0.075) 
-0.268*** 
(0.081) 
-0.276*** 
(0.080) 
-0.278*** 
(0.084) 
-0.273*** 
(0.079) 
-0.270*** 
(0.081) 
-0.254*** 
(0.073) 
Profitability - -0.749*** 
(0.174) 
-0.761*** 
(0.163) 
-0.755*** 
(0.158) 
-0.744*** 
(0.169) 
-0.640*** 
(0.133) 
-0.795*** 
(0.166) 
-0.831*** 
(0.166) 
-0.831*** 
(0.161) 
-0.764*** 
(0.160) 
-0.746*** 
(0.168) 
-0.630*** 
(0.134) 
Leverage + -0.007 
(0.083) 
-0.027 
(0.077) 
-0.028 
(0.077) 
-0.028 
(0.077) 
-0.021 
(0.075) 
-0.030 
(0.078) 
-0.027 
(0.078) 
-0.018 
(0.080) 
-0.034 
(0.076) 
-0.029 
(0.076) 
-0.025 
(0.075) 
Firm Size - -0.099*** 
(0.010) 
-0.073*** 
(0.013) 
-0.070*** 
(0.016) 
-0.070*** 
(0.015) 
-0.053*** 
(0.013) 
-0.064*** 
(0.013) 
-0.062*** 
(0.013) 
-0.065*** 
(0.014) 
-0.070*** 
(0.016) 
-0.070*** 
(0.015) 
-0.054*** 
(0.013) 
Firm Age - -0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
Industry Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes) Yes 
Constant +/- 7.874*** 
(1.847) 
10.649*** 
(2.354) 
10.649*** 
(2.379) 
10.546*** 
(2.419) 
10.218*** 
(2.362) 
11.780*** 
(2.649) 
11.582*** 
(2.265) 
13.062*** 
(2.754) 
11.455*** 
(2.405) 
11.117*** 
(2.470) 
11.238*** 
(2.714) 
Parameters             
Observations  351 351 351 351 351 351 351 351 351 351 351 
Wald chi2 (9/12/16)  78.51*** 77.04*** 77.54*** 83.70*** 80.58*** 86.80*** 87.81*** 85.38*** 80.09*** 84.78*** 85.35*** 
Pseudo R2  0.580 0.604 0.606 0.605 0.625 0.628 0.629 0.632 0.607 0.605 0.626 
Log pseudo  -85.024 -79.708 -79.656 -79.825 -76.807 -75.061 -74.764 -74.291 -79.375 -79.500 -75.564 
Accuracy  % % % % % % % % % % % 
Failed  85.37 85.54 85.54 85.54 90.12 87.06 86.90 85.88 84.34 86.59 86.75 
Non-failed  91.82 92.16 92.16 92.16 92.96 93.23 92.88 92.86 91.79 92.19 92.54 
Overall  90.31 90.60 90.60 90.60 92.31 91.74 91.45 91.17 90.03 90.88 91.17 
Hosmer-Lemeshow (10)             
Chi2(8)  6.88 5.38 8.51 7.41 2.53 2.59 1.96 2.67 7.79 7.33 3.22 
Prob>chi2  0.549 0.716 0.385 0.493 0.960 0.958 0.982 0.953 0.455 0.501 0.920 
ROC  0.946 0.955 0.955 0.955 0.960 0.961 0.960 0.960 0.955 0.956 0.960 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix 29:  Results of the Split Nomination Committee Effectiveness Logit Model 
MODEL 12:   POOLED t - 1/2 t  - 4/5 
PANEL  A B C A B C A B C 
VARIABLES Expected  
Sign 
         
H4C: NCP - -0.045 
(0.050) 
-0.030 
(0.041) 
-0.032 
(0.040) 
-0.027 
(0.059) 
0.007 
(0.043) 
-0.008 
(0.041) 
-0.045 
(0.060) 
-0.085 
(0.055) 
-0.066 
(0.046) 
H4D:NCI - 0.115** 
(0.047) 
0.110*** 
(0.037) 
0.109*** 
(0.038) 
0.154*** 
(0.055) 
0.118** 
(0.046) 
0.124*** 
(0.039) 
0.097* 
(0.056) 
0.116** 
(0.050) 
0.105** 
(0.046) 
H4E: NCCI - -0.011 
(0.039) 
-0.012 
(0.035) 
-0.009 
(0.033) 
-0.014 
(0.053) 
-0.026 
(0.043) 
-0.012 
(0.038) 
-0.004 
(0.045) 
-0.007 
(0.048) 
-0.002 
(0.040) 
H4F: NCS - -0.094** 
(0.040) 
-0.100** 
(0.035) 
-0.097*** 
(0.034) 
-0.131** 
(0.052) 
-0.119*** 
(0.031) 
-0.118*** 
(0.032) 
-0.074 
(0.047) 
-0.088 
(0.056) 
-0.080* 
(0.044) 
H4G: NCM1 - 0.011 
(0.043) 
-0.032 
(0.037) 
-0.005 
(0.035) 
-0.025 
(0.042) 
-0.031 
(0.044) 
-0.032 
(0.034) 
0.059 
(0.052) 
-0.021 
(0.060) 
0.024 
(0.046) 
CONTROLS           
Liquidity - 0.016 
(0.068) 
-0.186*** 
(0.069) 
-0.078 
(0.061) 
0.005 
(0.076) 
-0.260*** 
(0.080) 
-0.133** 
(0.062) 
0.064 
(0.081) 
-0.136 
(0.100) 
-0.008 
(0.074) 
Profitability - -0.552*** 
(0.163) 
-0.701*** 
(0.151) 
-0.612*** 
(0.137) 
-0.648*** 
(0.173) 
-0.695*** 
(0.198) 
-0.648*** 
(0.169) 
-0.487*** 
(0.182) 
-0.571*** 
(0.218) 
-0.527*** 
(0.154) 
Leverage + 0.095 
(0.070) 
0.005 
(0.075) 
0.056 
(0.068) 
0.147 
(0.090) 
-0.024 
(0.076) 
0.061 
(0.068) 
0.113 
(0.070) 
-0.041 
(0.093) 
0.063 
(0.069) 
Firm Size - -0.097*** 
(0.014) 
-0.087*** 
(0.013) 
-0.094*** 
(0.011) 
-0.093*** 
(0.016) 
-0.077*** 
(0.014) 
-0.088*** 
(0.012) 
-0.104*** 
(0.018) 
-0.087*** 
(0.017) 
-0.097*** 
(0.014) 
Firm Age - -0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0..000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Industry Effects  +/- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  3.711*** 
(0.932) 
4.824*** 
(0.899) 
4.167*** 
(0.813) 
4.064*** 
(1.163) 
6.164*** 
(1.686) 
4.971*** 
(0.774) 
3.402*** 
(0.953) 
4.164*** 
(1.013) 
3.523*** 
(0.785) 
Parameters           
Observations  875 873 1748 353 351 704 346 346 692 
Wald chi2(9/13)  87.52*** 129.87*** 128.02*** 83.56*** 88.48*** 127.11*** 71.29*** 86.74*** 113.41*** 
Pseudo R2  0.456 0.509 0.475 0.531 0.602 0.554 0.427 0.449 0.426 
Log pseudo  -274.538 -247.909 -530.488 -95.892 -80.336 -181.286 -113.716 -109.883 -228.438 
Accuracy  % % % % % % % % % 
Failed  84.86 81.37 82.77 87.18 86.75 85.63 81.43 74.68 77.55 
Non-failed  89.28 90.28 89.38 90.55 92.54 90.99 88.04 88.01 87.71 
Overall  88.34 88.20 87.93 89.80 91.17 89.77 86.71 84.97 85.55 
Hosmer-Lemeshow(10)           
Chi2(8)  31.62 8.00 24.45 19.28 9.65 24.89 4.59 3.03 11.32 
Prob>chi2  0.000 0.434 0.000 0.013 0.290 0.002 0.801 0.933 0.184 
ROC  0.914 0.931 0.920 0.934 0.952 0.941 0.906 0.913 0.907 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix 29: Continuation 1 of 1 
MODEL 12: t -1 t-2 t-3 t-4 t -5 
PANEL  A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C 
VARIABLES Expected  
Sign 
               
H4C: NCP - 0.023 
(0.063) 
0.027 
(0.067) 
0.020 
(0.040) 
-0.103 
(0.073) 
0.003 
(0.088) 
-0.028 
(0.049) 
-0.051 
(0.077) 
0.035 
(0.082) 
-0.022 
(0.051) 
-0.078 
(0.069) 
-0.042 
(0.076) 
-0.056 
(0.046) 
0.018 
(0.084) 
-0.108 
(0.085) 
-0.070 
(0.050) 
H4D:NCI - 0.147** 
(0.066) 
0.075 
(0.072) 
0.107** 
(0.043) 
0.151** 
(0.064) 
0.157* 
(1.091) 
0.138*** 
(0.043) 
0.084 
(0.062) 
0.130 
(0.094) 
0.095** 
(0.043) 
0.097 
(0.075) 
0.149* 
(0.086) 
0.126** 
(0.051) 
0.075 
(0.063) 
0.078 
(0.097) 
0.091* 
(0.050) 
H4E: NCO - 0.035 
(0.066) 
-0.024 
(0.053) 
0.017 
(0.041) 
-0.063 
(0.063) 
-0.036 
(0.086) 
-0.039 
(0.046) 
-0.045 
(0.062) 
-0.033 
(0.067) 
-0.020 
(0.042) 
0.005 
(0.070) 
0.051 
(0.080) 
0.022 
(0.046) 
-0.029 
(0.055) 
-0.036 
(0.076) 
-0.025 
(0.043) 
H4F: NCS - -0.152*** 
(0..057) 
-0.109* 
(0.064) 
-0.123*** 
(0.036) 
-0.060 
(0.071) 
-
0.148*** 
(0.057) 
-0.112*** 
(0.040) 
-0.054 
(0.067) 
-0.078 
(0.101) 
-0.083* 
(0.046) 
-0.069 
(0.063) 
-0.169 
(0.113) 
-0.112** 
(0.053) 
-0.049 
(0.064) 
-0.062 
(0.080) 
-0.052 
(0.047) 
H4G: NCM1 - -0.021 
(0.050) 
-0.023 
(0.067) 
-0.038 
(0.036) 
0.021 
(0.079) 
-0.047 
(0.088) 
-0.016 
(0.049) 
-0.021 
(0.071) 
-0.021 
(0.073) 
0.003 
(0.044) 
-0.013 
(0.0074) 
0.033 
(0.088) 
0.014 
(0.048) 
0.120* 
(0.061) 
-0.080 
(-0.129) 
0.039 
(0.047) 
CONTROLS                 
Liquidity - 0.027 
(0.027) 
-0.236 
(0.153) 
-0.147** 
(0.065) 
0.031 
(0.097) 
-0.233* 
(0.138) 
-0.119 
(0.073) 
-0.088 
(0.119) 
-0.054 
(0.143) 
-0.059 
(0.086) 
0.077 
(0.118) 
-0.125 
(0.148) 
-0.035 
(0.077) 
0.101 
(0.089) 
-0.170 
(0.169) 
0.013 
(0.080) 
Profitability - -0.939*** 
(0.103) 
-0.709* 
(0.406) 
-0.716*** 
(0.183) 
-0.459** 
(0.187) 
-
1.047*** 
(0.342) 
-0.627*** 
(0.191) 
-0.377 
(0.308) 
-
1.033*** 
(0.283) 
-
0.658*** 
(0.212) 
-0.491 
(0.348) 
-0.420 
(0.333) 
-0.466** 
(0.211) 
-0.463** 
(0.183) 
-0.937** 
(0.389) 
-0.632*** 
(0.145) 
Leverage + 0.207** 
(0.102) 
-0.087 
(0.136) 
0.034 
(0.066) 
0.123 
(0.110) 
0.075 
(0.143) 
0.083 
(0.081) 
-0.022 
(0.116) 
0.046 
(0.154) 
0.018 
(0.088) 
0.054 
(0.109) 
0.087 
(0.173) 
0.046 
(0.080) 
0.196*** 
(0.074) 
-0.138 
(0.173) 
0.080 
(0.070) 
Firm Size - -0.079*** 
(0.022) 
-0.066** 
(0.032) 
-0.082*** 
(0.013) 
-0.105*** 
(0.023) 
-
0.071*** 
(0.025) 
-0.097*** 
(0.015) 
-
0.099*** 
(0.020) 
-
0.098*** 
(0.022) 
-
0.098*** 
(0.014) 
-
0.084*** 
(0.021) 
-
0.114*** 
(0.030) 
-
0.103*** 
(0.015) 
-0.131*** 
(0.028) 
-0.063 
(0.023) 
-0.093*** 
(0.016) 
Firm Age - -0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Industry 
Effects  
+/- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  3.405** 
(1.534) 
10.026** 
(4.940) 
6.967*** 
(1.624) 
4.134** 
(1.831) 
5.511 
(3.532) 
4.926*** 
(1.490) 
4.158* 
(2.130) 
6.990 
(4.305) 
4.717*** 
(2.75) 
4.198*** 
(1.441) 
3.878 
(2.579) 
4.008*** 
(3.15) 
5.000*** 
(1.572) 
6.009*** 
(2.190) 
4.232*** 
(0.060) 
Parameters                 
Observations  177 176 353 176 175 351 176 176 352 173 173 346 173 173 346 
F(14, 175)   0.96   1.45   2.57***   2.48***   2.12**  
Wald chi2(9)  73.85***  82.70*** 55.35***  101.72*** 43.38***  86.65*** 47.08*** 0.003 90.53*** 54.97***  109.82*** 
Pseudo R2  0.676 0.674 0.631 0.468 0.602 0.498 0.419 0.538 0.454 0.419 0.457 0.420 0.473 0.496 0.442 
Log pseudo  -33.236 -32.916 -75.159 -54.326 -40.076 -101.806 -59.357 -47.665 -112.104 -57.626 -54.364 -115.540 -52.252 -50.024 -110.593 
Accuracy  % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % 
Failed  84.44 95.24 90.36 88.89 85.71 83.54 82.05 81.82 82.05 86.11 76.32 81.08 81.08 72.50 79.45 
Non-failed  93.18 95.52 93.33 89.29 92.48 90.07 89.05 90.91 88.69 89.78 87.41 88.60 88.97 87.97 88.28 
Overall  90.96 95.45 92.63 89.20 90.86 88.60 87.50 88.64 87..22 89.02 84.97 86.99 87.28 84.39 86.42 
Hosmer-
Lemeshow(10) 
                
Chi2(8)  6.75 12.73 11.67 11.02 1.51 13.06 9.93 7.55 7.66 12.55 9.99 4.97 8.79 4.72 11.31 
Prob>chi2  0.564 0.121 0.167 0.200 0.993 0.110 0.270 0.478 0.467 0.128 0.266 0.761 0.360 0.788 0.185 
ROC  0.970 0.960 0..957 0.916 0.955 0.925 0.902 0.931 0.912 0.905 0.917 0.905 0.919 0.924 0.909 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses ,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix 30: Results of the Split Audit Committee Effectiveness Logit Model 
MODEL 13  POOLED t  - 1/2 t - 4/5 
PANEL  A B C A B C A B C 
VARIABLES Expected  
Sign 
         
H5C: ACP - -0.191** 
(0.079) 
-0.034 
(0.074) 
-0.099 
(0.076) 
-0.071 
(0.072) 
-0.005 
(0.059) 
-0.049 
(0.064) 
-1.481*** 
(0.178) 
-0.086 
(0.109) 
-0.169 
(0.112) 
H5D:ACI - 0.015 
(0.039) 
-0.017 
(0.034) 
-0.002 
(0.033) 
0.026 
(0.043) 
0.018 
(0.043) 
0.021 
(0.034) 
0.017 
(0.050) 
-0.035 
(0.046) 
-0.013 
(0.042) 
H5E: ACX - -0.061* 
(0.035) 
-0.050 
(0.034) 
-0.059* 
(0.031) 
-0.046 
(0.038) 
-0.058 
(0.039) 
-0.057* 
(0.031) 
-0.081* 
(0.043) 
-0.066* 
(0.042) 
-0.079** 
(0.035) 
H5F: ACS - -0.059 
(0.039) 
0.019 
(0.037) 
-0.022 
(0.032) 
-0.059 
(0.049) 
-0.037 
(0.048) 
-0.041 
(0.036) 
-0.068 
(0.046) 
0.059 
(0.046) 
-0.007 
(0.038) 
H5G: ACM1 - -0.001 
(0.036) 
-0.022 
(0.041) 
-0.010 
(0.034) 
-0.006 
(0.052) 
0.001 
(0.044) 
-0.005 
(0.037) 
-0.005 
(0.047) 
-0.037 
(0.052) 
-0.017 
(0.041) 
CONTROLS           
Liquidity - 0.006 
(0.067) 
-0.168** 
(0.068) 
-0.076 
(0.061) 
-0.009 
(0.085) 
-0.238*** 
(0.082) 
-0.133** 
(0.065) 
0.036 
(0.081) 
-0.113 
(0.096) 
-0.021 
(0.071) 
Profitability - -0.505*** 
(0.145) 
-0.684*** 
(0.152) 
-0.579*** 
(0.129) 
-0.658*** 
(0.199) 
-0.670*** 
(0.181) 
-0.646*** 
(0.155) 
-0.458*** 
(0.145) 
-0.603*** 
(0.209) 
-0.513*** 
(0.138) 
Leverage + 0.083 
(0.068) 
0.004 
(0.078) 
0.045 
(0.067) 
0.077 
(0.103) 
0.012 
(0.080) 
0.045 
(0.072) 
0.118* 
(0.071) 
-0.055 
(0.095) 
0.060 
(0.068) 
Firm Size - -0.084*** 
(0.013) 
-0.096*** 
(0.014) 
-0.090*** 
(0.011) 
-0.089*** 
(0.016) 
-0.088*** 
(0.016) 
-0.090*** 
(0.012) 
-0.076*** 
(0.015) 
-0.098*** 
(0.015) 
-0.087*** 
(0.012) 
Firm Age - -0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
Industry Effects  +/- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  5.365*** 
(1.035) 
5.478*** 
(1.192) 
5.259*** 
(1.077) 
5.168*** 
(1.316) 
6.189*** 
(1.490) 
5.762*** 
(1.186) 
18.242*** 
(1.046) 
5.579*** 
(1.460) 
5.155*** 
(1.363) 
Model Parameters           
Observations  875 873 1748 353 351 704 346 346 692 
Wald chi2(10/13)  100.75*** 113.62*** 112.59*** 83.81*** 86.20*** 110.58*** 1595.33*** 84.75*** 97.76*** 
Pseudo R2  0.463 0.496 0.469 0.505 0.577 0.531 0.459 0.449 0.435 
Log pseudo  -271.49 -254.349 -535.922 -101.332 -85.374 -190.507 -107.274 -109.798 -224.752 
Accuracy  % % % % % % % % % 
Failed  83.42 81.63 81.54 80.49 83.91 82.61 81.94 78.67 79.59 
Non-failed  89.74 89.51 89.40 89.67 92.80 90.24 88.69 88.19 88.26 
Overall  88.34 87.74 87.64 87.54 90.60 88.49 87.28 86.13 86.42 
Hosmer-Lemeshow(10)           
Chi2(8)  14.08 9.25 28.51 4.27 5.37 11.48 6.34 4.49 10.52 
Prob>chi2  0.080 0.322 0.000 0.832 0.718 0.176 0.609 0.811 0.230 
ROC  0.916 0.925 0.916 0.926 0.946 0.933 0.919 0.914 0.908 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix 30: Continuation 
MODEL 13  t -1 t -2 t-3 t -4 t-5 
PANEL  A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C 
VARIABLES Expected  
Sign 
               
H5C: ACP - 0.006 
(0.082) 
-0.012 
(0.058) 
-0.024 
(0.057) 
-0.160* 
(0.091) 
0.020 
(1.178) 
-0.067 
(0.072) 
-1.554*** 
(0.217) 
0.018 
(0.128) 
-0.102 
(0.077) 
-1.562*** 
(0.231) 
-0.096 
(1.476) 
-0.146 
(0.116) 
-2.367*** 
(0.498) 
-0.101 
(0.088) 
-0.183* 
(0.108) 
H5D:ACI - 0.013 
(0.052) 
-0.006 
(0.064) 
0.030 
(0.032) 
0.014 
(0.057) 
0.029 
(0.072) 
0.008 
(0.040) 
-0.035 
(0.057) 
-0.028 
(0.062) 
-0.022 
(0.040) 
-0.019 
(0.072) 
-0.032 
(0.070) 
-0.023 
(0.044) 
0.042 
(0.050) 
-0.039 
(0.075) 
-0.007 
(0.042) 
H5E: ACX - -0.057 
(0.042) 
-0.057 
(0.064) 
-0.062** 
(0.028) 
-0.036 
(0.046) 
-0.057 
(0.080) 
-0.059 
(0.037) 
-0.081 
(0.050) 
0.014 
(0.078) 
-0.030 
(0.038) 
-0.077 
(0.089) 
-0.046 
(0.070) 
-0.057 
(0.037) 
-0.169*** 
(0.049) 
-0.080 
(0.063) 
-0.105*** 
(0.034) 
H5F: ACS - -0.081 
(0.051) 
0.058 
(0.085) 
-0.026 
(0.036) 
-0.027 
(0.063) 
-0.105 
(0.073) 
-0.052 
(0.041) 
-0.015 
(0.064) 
-0.001 
(0.071) 
-0.010 
(0.042) 
0.015 
(0.066) 
-0.005 
(0.070) 
-0.001 
(0.042) 
-0.094** 
(0.063) 
0.129** 
(0.074) 
-0.010 
(0.042) 
H5G: ACM1 - 0.031 
(0.054) 
-0.067 
(0.077) 
-0.011 
(0.038) 
-0.016 
(0.655) 
0.074 
(0.072) 
0.006 
(0.042) 
0.015 
(0.054) 
0.026 
(0.080) 
0.013 
(0.043) 
0.024 
(0.063) 
-0.035 
(0.082) 
-0.007 
(0.045) 
-0.036 
(0.060) 
-0.054 
(0.076) 
-0.034 
(0.044) 
CONTROLS                 
Liquidity - -0.035 
(0.083) 
-0.267** 
(0.120) 
-0.192*** 
(0.071) 
0.032 
(0.103) 
-0.139 
(0.143) 
-0.081 
(0.074) 
-0.085 
(0.116) 
-0.043 
(0.149) 
-0.042 
(0.078) 
0.039 
(0.127) 
-0.070 
(0.142) 
-0.022 
(0.077) 
0.054 
(0.077) 
-0.188 
(0.161) 
-0.020 
(0.076) 
Profitability - -1.066** 
(0.453) 
-0.740* 
(0.381) 
-0.764*** 
(0.203) 
-0.434** 
(0.183) 
-0.892** 
(0.357) 
-0.578*** 
(0.160) 
-0.296 
(0.241) 
-0.949*** 
(0.283) 
-0.597*** 
(0.187) 
-0.428 
(0.316) 
-0.378 
(0.339) 
-0.405** 
(0.188) 
-0.493*** 
(0.163) 
-1.048*** 
(0.308) 
-0.665*** 
(0.137) 
Leverage + 0.134 
(0.110) 
-0.037 
(0.153) 
0.023 
(0.073) 
0.018 
(0.119) 
0.169 
(0.184) 
0.062 
(0.081) 
-0.033 
(0.118) 
0.054 
(0.173) 
0.017 
(0.085) 
0.032 
(0.119) 
-0.052 
(0.149) 
0.035 
(0.080) 
0.198** 
(0.080) 
-0.171 
(0.159) 
0.068 
(0.067) 
Firm Size - -0.081*** 
(0.016) 
-0.079*** 
(0.020) 
-0.083*** 
(0.012) 
-0.098*** 
(0.021) 
-0.094*** 
(0.027) 
-0.098*** 
(0.014) 
-0.088*** 
(0.018) 
-0.100*** 
(0.022) 
-0.098*** 
(0.014) 
-0.097*** 
(0.020) 
-0.098* 
(0.053) 
-0.098*** 
(0.014) 
-0.050*** 
(0.018) 
-0.096** 
(0.022) 
-0.076*** 
(0.012) 
Firm Age - -0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Industry Effects  +/- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  4.005** 
(1.723) 
11.351 
(5.052) 
6.540*** 
(1.525) 
5.661*** 
(1.749) 
4.388 
(15.390) 
5.465*** 
(1.141) 
18.829*** 
(1.589) 
4.335*** 
(2.157) 
5.220*** 
(1.080) 
20.178*** 
(1.958) 
4.894 
(15.224) 
5.224*** 
(5.224) 
18.168*** 
(1.755) 
9.438 
(2.811) 
5.861*** 
(1.529) 
Model Parameters                 
Observations  177 176 353 176 175 351 176 176 352 173 173 346 173 173 346 
F(13 , 175)   1.27   2.01**   2.89***   2.64**   3.13***  
Wald chi2(10)  65.45*** n/a 76.93*** 51.73*** n/a 103.46*** 986.39*** n/a 88.48*** 440.26*** n/a 88.84*** 112.05*** n/a 96.97*** 
Pseudo R2  0.618 0.647 0.601 0.447 0.565 0.478 0.450 0.513 0.449 0.421 0.439 0.414 0.565 0.513 0.469 
Log pseudo  -39.148 -32.867 -81.310 -56.450 -43.892 -105.861 -56.131 -50.218 -113.181 -57.441 -56.251 -116.793 -43.135 -48.330 -105.305 
Accuracy  % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % 
Failed  86.05 83.72 89.29 80.00 80.95 79.49 86.49 85.00 79.75 82.35 78.95 79.73 84.21 75.00 82.43 
Non-failed  92.54 92.48 93.31 88.97 90.98 88.64 89.21 89.71 88.28 87.77 88.15 88.24 90.37 88.72 89.34 
Overall  90.96 90.34 92.35 86.93 88.57 86.61 88.64 88.64 86.36 86.71 86.13 86.42 89.02 85.55 87.86 
Hosmer-Lemeshow (10)                 
Chi2(8)  8.80 1.90 22.23 11.16 2.59 10.01 9.99 6.18 9.65 4.43 3.41 6.44 1.94 11.38 8.39 
Prob>chi2  0.359 0.984 0.005 0.193 0.957 0.264 0.266 0.627 0.290 0.817 0.906 0.598 0.983 0.181 0.396 
ROC  0.957 0.962 0.950 0.903 0.950 0.918 0.906 0.926 0.908 0.903 0.909 0.901 0.949 0.931 0.917 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust (Jackknife) standard errors in parentheses for panel A and C(B) ,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** 
p<0.01 
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Appendix 31: Results of the Split Remuneration Committee Effectiveness Logit Model 
MODEL 14  POOLED t - 1/2 t  - 4/5 
PANEL  A B C A B C A B C 
VARIABLES Exp. Sign          
H6C: RCP - -0.131 
(0.099) 
0.068 
(0.064) 
0.003 
(0.069) 
-0.057 
(0.089) 
0.049 
(0.065) 
-0.019 
(0.077) 
-1.159*** 
(0.162) 
0.070 
(0.085) 
0.004 
(0.077) 
H6D:RCI - -0.014 
(0.039) 
-0.024 
(0.033) 
-0.018 
(0.033) 
0.051 
(0.043) 
-0.003 
(0.038) 
0.027 
(0.034) 
-0.041 
(0.047) 
-0.053 
(0.043) 
-0.048 
(0.039) 
H6E: RCCI - -0.166*** 
(0.028) 
-0.168*** 
(0.025) 
-0.169*** 
(0.024) 
-0.171*** 
(0.032) 
-0.145*** 
(0.028) 
-0.165*** 
(0.024) 
-0.182*** 
(0.029) 
-0.170*** 
(0.032) 
-0.170*** 
(0.027) 
H6F: RCS - -0.016 
(0.041) 
0.032 
(0.035) 
0.007 
(0.033) 
-0.072* 
(0.044) 
-0.001 
(0.044) 
-0.039 
(0.035) 
0.014 
(0.056) 
0.067 
(0.046) 
0.043 
(0.041) 
H6G: RCM1 - 0.020 
(0.043) 
-0.025 
(0.034) 
-0.002 
(0.035) 
0.054 
(0.048) 
-0.033 
(0.036) 
0.008 
(0.034 
0.005 
(0.050) 
-0.028 
(0.043) 
-0.016 
(0.039) 
CONTROLS           
Liquidity - -0.033 
(0.066) 
-0.136** 
(0.060) 
-0.080 
(0.054) 
-0.060 
(0.073) 
-0.180*** 
(0.065) 
-0.141*** 
(0.049) 
0.059 
(0.080) 
-0.131 
(0.097) 
-0.005 
(0.073) 
Profitability - -0.423*** 
(0.135) 
-0.580*** 
(0.126) 
-0.491*** 
(0.117) 
-0.563*** 
(0.188) 
-0.471*** 
(0.131) 
-0.511*** 
(0.132) 
-0.361** 
(0.146) 
-0.596*** 
(0.178) 
-0.469*** 
(0.138) 
Leverage + 0.053 
(0.062) 
0.021 
(0.064) 
0.037 
(0.057) 
0.036 
(0.073) 
0.037 
(0.069) 
0.023 
(0.054) 
0.128** 
(0.065) 
-0.025 
(0.096) 
0.083 
(0.066) 
Firm Size - -0.067*** 
(0.012) 
-0.079*** 
(0.012) 
-0.073*** 
(0.010) 
-0.068*** 
(0.013) 
-0.065*** 
(0.012) 
-0.066*** 
(0.010) 
-0.061*** 
(0.015) 
-0.096*** 
(0.016) 
-0.079*** 
(0.012) 
Firm Age - -0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Industry Effects  +/- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  5.629*** 
(1.335) 
4.971*** 
(1.136) 
4.890*** 
(1.070) 
5.929*** 
(1.606) 
5.748 
(1.442) 
6.101 
(1.376) 
16.892*** 
(0.977) 
4.830*** 
(1.280) 
3.946*** 
(1.065) 
Parameters           
Observations  875 873 1748 353 351 704 346 346 692 
Wald chi2(10/13/16)  100.42*** 98.99*** 123.24*** 72.08*** 96.69*** 115.26*** 1038.05*** 69.38*** 104.60*** 
Pseudo R2  0.515 0.568 0.532 0.581 0.648 0.603 0.519 0.494 0.487 
Log pseudo  -245.181 -217.920 -472.009 -85.750 -71.045 -161.362 -95.359 -100.912 -203.885 
Accuracy  % % % % % % % % % 
Failed  83.25 83.96 81.95 87.21 83.53 85.88 81.08 79.76 81.41 
Non-failed  90.12 91.98 90.58 92.88 92.11 92.51 88.97 90.84 89.93 
Overall  88.57 90.03 88.73 91.50 90.03 90.91 87.28 88.15 88.01 
Hosmer-Lemeshow(10)           
Chi2(8)  12.89 6.89 19.63 7.78 5.26 6.64 9.10 6.02 7.68 
Prob>chi2  0.118 0.548 0.012 0.455 0.729 0.576 0.334 0.645 0.466 
ROC  0.934 0.946 0.938 0.949 0.964 0.953 0.939 0.927 0.927 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix 31: Continuation 1 of 2 
MODEL 14  t-1 t-2 t-3 
PANEL  A B C A B C A B C 
VARIABLES Exp.Sign          
H6C: RCP - 0.070 
(0.072) 
-0.635 
(0.416) 
-0.015 
(0.064) 
-1.157*** 
(0.219) 
0.192** 
(0.076) 
-0.024 
(0.089) 
-1.279*** 
(0.214) 
0.094 
(0.093) 
0.026 
(0.071) 
H6D:RCI - 0.068 
(0.044) 
0.030 
(0.049) 
0.042 
(0.032) 
0.056 
(0.057) 
-0.036 
(0.048) 
0.010 
(0.041) 
-0.073 
(0.066) 
0.023 
(0.080) 
-0.032 
(0.044) 
H6E: RCCI - -0.159*** 
(0.034) 
-0.152*** 
(0.056) 
-0.159*** 
(0.023) 
-0.205*** 
(0.044) 
-0.169*** 
(0.042) 
-0.175*** 
(0.027) 
-0.160*** 
(0.048) 
-0.190*** 
(0.037) 
-0.186*** 
(0.028) 
H6F: RCS - -0.094* 
(0.047) 
-0.024 
(0.054) 
-0.033 
(0.030) 
-0.110* 
(0.062) 
0.015 
(0.070) 
-0.038 
(0.047) 
0.028 
(0.078) 
0.001 
(0.097) 
0.036 
(0.049) 
H6G: RCM1 - -0.064 
(0.049) 
0.048 
(0.067) 
0.017 
(0.031) 
0.132* 
(0.064) 
-0.122*** 
(0.043) 
-0.003 
(0.040) 
-0.046 
(0.051) 
0.028 
(0.070) 
-0.005 
(0.039) 
CONTROLS           
Liquidity - -0.032 
(0.058) 
-0.145 
(0.095) 
-0.163*** 
(0.047) 
-0.064 
(0.095) 
-0.158 
(0.102) 
-0.129** 
(0.062) 
-0.179* 
(0.109) 
0.016 
(0.105) 
-0.075 
(0.071) 
Profitability - -1.127*** 
(0.394) 
-0.442 
(0.294) 
-0.600*** 
(0.150) 
-0.293** 
(0.146) 
-0.667*** 
(0.190) 
-0.454*** 
(0.143) 
-0.260 
(0.173) 
-0.639*** 
(0.231) 
-0.470*** 
(0.152) 
Leverage + 0.102 
(0.083) 
0.003 
(0.113) 
0.031 
(0.051) 
-0.039 
(0.080) 
0.080 
(0.108) 
0.013 
(0.064) 
-0.049 
(0.102) 
0.046 
(0.090) 
-0.009 
(0.070) 
Firm Size - -0.049*** 
(0.012) 
-0.050** 
(0.024) 
-0.060*** 
(0.009) 
-0.065*** 
(0.022) 
-0.065** 
(0.019) 
-0.072*** 
(0.013) 
-0.069*** 
(0.018) 
-0.070*** 
(0.023) 
-0.076*** 
(0.013) 
Firm Age - -0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
Industry Effects  +/- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  3.209* 
(1.679) 
23.761*** 
(8.102) 
7.007*** 
(1.718) 
19.728*** 
(1.752) 
4.478 
(2.311) 
5.839*** 
(1.359) 
18.783*** 
(1.493) 
3.582 
(2.447) 
4.967*** 
(4.09) 
Parameters           
Observations  177 176 353 176 175 351 176 176 352 
Wald chi2(13)  45.03*** 1.53 82.26*** 1021.53*** 1.69* 96.74*** 950.56*** 1.26 85.41*** 
Pseudo R2  0.692 0.746 0.678 0.565 0.642 0.547 0.496 0.635 0.529 
Log pseudo  -31.590 -25.682 -65.523 -44.425 -36.044 -92.018 -51.452 -37.630 -96.589 
Accuracy  % % % % % % % % % 
Failed  90.70 89.13 88.89 84.09 85.71 83.53 82.93 87.23 82.56 
Non-failed  94.03 96.15 95.06 92.42 92.48 91.73 90.37 94.57 90.98 
Overall  93.22 94.32 93.48 90.34 90.86 89.74 88.64 92.61 88.92 
Hosmer-
Lemeshow(10) 
          
chi2(8)  5.86 14.57 7.59 9.23 2.38 10.17 5.32 3.28 5.15 
Prob>chi2  0.663 0.068 0.475 0.323 0.967 0.253 0.723 0.915 0.742 
ROC  0.972 0.973 0.966 0.945 0.964 0.941 0.924 0.960 0.936 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust(jackknife) standard errors in parentheses for panel A and C(B) ,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** 
p<0.01 
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Appendix 31: Continuation 2 of 2 
MODEL 14  t-4 t-5 
PANEL  A B C A B C 
VARIABLES Exp.Sign       
H6C: RCP - -1.187*** 
(-0.204) 
0.078 
(0.117) 
0.029 
(0.077) 
-1.983*** 
(-0.315) 
0.043 
(0.119) 
-0.013 
(0.076) 
H6D:RCI - -0.083 
(0.061) 
-0.001 
(0.066) 
-0.048 
(0.041) 
-0.002 
(0.060) 
-0.113* 
(0.067) 
-0.053 
(0.041) 
H6E: RCCI - -0.150*** 
(0.044) 
-0.221*** 
(0.041) 
-0.187*** 
(0.027) 
-0.203*** 
(0.069) 
-0.098* 
(0.056) 
-0.152*** 
(0.030) 
H6F: RCS - 0.051 
(0.064) 
0.033 
(0.076) 
0.039 
(0.044) 
-0.027 
(0.069) 
0.097 
(0.080) 
0.050 
(0.048) 
H6G: RCM1 - -0.049 
(0.069) 
0.030 
(0.061) 
-0.008 
(0.041) 
0.057 
(0.053) 
-0.093 
(0.063) 
-0.026 
(0.039) 
CONTROLS        
Liquidity - 0.058 
(0.241) 
-0.107 
(0.142) 
-0.020 
(0.076) 
0.080 
(0.080) 
-0.251 
(0.161) 
0.014 
(0.079) 
Profitability - -0.362 
(0.240) 
-0.454* 
(0.260) 
-0.405 
(0.159) 
-0.326*** 
(0.127) 
-1.028*** 
(0.315) 
-0.575*** 
(0.142) 
Leverage + 0.065 
(0.104) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.055 
(0.068) 
0.179** 
(0.075) 
-0.110 
(0.151) 
0.109 
(0.073) 
Firm Size - -0.058*** 
(0.018) 
-0.097*** 
(0.025) 
-0.080*** 
(0.014) 
-0.057*** 
(0.016) 
-0.087*** 
(0.024) 
-0.078*** 
(0.013) 
Firm Age - -0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Industry Effects  +/- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  17.579*** 
(1.630) 
5.053** 
(2.224) 
4.140*** 
(1.101) 
17.876*** 
(1.543) 
7.997** 
(2.861) 
4.278*** 
(1.126) 
Parameters        
Observations  173 173 346 173 173 346 
Wald chi2(13)  646.72*** 2.26*** 93.45*** 586.01*** 2.09 101.05*** 
Pseudo R2  0.488 0.545 0.490 0.594 0.498 0.492 
Log pseudo  -50.790 -45.574 -101.589 -40.235 -49.763 -100.848 
Accuracy  % % % % % % 
Failed  76.32 81.82 79.75 82.50 80.95 82.89 
Non-failed  88.15 92.25 89.51 90.98 91.60 90.00 
Overall  85.55 89.60 87.28 89.02 89.02 88.44 
Hosmer-Lemeshow(10)        
chi2(8)  3.71 7.10 6.76 5.32 11.31 4.90 
Prob>chi2  0.883 0.526 0.562 0.723 0.185 0.768 
ROC  0.929 0.939 0.928 0.958 0.929 0.936 
Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust (jackknife)  standard errors in parentheses for panel A and C(B) ,, ∗* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** 
p<0.01 
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Appendix 32: Re-estimation of Taffler’s (1983) Model 
Taffler‘s Model  
 
t - 1 t - 2 t - 3 t - 4 t - 5 POOLED 
 
expected 
sign       
intercept +/- -3.305*** -2.312*** -2.139*** -2.079*** -2.087*** -2.240*** 
  
(0.461) (0.406) (0.387) (0.402) (0.440) (0.315) 
Profitability - 0.014  0.037* 0.045  0.034  0.060  0.037  
  
(0.024) (0.021) (0.034) (0.034) (0.051) (0.024) 
Working Capital - 0.114*** 0.060* 0.058  0.054  -0.029  0.031  
  
(0.037) (0.035) (0.040) (0.036) (0.028) (0.032) 
Financial Risk + 0.482*** 0.295** 0.200  0.199  0.350*** 0.338*** 
  
(0.094) (0.119) (0.134) (0.130) (0.116) (0.089) 
Liquidity - -0.001* 0.000  0.000* 0.000*** 0.000  0.000  
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PARAMETERS 
       Taffler’s Model        
Wald Chi2 
 
31.39*** 18.06** 13.75* 18.55*** 9.75** 20.42*** 
Pseudo R2 
 
0.135 0.057 0.066 0.078 0.05 0.058 
Accuracy  % % % % % % 
Failed  
 
76.67 66.67 64.71 86.67 81.82 67.12 
Non-failed  78.33 75.30 74.93 76.44 75.82 75.34 
Overall  78.19 74.93 74.43 76.88 76.01 75.00 
Hosmer-Lemeshow(10)       
Hosmer Prob>Chi2 15.57 11.25 18.51 5.21 6.77 20.5 
Chi2(8) 0.049 0.188 0.018 0.735 0.0562 0.009 
ROC 
 
0.733 0.658 0.669 0.643 0.649 0.654 
Model 1    
    
Wald Chi2  74.63*** 92.68*** 80.50*** 84.95*** 98.31*** 107.51*** 
Pseudo R2  0.593 0.464 0.440 0.399 0.426 0.456 
Log pseudo  -82.864 -108.706 -114.890 -119.838 -113.811 -549.665 
 Accuracy  % % % % % % 
Failed Accuracy  89.02 78.95 80.52 76.71 77.03 80.31 
Non-failed Accuracy  92.62 88.00 88.00 87.18 87.87 88.59 
Overall Accuracy  91.78 86.04 86.36 84.97 85.55 86.78 
Hosmer-Lemeshow(10)        
Hosmer Prob>Chi2  12.92 12.94 6.95 6.19 7.34 22.05 
Chi2(8)  0.115 0.114 0.543 0.626 0.500 0.005 
ROC  0.947 0.913 0.908 0.896 0.904 0.913 
        
observations 
 
353 351 352 346 
 
346 1748 
Notes: 
1. Marginal effects of each variable is reported in the first line, robust standard errors clustered at firm in 
parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
2. Profitability = profit before interest and tax/current liabilities 
3. Working Capital = current assets/ total assets 
4. Financial Risk = current liabilities/ total assets 
5. Liquidity = No credit interval = (quick assets – current liabilities)/daily operating expenses 
6. Daily operating expenses = (sales – profit before interest and tax – depreciation)/365 
 
 
 
